CONTENTS
STRUCTURAL INJUSTICES AND POLICY OF RECOGNITION
Abstract
Proponents of the policy of cultural recognition transfer the model of Hegel’s understanding to the cultural and political realm, ignoring distributive injustice and social inequality. According to them, the foundation of justice is the recognition of the specificity of group identity as a political goal. Recognition does not require a group-specific identity, but the status of individual members of the group as full partners in social action. Proponents of cultural recognition base their interpretations of recognition within the framework of institutional meaning and norms that establish different opportunities for social participation and the connection between essentialization, identity complexity and social division. The policy of cultural recognition has a limited understanding of justice because it is primarily devoted to freedom and autonomy, and not to the creation of equal opportunities necessary for the development of human abilities and the realization of the purpose of life. The policy of recognizing status differences recognizes the existence of structural inequalities, but not cultural differences because culture is the medium of hierarchical status differences and economic class inequality. Correcting inequality requires a policy of status recognition that is not reduced to the question of identity but to overcoming subordination in such a way that an unrecognized group is recognized as a full member of society, capable of equal participation in society. It is necessary to reconcile the false antitheses between the concepts of redistribution and cultural recognition, which are conceptually possible, and to balance economic goals with the activities of civil society and social institutions if the foundation of society and policy is the promotion of fairness. The theorists of the recognition of status differences point out that the elimination of unfair inequality explicitly requires the recognition of group differences and the compensation of these deficiencies. They indicate that the socio-economic classes of people are not the result of social division of labor and decision-making structures, but are groups with disabilities that are the result of institutional racism Proponents of both discourses find their foundation of recognition in justice, but interpret it differently. Although they have different understandings of diversity and their alignment with justice and equality, both forms of diversity politics have similarities even though they are not guided by the same logic of deliberation. Both discourses dispute political equality, point to the existence of domination that limits freedom or reduces opportunities in different ways, and consider that situations in which group diversity is sufficient for the emergence of conflict and domination. Due to many superficial and unfounded analyzes that have become part of the discourse of contemporary theories of social justice, there is increasing doubt about their suitability for suppressing or explaining the existing growing injustices in society. That is why the search for a redefined approach to liberal-egalitarian theory is becoming more and more pronounced, since the loss of connection with egalitarian socio-political movements is becoming more and more obvious.
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