How Democratic Institutions Emerge

Dušan Pavlović

Abstract

The paper discusses the emergence of democratic institutions. It assumes that institutions can be created if they are compliance-inducing, and tries to answer the question when and why institutions bring about compliance. The paper is divided into two parts. In the first part, I discuss the emergence of institutions generally by applying the concept of the social dilemma. In the second part, I look into the compliance-inducing capability of democratic institutions.

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