SERBIAN POLITICAL THOUGHT

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Serbia Between Electoral Authoritarianism and Consolidated Democracy

Abstract

Transition from mono-organisational, single-party, ideological and authoritarian regimes into plural, competitive and democratic systems has proven a far more complex and uncertain process, with a far higher social price than the analysts, and especially citizens of the transition countries expected and desired. In this text, starting from different qualitative and quantitative criteria and indicators for "democracy measuring", the author formulates and argues an assessment that after two decades of transitional roaming, Serbia is just a "deficient", semi-consolidated democracy, and he suggests the elements of "exit strategy" from the status of democratic deficit.

Keywords: democracy, transition, consolidation, consensus

Transition and Democracy

From the mid nineties of the 20th century, the concept of democracy in the transitional bibliography has appeared together with the concept of consolidation.

"Transition is the interval between one political regime and another" (Schmitter and O' Donell 1986: 3). Transition with the prefix democratic involves establishment of democratic institutions, the government structure arising from elections, free media and access to them, freedom of association and political organising, an independent judiciary. However, the main transitional dilemma isn't establishing the institutions that will allow a change of government, but a dilemma

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whether it will occur to someone, after the next elections, to abolish these institutions and start renewing those of the old regime. The problem with ending the transition is that, according to Huntington, after the transition begins, as a rule, follows a disappointment in democracy that could result in a turnover in the government politics and an attempt to restitute a nondemocratic system. "Democracy does not mean that the problems will be solved; it means that people in the dominant positions may be changed; and that their change, when they do not solve the problems, represents the essence of democratic behaviour. Democracies become strengthened (transition is ending) when people realise that democracy represents solution to the problem of tyranny, but not necessarily for other issues" (Huntington 2004: 251).

In order to be able to more precisely say when the transition is ending, Huntington is introducing the concept of consolidation. Transition towards democracy is ended when the democracy is consolidated. One criterion for consolidation could be the two-turnover test. According to that test, democracy becomes consolidated if the political group that takes over power after the breakup of a nondemocratic regime, loses elections and hand over power peacefully, and if the old (nondemocratic) regime forces return to the power, and then they lose election and hand over power in a peaceful manner (Huntington 2004: 255).

In their study on democratic transition, Juan Linz and Alfred Stepan emphasise that existence of a sovereign country is a fundamental precondition to democratic development.

"Democracy is a form of governing a modern state. Thus, modern democracy is not possible without state".(Linz and Stepan 1998: 32).

In order that democracy is strengthened, Linz and Stepan believe that, in addition to effective state, there also must exist five interactive arenas that make a positive influence on each other: (1) a free and active civil society; (2) a relatively autonomous and respected political society; (3) the rule of law, which guarantees civil freedoms and the freedom of association; (4) the state administrative apparatus that the new democratic government can properly use and (5) an institutionalised economic society.

"There is no civil society without previous, or at least parallel emancipation of a vassal into a self-confident and responsible citizen, sensitive to the usurpation of his rights, but also ready to fulfil his civil obligations. A corpus of accepted and exercised rights and obligations clearly distinguishes citizens from vassals, or arrogant, primitive or infantile

persons unprepared to accept responsibility and self-care" (Stojiljković 2007: 24).

Based on that we could conclude that the starting point of the civil society concept is a citizen with his individual civil rights, and that civil organisations and associations (non-governmental non-profit organisations, media, church organisations and religious groups, sindicates, and many local initiatives for community development) are in its centre. Therefore, in a civil society, three levels can be distinguished: "citizens as persons, individuals; associations of citizens, social movements and civil institutions; and the public" (Pavlović 2006: 58).

Modern democracy and modern democratic societies are created by separation of the private and the public, state and society, and they persevere through synergy and symbiosis of these two fields. Only a robust civil society, with its capability to bring forth political alternatives supervising the government and state, could help start the transition, help resist going back and to finish the process of transition, as well as strengthening and deepening the democracy.

According to that, an active and independent civil society in all phases of democratic process is invaluable.

The second arena is made up of establishing an autonomous, legal, legitimate, plural political society. The following is of key importance to a democratic political society: political parties, elections, appropriate electoral rules, political leaderships, inter-party alliances and the legislatures. These are all elements that make it possible for a democratic government to be elected, and to be appropriately supervised. Therefore, a political society is supplied and ordered with the democratic political and electoral legislation – "game rules" that regulate the funding, conduct and course of political and electoral game in such a way that, at least principally, the battle for an empty space in the power is taking place under the same conditions.

In order that a certain level of autonomy and independance of a civil and political society is developed, and thereby democracy is strengthened, it is necessary to ensure the rule of law that represents the third arena. The rule of law implies, first of all, (1) legitimacy of power. The state power should express the true will of citizens, i.e. it should be the expression of the consent of the people (consensus populi) taken at free and direct elections in a political competition in which all political parties had the same opportunity to win the votes. Also, the government should not be concentrated around one state body, it has to be distributed to more power holders, which results in (2) power balance and

establishes the rule of law. The rule of law implies both constitutionality and legitimacy, or rule of objective will expressed in the constitution and laws, which prescribing the rules for behaviour of power holders in advance, exclude the wilfulness of individuals and voluntarism. The constitution must guarantee (3) human and civil rights, and the laws must be interpreted by one (4) independant system of justice, and all this should be supported by (5) one explicit legal culture in a civil society. Therefore, to be able to talk about the rule of law at all, the power must be restricted by the law. All relevant actors, especially democratic government and state, must respect and support the primacy of law.

The fourth arena of consolidation of democratic processes and institutions is made up of establishing "good administration and good governance". "It includes creation of a professional, competent, responsible (and resistant to daily political pressures) public administration, that is capable of guiding the realisation of the adopted economic and social politics" (Stojiljković 2007: 24).

So, there needs to be a functioning state and a state administrative apparatus that the democratic government can use.

Finally, an institutionalised and plural economic society is the fifth arena that is necessary for democracy to be strengthened. On one side, Linz and Stepan think that there cannot be strengthened democracy if it is about a conducted economy, if all the property is in the hands of state and if the state is making decisions about all prices, workforce, supply and distribution.

On the other side, they claim that there cannot be a modern, consolidated democracy even when it comes to a pure market economy, as it cannot be sustained without a certain level of state regulation. Market specifically requires: regulations on companies, regulation of stock market, standards for measures, and also measures for protection of property, both public and private, and all this requires state intervention in economy. Therefore, modern consolidated democratic regimes require a number of behaviour norms, institutions and regulations what Linz and Stepan call the economic society.

Testing Democracy

Every possible reply to where is Serbia going is preceded by a logical question where is it now, or by testing 3 arguments or criteria for democracy development measures and also the 3 indicators for evalu-

ation of the actual "health status" of actors, processses and institutions in Serbia.

The first criteria questions elementary, initial presumptions of a liberal democratic political design – existance of a competitive, multyparty match for a power position that is taking place under already known and (relatively) equal conditions. Within this framework, starting from differentiating the electoral authoritarianism – a system in which, due to unequal conditions, the opposition is "condemned" to constantly losing the elections, and electoral democracy in which the change of power is a possible and present practice (Andreas Schedler), we could say that Serbia has been classified as the electoral democracy. Certainly, the electoral system and legislation, and particularly the accompanying electoral practice, are far from perfection, but they are within the boundaries of correctness, which is best illustrated by a lack of strong post-electoral conflicts and challenging electoral procedures and results. Nevertheless, a lack of the central electoral register, its untimely update, as well as a lack of a standing, professionally trained and resistent to (direct) party influences electoral administration show that the situation is far from ideal. The money flows in politics, especially in funding regular party activities and election campaigns, have also remained hidden from the public.

Insufficiently developed media regulation of elections and a stream of "leased terms" and paid political marketing threaten to flood the equal access to media as a presumption of fair elections.

The second criteria consists of the system and practice of a responsible government and authorities. The main purpose of political responsibilty is that the authorities "respond" to the needs and expectations of citizens– voters. Challenged by the risk of losing the power and "anticipated reactions of voters" (Friedrich), it has to give its best, at least before elections, to show that it "has passed the exam before the citizens".

In addition to periodical democratic elections, the channels and instruments for determination of political accountability are consisted of self-constituted and pluralised political public, as well as the vertical and horizontal control and division of power itself, supported with the principle of subsidiarity.

In a situation when there is a party impregnated and disciplined parliament – the parliamentary majority above all, the dominant executive power is already outside the zone of effective responsibilty. The weak, fourth type of limitation are, for now, the institutions and instruments of the "fourth branch of power", such as the Ombudsman, the Com-

missioner for information of public importance, or anti-corruption bodies and agencies. Unfortunately, no bigger is the role of tripartite bodies, in which the representatives of the civil society – sindicates and unions of enterpreneurs, through the social dialogue with the responsible government, also design the field of a wide social consensus on the contents, dynamics and "price" of change.

At the same time, Serbia is on a narrow road between the Scylla of unsatisfactory state of economy and the Charybdis of great social spending on the aged population, unemployed and displaced persons.

The third criteria of the extent of democracy development are the contents and the width and quality of citizen participation, or the existance of an active and robust civil society, with civil institutions and movements, and a politically literate "upright" citizen as its source and mouth. In a crisis transitional society, the watergate to the destructive mixture of political irresponsibility and social demagogy is the corpus of practiced, civil individuals and colletive rights and a democratic political culture.

A devastating virus of intolerance and unwillingness to dialogue, provincial xenofobia and narrow-minded nationalism, alternative falling into a state of nationalistic, aggressive and even sometimes paranoid euforia and lethargy, and the fall into nationalistic masochism and frustrations can only be cured with democratic, civil, political participation and culture.

The late Zoran Đinđić concludes that neither the political elite nor political institutions, but only small, civilian networks through which millions of citizens participate, can ensure that democratic political project is implemented and lives in everyday life.

If, in addition to the project and institutions, the third part does not occur, if democracy does not become culture, if in the value system of a society there is not the norm that democracy is lived as a form of everyday life, then institutions are worth very little and democracy will depend on the balance between political powers, and not the will and consensus in the society itself (Đinđić 2007a: 10).

Without a sufficiently operative, social and political census, two decades after the inititation of the democratic changes, the regime in Serbia still belongs to the "low intensity democracies" (Diamond).

Faced with the heavy burden of authoritarian legacy and many challenges carried by the process of a post-war determination of the state's framework and identity, Serbia seems to be stuck in "another transi-

tion" (Przeworski) or the controversial process of transferring the powers from groups of people to rules and institutions.

The process of consolidation and stabilisation of democracy is strongly opposed by both personalised political culture and the widespread spirit of intolerance, or "warlike" political style and perceiving political opponent as an enemy.

Widespread poverty and subjective sense of transitional losing present in one third of the population, combined with frustration created by the declaration of Kosovo independance still delegitimize the actors of the democratic changes.

An additional problem is the widespread belief of a present endemic, systemic and political corruption that is eating out the fragile institutions.

The fact that in our country "democracy is not the only game in the town" is not suprising (Linz and Stepan). These assessments have been confirmed by the proposed tests of "health status" of democracy in Serbia.

The first practical indicator is the extent of the democratic sentiment, or the acceptance of democracy as the best possible system and belief of (un)successful functioning of democratic institutions. In the poor, post-war societies, attitudes towards democracy depends, to a great extent, on believes of citizens about developmental, economic effects of the regime. Social consensus around the concept of development, meaning the price of the transition, has to go parallel with the agreement on the democratic constitution of the society.

Lack of a clear and coherent concept of development logically led to already ascertained, barely above average acceptance of democracy and to majority being dissatisfied with the functioning of democratic institutions and to distrust in political actors.

The other indicator is the dominant legitimacy formula of the regime. Possible, legitimacy basis of the system has, throughout the history of Serbia, been searched for in a strong competition between the populist and participative pattern. Due to poverty, no government could count on the third compensational model of legitimacy, or support based on the achievement of material prosperity.

In order that Serbia would be and remain on the right track, we need a clear strategy of modernisation and democratisation, and a good shape for its implementation. Our national mentality is charac-

teristic of big oscillations in occassional eruptions of energy followed by discharge and dispiritedness, even defeatism.

Finally, the third indicator in the "medical records" of Serbia is the check whether legitimately chosen power holders are in fact legitimately chosen power holders and not just formally, or whether "reserve domains of power" – tycoons, oligarhs, semi-public police and security structures are in action? Aren't they rather perhaps the "outside veto-players" (Sartori) – key international political actors, multinational corporations and their domestic exponents or rather politicised crime, or criminalised politics?

According to Cesid surveys, "the triumvirate in power" in the opinion of the citizens of Serbia, is consisted of political leadership structure, international representatives and before all, the rich individuals, known as the "thieves and criminals".

In these and such circumstances, there are no conditions for the existance of a strong state of Joel Migdal – a state capable to achieve goals, including the capability to penetrate society, to regulate social relationships, to gain funds, to direct or use these funds in developmentally productive ways.

Weak states – often even uncompleted or emerging states, or international protectorates that we encounter in the Balkans (euphemistically said in the Southeastern Europe) are weak for two main reasons. Firstly because they are unautonomous, by powerful interest groups captured states, but also because they are deprived of efficient and professional state apparatus and sufficient total organisational resources (Migdal 1988).

It is most often about selectively weak, cunning states. The truth is they do not manage to limit the vast sector of informal economy but they are very successful in balancing between the pressures of the international community and their own public, and in paternalistic promotion of narrow interests – first of all the interests of the ruling elite itself.

In many of these countries, there is a realistic risk that a weak state regresses into an unsuccessful – a failed state. A failed state – a state that does not manage to solve the problem of the national and state identity and to productively employ its citizens, who are then ready to leave it, searching for a certain, better existence, leads to hopeless citizens and societies. States deprived of hope in return contribute to the failure of the state (Blue Bird, The inflexibility trap 2004: 35-42).

Consolidation of Democracy

Recombining different indicators and indexes of mapping and measuring of democracy "it could be concluded that, two decades after the collapse of a single-party system, Serbia seems to be trapped in a plane of semi-consolidated, "lacking" or "defective" democracy.

Defective or semi-consolidated democracies (Merkel) are in fact unstable and prone to political crisis democracies which are characterised by: (1) partocracy and the resulting (2) weak structural (parlamentary) representations; (3) unfinished decentralisation of power; (4) limited, foreign sources dependant potentials of a civil society; (5) influence of "the powerful"- specific economic and political interest groups on media; (6) slow, inconsistent and judicial processes not resistant to pressures and (7) weak capacities for fighting the widespread corruption.

An indirect evidence of the reached, only lacking and defective character of democracy are also critical suggestions contained in the reports of the European Commission. Gaining the candidate status for acceptance into the EU will, in addition to "Kosovo weight", largely depend on the acceptance of critiques related exactly to the "fragile health of democracy".

First of all, there is a request for implementation of transparent system of funding political activities, as well as the abolition of blank resignations of the selected parlament members, as key preconditions for "anchoring" electoral democracy.

Serbian authorities must also prove a systemic improvement in the creation of conditions for the efficient work of formed regulatory and control bodies and far more effective fight against the widespread systemic corruption in the public sector, which puts us at the bottom of the European list.

A sort of embarrasment is also the "repeat exam" of the judiciary reform. Due to illegal procedures and nontransparent process of election and re-election of judges and prosecutors, i.e. suspicions in the influence of political criteria and reasons during the elections, the pompously announced judiciary reform has been very compromised.

The first strategic course of change is precisely linked to the stabilisation and consolidation of democracy and the smooth functioning of democratic institutions. The government should really live at its constitutionally defined address, and not reside in informal assemblies of power and in "reserve domains of power" (Diamond) between internal

and external veto players that, outside the public scene and defined responsibility influence the making of key decisions, conditioning, blackmailing and even corrupting the official power holders.

The role of civil society organisations is to "push" and control the field of politics through development and implementation of 4 complementary strategies of influence spreading: (1) through networks of civil and legislative initiatives, (2) partnership and cooperation with state bodies in formulating and implementation of public politics and developmental strategies, but also thorugh (3) lobbying and public advocation and (4) application of different forms of workers protests and civil disobedience.

Democratic stabilisation in Serbia has its 5 key prerequisites or priorities. The first precondition certainly consists of rounding up democratic political and electoral legislation which guarantees Serbia a sustainable minimum treshold of at least electoral democracy.

Clear electoral procedures and processes, a possibility for citizens to learn about the offered electoral actors and platforms in campaigns, and to know who and under what circsumstances gives the money to those who fight for their vote and trust, as well as permanent professional and resistant to political pressures electoral administration are just some of preconditions for democratic constitution of the government.

Key importance on the "road map" towards the consolidated (electoral) democracy therefore has the formation of a professional and independant State electoral commission – resistant to pressures from political actors, controlling electoral process, as well as an accompanying ammendment to the regulative that controls political and electoral activity, by handing over control and monitoring of the funding to the independant regulatory body – Agency for fight against corruption.

A corpus of laws belonging to the electoral codex also involves a model of election of parliament members that should be changed so that advantages are combined in an optimal way and key disadvantages of both majority and proportional system sare avoided. Personalised proportional system, i.e. solutions making it possible that with the saved proportionality at the level of total electoral results citizens are able to vote (by majority) for a candidate with "full name" at a concrete voting place, is the essence of the proposal for alteration of the previous model of indirect proportional election from the list that is under control of party oligarchies.

The other priority, i.e. a group of priorities is consistently implemented horizontal and vertical power sharing. In this context, credible

towards the public, turned and supplied with an effective legislative, representative and control function, not purposely devalued and de-legitimised parliament, in which members of paliament are reduced to the role of marionetes in a puppet theatre, and the autonomous, and not politically vassal judiciary are the links of democracy stabilisation.

No less importance has the democratic control of executive power and stopping and turning around the trend of moving the power to the government coordination and regulatory bodies and agencies, hard to access for the public and in fact irresponsible.

The same function also have the rounded up de-centralisation and regionalisation of Serbia, based on the principles of government sub-sidiarity and further strengthening of the local authoritites.

Instead of political bargaining and arbitrariness, the process of re-gionalisation must also be guided by the logic of optimal distribution of authorities and functions at a level of the government where it gives the best results.

The model of forming regions (with 800 000 - 3 000 000 inhabit-ants) and sub-regions (150 000 - 800 000) seems to be optimal, integrat-ing territorial, traffic and economic, and also cultural and tradicional entities. Subsidiarity also involves full coordination of the government operation with civil stakeholders and under public scrutiny. Otherwise, it is of no use to citizens if closeness and centralisation at one level of power are replaced with the same established relationship at the other (lower) level.

The next, third direction of political and administrative reforms is the "abolition of sacred cows" of public (political) administration. Re-duction of an over-populated space of state administration and build-ing its capacities is, however, a matter of designed long-term strategy based on the quality of projected services as the key criteria.

Unfortunately, already seen short-term political campaigns reduc-ing the bureaucratic apparatus are in action. The same goes for ratio-nalisation of total public sector. Public sector must be economically ra-tional and sustainable, and it must remain out of reach and logic of both the distribution of party and political prey, according to which public companies and institutions are run by party commissioners from the rulling coalition, and the short-term interests motivated by privatisa-tion from "above". Concessions, public and private partnerships and independant regulatory bodies that set standards for prices and quality of services are the most acceptable solutions for products and goods of public interest.

The fourth area consists of further democratic designing and civil control and professionalisation and de-politisation of "repressive" state apparatus - army, police and security services and agencies. Politically impregnated, "party" armies and police, the war between "our" and "their" services, placing trusted informants and unauthorised tracking and eavesdropping, fabrication of classified files and mutual blackmailing and trading of "compromats" – compromising materials must become a thing of the past.

Finally, bodies and institutions of "the fourth branch of power", such as the Representative of the citizens, Commissioner for information of public importance and personal data protection, auditors, anti-monopoly and public procurement commissions, including the newly formed Agency for fight against corruption, must be reinforced materially and with staff.

How they are equipped and what their efective authorisations are, i.e. respect for their deisions and suggestions linked to the registration of property and de-acummulation of functions are the best test of the willingness of the political elite to deblock democratic processes. At the same time, it is testing the willingness for realisation of an integral and effective anti-corruptive strategy.

Transparency of public procurements and tendering, prevention of money laundrying as a channel for politisation of crime and criminalisation of politics, and control of public finances, primarily rationality behind budgetary funds spending and economy of public companies have, in addition to legal and political, also an important economic and developmental dimension and price.

State, Social Cohesion and Solidarity

The other wide field of reforms consists of socially and ecologically sustainable development. Political instability, frequent elections (4 parliamentary cycles) and the change of governments (5, and if we count in Cvetković's reconstructed office, 6 coalition offices) even beyond 2000, led towards the absence of a developed coherent and integral developmental strategy despite the adoption of dozens of strategies dealing with reforms of certain economic and socials areas.

Consequently, in times of a current crises of planeraty proportions, Serbia must abandon its previous model of development based on an overheated demand and importation, overblown public and private

spending and consequently created, internal and foreign deficits and imbalances. Following the developmental logic and the EU strategy for the next decade Europe 2020, this new model of development could, on the contrary, be based on savings, investments, production and the increase of import. The key, final goal of the strategy should be employment growth and the prosperity of citizens. There must be a high level of agreement also on the orientation for socially responsible state – partner state, which is in a counterposition with polar models of a minimum and neutral country, on one side, and a custodial, omnipresent – paternalistic country, on the other. A partner state, in dialogue and cooperation with associations of civil societies, first of all sindicates and employers, defines industrial and social relationships and achieves social politics and goals.

Social cohesion of society and increase of social involvement of vulnerable and marginalized groups, apart fom obligatory developmental, economic dimension, has its own complex social component. Social cohesion requires a sustainable, wide and strong enough safety social network through which you cannot fall into the whirlpool of poverty, a network which includes measures of preventive action or mechanisms for increase in education, and a total social capital. Making a safety social neworkt includes, among other things, activities for reduction of destructive effects of 4 groups of factors which, if interrelated, lead to poverty and social exclusion: unemployment, disease, financial poverty, and poor and non-functional education.

A New Role of the State

Social transfers, aimed at the reduction of poverty and active and passive measures of assistance to the unemployed, seek to protect and enable "persons in social need" to exit the circle of the marginalized and poor primarily by their own efforts.

Partnership between the state and civil and market sector in formulation and implementation of the employment strategy and the overall poverty reduction strategy, is ultimately based on the logic of linking the scope and structure of social transfers to the growth in production and strengthening economic performances of the society.

If the state is no longer, and should no longer be an exclusive organiser, controller and financier in the sector of education, health, culture and social services, it must keep taking active part as the key ac-

tor in monitoring and evaluation of defined standards and quality of services.

The model of exclusive state control and organisation should not be replaced with completely open market "supermarket model" that is too much vulnerable to dictation of current and conjuctive needs, as well as to corruption and overthrowing the quality of services. The solution lies in a multi-stakeholder, corporative model in which, beside the state bodies, sindicates and employers, professional organisations and interest associations of providers and users of services have the key role.

Having in mind their formative importance and role in shaping the informed and critical public, these principles, to even greater extent, apply to media and editing media space. At the same time, setting professional standards, media ethics and solutions for prevention of the concentration and creation of media monopolies have a particular importance.

We could conclude that the initial, widest political dialogue and agreement on the new constitutional and political vesture of Serbia must also start from giving firm guarantees of accomplishing the full list of individual and collective rights of citizens, as well as an effective process of controlling and limiting the government and its consistent vertical and horizontal division.

The rule of law and the final consitutionalisation and political institutionalisation are necessary, however not sufficient enough a precondition for democratic consolidation and Serbia's exit from the zone of high social and political risk.

It is also necessary to have a wider social consensus, an open and mutually binding social dialogue between the Government and social partners – employers and autonomous sindicates.

The contents of the dialogue is primarily directed towards getting an agreement on the strategy of economic development, the effects of privatisations, employment policies, conflict regulation in the process of collective negotiations and decision-making, and more importantly, implementation of a balanced, adjusted to the European standards, working and social legislation.

A permanent exit is signing the social pact on development and employment in which the government would guarantee the increase of production and price and investements trends, and sindicates would negotiate conditions of generating incomes and employment, wages, pensions and social benefits trends.

Whenever someone does not fulfill his part of obligations, a red lamp would light up warning that the fuel in the car is running out or we are heading in the wrong direction.

Only through an argumented and critical dialogue can responsible citizens and responsible, competent and uncorrupted government be accomplished.

Social dialogue and transition towards democracy are also a framework within which the citizens of Serbia are taking the test of their strength, maturity and ability to organise themselves.

Instead of Conclusion

At the end of analysing the conflict process of transitional changes in Serbia, and an attemp to discover the logic and effects behind them, we could conclude that in the current transitional phase characterised by overcoming electoral autoritharianism and establishment of electoral democracy, social gaps and conflicts concerning basic issues of state and political identity of community still dominate over less hazardous interest disputes.

The only way out of this vicious circle is a developed and operational reform strategy.

Five basic goals, and criteria for democratic transition at the same time, are as follows: (1) economic growth; (2) socially and environmentally sustainable development; (3) open economic and political market deprived of monopoly; (4) social cohesion and (5) quality of life and social prosperity.

Efective strategy must rely on a wide social and political partnership for democratic changes. Civic field and stakeholders in this partnership have the central role to mobilise, control and integrate, but also an important initiative function. Social movements, and not just fragmented, incoherent and often willing to pseudo-party arangements and engagements non-governmental scene, can be the mediator of changes, the prime actor as far as dynamics of society is concerned – the means of accomplishing (desirable) future.

The other side of this process of partner cooperation and development is the necessary parallel evolution of the political field – its democratic institutionalisation, followed by and related to stabilisation of political ground and legitimising political actors.

However, both the potential of political and civic field and the destiny of democratic reforms are, in the end, linked to the mass transformation of vassals – their structure of consciousness and mentality, and the creation of "adult and upright" citizens. We are not born as citizens. Namely, one becomes a citizen by working hard on oneself (Fuko). Male and female citizens are aware not only of their rights but of their duties and obligations too. Self-esteem, a sense of being able to carry out public activity, self-awareness of rights that the state must respect, but also awareness of the need to balance private motives and interests with the sense of community and solidarity, practically differentiate citizens from vassals.

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The Organisation and Political Position of Serbs in Croatia

Abstract

In this paper the author gives ample information on political and non-political organisation of Serbs in Croatia in the last twenty years based on the literature, archival materials from the Archives of Serbs in the Republic of Croatia and the interviews conducted with representatives of the Serbian national minority from across Croatia. The paper consists of four sections: history of the organisation of Serbs in Croatia and their legal status, political organisations of Serbs in Croatia, non–political organisations of Serbs in Croatia and respondents` stands on the organisations of Serbs in Croatia.

Key words: Serbs, Croatia, political parties, non-governmental organisations, 20th century.

Introduction

This paper includes four sections. The first section outlines the history of the organisation of Serbs in the territory of Croatia until 1990. The second section covers legal provisions governing the position of Serbs in Croatia from 1990 until present day, the third section treats political and cultural parties and organisations of Serbs in Croatia from 1990 until today, and the fourth section summarizes a survey of the stand of the Serbian population in Croatia on the parties, non-governmental organisations and cultural institutions of Serbs in Croatia.

The paper is written on the basis of literature, archival materials from the Archives of Serbs in the Republic of Croatia, and thirty one

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in-depth interviews with members of the Serbian national minority and Internet sources.

To this date no single paper has depicted, not even sketchily, the activity and diversity of all Serbian parties and organisations in Croatia in the last two decades. There are several publications which treat Croatian national legislation governing the issue of national minorities, and in particular of the Serbian national minority. This paper treats in more detail relationship of the members of the Serbian national minority toward the Independent Democratic Serbian Party (SDSS), Councils of the Serbian National Minority, and the Serbian Cultural Society "Prosvjeta" (Education), as the most important institutions of Serbs in Croatia today.

History of the Organisation of Serbs in Croatia[2]

Following their migration to the territory of today's Croatia, Serbs started building their political position. Numerous documents which granted them a special position within the borders of The Habsburg Monarchy testify to this. Immediately after their settlement in the territory of today's north-western Croatia, the 1630 Statuta Valachorum granted the Vlachs living between the Sava and the Drava river right to internal autonomy, though there were concurrent endeavours to deprive them of possibility to convene national assemblies, or at least efforts to ensure that every national assembly is under the supervision of military authorities. The largest Serbian migration to the today's territories of Croatia and Vojvodina was during the Great Vienna War (1683 - 1699). On 21 August 1690, worried over the state at the battle field, Austrian Emperor Leopold I issued the Privileges granted to the Serbs, which guaranteed them freedom of religion, right to use the old calendar, right to elect archbishop who, as the head of the Serbian Orthodox Church in the Habsburg lands, was vested with the power to freely administer the church and appoint bishops and the clergy. On 4 March 1695, due to Turkish intrusions, Leopold issued a new edict on privileges. Reaffirming all the earlier Serbian privileges, the emperor reaffirmed as well the decrees issued by Matthias Corvinus and Vladislav II which exempted Serbs of the payment of the tithe to the Catholic clergy, subject to using such tributes exclusively for support to the Orthodox churches, and

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2 General information regarding the history of the organisation of Serbs in Croatia are taken from: Roksandić 1991; Historija naroda Jugoslavije, Vol. 2 1959, chapters XXXIII, XXXVI, XXXVII, XLII; Veselinović 1971: 114.

guaranteed them freedom of religion, "but without prejudice against the prelates and the Roman Catholic Church". Headed by the metropolitan, National-Church Assembly and the Holy Synod of Bishops, which administered national and clerical convocations, the Karlovac Metropolia, divided into dioceses, comprised all the Orthodox Serbs in Hungary, Croatia and Slavonia (and also Romanians in Banat); in 1699 it detached from the Patriarchate of Peć, still considering it as the national religious hub until 1766. Privileges were reaffirmed also by subsequent emperors in 1717, 1732 and 1743, in order to be revoked by Empress Maria Theresa in 1770, and definitively terminated under the Declaration of 1779 which instead of political autonomy granted to the people ecclesiastical-educational autonomy. In 1791, under Article 17, Hungarian Diet granted to the Orthodox the right to confess their faith, to be officials or possessor, and to enjoy their earlier privileges. Article 30 provided also for the Serbs the right to own land and to hold official titles, so they became equal citizens of Hungary. In the first half of the 19th century many Serbs took part in the Croatian national revival and became its most prominent proponents (Petar Preradović). Cooperation between the Serbs and the Croats reached its peak in the 1848 revolution. Serbs sided with Austria, and in the second stage of the movement, the so called May Assembly was held in Sremski Karlovci, on 13-15 May. This Assembly demanded for the Serbian people in Austria and Hungary right to autonomous political and cultural development. In 1848 Serb representatives from the towns of the Civil Croatia also entered Croatian Assembly. Serb candidates made almost one half of the assembly representation and were "the most numerous in the group of representatives which from the beginning of the assembly session insisted on more radical solutions for the unsolved questions", as stated by Dr. Roksandić. In the same year, in April 1848, Serbs from Dalmatia voiced their demands. They requested, among others, "complete freedom of our church, our Creed and all our rites and church books", free conversion from Catholicism to Orthodoxy and vice versa, budgeted salaries for the priests, freedom of schools… As regards Governor (Ban) Josip Jelačić, his stand on the "unity and fraternity" between the Croats and the Serbs was never questioned. This is testified to also by his Cyrillic proclamation "To Croatian and Serbian peoples in the Triune Kingdom of Dalmatia, Croatia and Slavonia…" related to his appointment as the governor, in which he stated"… may accord and fraternity be among us irrespectively of our Creeds". During the rule of Ivan Mažuranić and Khuen Héderváry, Serbs assumed high offices in Croatian society. At the time when Mažuranić was the governor, all the

three highest offices in Civil Croatia and Slavonia, with the exception of the bank, were held by the Serbs. Jovan Živković was the head of the Department of internal affairs and vice-governor. Livije Radivojević was the president of the Supreme Court, and Nikola Krestić was the Speaker of the Croatian Parliament. In 1887 representatives to the Croatian Assembly reaffirmed Serbian national-church autonomy. After the model of the 1868 Article IX of the Hungarian Diet, Serbs were granted church and school autonomy, and guaranteed equality with other religions, and were free to use Cyrillic script, too, in the whole territory of the Kingdom of Slavonia and Croatia, and to use it singularly in those regions where they lived in greater numbers.

In the last decades of the 19 century Serbs of Croatia created a sequence of powerful institutions such as the Serb Bank, Union of Serb Farming Cooperatives and Entrepreneur. In 1884 Serb Independent Party started publishing its party journal Srbobran. In the first decades of the 20th century the Croat-Serb Coalition was founded in the territory of Dalmatia and Croatia. In October 1905 two resolutions were signed, the one of Zadar signed by the Serbian part, and the other of Rijeka signed by the Croatian part, which emphasized unity of the Croatian and the Serbian people and their equality. In the Zadar Resolution Serbs supported Croats in their aspiration to unite Dalmatia with the rest of Croatia. In the Kingdom of Serbs, Croats, and Slovenes, and subsequently in the Kingdom of Yugoslavia, the Independent Democratic Party of Pribićević, aspired toward integral Yugoslavhood and a strong national state. From 1925 until 1939 the Independent Democratic Party, as the strongest party of the Croatian Serbs, remained in opposition, and in 1939 came back into power as a coalition partner of the Croatian farmers party within the Farmers-Democratic Coalition. With the establishment of the Independent State of Croatia in 1941 began the most tragic period in the history of the Serbian people in Croatia. The uprising first started in regions with the Serbian population. Nevertheless, Serbs and Croats participated together in the resistance against the Ustashe, Nazis and fascists. From the joint resistance against the enemy a seemingly united Yugoslavia was born, although both Croats and Serbs of Croatia were scarred by traumas of WW II atrocities. Documents of ZAVNOH (The National Anti-Fascist Council of the People's Liberation of Croatia) acknowledged Serbs of Croatia, along with the Croats, as the constituents in the forming of ZAVNOH and in the adoption of all its documents by which Democratic Croatia was established during the National Liberation War (with the formation and activity of the Serb councillor group within the framework of the ZAVNOH).

Undoubtedly, the most important evidence of Croat-Serb cooperation in the twentieth century is the document from the Third meeting of the ZAVNOH, the Declaration of basic rights of peoples and citizens of the Democratic State of Croatia, because it was the basis for the constitutional development of the People's Republic/Socialist Republic of Croatia in the entire post-war period (ZAVNOH 1970). It says: "The Croatian and Serbian people in Croatia are equal in every way".

In the summer of 1990 Croatian Assembly adopted amendments to the Croatian Constitution of 1974. Since Croatian authorities had concluded that neither these amendments satisfied current needs of the social and political life, on 25 July 1990 they initiated adoption of a new Croatian constitution. Croatian Constitution from 1974 stated that "Croatia is the national state of Croatian people, state of the Serbian people in Croatia and state of nationalities (national minorities) living in Croatia". Correspondingly, this Constitution made specific reference to the Croatian Serbs, by name, as a people living in Croatia. Announcement of amendments to the Croatian Constitution was met by the disagreement of a part of Croatian Serbs. The new constitution was supposed to define Croatia as a national state of the Croat people and other nations and minorities who are its citizens.[3]

One part of Serbs from Croatia considered that the new Croatian constitution should define Croatia as part of the Yugoslav state, because this was the wish of and in the interest of the Serbs of Croatia. There were also suggestions that the new Constitution should define that the Republic of Croatia comprises autonomous provinces as forms of the territorial autonomy (in the territories where Serbs are a majority population) or as forms of the cultural autonomy (in all the other zones).

With legal regulations that followed in the first half of the nineties, life conditions of Serbs in Croatia toughened. Although the law envisaged proportionate political representation of Serbs in the Croatian Parliament, this representation was not realised by having those representatives elected by Serbs themselves, but by having them elected

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3 "Republic of Croatia is being formed as the national state of the Croatian people and the state of the members of other peoples and minorities who are its citizens: Serbs, Moslems, Slovenians, Czechs, Slovaks, Italians, Hungarians, Jews and others, who are guaranteed equality with the citizens of the Croatian nationality and the realisation of ethnic rights in accordance with the democratic norms of the United Nations Organisation and the free world countries" (Documents on the national sovereignty of the Republic of Croatia; from the first multy party elections in 1990 to the international recognition on 15 January 1992; Milardović 1992: 43-71). Constitutional changes were not adopted by the two-thirds majority vote, as envisaged by the law, but by a simple majority vote of the Croatian parliament (Pupovac 1999: 133).

by the ruling party. Thus also those below the electoral vote threshold found their way to the Parliament. Law on local administration and self-government units resulted in such territorial division of counties (županija) that Serbs made majority in two counties (Zadarsko-Kninska and Sisačko-Moslavačka), which sometimes led to absurd situations where county centres were over a hundred kilometre away. On the other hand, municipalities were formed in such a way to have the lowest possible number of Serbs in certain units, splitting logical wholes.[4]

Law on Croatian Citizenship prevented many Serbs from continuing their years or decades-long life in Croatia. Because of the prolonged procedures applied to their applications for citizenship, many lost their jobs, could not buy off their apartments or enrol children to school. Special problems were faced by persons who were granted the status of an alien with temporary or permanent residence, who could not travel outside Croatia unless completing the procedure for obtaining single-journey travel documents. Laws which regulated primary, secondary and high education at that time, did not allow Serbs of Croatia

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4   During the existence of the Republic of Serbian Krajina, Croatian authorities offered Serbs in Croatia special, although limited agreements. Constitutional law on human rights and freedoms and the rights of national and ethnic communities or minorities in the Republic of Croatia (NN 65/91) guaranteed all national minorities which participate with more than 8% in the population of the Republic of Croatia the right to the representation in the Croatian State Parliament and the Government of the Republic of Croatia, as well as in the bodies of the supreme judicial authority, proportionate to their share in the total population. Chapter V of this law envisaged formation of municipalities (districts) with special self-government status in the territories where members of minorities make over-a-half majority of the population according to 1991 census. Constitutional law on amendments to the Constitutional law on human rights and freedoms and the rights of national and ethnic communities or minorities in the Republic of Croatia (NN 27/92) turned autonomous municipalities (districts) into counties Knin and Glina, which allows saying that this legal provision represented a concrete offer of territorial autonomy to Serbs in Krajina. These offers were not accepted by the Serbian part. County Knin was supposed to include municipalities of Knin, Benkovac, Obrovac, Donji Lapac, Gračac and Korenica, which were part of the Zadarsko-Kninska county, and County Glina – municipalities of Dvor, Glina, Hrvatska Kostajnica, Vrginmost and Vojnić, which were part of the Sisačko-Moslavačka County. Other municipalities would be outside the so called Serbian counties. This idea was abandoned after the Storm operation in 1995, when Croatian Parliament adopted Constitutional law on Temporary non-application of certain provisions of the Constitutional Law on human rights and freedoms and the rights of national and ethnic communities or minorities in the Republic of Croatia (NN 68/95). This law says that the application of the Constitutional law on human rights and freedoms and the rights of ethical and national communities or minorities in the Republic of Croatia will be postponed until the new census. Thus this law abolishes counties against the explanation that the number of Serbs in mentioned municipalities cannot be determined after the exodus of the Serbian population, and that therefore first a census should be conducted in order to conclude whether the existence of "Serbian counties" would be meaningful.

to develop autonomy in education which was, otherwise, envisaged by the Constitutional Law and the Constitution. Law on the official use of language and script provided for their official use only on the level of the local administration (municipalities and future districts), including all its instances.[5]

Today the Constitutional Act on the Rights of National Minorities[6] puts forward good solutions for the protection of minorities, which often exceed European standards, but the application of those solutions in practice is sometimes very poor. The law grants national minorities in Croatia: political representation of national minorities in the Parliament, formation of Councils of national minorities in local self-government units, usage of own language and script in private, public and official use, upbringing and education in own language, usage of own insignia and symbols, employment of minorities in administration and judicial bodies, cultural autonomy, right of confessing own religion, access to media of mass communication and performing of actions of public information in the language and script they are using. Croatia started registering the practices of autonomy of minorities, funding of minority organizations and institutions through the Councils of national minorities, political representation of minorities in the Parliament and local self-government units, upbringing and education in own language and partly minority self-government through the Councils of national minorities. However, still missing is the proportionate employment of members of minorities in administration and judicial bodies, which hinders return of those who had left Croatia, as well as the usage of minority insignia and symbols, which is not sufficiently

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5 Archives of Serbs in the Republic of Croatia (ASH), Archive on the Serbian Democratic Forum, Položaj Srba u Republici Hrvatskoj danas (Today`s Position of Serbs in the Republic of Croatia), 24 August 1994.

6 In addition to Constitutional Act on the Rights of National Minorities (NN 155/2002), a whole sequence of laws concerning the position of national minorities in Croatia were adopted. These include: Law on the Use of the Language and Script of National Minorities in the Republic of Croatia (NN 51/2000), Law on upringing and education in the language and script of national minorities (NN 51/2000), Act on the Elections of Representatives to the Croatian Parliament (NN116/1999, NN 109/2000, NN 53/2003), Amendments to the Law on the Election of Members of the Representative Bodies of Local and Regional Self-government (NN53/2003), Law on theRratification of the Framework Convention for the Protection of National Minorities (NN 14/1997), Law on the Ratification of the European Charter of Local Self-government (NN 14/1997), Law on the Ratification of the European Charter for Regional or Minority Languages (NN 18/1997), Agreement between the Republic of Croatia and Serbia and Montenegro on the protection of the Croatian minority in Serbia and Montenegro, and Serbian and Montenegrin minority in Croatia (Agreement ratified by the Croatian Parliament in 2005).

represented (at least in case of the Serbian national minority) (Džakula, Bubalo and Ećimović 2008: 11-12).

Loss of the status of a constitutive nation, i.e. placing Serbs in the position of a national minority, means loss of a position which Serbs of Croatia have been building for centuries. Serbs have crossed the path from an unrecognized community, via a community organized through the mechanisms of personal autonomy and which restores the memory of its historical role, to a new community under construction within the new, future European society. A respondent from Hrvatska Kostajnica (1978) rightfully said that "What borders Serbs in particular is to be a minority". "One cannot lump us together with the Ruthenians or Slovaks. After all, we were building this state".

Political Organizations of Serbs in Croatia From 1990 Until Present Day

During the last decade of the twentieth century several political organisations of Serbs in Croatia gained prominence in representing, with more or less success, this national minority. On January 11 1990 the Parliament endorsed a decision to change the Constitution of the Socialistic Republic of Croatia, and adopted the Law on Amendments to the Law on Social Organisations and Citizens Associations by which constitutional and legal prerequisites were laid to shift from a single to a multi-party system.[7] In the end of 1980s nationalism started blooming among a part of the Croatian Serb population. In Croatia, already then started the germination of an idea on the creation of a special Yugoslav federal unit which would encompass Serb populated areas of Croatia. However, it should be emphasized that such approach to the resolution of the issue of Serbs in Croatia was not upheld by the Serbs of civic orientation. This is evidenced also by the 24 October 1990 meeting of the Working Group tasked to draft a project of cultural autonomy of Serbs in Croatia. This group was composed of Croatian intellectuals, including some of the Serbian nationality. Working Group's materials, prepared by Dr. Drago Roksandić, Dr. Mirko Valentić and Dr. Anđelko Milardović, were presented to the Parliament on 28 November 1990.[8]

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7   NN, 2/90. The first party to join together politicians and activists who will take part in a rebellion was the Yugoslav Independent Democratic Party, founded in Vojnić on 11 February 1990. Its president was Mile Dakić, and the party soon retreated from the political scene, never exceeding the limits of the Vojnić municipality (Žunec 2007: 261).

8   Ideas of Dr. Drago Roksandić are presented in: Roksandić 1990: 217-228.

Serbian Democratic Party (SDS)[9], founded on 17 February 1990[10], considered this group illegitimate and alleged that the cultural autonomy of Serbs in Croatia can be applied only in those parts of Croatia where Serbs are a minority, and even there only subject to approval by the Serbian National Council (SNV) which not long before that, on 30 September 1990[11], declared Serbian autonomy in "ethnical and historical territories" populated by Serbs, located inside "the current borders of the Republic of Croatia as a federal unit of the SFRY"[12] (Barić 2006: 210-211). Numerous Croats joined the Croatian Democratic Union, and numerous Croatian Serbs joined the Serbian Democratic Party.[13] Yet however, in the first democratic parliamentary elections in Croatia, held on 22 April and on 7 May 1990, Serbian Democratic Party won, respectively, only 1.55% and 2% votes, which entitled them to only five seats in the Croatian Parliament.[14] Already on 18 May 1990, SDS froze its relations with the Croatian Parliament.[15] Serbian Democratic Party

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9   The founder of this party was Jovan Rašković who enjoyed great respect among Serbs. Due to his disagreement with Milošević's policy, Rašković was replaced by more radical oriented Milan Babić.

10   SDS for Slavonia was founded in May 1990.

11   The autonomy was declared after a plebiscite held between 19 August and 2 September 1990 in which allegedly 756781 voters turned out, out of whom 756549 allegedly voted for the atonomy. Voting took place in 23 municipalities, entirely, plus in 22 municipalities, partly, as well as outside Croatia. According to the opinion of O. Žunec, these figures and voting method, i.e. the number of voters are doubtful (Žunec 2007: 267-268).

12   Serbian National Council was elected on 25 July 1990 in Srb in the presence of 120000 - 200000 Serbs from Croatia and other parts of Yugoslavia. On that occasion Great Serbian Assembly was held and Declaration on the sovereignty and autonomy of the Serbian people was adopted (Žunec 2007: 263-264).

13   Serbs would join the Serbian Democratic Party only after Serbs who were members of the SKH-SDP became disappointed and got assured of the incompetence of this party in 1990.

14   The elections results show that SDS won in the election for the Social Political Council in Knin (17563 votes, i.e. 67.27%) , for the Council of Municipalities of the Parliament also in Knin (18237, i.e. 69.8%), and in Donji Lapac (2400 votes, i.e. 46.22%), and Gračac (1962 votes, i.e. 27.89%) (in Gračac and Donji Lapac candidates entered the second round), for the Associated Labour Council in Knin (5286 votes, i.e. 61.19%). Correspondingly, it appears obvious that SDS enjoyed full support only in Knin, while in other Serbian municipalities in Croatia SKH-SDP enjoyed greater support. At the time of the first democratic elections SDS did not enjoy voters' support either in Banija and Kordun. Yugoslav Independent Democratic Party ranked better there. This party was particularly strong in the Vojnić municipality (Izbori '90, Informacije, no. 14, press center).

15   However, not earlier than in the second half of 1990, SDS representavies stopped attending meetings of the Croatian Parliament, and in January 1991 also those representatives of Serbian nationality who were elected as candidates on the lists of other Croatian parties (SKH-SDP) stepped out of Parliament. On 8 January 1991 Babić notified the Parliament

took as a point of departure the fact that the Serbs of Croatia are a con-
stitutive people, and not a national minority, and that they have the
right to political autonomy, which means forming of a Serbian state in
the territory of Croatia in case of secession of the Republic of Croatia
from the SFRY. At that time Party of Democratic Changes, i.e. the
League of Communists of Croatia did not have a clear idea of how to
approach the Serbian issue, thus one part of Serbian members or sup-
porters of this party simply become passive or joined Serbian Demo-
cratic Party. After Serbs who were part of the League of Communists of
Croatia, Serbian Democratic Party and Socialist Party of Croatia had
stepped out of Parliament, it was not clear who represented Serbs in the
Croatian Parliament. Split in the Serbian Democratic Party became
clearly visible after the foundation of the SDS Party of Krajina, which
unlike the primary SDS associated its activity to the territory of the
Serbian Autonomous Region (SAO) Krajina. SDS of Krajina was found-
ed in Gračac on 16 March 1991, and was headed by Ljubica Šolaja. Be-
hind Ljubica Šolaja was Milan Babić from Knin who, unlike Rašković
who pursued a peaceful course, maintained an uncompromising policy
toward Croats. In 1991 Rašković moved to Belgrade, but kept on endea-
vouring to ensure creation of the SAO Krajina in a peaceful manner.
Due to such policy, he completely lost the support of SAO Krajina.
However, neither Babić's authority in the Republic of Serbian Krajina
was of long duration. Because of his conflicts with Milošević, Babić was
replaced from this position in the beginning of 1992. Zdravko Zečević
stepped up then to the helm of SAO Krajina. At that time broke a con-
flict between Milan Martić and Milan Babić. Wavered by the conflict
between Martić and Babić, Ljubica Šolaja, who until then was the presi-
dent of SDS of Krajina left Knin and resigned. In addition to this, dur-
ing June 1992 a moratorium was declared in Krajina which banned
activities of all political parties. This decision was reasoned by the ab-
sence of a law on the work of political parties in the Republic of Serbian
Krajina and, furthermore, by the need "to achieve unity of people and
combatants at the front and in the back land" since in that period there
was a strong possibility of attack by Croatian forces against Krajina. In
the end of September 1992 laws which regulate the activity and funding
of political parties were adopted. SDS of Krajina regarded that the Ser-
bian people in Croatia had the right to establish their own state. Ac-
cording to the opinion of this party, genocide was committed against
the Serbian people two times. The first time it was in 1941, and the

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and the Government that "representatives of SAO Krajina municipalities will not be
coming to Zagreb" (Žunec 2007: 267-268).

second time in 1990, because Serbs were for the first time deprived of equality under the new Constitution of Croatia. For that reason SDS of Krajina rejected any possibility of communion with the Republic of Croatia. SDS of Krajina regarded delineation as the only option, and emphasized that the Republic of Serbian Krajina should encompass also parts which were not under their control, but had a majority Serbian population. SDS of Krajina considered that cooperation with peace forces was important because they made the status quo possible, and advocated unification with other Serbian lands (in the first place with the Republic of Srpska) and also attached importance to cooperation with the Serbian Orthodox Church. In November 1993, together with the SDS of the Republic of Srpska, SDS of Serbia and SDS of Montenegro, the SDS of Krajina entered the Serbian Democratic Party for All Serbian Lands. Thereafter the SDS for all Serbian Lands in the Republic of Serbian Krajina singled out and advocated the Republic of Serbian Krajina as an independent state which would ultimately join a commonwealth with other Serbian lands. This party was led by Mile Paspalj who, unlike Babić and SDS of Krajina who advocated implementation of the Vance Plan, supported Milošević and his role of the leader of the Serbian people (Barić 2005: 219-230). SDS fraction which advocated Principality of Krajina, headed by Tomislav Karađorđević, was tagged "monarchist" SDS. In eastern Slavonia Goran Hadžić formed the Serbian Democratic Party for the Unified Serbian States. At the elections conducted in the Republic of Serbian Krajina on 12 December 1993 SDS of Krajina won 33 seats, SDS for All Serbian Lands 17 seats, Serbian Radical Party 15 seats, and out of the remaining 19 seats, eight were won by independent candidates, six by the Serbian Party of Socialists, four by SDP, and one seat by the "monarchist" SDS (Barić 2005: 248). Milan Babić and Milan Martić entered the second round of presidential elections in the Republic of Serbian Krajina. Milan Martić became the president with several thousands votes more than Milan Babić. Thereafter Milan Babić formed a coalition government together with the radicals (Rade Leskovac). Milošević wanted Borislav Mikelić to take the office of the Prime Minister in Krajina although SDS of Krajina, the winner at the elections, was against this. Mikelić was appointed as the Prime Minister and stayed in this office until May 1995, when his government was removed against a vote of no confidence after the Operation Flash. Thereafter Milan Babić was appointed as the prime minister designate of the last government of the Republic of Serbian Krajina, yet performed the duty of a Prime Minister only for a week, until the onset of the Operation Storm (Barić 2005: 242-255). In 1990 the

League of Communists – Movement for Yugoslavia (SK-PJ) was also formed in Croatia. This party was tagged "generals' party" because many former Army officers had joined it. The League of Communists – Movement for Yugoslavia advocated, with no reserves, perseverance of Yugoslavia, underpinned by the Yugoslav National Army (YNA). The party assessed both Croat and Serb nationalism as dangerous and threatening to revive, respectively, the Ustashi and Chetnik movements. Therefore, formation of the Republic of Serbian Krajina was followed with the conflict between the leaderships of the SDS and the SK-PJ. The SDS deemed that Yugoslavhood and communism were obsolete options. As stated by Nikica Barić, conflict between the SDS and the SK – PJ was best displayed in the case of the President of the Municipality Vrginmost, Dmitar Obradović, who was a member of the SK – PJ. In the second half of 1991 he supported ideas of the Serbian Democratic Forum, and correspondingly backed a peaceful solution to the conflict between Croats and Serbs. However, Knin authorities first accused Obradović of being a "bolshevik", then of being "a false Serb" and "CDU spy", and ultimately his reconciliatory attitude toward Croats led to his assassination in June 1992 (Barić 2005: 233-240). In the Republic of Serbian Krajina also the following parties were active: Social- Democratic Party with the seat in Okučani, RSK Serbian Radical Party, RSK Serbian Party of Socialists, Democratic People's Party of Krajina with the seat in Beli Manastir, Romanian-Roma Democratic Party with the seat in Beli Manastir and RSK Party of Serbian Patriots with the seat in Tovarnik (Barić 2005: 241).

On 18 May 1991 Serbian People's Party (SNS) headed by Milan Đukić entered Croatian political scene. Since its onset, this party was a unique counterpoint to the Serbian Democratic Party which supported fulfilment of Serbian aspirations in the territory of Croatia without a dialogue. Serbian People's Party defined as its goals in 1991: cultural autonomy of the Serbs of Croatia (enforcement of the right to language, cultural institutions and national symbols), local self-government and Serbs' proportional participation in administration. Serbian People's Party was oriented to the urban and not to the rural Serbs. Serbian media tagged it a pro-regime and pro-CDU party (Party of Tuđman's Serbs). The most severe attacks at Serbian People's Party came from the Serbian Democratic Party. SNS confronted also the views of the Serbian Democratic Forum which was throughout the war informing about the jeopardy of Serbs in unoccupied Croatian areas (Piskač and Domini 1992). President of the Serbian People's Party Milan Đukić got the position of Assistant Minister of the Interior and Counsellor to Presi-

dent Franjo Tuđman. At parliamentary elections in 1992 SNS failed to reach the 3% threshold for the Parliament. However, by the ruling of the Constitutional court, three of its representatives, including Đukić, were granted Parliament mandates, because on the lists of other parties which had reached the threshold there were not sufficient representatives of Serb nationality to meet the quota prescribed by the applicable Constitutional Act on the Rights of National Minorities.[16] Constitutional court ceded mandates to the SNS, although the list of Social – Democratic Union was ahead of it by the number of votes won by the lists which have Serb representatives, stating in the reasoning that the SNS, as an ethnic party, enjoys greater right to ethnic mandates. Soon thereafter Milan Đukić become the Vice Speaker of the Parliament. After the Operation Storm SNS started criticizing CDU policy. The Independent Democratic Serbian Party soon marginalized the Serbian People's Party and in 2003 SNS lost its position in the Parliament.[17] In 2011, together with the Democratic Party of Serbs (headed by Veljko Džakula, who concurrently was President of the SDF) and Our Party, SNS tried to form a coalition block against SDSS.[18] Today this party controls two county organisations (in Karlovačka and Sisačko-Moslavačka County), three town and four municipal committees.[19]

In 1991 constitution of a Serb National Assembly was planned. It was schemed as a "supra-party representative-advisory body for defining the long-term policy of the autonomous will of the Serbian people in Croatia which will represent its legitimate interests in Croatia and before the international community". The objectives of the Serb National Assembly were: permanent cease-fire and establishing peace, gaining back the trust and normalization of Croat-Serbian relations, discussion on global solution to the crises, defining autonomy for Serbian people in Croatia based on its national interests and its autonomous politic will, human freedoms and civil rights and democratization of the society.

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16 Milan Đukić, Dragan Hinić and Veselin Pejnović entered the Parliament. In addition to them, further 10 Serbs entered the Parliament: two from the Croat People's Party and 8 from the Social Democratic Party. Out of these 8, three acted as independent representatives and five joined other parties. (ASH, Archive on the Serbian Democratic Forum, Položaj Srba u Republici Hrvatskoj danas).

17 Milan Đukić lost by 0.37% against Ratko Gajica from SDSS, who entered the Parliament. (www.izbori.hr/2003Sabor/index.htm).

18 "Srpskom slogom protiv Pupovca". Vesti online [Online] 14.10.2011. Available at: http://www.vesti-online.com/Vesti/Ex-YU/171354/Srpskom-slogom-protiv-Pupovca-. [Accessed on October 15 2011].

19 www.sns.hr.

In 1996 the Alliance of Serbian Organizations was formed. This Alliance stemmed from the association of Serbian non-governmental and non-party organisations in Croatia and it focused on the new status of Serbs in public, cultural and social life of Croatia, on the formulation and establishment of the most adequate forms of organization and activity of Serbs, networking of Serbs from different organisations, on the protection of human rights and rights of ethical minorities, education autonomy of the Serbs of Croatia, media presentation, economic equality and financial independence of the Serbian people in the Republic of Croatia and on the promotion of religious life. This Alliance operated until the establishment of the Serbian National Council (SNV) when Alliance's functions became redundant.[20]

A solid formation of an umbrella organisation which would gather together all the Serbs of Croatia started only with the constitution of the Serbian National Council, on 19 July 1997.[21] The Constitution of the Republic of Croatia defined the right of the Serbs of Croatia to appoint own minority councils – from the level of municipalities and towns up to the level of counties. These councils actually function as minority self-governments. County councils of national minorities can form their national Coordination and delegate to it part of their statutory powers. Thus the Serbian National Council is actually a Coordination of 19 County councils of the Serbian national minority.[22] In the elec-

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20 ASH, Archive on the Alliance of Serbian Organizations, Box 1, Programska deklaracija Saveza srpskih organizacija (Program Declaration of the Alliance of Serbian Organizations), 19 March 1996.

21 Declaration of the representatives to the Constitutive Assembly of the Serbian National Council underlines as priority tasks for all Council members "the removal of hindrance that violete rights of all displaced persons and refugees to return to their homes, rebuilding mutual trust, broken by war and war atrociities, between the members of the Serbian and the Croatian peoples, and resolution of the status of the Serbian national community in the Republic of Croatia" (ASH, Archive on Serb National Council, Izjava vijećnika Konstitutivne Skupštine Srpskog narodnog vijeća). Dr. Milorad Pupovac has been the President of the Serb National Council ever since its constitution.

22 Councils are formed in all counties except in the Krapinsko-Zagorska County where neither a council nor a representative are present, and in the Međimurska County which has a representative of the Serbian national minority (www.snv.hr). Councils of the Serbian national minorities are formed in the following towns: Osijek, Rijeka, Kastav, Vrbovsko, Pula, Vukovar, Ilok, Vinkovci, Beli Manastir, Slatina, Garešnica, Grubišno Polje, Požega, Bjelovar, Daruvar, Koprivnica, Križevci, Sisak, Petrinja, Glina, Hrvatska Kostajnica, Karlovac, Ogulin, Slunj, Obrovac, Split, Dubrovnik, Knin, Otočac, Gospić, and in the following municipalities: Topusko, Gvozd, Majur, Hrvatska Dubica, Donji Kukuruzari, Vojnić, Barilović, Plaški, Lasinja, Saborsko, Krnjak, Plitvička Jezera, Udbina, Vrhovine, Donji Lapac, Borovo, Markušica, Nijemci, Negoslavci, Trpinja, Stari Jankovci, Tovarnik, Erdut, Darda, Jagodnjak, Kneževi Vinogradi, Magadenovac, Popovac, Šodolovci, Viljevo, Okučani, Đulovac, Voćin, Rasinja, Sirač and Sokolovac (www.snv.hr).

tions for the councils of national minorities, held in June 2007, Serbian National Council won 1684 mandates on the level of towns, municipalities and counties, which equals 84% of the councillor seats total, which entitles SNV to form councils in 19 counties with 470 councillors, in 49 towns with 657 councillors and in 54 municipalities with 527 councillors, as well as with thirty representatives wherever the number of Serbs is below the statutory minimum. In the course of its activity, Serbian National Council has achieved many prominent results of great importance for the Serb community in Croatia. With the Independent Democratic Serbian Party and Joint Council of Municipalities, it contributed to peaceful reintegration of the eastern Slavonia, Baranja and western Srem, and ensuring partial return of Serbs to areas exposed to operations Storm and Flesh, through the struggle for their fundamental human rights. Along with the Serbian Democratic Forum and Joint Council of Municipalities they started publishing the Novosti weekly. Serbian National Council participated in the drafting of the constitutional act on the rights of national minorities and struggled for its enforcement, and it also participated in the drafting of the intergovernmental Agreement on the rights of national minorities reached between the Republic of Croatia and the Republic of Serbia. Within the Serbian National Council operate the Archives of Serbs in the Republic of Croatia (ASH), Centre for development and Tesla bank, and SNV can boast membership in the FUEN (Federal Union of European Nationalities) which is the advisory body of the Council of Europe.

In 1997, concurrently with the Serbian National Council, the Independent Democratic Serbian Party was formed. Independent Democratic Serbian Party was formed through the association of all progressive Serbian powers and political options which acted from 1991 until 1997 in the territories of eastern Slavonia, Baranja and western Srem under the leadership of the Serbian Democratic Party. SDS was declared to be a terroristic party and as such was banned, which has triggered a merger of the Independent Serbian Party from Zagreb[23] and the Serbian Democratic Party from Vukovar into the Independent Democratic

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23 The same as the Serbian Democratic Forum, the Independent Serbian Party advocated a peaceful solution to the conflict between the Croatian and the Serbian people in Croatia. The Independent Serbian Party based its activity on the following objectives: peace and peaceful resolution of open issues between the Croatian and the Serbian people and their countries, national agreement as a way for the harmonization of national rights and state interests of the Croatian and the Serbian people, modern national and political identity of Serbs as a prerequisite for the promotion of their national rights and harmonization with the rights of the Croatian people, legal security and economic prosperity, and development of civil society institutions, and activities of the Independent Serbian Party as a partner for democratization. (ASH, SDSS Archive, Box 1, Program Orientation of

Serbian Party.[24] The founding assembly meeting was held in Zagreb on 19 March 1997, and Vukovar was assigned as the party seat.[25] In 1997 the SDSS succeeded to win 12 mandates in Vukovar, thus this party was individual winner in the elections, and further 28 electoral lists were submitted in the region of eastern Slavonia, Baranja and western Srem. In 2001 local elections this party won 4 representatives in the Sisačko-Moslavačka County, 4 representatives in the Šibensko-Kninska county, 3 in Osječko-Baranjska, and 7 in the Vukovarsko-Srijemska County. After coming into power in Trpinja, Markušica, Negoslavci, Borovo, Erdut, Darda, Jagodnjak, Mirkovci, Beli Manastir and Tenja - in 1997, and then in Plaški and Biskupija - in 2001, further to elections in 2005 the SDSS came into power in Krnjak, Kistanj, Gvozd (Vrginmost), Udbina, Gračac, Dvor, and in June 2006 also in Donji Lapac. In 2000 parliamentary elections, the SDSS failed to enter Croatian Parliament as it had not reached the 5% threshold in any of the electoral units. In 2003 the SDSS won all three representative seats in the Croatian Parliament further to law amendments that provided for three instead of

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the Independent Serbian Party 1995). President of the Independent Serbian Party was Professor Milorad Pupovac, Ph.D.

24 The Independent Serbian Party changed its name into the Independent Democratic Serbian Party.

25 Independent Democratic Serbian Party, Vukovar 2007. On 5 March 1997 in Vukovar also the Independent Democratic Serbian Party held its founding meeting, in order to merge two weeks later in Zagreb with the Independent Serbian Party. At the founding meeting in Vukovar spoke Goran Hadžić, Miloš Vojnović, Vojislav Stanimirović, and Branko Šekuljica. Hadžić's address revealed Serbs' fears concerning peaceful reintegration. He underlined that no one from the list of war criminals was a criminal and that there is no reason for anyone to move out of Eastern Slavonia, Baranja and Western Srem. Stanimirović emphasized that the new party "has incorporated into its program the ideas and experience of Serbian political champions: Svetozar Miletić, who was the founder of the Serbian National Freethinkers Party, Bogdan Medaković, the founder of the Serbian People's Independent Party, Svetozar Pribićević, the founder of the Independent Democratic Party and Jovan Rašković, the founder of the Serbian Democratic Party". By consensus, all the parties of the former SAO Eastern Slavonia, Baranja and Western Srem were united into a single party. Stanimirović underlined that there was no more room for war solutions and that the SDSS would advocate demilitarization of Eastern Slavonia, Baranja and Western Srem. Branko Šekuljica presented the program and objectives of the SDSS: the principle of agreement, the principle of autonomy and the principle of integration. National unity and accord, inter-ethnic and inter-religious tolerance, security and equality of all individuals, cultural and personal autonomy of Serbs in the entire Croatia, local and regional self-government and administration in the Eastern Slavonia, Baranja and Western Srem were highlighted as important elemnts of SDSS activity. At the founding meeting in Vukovar 33 members of the Main Board were elected, as well as members of the Statutory and Supervisory Boards (ASH, SDSS Archive, Box 1, Minutes of the Founding Meeting of the SDSS, held on 5 March 1997 in Vukovar). A comprehensive Draft Program of the Independent Democratic Serbian Party was endorsed in December 1997 (ASH, SDSS Archive, Box 1, Program of the Independent Democratic Serbian Party).

one Serbian representative to the Croatian Parliament. Today the Independent Democratic Serbian Party has three representatives to the Croatian Parliament and more than 250 councillors in county, town and municipal assemblies.[26] In accordance with the Erdut Agreement and Constitutional Act, representatives of the SDSS discharge duties of County's Deputy Governor in the Osječko-Baranjska and Vukovarsko-Srijemska County, and are members of the county government in Sisačko-Moslavačka, Šibensko-Kninska and Karlovačka counties.[27] SDSS has more than 10000 members, and 68 municipal, town and county organisations.[28]

In addition to the mentioned political parties, Serbs in Croatia have also the following political parties: Democratic Party of Serbs, Our Party, New Serbian Party, Party of Danube Serbs. One more party was active before, namely the Serbian Democratic Baranja Party established in 1998 in Beli Manastir. In 1999 it had 425 members, but was officially dissolved in 2007. In addition to Beli Manastir municipality, this party acted also in the municipalities of Jagodnjak and Darda. President of the party was Ljubomir Mijatović. Together with the Party of Danube Serbs, the Serbian People's Party and a number of other Serbian organisations, this party formed Serbian National Council in 1999 as an alternative option to SDSS. The Democratic Party of Serbs was formed on 4 August 2009 with the seat in Zagreb. The initiative for the establishment of this party came from the Serbian Democratic Forum.

This party is a member of the Serbian Accord coalition. President of the party is Mitar Kojadinović, and president of the Party Program Board is Veljko Džakula. The coalition which it formed with the Ser-

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26 SDSS is now in power in the following municipalities: Biskupija, Borovo, Dvor, Erdut, Ervenik, Gvozd, Jagodnjak, Kistanje, Krnjak, Markušica, Negoslavci, Šodolovci, Trpinja and Vrhovine (www.sdss.hr).

27 Serbs are County Deputy Governors in the following counties: Vukovarsko-Srijemska, Osječko-Baranjska, Požeško-Slavonska, Bjelovarsko-Bilogorska, Virovitičko-Podravska, Sisačko-Moslavačka, Ličko-Senjska, Karlovačka, Zadarska and Šibensko-Kninska. From among them, 7 are members of the SDSS. In the following towns Serbs hold offices of deputy mayors: Vukovar, Lipik, Pakrac, Grubišno Polje, Slatina, Glina, Hrvatska Kostajnica, Ogulin, Slunj, Gospić, Vrbovsko, Benkovac, Obrovac, Skradin and Knin, . From among them 7 are members of the SDSS. In the municipalities of: Stari Jankovci, Darda, Popovac, Podgorač, Viljevo, Đulovac, Sirač, Velika Pisanica, Dragalić, Okučani, Voćin, Suhopolje, Rasinja, Sokolovac, Topusko, Hrvatska Dubica, Majur, Sunja, Barilović, Lasinja, Saborsko, Plitvička Jezera, Lovinac, Lišane Ostrovičke, Polača, Zemunik Donji and Civljane - Serbs hold only the offices of deputy heads, while in those municipalities where they hold the offices of municipality heads (Borovo, Markušica, Negoslavci, Trpinja, Erdut, Jagodnjak, Šodolovci, Gvozd, Dvor, Krnjak, Vrhovine, Gračac, Biskupija, Ervenik i Kistanje) Serbs hold as well the offices of deputy heads.

28 President of the Independent Democratic Serbian Party is Dr. Vojislav Stanimirović.

bian People's Party and Our Party in the 2011 parliamentary elections was named the Democratic Opposition of Serbian Parties. Džakula won 16% of the votes in the 12th electoral unit which was not enough for entering the Croatian parliament. Our Party was formed in 2011 in Borovo, headed by Jovan Ajduković, former high-positioned member of SDSS from which he was expelled further to his independent candidacy for County's Deputy Governor of the Vukovarsko-Srijemska County in 2009. Ajduković won 21.5% of the votes in the 12th electoral unit which was not enough for entering the Croatian parliament.[29] New Serbian Party was formed in Vukovar in 2009, with Svetislav Lađarević at its helm. The Party of Danube Serbs is a continuation of the activity of the Serbian Radical Party in the territory of former Republic of Serbian Krajina. Organizations of the Serbian Radicals in Krajina had its branches in Vukovar, Kostajnica and Dvor upon Una. The party in Krajina was led by Rade Leskovac, but at the end of 1994 he tried to make RSK Serbian Radical Party independent from the Central Fatherland Administration in Belgrade, and was therefore removed from the office, and Branko Vojnica took over the helm (Barić 2005: 230-233). After the peaceful reintegration in 1998 former RSK radical party was registered under the name Party of Danube Serbs. It was formed on 17 April 1998 in Vukovar, headed by Radivoje Rade Leskovac. Party took part in 2007 elections in the 12th electoral unit, and candidate Rade Leskovac won 10.9% of the votes. On the posters posted all around Vukovar and in its vicinity, Leskovac was photographed with the three-finger salute which gave rise to numerous protests of Vukovar citizens and Croatian public.[30]

In accordance with the Erdut Agreement and the Letter of intention of the Government of the Republic of Croatia a Joint Council of Municipalities was formed in the territory of two counties: the Osječko-Baranjska and the Vukovarsko-Srijemska. Joint Council of Municipalities plaid a very important role within the process of peaceful reintegration and affirmation of constitutional rights of Serbs in the Republic of Croatia. Joint Council of Municipalities is an advisory body which follows and analyses overall affairs in the sphere of consistent implementation of education and cultural autonomy, protects human, civil and minority rights of the Serbian national minority in accordance

29 www.nasa-stranka.hr.

30 www.hidran.hidra.hr.

with the Constitution of the Republic of Croatia.[31] Joint Council of Municipalities is the assembly composed of members of the Serbian national minority irrespective of their party affiliation, who are elected in the elections for local self-government and administration bodies in the territory of the two mentioned counties. In the present term of office the Assembly has 28 counsellors. Deputy Governors of these two counties are vice presidents of the Joint Council of Municipalities, and presidents perform the function professionally.[32]

The motives for the establishment of Serbian parties which operate today, except in case of SDSS, mostly include aspirations to gain power and esteem as well as material benefits for individuals and party mem-

31 Joint Council of Municipalities has the following scope of competence: nominates candidates for the two positions of county's deputy governors in county assemblies, nominates candidates for the office of assistant ministers in the Ministry of the Interior, Justice, Education, Sport and Culture, and high-ranking office in the Ministry of Development and Reconstruction, and the Department for Exiles, nominates candidates for other offices, monitors work of its appointed and elected representatives, analyzes situation in municipalities and submits motions to higher-instance competent bodies and organizations, founds and directs, in accordance with the law, information and publishing activity of the Serbian national community (TV, radio stations and other mass media of communication), monitors implementation of cultural and education autonomy and gives proposals for their realization and promotion, takes care of the realization of human, civil and ethnic rights of the Serbian national community, analyzes and gives proposals in connection with the proportionate representation of Serbs in the police, judiciary, healthcare and other public services, maintains contacts with the President of the Republic of Croatia or his Office, participates in the building and maintenance of the institutional links with other Serbian ethnical communities in Croatia and abroad and cooperates with other entities in compliance with its scope of activity (www.zvo.hr).

32 www.zvo.hr. and ASH, SDSS Archive, Box 1, Letter of Miloš Vojnović dated 17 December 1997 addressed to the Parliament of the Republic of Croatia. In this letter Miloš Vojnović wrote about all the roles of the Joint Council of Municipalities and expressed his dissatisfaction because the Council "was registered as the association of citizens" whereby stipulations of the Erdut Agreement and Letter of Intentions of the Government of the Republic of Croatia were violated. By such registration the Council was reduced "to the margins of social developments and is prevented from realizing its role defined under the stated acts, which means that in soon future it shall, by itself, dissolve", concluded Vojnović. Therefore Vojnović suggested to assign the Council a place "in the legislative-legal system of the Republic of Croatia, either through the amendments to the current Constitution Act on human rights and freedoms and the rights of ethnical communities and minorities in the Republic of Croatia, or through the Parliament's adoption of a special law". In 2001 the Department for international legal affairs of the Republic of Croatia sent a notification that after the conclusion of the UNTAES mission in Eastern Slavonija the Erdut Agreement shall remain in force, and specifically that further applicable shall be the provisions on proportionate representation in local self-government bodies, provisions on proportionate representation in police, healthcare and judiciary, and the fact that Serbs hold offices of two county's deputy governors in Osječko-Baranjska and Vukovarsko-Srijemska County (www.zvo.hr). Joint Council of Municipalities is currently presided by Dragan Crnogorac.

bers, and in some cases the need for regional development of certain Croatian areas. Aspiration to material benefits, esteem and power is the most common reason in the creation of parties. This is most clearly visible from the fact that small Serbian parties, which do not have substantial number of voters in any Croatian region have joined together in order to defeat the Independent Democratic Serbian Party, and that their leaders, most often former prominent members of the SDSS or close associates of Dr. Milorad Pupovac, have joined together against the most powerful Serbian party in Croatia with the aim of gaining material superiority.

Cultural and Non-Governmental Organisations of the Serbs of Croatia

The most important cultural institution of Serbs in Croatia is the Serbian Cultural Society "Education" (SKD "Prosvjeta"). It gathers together members of the Serbian population in Croatia and their institutions with the view to maintain and develop national identity. SKD Prosvjeta was formed in 1944 in Glina. The act of forming the society meant a continuation and renewal of the tradition of the activities of Serbian cultural, educational, publishing, scientific, economic, and humanitarian organisations which worked in Croatia at the end of the 19th and in the beginning of the 20th century. Thus the SKD "Prosvjeta" built its activities directly upon the activities of the pre-war Seljačko Kolo. After WW II this society formed over 300 sub-boards and gathered together a few dozens of thousand of members. It published newspapers Srpska Riječ, magazine Prosvjeta, and founded Publishing Company Prosvjeta, Museum of Serbs in Croatia and Printing House Prosvjeta. The activities of Prosvjeta died out after 1971, at the time of well-known political developments, and the activity of the Society was formally banned in 1980. In 1990, Society was revived, but its activities were completely absent due to war events. The activities of the Prosvjeta which operates today, were renewed in 1993. At first, sub-boards were active in the areas controlled by Croatian forces, and after 1997 sub-boards were formed throughout Croatia[33] During the war in the

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33 Sub-boards operate in Zagreb, Rijeka, Vrbovsko, Srpske Moravice, Donje Dubrave, Daruvar, Pakrac (Western Slavonija), Umag (Bujština), Karlovac, Osijek, Vukovar, Beli Manastir, Split, Knin, Dalj, Okučani, Negoslavci, Jagodnjak, Darda, Markušica, Trpinja, Mirkovci, Borovo, Korenica, Garešnica (Moslavina), Krnjak, Pačetin, Bršadinu, Veri, Petrinji, Malom Gradcu, Bijelom Brdu, Vrginmostu (Gvozdu), Gabošu, Kistanjama, Ostrovu, Biskupija, Vojnić, Dvor, Kneževi Vinogradi, Udbina, Gomirje, Glina, Bobota,

areas controlled by the Serbian forces Prosvjeta's work was manifested through other associations (Zora in Knin, Srpski Glas in Topuski and Serbian cultural centre in Vukovar).[34] Today SKD Prosvjeta publishes the Prosvjeta bimonthly magazine, the Ljetopis SKD Prosvjeta Annual Chronicles, books related to national culture and history of Serbs in Croatia, as well as fiction and poetry authored by Croatian Serbs.[35]

The second non-governmental, non-party and non-profit civil society organization which protects and affirms human rights and rights of national minorities is the Serbian Democratic Forum. At the initiative meeting, held on 13 June 1991 in Lipik Declaration on the interests and rights of the Serbian people in Croatia and procedures for their realization was adopted. From among the interests of the Serbian people it emphasizes the interest of remaining in a common state (together with the Serbs from Bosnia and Herzegovina, Montenegro and Serbia) and fostering of ethnical and cultural particularities along with taking into account cultural unity and cultural ties between the Serbian people and other peoples, including particularly Croatian people. From among the rights of the Serbian population in Croatia it emphasizes possible territorial, cultural and political autonomy. It also stresses the need to pursue independent policy, and specifically to form representative supra-party body, renew the party and set up negotiation groups with a negotiating position.[36] At the meeting in Lipik, Jovan Rašković was also present, and the meeting was backed also by the vice president of the SAO Krajina government Dušan Starević, at the same time also the president of SKD "Prosvjeta". Leadership of the SAO Krajina strongly opposed this meeting, and announced removal of Dušan Starević from the position of the vice president of the SAO Krajina government. Serbian Democratic

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Vrhovine, Ogulin, Virovitica, Sisak, Viškovo, Bjelovar, Hrvatska Kostajnica, Voćin and Metković (www.skdprosvjeta.com).

34 www.skdprosvjeta.com.

35 The objectives of SKD Prosvjete include study of the history, culture and modern life of the Serbian people and preservation of cultural-education legacy, encouragement of scientific, research, art and literary work, organization of public discussions and gallery displays, and other activities in the sphere of science, culture, literary meetings and book promotions, publishing regular and periodical publications, organization of folklore, music and other cultural activities, support to development of reading clubs and libraries, study of the identity and script of the Serbian people, encouring adoption and providing for the implementation of teaching programs important for the preservation of the identity of Serbs in Croatia, supporting gifted pupils and students, cooperation with akin societies, cooperation with the Serbian Orthodox Church, marking important cultural events and figures from the history of the Serbian people and promotion of public education as a traditional function of the Society.

36 ASH, Serbian Democratic Forum Archive, Deklaracija o interesima i pravima srpskog naroda u Hrvatskoj te postupcima njihova ostvarivanja.

Forum was formally established on 8 December 1991 in Zagreb, with 26 founders attending the assembly. At the founding assembly Starting Points for the Resolution of the Serbian Question in Croatia were adopted. Starting Points propose cultural and territorial autonomy of Serbs in Croatia.[37] The Proclamation of the Serbian Democratic Forum of the same date emphasizes that the Serbs of Croatia do not want to be "Palestinians in a Greater Serbia or in an Independent State of Croatia.[38] It is visible from the documents of the Serbian Democratic Forum originating from the early nineties that the standing policy of SDF was a peaceful resolution of war conflicts and negotiation between the belligerent parties. Besides this, as hardly any other organisation in Croatia, SDF was keeping records also of all discriminatory regulations, violations of human rights and crimes against Serb civilians and Serb property in parts of Croatia which were not under the control of the Army of the Republic of Serbian Krajina.[39] Over many years, as well, SDF kept warning Croatian and foreign officials about the possible consequences of a conflict (which have ultimately come true). Since SDF had expanded its activity over the years, its Assembly supplemented the SDF Statutes. As of 24 July 1996 SDF is registered for providing assistance to citizens in the protection of their human, civil and national rights and giving them expert advices, for collecting humanitarian aid, conducting researches related to cultural and other assets of Serbs in Croatia and studying research findings, for publishing activity and working on the settlement of war consequences and renewal of devastated areas. SDF-led projects today include free of charge legal aid, human rights on the local level, minority employment, institutional support to stabilization or development of association, NGO capacity building and publishing the Identity magazine (Srpski demokratski forum 1997: 4-10).

The third key non-party and non-political organization of Serbs in Croatia is the Serbian Business Association "Entrepreneur" ("Privrednik"), formed at the end of the 19th century in Zagreb upon the initiative of Vladimir Matijević from Gornji Budački, a wholesaler

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37 ASH, Serbian Democratic Forum Archive, Polazišta za rješenje srpskog pitanja u Hrvatskoj.

38 ASH, Serbian Democratic Forum Archive, Proclamation of the Serbian Democratic Forum. The objectives of the Serbian Democratic Forum 1991 included work related to normative solutions which regulate the position of the Serbian people in Croatia, based on the agreement with representatives of the Croatian people, maintaining intensive contacts with all relevant social, political and government factors in Croatia, Europe and the world with the view to establish lasting peace and lasting agreement between the Serbian and Croatian people in Croatia.

39 See SDF'sBulletins I-V which, among others, include 1992- 1995 records of numerous crimes against Croatian Serbs, and against their property.

and a patriot. After the foundation of the Serbian Bank and the Union of Serb Farming Cooperatives, Matijević's idea about an institution which would financially support gifted children from Bosnia and Herzegovina, Croatia and Vojvodina was realised. From its foundation in 1897 until its closure by the communist authorities in 1946, the "Entrepreneur" provided for the schooling of 36.775 pupils. The "Entrepreneur" was renewed before the first democratic elections in May 1990, but as a part of SKD "Prosvjeta". The same as "Prosvjeta", the "Entrepreneur" too, failed then to become sustainable. However, along with the renewal of the "Prosvjeta" on 18 December 1993, activities of "Entrepreneur" were renewed and since then it has been operating independently, and its main task is, the same as at the time of its foundation, to extend scholarships to gifted students and students of poor financial standing, and also to enhance economic opportunities in rural areas with Serbian population.[40]

In addition to these non-governmental, non-party organisations, also active in Croatia are numerous cultural-art societies, cultural-scientific centres (such as for example Milutin Milanković Cultural and Scientific Centre in Dalj) and other types of organizations (Entrepreneur Junior, Serbian Youth Forum, Community of Serbs from Zagreb, Community of Serbs from Rijeka, Community of Serbs of Istria, Community of Serbs in the Republic of Croatia, Miloš Vojnović Native Club of Kordun and Banija, 'Against Forgetting' Association of the Serbian Families of the killed, missing, kidnapped and disabled, and others).[41]

Respondents' Stands on the Organisations of the Serbs of Croatia

In the framework of a research regarding the identity of Croatian Serbs in the territory of the entire Croatia, a survey was conducted in which two questions were related to political institutions and non-political organisations of Croatian Serbs. Respondents were asked the following questions:

- To what extent do political parties with the Serbian prefix (e.g. SDSS) have importance for the formation of the identity? In the area where you live, are there more Serbs in the Croatian political parties (e.g. HNS, SDP)?
- To what extent do non-political organisations (Prosvjeta,

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40 Srpsko privredno društvo Privrednik – programska načela.

41 www.snv.hr.

Entrepreneur...) have importance for the identity of Serbs in Croatia/Krnjak?

This survey encompassed 36 persons of Serbian nationality from eastern Slavonia (Osijek: 2, Našice: 1), western Slavonia (Daruvar: 2, Pakrac: 1, Slatina: 3, Nova Gradiška: 1), north-western Croatia (Bjelovar: 3, Ludbreg: 1, Koprivnica: 1, Garešnica: 2), Banija (Dvor: 1, Kostajnica: 2, Glina: 1), Kordun (Slunj: 2, Karlovac: 1), Lika (Otočac: 1, Gospić: 1), Gorski Kotar (Ogulin: 1, Vrbovsko: 1), Dalmatia (Split: 1, Knin: 2, Benkovac: 1, Sinj: 1, Imotski: 2) and Dubrovnik coastal area (Dubrovnik: 1). Respondents belonged to different age groups. Thus, six belonged to 20 - 30 age group, nine to 30 - 40 age group, one to 40 - 50 age group, six to 50 - 60 age group, twelve to 60 - 70 age group, one to 70 - 80 age group, and one to above 80 age group.

It should be particularly emphasized that the responses quoted here are personal considerations and opinions of the respondents themselves, and that they do not represent general conclusions, or definitive facts. Additionally, although the respondents were sampled from different regions of Croatia, already their consent to interview places them into a group of those who want to talk about the Serbian party and non-party organisations in Croatia, or about other questions concerning the identity of Serbs in Croatia, whereby they can be classified as members of the group which accepts dialogue about this type of questions, opposed to the other existing group which does not want to speak about the asked questions either out of fear or because those question are of no interest to them. I could not cover this type of respondents, thus this survey is inevitably partial in the very inception.

Answers to the first question mostly regarded the Independent Democratic Serbian Party and the activity of the Serbian National Council, considering the fact that minor parties do not have significant influence among Serbs of Croatia. Respondents' opinions depicted different aspects of the activities of the Party and the Council.

One of the opinions, entirety correct, is that SDSS has the greatest number of voters precisely in Vukovarsko-Srijemska and Osječko-Baranjska County. Namely, in these two counties, where peaceful reintegration had been carried out, the greatest number of Serbs have staid, and precisely SDSS was the most meritable for the conclusion of the Erdut Agreement which had made this possible. Serbs in eastern Slavonia and Baranja are still of the opinion that SDSS provides them for a better position than in other parts of Croatia. A respondent from Osijek (1957) thinks that position of the SDSS is the strongest in eastern Slavo-

nia and that there they make part of the Serbian identity: "SDSS in eastern Slavonia had ensured that Serbs could stay and therefore they are the main Serbian option. Serbs expect SDSS to protect Serbian interests and to ensure their survival and staying". A respondent from Dalj (1955) says that "thanks to peaceful reintegration and SDSS, Serbs in eastern Slavonia feel significantly better than in the rest of Croatia". In the rest of Croatia SDSS is also successful, especially in areas where traditionally 'Serbian' parties domineered. Thus SDSS has voters in Lika and parts of northern Dalmatia, but also in certain areas of Banija and Kordun where their influence is significantly weaker due to the anti-fascist past of these areas. A respondent from Gornji Kosinj (1967) speaks about this fact. "They (SDSS) have re-ethnicized the population there. What they had failed to accomplish in Banija and Kordun, where the anti-fascist tradition was stronger, they accomplished in Lika where Serbian parties and programs have always had more success. In Lika the power is divided between the CDU and the SDSS. There is no room for other parties." Serbian parties have had traditionally week status in Hrvatska Kostajnica. A respondent from this town (1978) says that her "grandfathers and grand-grandfathers have never voted for Serbian parties. Grandpa used to say: nothing good can come out of it! Thus in my town also HNS is almost a purely Serbian party". Also in parts of western Slavonia, although in a considerably lower extent, SDSS is successful. Yet, here SDSS did not succeed to win power in any single municipality. The reason for this is probably related to a small number of returnees and insufficient engagement by the party itself, or stronger engagement by the non-party SDF which is in conflict with the SDSS leaders. A respondent from Voćin near Podravska Slatina (1976) testifies to a relative success of the SDSS: "Political parties with the Serbian prefix might have strongest impact on the formation of the identity, because if in power in individual municipalities they can initiate and fund concrete projects that contribute to creating and preserving identity. In Voćin municipality 75% of Serbs vote for the SDSS, and in parties with Croatian prefix Serbs are not in leading positions." A respondent from the surrounding of Pakrac (1961) regards that Serbian parties do not have more success in western Slavonia due to their disunity. "In Pakrac SDF and SDSS are active. They are disunited, actually fragmented into several fractions. People, you know, get more attached to individuals, to a name or a man." In some areas SDSS does not have enough voters due to its insufficient engagement. A respondent from Knin (1983) considers that the Party did not accomplish much in her community. "In Knin people do not care much for the party. They react

commensurately to benefits that a party had brought them. The question is what did that party do for the returnees?" Also a respondent from Garešnica (1986) thinks that the Party is strong only where there were conflicts. In addition, he explains other reasons why Serbian parties do not have success in areas where there were no interethnic conflicts . Another reason of insufficient interest in Serbian parties is weak Serbian identity in those areas (the area of Drava basin, Bjelovar and around Moslavina). "There the party resolved problems (he refers to eastern Slavonia and returnee regions). Here, in Moslavina, there were no such things, so the party is weak. A minority party cannot be successful where there is no jeopardy. Here we have a strong antifascist tradition, so people vote for SDP. Besides, Serbs in Moslavina are not interested in Serbian policy, they do not perceive themselves as a minority but as a part of population living in Croatia. Serbs may well join the Council or "Prosvjeta", but by no means would they join the Party". In some places the influence of SDSS is weak because of the small number of Serbs. A respondent from Imotsko (1957) regards that SDSS did not make much effort to win over voters in her community. "There where Serbs are a majority population, Serbian parties have more success. This does not apply to our community that much, because until the last year nobody from SDSS had turned up. I think that people have more trust in SDP and HNS." A respondent from around Ludbreg (1985) shares the same opinion: "Here half of the people take the voting lists for minorities, and the other half for the national list. SDSS does not have sufficient electorate here to be able to at least present itself." Also in Sinj, where the number of Serbs is extremely low, the situation is similar, according to a respondent from Dabar near Sinj (1949): "Here members of the Serbian community are most often politically organized through the SDP as well as through some other parties of left orientation." Even in Nova Gradiška, where there are significantly more Serbs than in Ludbreg, Sinj or Imotski, Serbian parties do not have much success: "Here most of the Serbs are traditional voters of the SDP and even members and voters of SDSS and other Serbian parties are concurrently members of SDP," said a respondent from Nova Gradiška (1981). A respondent from Benkovac (1982) regards that SDSS could deliver much more in his town. "Our representatives in Benkovac are not good. Much more should be done for the returnees, specifically one should go to see them and ask them about their problems." That SDSS is not just a national party is also the opinion of a part of my respondents. A respondent from Budimac near Našice (1960) regards that the SDSS is not "just a national party, it is a social-democratic party too.

Notwithstanding seven Serbian parties, there are many Serbs in Croatian parties. People from Banija are in HNS, because in their returnee communities this party was the only moderate option against the CDU." A respondent from Ogulin (1979) talks about the division between the Serbian parties and the Social-Democratic party, but also about the necessity to present Serbian identity through the Serbian prefix: "Political representation of Serbs through the parties with the Serbian prefix is presently the only realistic representation of the Serbian community. Serbs are divided between Serbian parties and the SDP. And the only reason for this is that Serbs in Ogulin are nostalgic toward the Communist Party (KP) and live with conviction that the SDP is KP. Every public representation, activity or anything else through anything that holds a Serbian prefix helps to preserve the identity, if by nothing else then at least by mentioning the name. Serbs are still frightened, they are afraid to express their identity, therefore it is necessary to act in all fields under the Serbian prefix." A respondent from Zagreb (1948) regards that Serbs had been traditionally SDP voters, before the Communist Party. "However, in the last conflicts SDP did not take the side of Serbian people in Croatia. In the 1990 elections all my people voted for SDP, believing that they would represent them. Yet, SDP kept silent, and silence means approval. That is why they no longer have equal Serbian support." Serbian identity is also weak in big cities where because of mixed marriages also those who declare themselves as Serbs do not want to vote for the 'Serbian' parties, and instead vote for the 'national' parties. A respondent from Garešnica (1981), who works in a Serbian organization, gave an interesting statement, which coincides with the previous one given by a respondent from nearby Garešnica. "We called over 1000 people in Zagreb to explain them that there is a minority voting list. Most of them answered they were not interested in voting for a minority list because they feel as citizens of this state, and not as a minority, and that therefore they would vote for the national list." Reasons for voting for the national list can be of different nature. A respondent (1986) from Velike Grabičane near Koprivnica (1986) recounted how she came to poll in Črnomerac (Zagreb) and asked for a national minority list. "To my astonishment, they asked me what minority I belonged to. In spite of my belonging to a minority, they were urging me to take the voting list for the national list. Only after I had long insisted that I want to vote as a minority they brought me the minority list, and then I filled it in at their desk. It was such an embarrassing experience." How changeable and differently understood the identity can be illustrates the case of the grandfather of a respondent from Garešnica (1981). Additionally, it exposes reasons why a part of Serbs

in Croatia do not vote for the minority list. "When my grandpa and his friend came to vote at the last elections, a woman from the electoral commission asked them: 'Do you want to vote for the minority list?' Grandpa started yelling at her and told her that he was no minority but a citizen of this country and that his family has been there for three hundred years. These old people will never accept that they are a minority. They are so attached to this area and ever since they know of themselves they know they belong there".

Some respondents perceive SDSS as centralized, or oriented only to the area of eastern Slavonia, Baranja and western Srem where they have the largest number of voters. A respondent from Vlahović near Glina (1946) regards that "it is not good that SDSS has its headquarters in Vukovar. They should establish other local centres, and then the party would surely be stronger". A respondent from Daruvar regards that SDSS is sometimes insufficiently convincing: "SDSS accomplished most on the psychological level, to have the political voice of Serbs heard to some extent, but they were often unconvincing, short of political skill. Probably there is no consistent policy of Serbs in Croatia, all parties with the Serbian prefix quarrelled among each other over preferential treatment by the authorities, so we could name this policy a policy of favouritism. The official Croatian policy does not allow articulation of authentic political interest of Serbs in Croatia, nor the establishment of Serbian political unity. Sometimes, it seems to me that some people are paid not to express interests of Serbs in Croatia in a proper way". Some join a party exclusively because of the individuals at its helm. A respondent from Primišlje (1949) who lives in Zagreb for a long time recollects that "throughout the war Pupovac was with us in Zagreb and he never concealed anything". Some Croatian Serbs criticize SDSS along the same lines as a respondent from Zagreb (1948) who regards that "the party functions more based on interests. They quickly fall for material benefits, and much more could have been accomplished and many more people could have come back". A respondent from Knin (1979) reasons similarly: "It turns out that the parties serve more to themselves than to their electorate".

It appears clear out of all the respondents' answers that for Serbs in Croatia SDSS is the only party identifiable as a serious representative of this national minority. SDSS obviously accomplished most for the Serbs in eastern Slavonia, Baranja and western Srem where they succeeded to rescue Serbs from exodus. Therefore, the headquarters and the largest number of voters of this party are there. The party has success also in certain returnee communities where Serbian parties traditionally have

more voters. However, in north-western Croatia and in big towns the party has no success because of its weak engagement and a small number of voters, notably because of the weak Serbian identity. In some returnee communities with stronger antifascist tradition, SDSS has a feeble influence (e.g. Vojnić where it defeated SDP). The situation is similar also in returnee communities where before the arrival of SDSS, Croatian parties got formed and attracted local Serbs (as in Hrvatska Kostajnica). Some respondents vote for SDSS because of the prominent individuals who by their endeavours in the protection of the rights of Serbian national minority in Croatia have obliged Serbs of Croatia (e.g. Dr. Milorad Pupovac).

Only one response testifies to the importance of the Council in certain communities. A respondent from Primišlje near Slunj (1949), residing long in Zagreb, regards that the Council gives citizens of Serbian nationality possibility to socialize. "The Council gathers us together on New Years' Eve in the Globe. It is a gathering of Croatian Serbs and there we see each other. Otherwise, we would not see each other anywhere." The fact that no one else from among the other respondents found the Council individually worth mentioning, and that it was usually mentioned only alongside parties, pictures in realistic colours Council's recognition and importance for the respondents.

Respondents' answers mostly affirm the importance of minority institutions of non-political character, where the "Prosvjeta" holds a special place. A respondents from Velike Grabičane near Koprivnica (1986) spoke about the importance of the activities of the Serbian cultural society "Prosvjeta" for her personal identity after her coming to Zagreb: "I went to 'Prosvjeta' to socialize with Serbs. Thereby I somehow nurtured my identity in a big city. I wanted to dance Serbian folklore and I found free time for this. I knew that it was something ours." It is noteworthy that "Prosvjeta" in Zagreb does not gather Serbian residents of Zagreb. A respondent from Budimci (1960) regards that in big towns mostly "rural Serbs, those who had moved to that town, gather together in "Prosvjeta". He finds the reason for this in the awareness of the own identity and the elements that make it. With rural Serbs those are national customs and folklore, while urban Serbs are mostly short of that part of the identity. It is visible that in areas where Serbs make absolute majority, cultural institutions are not as important as in those areas where Serbs are not a majority population and where they are not well politically organised. A respondent from Gornji Kosinj (1967) who spent a part of his childhood in Doljani near Donji Lapac gave an interesting comment. "In Donji Lapac people treat culture as a light

stuff. Otherwise, their antennas are directed toward Bosnia and Serbia, they have strong Serbian parties, and they play big Serbs in pubs, so they do not need 'Prosvjeta' to preserve identity. Besides, culture is of no importance to them, and politics comes first." In Ogulin, where Serbian identity was nearly suppressed after the War in ex-Yugoslavia "Prosvjeta" played a very important role of the initiator of national awakening and blocker of the assimilation. A respondent from Ogulin (1979) regards that "Prosvjeta" is one of the factors meritable for the restoration of co-existence after war tragedies between 1991 and 1995: "in 2005 Serbian cultural association 'Prosvjeta' was formed in Ogulin and folklore section began to work. Fifty children got enrolled. The first performance was held in the movie theatre (in 2006) with the participation of two Serbian (from Drežnica and Ogulin) and two Croatian cultural-art societies. Around 500-600 viewers (of different nationalities) watched the programme and I can say that this started a new era of co-existence among people. I believe that many have understood that differences must not be the reason for hate but the bridges that connect us. 'Prosvjeta' was the first to stop assimilation by its cultural work and activity. It opened the way for the church (it gathered children and freed some parents from fear) for the programme of religious education." In Benkovac, where Serbian identity is relatively strong, SKD "Prosvjeta" makes it even stronger. "By organising the folklore, the Days of Desnica and similar events they contribute to preserving the identity", said an interviewee from Benkovac (1982). Sub-boards of the "Prosvjeta" dissolved in certain Serbian communities in Croatia precisely because of the lack of people. "Our first sub-board of 'Prosvjeta' was established in Kosinj in 1994. It dissolved because of the absolute lack of people", regards a respondent from Gornji Kosinj (1967). Still, most of the respondents regard that "Prosvjeta" has a very low importance among Serbs in Croatia. "The identity of Serbs in Ludbreg is formed by religion and church. People don't have a clue about the 'Entrepreneur', while 'Prosvjeta' is also an unknown to them", said an interviewee from Ludbreg (1985).

Taken all together, these statements allow for a conclusion that "Prosvjeta" had achieved really much in those communities where this Society had exceptional figures as its organisers and, on the other hand, failed to gather together Serbs in those communities where the number of Serbs is very low, where Serbian identity is weakened and where insufficiently committed individuals lead "Prosvjeta". In areas where Serbs are in absolute majority, like in some parts of Lika, Kordun, Banija and eastern Slavonia "Prosvjeta" does not play an important role in the creation of the Serbian identity. There, Serbs have their parties, church

organisation, councils, media, thus a folklore society does not make particularly important element in their identity. "Prosvjeta" is also not strong in Croatian towns since the identity of urban Serbs is based on other elements. Practically, we can conclude that "Prosvjeta" is the most important in small rural areas where Serbian identity is endangered because of the assimilation, ethnic mimicry, and mixed marriages. There it preserves Serbian customs and folklore and the Serbian people identity which would otherwise be either suppressed, among the older generations, or forgotten or unknown, among the younger.

Conclusion

In the last twenty years Serbs of Croatia crossed the path from guardians of the state to guardians of the name. By organising themselves into numerous political and non-political organisations Serbs of Croatia tried to preserve their legal position the best they could. In early nineties, one part of Serbs of Croatia tried to do this by violent means establishing the Republic of Serbian Krajina (SDS), while the other part, acting in Croatian towns, tried to ensure referred position by legal means (SDF, SKD "Prosvjeta"). After 1995 and exodus of Serbs from western Slavonia, Banija, Kordun, Lika and northern Dalmatia the number of Serbs in Croatia significantly decreased. Legal means for the realization of the rights of Serbs in Croatia remained as the only possible modus. During the implementation of the peaceful reintegration of the Danube Basin territories, the Independent Democratic Serbian Party was formed, as the only relevant Serbian party present in Croatia, and thereafter also a sequence of other minor parties with the Serbian prefix which failed to attract voters to their programmes (partly because from their inception they were split parties, partly because they were politically obsolete, and partly because they were limited to a smaller territory). Through the Serbian National Council, county Councils and Joint Council of Municipalities Serbs of Croatia managed to realize equality at the local level, and through three parliament representatives at the state level. Although, numerous problems have not been solved yet, although numerous status rights of Serbs of Croatia have not been fully defined, after examining the development of the Serbian organizations in the last twenty years we can conclude that the democratic processes that Croatia has been undergoing in the last twelve years have opened way towards a more equitable society in which national minorities, including in particular the Serbian, as the most numerous national minority in Croatia, will be enjoying the position they deserve.

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Interviews with members of the Serbian national minority in the Republic of Croatia, 2012

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Negative Aspects of Social Capital (Non-Social Capital) as Factors of a Slow Development of Institutional Capacities in Serbia

Abstract

This paper attempts to examine mutual relations between pre-modern and modern forms of social capital, as well as their impact on the overall social capacities of a society in transition, as Serbian society is today. It also examines the relationship and the correlation between the so-called democratic values and civil society and the total flow of democratization of the modern political order emerging in Serbia. The ways a semi-peripheral and pseudo-modern society can, based on some pre-modern forms of social capital, build a community that should become modern and prosperous according to its projected capacities. And whether it is possible to build and adopt the values that raise the capacity of the democratic political system and the general level of political culture in Serbia through political socialization and interiorisation.

Key words: social capital, democratic values, civil society, modern political order, political culture, Serbia.

A part of the authors who belong to the neo-Tocquevillian tradition open very interesting questions regarding relations and the role of civil society and nature of the democratic order in a country in their critically intoned discussions, particularly the issues focusing on the problem of the civil society, which in some cases (e.g. transitional societies, etc.) produces more non-social than social capital, i.e. contributes to its

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fragmentation, creation of nondemocratic relations and greatly endangers the achieved level of institutionalization of the state and society. In such cases, civil society appears as a factor of disintegration and the instability maker and not as an agent of support to the much-needed democratic constitution of the modern political order, especially at its institutional level. Transition societies, as a rule, belong to the type of society where the emerging civil sector aggravated the processes of democratic consolidation at the institutional level by producing surplus of non-social capital, thus further aggravating the already difficult and slow pace of social reforms and changes.

The modern political order, emerging for at least the past two centuries, essentially incorporates several important pillars that carry and maintain it. In addition to the nation state, civil society and citizens, these are certainly democratic values, the rule of law, and the system of positively perceived social capital. They fuse this order, reinforce it and make it functional and self-supporting. A system of political, legal and social institutions could not create and provide a cohesive-legitimate basis for functioning and efficiency of the modern political order on its own, without integrating functions of democratic values and political culture based on deeply rooted social relationships and a positive basis of social capital. Without them, it would have remained a stiff skeleton with little functional strength and mobility. Therefore, it is quite clear why F. Fukuyama determines and defines social capital as a specific series of informal values and norms that are valid among the members of a group or society that promote social cooperation. A part of values that inevitably constitute the network of positively perceived social capital are trust, honesty, reciprocity, solidarity and readiness to cooperate. However, possessing the same values and norms does not necessarily imply positive social capital. Its negative implications are also possible as part of regional or traditional religious forms that create the opposite effect and reduce the amount of social capital in the community. For, according to Fukuyama, norms and values can be also misleading, and when that happens we have a situation of social capital deficit, which in turn creates bad and undesirable social relations in itself (mafia, racism, sexism, etc.). "Southern Italy is a region of the world that is almost universally characterized as lacking in generalized social capital and trust. This does not mean that there are not strong social norms" (Fukujama 2004: 172).

An increase in positive social capital is contributed to only by those norms that contain virtues. M. Weber formulated it in a similar way in the case of impact of Protestant ethic values on shaping the spirit of

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modern capitalism. Therefore it is not surprising that a strong source of social capital can usually be found in the family, particularly the one of the patriarchal type, that strongly influenced its youngest members' interiorization and acquisition by the body of values and virtues that has been passed down to them. By the destruction of the old and the formation of a modern type of family this primary source of positive social capital is largely lost. "Families are obviously important sources of social capital everywhere" (Ibidem: 173). "This confirms the correlation between the family and civil society, mediated by social capital. For neo-Tocquevillians, especially Robert Putnam, this is more than an obvious fact. A dispersed network of social interaction leads to strengthening of trust and an increase in social capital. It is followed by the strengthening of civil society, and in turn, without strong civil society there is no successful democratic rule, as the ultimate goal. "A strong society makes for a strong state" (Vintington 2004: 33).

This, for neo-Tocquevillians obvious, correlation was not without critical observations especially in the part of American expert public that points out that this seemingly logical and obvious connection is not necessarily confirmed. Civil society can often undermine democratic political institutions and their functioning, when it acts too strongly towards their destabilization. For "A well-functioning democracy depends not only on social relations, but also on political institutions and on constitutional order that structures the relationship between them" (Ibidem: 34). Destabilization of political institutions and constitutional order that can come from the sphere of civil society is aimed at reducing the level of loyalty and functionality of political institutions, because associations that constitute an extensive network of civil society can largely substitute the work and significance of political institutions. "Since the ultimate touchstone of political legitimacy in a democracy was the faithful representation of the will of the people, then governement officials were particularly vulnerable to being undermined by voluntary associations that could make their own claims to popular representation. (...) As modern analysts have observed in the American context, 'interest groups' gain leverage over elected officials precisely because of the former's representative authority. Civil society was not merely a foundation for democratic governance; it was also a potentially disruptive force, subversive of regime legitimacy. Democratic governance risked deteriorating into mere anarchy" (Ibidem: 37).

Harmful influence of civil society on the functioning of political and legal institutions is possible in the domain of conflicts of interests and goals of various groups and associations of civil society. Selfishness

and egotism of partial interests may, in their extreme forms, jeopardize what is reported as public interest and the common good of the entire community, especially the part relating to the national interest. And although Tocqueville believed that political associations are an important counter-balance to the tyranny of the majority and alienation of political institutions' interests, a situation with completely reversed value and functional prefix is possible in the modern society, with the general jeopardized by the partial, especially if the partial is well networked and organised as it usually happens in a strong civil society of the Western type. This is particularly dangerous in the communities with the concept of common good not clearly defined, especially when the common good is not additionally protected as the public interest and verified by the most important legal documents such as the Constitution and organic laws, as well as other individual positive legal regulations. In these situations Tocqueville believes, "the state must also play a socializing role", direct the competition of social interests, regulate and bring them to the level of lawful conduct. Otherwise, there would be a strong risk of bringing the division of the state and society in democracies to a situation where "government and social institutions would advocate different or even contradictory" (Ibidem: 43). The role of political institutions and legal system is particularly important in regulating potential or actual conflicts when they arise due to the overstated need to achieve and impose partial interest, substantiated by the strong support of social capital, as general. Such a risk is not unique to countries with the developed civil sector; it is equally if not more strongly emphasized in countries of transition type such as Serbia. Weak state institutions, without convincing democratic legitimacy, without strong functional capacity and tradition, most often are unable to solve social problems and conflicts arising within civil society in the making, that threaten, like a reactive volcano, to destroy modest crops of political freedom and emerging democracy with its eruptive force. "The potential of civil society has been reduced to intellectual circles and NGOs, supported by foreign donations, in comparison to which a vibrant civil society can not get a word in edgeways, in addition to losing the will to engage because it does not see the point. It is about the subordination of the state to a simulacrum of civil society, that is, to small groups of 'experts' whose expertise has not been verified anywhere, whom no one ever, anywhere, elected, and who ensure that their legitimacy is not verified before the citizens at the polls. Therefore, although they don want to be political parties, they behave as if they were" (Brdar 2007: 278). And the thing, as a rule does not end there, it is not only that they (NGOs) do

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not have the original forms of democratic legitimacy, but they also represent a kind of condensed non-social capital, whose negative charge is directed to the destruction of the institutional framework of the state. This so-called civil sector in Serbia has for almost two decades, systematically attacked and destroyed what little is left of national institutional framework still attempting to make a decent political community out of Serbia. Political order here can not be constituted as competent, another reason being that in this dim zone pressures, aimed at the institutional area of the state, constantly occur, repudiating it and making it nonsensical. Take, for example, a devastating but also huge impact an NGO and its president have had to the scope of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Serbia, that, supported by influential circles from abroad, de facto have taken the initiative in determining strategic moves of Serbian diplomacy. In this context, it is about the absence of valid political and legal institutions in transition societies, accompanied with possible misuse of social capital embodied in the fabric of civic associations, hungry for affirmation of their own (and often others') interests (uncontrolled privatization processes, formation of a tycoon structure, crime and the like). "It comes, of course, from the fact that poor countries can hardly have strong democracies" (Antonić 2006: 34).

"Social capital can be used in many ways, and that often means in a way that is at odds with social order and democratic aspirations. For suspension of social conflicts and keeping natural tendencies of civil society under control, successful state institutions are essential" (Ibidem: 46). Social capital and its role in civil society and interaction of the latter with the political order are inseparable from ways of its formation and political use. Without well-balanced use of social capital in the formation of the value environment, political aims and interests of civil society, its mission can easily be reversed from the positive to the negative field of political action. Then it can be used against other members of society, or public interest of the government community. In such situations, the role of the very institutions of the political and legal order in establishing proper functioning of democracy is indispensable. In transition countries like Serbia, where such institutions are underdeveloped and of modest democratic capacity, or even belong to the old regime and the order of uncontrolled political power, the situation is additionally complicated and confusing. According to Sheri Berman, it would be possible for civil society in transition countries to produce more so-called non-social than social capital. This occurs because civil order corrodes the order of political institutions.

On the other hand, S. Huntington cited the low level of political in-stitutionalization, unable to meet the needs of rapid modernization and industrialization, as the reason for failures of modernization projects of countries in transition (countries of the periphery and semi-periph-ery). "In this view, the more complex and diverse a society, the greater the need for strong political institutions capable of bringing together people with a wide variety of interests and associational affiliations and mobilizing them in the service of societal, rather than individual, goals. 'Civicness' could not be created by civil society alone because this sphere remained tied to the varied and particular interests of citiyens; only strong political institutions worked in the service of society as a whole and not its individual components" (Berman 2004: 57). Even Berman herself notes that this type of analysis and argumentation, as suggested by Huntington, cut against the grain of much of the existing literature on development. The problem of these societies did not only lie in the low level of development of their institutional field (undoubtedly the fact), but primarily in the low capacity of modernization, political mod-ernization in particular, as well as the fact that the industrial and overall economic development was not in line with the real needs of these so-cieties. In addition, it should be noted that these societies were further exposed to constant economic plunder and borrowing from the core countries, which further contributed to the rise of authoritarianism and non-democracy in their political fields.

In confusing conditions of transition, with a new order being created on the ruins of the old one, with strong counter-modernization strikes, in Berman's opinion, civil society will not be a promoter of liberal de-mocracy as neo-Tocquevillians would have it, but will rather lead to destabilization of the current system and provide means for its demoli-tion. At this point, we have to express doubts regarding the correctness of this argumentation. It seems that both directions in the post-Toc-quevillian tradition of political sociology in the west rather freely apply their theoretical matrix to societies outside that tradition, as well as to transition societies in Europe, and even more problematic, to societies of peripheral nature, such as those in Asia or Africa, accusing them, like S. Huntington for example, for the failure of modernization and industrialization endeavors.

Slow modernization processes in transition societies relate to many aspects. One of them is certainly related to the social capital deficit aspect, as defined by Western standards. By structure, these societies are anti-modern in many aspects, hence the fact that modern forms of social capital relating to forms of corporate culture in these countries

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are more than meager. Richard Rose highlights the data from a survey saying that more than ninety percent of Russians do not belong to any voluntary association, that by their nature raise the most modern social capital. "Altogether, 91 percent are not members of any of the face-to-face organizations often described as the building blocks of a civic democracy" (Rouz 2004: 97). Therefore, as a recommendation for such a situation he suggests – "If post-Communist governors want people to rely less on personalistic or antimodern tactics, they should reform public sector organizations that reward individuals for using social capital against the modern state" (Ibidem: 98). In places with predominant anti-modern practice, the immediate objective can not be the change in values and positions of the majority of the population, but the change in the method of government. One can not agree with the author's claim on the whole. In addition to changing the method of government, working on changing the citizens' value system and the position is essential, for without that no change made at the institutional level will produce positive effects on the democratization of the country. In that case, the change of the type of government will remain hanging in the air, with no real social foundation to monitor and strengthen the resulting political reform.

From numerous examples of the transition period in the Russian Federation, it was clear that without fundamental changes in the nature of the society (especially its political culture, values and positions of its citizens) democratic order can not be established solely on the strengthening of political institutions or a change of their personnel. A classic Schumpeterian solution that includes expulsion of thieves from institutions, general elections, giving the opposition a chance to occupy the ruling structure, showed the inability of democratic transformation, because for most people, even the very social and political order, the matter was reduced to the change of the so-called thieving structures. "But what is to be done if a sequence of elections simply results in the "circulation of rascals", as one unpopular government is replaced by another that appears no better?" (Ibidem: 98).

There is no successful democratization that is not accompanied by strong and fundamental changes in the sphere of political values and positions that underlie democracy. Without changing the type of political culture, no democratic reform will be able to get more deeply rooted, and to last for a longer period. Political socialization of democratic values (in addition to changing the type of governance and an institutional reform) is in our opinion the key factor for the survival and success of the democratic system and the construction of its insti-

tutions. This is particularly important for the type of transition changes that have been taking place in Serbian society and state in the last decade and a half. For Serbian society is burdened with all kinds of deficits, especially those related to civicness and continuity of democratic tradition. Serbia as a semi-peripheral society of general scarcity, on its way to the constitution of the modern political order, necessarily has to perform the task of abolishing the old regime. On its way, it needs to build a network of civil institutions, initiatives and associations, namely the infrastructure of civil society, as the second important part of the modern political order, and thirdly, it needs to work on changing the type of political culture from authoritarian to democratic. Also, it needs to make a thorough political socialization and interiorization of the corpus of democratic values, the end result of which should be the creation of citizens with full awareness of their civil and political subjectivity as an irreplaceable factor in creating a democratic order. The end result would be Serbia as a modern national state and a modern civil society.

In such a specified context, the role and task of the civil society in Serbia may focus on three important fields. First of all, civil society must play an important defensive-constitutional role, which means that it needs to build all necessary constitutional limits on political power, especially those relating to the protection of human and minority rights. In the next phase the so-called offensive-participatory role of civil society is important, and it should be directed to the area of concentrated political power by focusing civil initiatives and interests to the field of political decision making. And the third, but no less important the role of the so-called civil education and self-education, has the goal to achieve change in the type of political culture, from the old submissive-patriarchal to the new democratic type of political culture, through the processes of changing citizens' values and positions.

It is also important to note that the difficulties in the formation of the civil society in Serbia could be linked to the so-called pre-modern forms of social capital that are formed within the family, in the wider kinship structure, tribal and small-town culture, guild associations and so on. In such an environment, it is difficult to create modern forms of social capital, especially those linked to corporate and civil identity and organizational culture; without it, it is not easy to establish a consistent value system that will imply a stronger identification with the (post) modern community and loyalty to its interests and goals. Part of the problem is also related to the deficit of social elites in Serbia, and in the opinion of M. Brdar it is related to the problem of diffusion of neces-

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sary capital (among them social capital is particularly important) "The main reason for low work-reform potential of transition societies co-incides with the reason for the thesis on absence of real elites. The fact is that groups that would otherwise account for elites are scarce owing to the diffusion of necessary capital" (Brdar 2006: 146). The absence of a competent elite in Serbia is a huge problem of our society- without it is difficult to build a basis of systemic development and establish standards of decent national community. Hence such resistances and a slower pace of democratic change than what we need and what the majority of citizens want.

Between needs and reality, in addition to other factors of political and institutional nature, the problem of social capital deficit in Serbia surely also achieves negative impact to the depth of democratic chang-es and the velocity of forming competent institutions. Ultimately, good functioning of democratic institutions and procedures largely depends on proper and balanced interaction between civil society and politi-cal institutions, and not simply on their mere existence and everyday activities. The total contribution of civil society to democratic changes in Serbia, among other things needs to be measured by the quantity of generated social capital or lack of non-social capital as products of its activity.

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Harmonisation of Asylum and Integrations Policy With the European Union Legislation

Abstract

Serbia's strategic priority in the EU integration process is harmonisation of legislative and administrative frameworks with European standards. The importance of migration issue arises from its relevance for the social and economic development and the rate of progress in the European Union accession process. Still, Serbia has no unique and explicitly formulated migration policy. Migration management and integration policy are primarily characterised by being focused on problems and needs of refugees and internally displaced persons. Despite the revised legislation within legal and illegal migrations, asylum and visa policies, adoption of many sector strategies, there is no comprehensive migration policy that is completely harmonised with the European Union guidelines, moralities and principles. Even with the significant progress in these areas, first of all in the asylum system which is harmonised to the international standards to a great extent, Serbia is still facing great challenges due to limited resources, lack of capacities and insufficient coordination of responsible authorities.

Key words: asylum, integration policy, legislation, harmonisation.

In the past decades, migration policy has taken a very important place in the agendas of all the European countries. Migrations particularly gain in significance in the contexts of globalisation, respectively in the guaranteed freedom of movement and European integrations. Uniquenesses of every country, amplified multiple times at supranational level, pose a challenge to harmonisation of the European migration policy. A need for harmonised migration policy at the level of the Union is directly linked to establishing "a space for freedom, safety and justice in which secured free movement of people is linked to appropriate measures in relation to the control of external borders, asylum, immigration, prevention and fight against crime".[3] Abolishment of internal borders between the states initiated the imperative classification of imigration into the issues of common interest as a non-border area meant that the immigration policy of one country had direct implications on other member countries (Stanković 2011).

The key to success of a harmonised immigration policy lies in the common European framework for integration of migrants. Growing tensions between domicile population and immigrants initiated the first call-up to "more energetic integration policy" in the EU region, sent from the Summit in Tampere in 1999, thereafter a whole number of initiatives which were decorated with efforts for a more efficient integration on one side, and the hostility toward immigrants, on the other.

The status of immigrants within the European Union differs very much depending on economic, demographic, political, social, cultural and other characteristics of a member country – destination country, but also the characteristics of an origin country of migrants. Although heterogenous, a group of immigrants from other member countries is better integrated in the European societies, according to most integration indicators (presence on the labour market, level of education, rates of political participation, housing conditions and so on), while immigrants from the so-called third countries are still very often perceived as a safety treat, especially after the events from 11 September 2001, ever since more restrictive immigration policies have been put into effect.

The acceptance procedure and the length of their stay, countries usually define independanltly or through bilateral agreements, depending on demographic, economic and political need for a certain group of immigrants. Perception of migrants as a jeopardizing factor and the politics of fear coming out of it, have had an impact on the contents of conditions imposed by the Union on the candidate countries in view

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3   The Treaty of Amsterdam, Article J.7.

of migration issues (Jileva 2002). Increased vigilance of the member countries towards citizens from outside the European Union draws and sets a number of additional conditions that these countries need to meet if they aim at the membership in the Union.

All of these factors have a direct impact on creation and modification of immigration and integration policies of the member countries, but also on their preference, or resistance to common regulations in this field.

Building of Legislative Framework of Migration Policy of Serbia

Dealing with all kinds of migrations – internal and external, legal and illegal, forced and voluntary, there has been the need for a comprehensive migration policy in Serbia for a long time.

The necessity for a systemic management of migrations more recently has come out of the actual demographic situation, which is primarily characterized by a rapid population aging and depopulation in the most vital ages (Nikitović 2009). Also, Serbia has always been the country of emigration, with 2.5 to 4.5 million people of the first, second and third generation in the diaspora. Like other transitional countries, Serbia is dealing with serious economic and social dislocations connected to the persistant poverty, high unemployment rates, growing crises of economic safety, which is why a great number of people are still leaving the country in search of a profitable working engagements.

The basis of migration politics in Serbia, or former SFRY, was made up of ratified documens of the international law within the domain of protected human freedoms: Convention relating to the legal status of stateless persons (1959), Convention relating to the status of refugees (1963), International convention on the elimination of all forms of racial discrimination (1965), International covenant on civil and political rights and other conventions.

With the breakup of the former Yugoslavia, the civil war and NATO military intervention, migration issues have been focused on finding solutions to the status and problems of a large number of refugees and internally displaced persons. At that time, the National strategy for resolving the issues of refugees and internally displaced persons was adopted (2002), which seeks to resolve this problem in a comprehensive manner.

A more intensive activity in the field of migration policy followed in 2005/2006 with the beginning of negotiations on the conclusion of the Stabilisation and Association Agreement, or adoption of the mandate by the Council of EU ministers for negotiations on the visa facilitation and readmission agreements.[4]

Preconditions for the conclusions of these agreements referred to a clear and decisive fight against illegal migration and admission of citizens residing illegally in a country of the Union, as well as other persons who arrived to the EU through Serbia's territory.

In the period preceeding the signing of Stabilisation and Association Agreement (2008), and immediately after the signing, most legal acts were adopted, which is the basis for building a unique and comprehensive migration policy.

The process of European Union accession has actualized the issue of migration management in its most important segments: fight against illegal migrations, visa policies, integration policy, border controls, regulation of residing of foreigners and the protection of citizens in a foreign country.

Guidelines for harmonisation with the European Union legislation in this area have been given in the part of the Stabilisation and Association Agreement on justice, freedom and safety (2008)[5] and they include mutual coordination and consultation regarding people's movements and suppression of criminal activities.

The begining of a systematic and coordinated migration management towards accomplishing goals and priorities of a migration policy marked the making of the Strategy for migration management in 2009 and the action plan for its implementation two years later.

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4   Mandates for negotiations on visa facilitation and readmission agreements with Bosnia and Herzegovina, Macedonia and Montenegro were adopted in the same year as well. Albania had already had a concluded readmission agreement so only the mandate for negotiations on visa facilitation was adopted.
    The Agreement concluded between Serbia and the European Union in 2008 on readmission of persons residing illegally on the territory of the Union, procedures for the reintegration of Serbian citizens have been regulated, and their admission has been one of the conditions to put Serbia on the Schengen white list. In order to fulfill the agreement, the government has adopted the Strategy on reintegration of returnees in 2009 as well as the appropriate action plan.

5   The area of justice, freedom and security in its fullest extent defines all relevant elements of a consistent and comprehensive migration policy such as visa regime, border control, prevention and control of illegal immigration, readmission, but also of activities in fighting crimes (human trafficking, corruption, money forging, illegal trade in weapons and narcotics, terrorism).

Apart from this strategy, in the same year were also adopted the Strategy for suppression of illegal migrations in the Republic of Serbia for period 2009 – 2014, the Strategy of reintegration of returnees based on the Agreement on readmission, as well as the Strategy for development of official statistics in the RS from 2009 until 2012, which introduced regular annual investigations of internal migrations from 2009 and external migration begining from 2012.

It could be said that 2009 was the key year in regulating migration issues because, amongst other things, the rights, obligations and status of foreigners in our country have been defined by the Law on foreigners[6] and a number of legal acts which regulate in more detail conditions for the approval of temporary stay to foreigners for the purpose of professional development, family reunion, medical insurance, conditions for issuing a visa at the border crossing, extension of a visa expiry date or permanent residence, as well as conditions for refusal of entrance of foreigners into Serbia.

There is no doubt that Serbia made a giant progress in harmonising its legislation to the EU acquis in the area of migration. Although success in certain areas of migration differs a lot, a significant improvement in the asylum system which is largely harmonised with the international standards, cannot be denied.

Asylum Policy Development

An important element of migration policies is asylum policy. Due to migration pressures in the 80s and a great number of applications, asylum policy, which had been in a shadow of the European integration by then, started to take the central place in the political discourse of the Union. It was only by the Amsterdam Treaty that the asylum policy was transferred from the third to the first pillar of the EU, and criteria and mechanisms for establishing the country competent for examination of applications of asylum seekers, minimum standards for their admittance and temporary protection were defined.[7]

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6 Law on foreigners came into force on 4th November 2008, and began to be implemented on 1st April 2009.

7 Treaty of Amsterdam, Article 73k, [online]. Available at: http://www.eurotreaties.com/amsterdamtreaty.pdf [Accessed 12 December 2011].

Asylum procedure harmonisation within the Union itself started by the signing of the Dublin Convention[8] in 1990, which entered into force only in 1997, whereas the foundation for the joint European asylum policy were set in 1999 by the Tampere Programme, respecting the Charter on basic rights in the European Union and the Geneva Conventions. The aim of establishing such a policy is to accomplish similarity in asylum procedures in all the EU member states.

Although the national legislation on asylum policy is based on many international conventions[9] ratified by our country, in Serbia this area started to be defined ten years after the joint European policy had been establihed. Beside the international guidelines, this process has been affected by a sudden and constant increase in numbers of asylum seekers.[10] The Law on asylum was adopted in 2007[11] and sets the basis for the adoption of a number of regulations[12] for the work of Asylum centre, but also for the rights of asylum seekers.

Asylum application procedure is unique and consists of 4 phases. In the first phase, a person expresses the intention before the authorised

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8 The Dublin Convention determines the state responsible for examining applications for asylum, submitted in an EU member state, based on family connections, valid visas or residence permits, crossing the borders of a Union member state during arrival of an asylum seeker from the third country and control of asylum seekers entrance into the territory of member states.

9 Serbia has signed many conventions that make the basis of regulation in this area, such as: UN Convention on the rights of the child, Optional protocol to the Convention on elimination of all forms of discrimination against women, UN Convention against transnational organised crime, The Council of Europe Convention on Action against Trafficking in Human Beings, International Labour Organisation Convention number 14, on migrations in cases of abuse and improvement of equal opportunities and treatment of migrant workers, International Labour Organisation Employment Policy Convention number 122 and number 111 (discrimination in terms of employment and occupations), number 88 (on employment mediation agency), Police Cooperation Convention for Southeast Europe and many other.

10 Until the end of 2010, 461 persons requested asylum compared to 2008 when there was only 77 asylum seekers. Most seekers came from Aphganistan, which was much higher than in other countries of origin (Georgia, Ivory Coast, Iraq, Somalia…).

11 Implemented since 1st April 2008.

12 In accordance with obligations coming out of the Law on asylum, The Commisariat for refugees enacted the following regulations: Regulations on the house rules in the asylum centre, Regulation on the housing conditions and provision of basic living conditions at the asylum centre and the Regulation on records keeping methods and contents regarding persons in the asylum centre ("Official Gazzette of the Republic of Serbia", number 31/2008), and the Regulation determining the right to social welfare for asylum seekers, or those that have been approved asylum (Ministry of labour and social policy) and Regulation on medical examinations of asylum seekers (Ministry of Health).

official of the Ministry of Interior Affairs after which he or she is issued a certificate to be reffered to the Asylum Office or Centre. Second phase is registration, during which the establishment of identity, photographing and dactiloscoping is being carried out in the Asylum Department, followed by issuance of identity card to a person, meaning that he or she can formally submit an application for asylum. After the application has been submitted, follows a hearing for the purpose of examining the reasons for seeking asylum. Based on the collected data, an appropriate decision is made (Law on asylum 2007). In case the application is denied, a person can submit an appeal to the second instance court[13] - Asylum Office, against whose decision an administrative proceeding can be initiated.

According to the UNHCR information, the Law on asylum is largely harmonized with the EU regulations, as well as the duration of the process. While the Directive on asylum procedure (Article 23.2) obliges member states to finalize the procedure in the shortest possible period (FRA, 2010), the European Commission , in its altered proposal[14] suggested that it is limited to 6 months at the first level instance. Although our Law on asylum does not prescribe the maximum duration of the procedure, according to the Law on general administrative procedure, the first instance, or the second instance body must make a decision on application, or complaint, within 60 days, which means that the whole procedure cannot last more than 4 months.

The Law on Asylum provides three forms of protection which are, at the same time, normative solutions in most member countries:

- refuge, or refugee status provided to refugees on the territory of Serbia due to justified fear of persecution from their own country (Article 2);
- subsidiary protection, granted to foreign citizens whose lives, safety and freedom would be endangered should they return to their country of origin (Article 2), and
- temporary protection, provided in the case of a massive influx of persons from a country where their lives are threathened by a generalised violance, conflicts or violation of human rights (Article 36).

Harmonisation with the European Union legislation is also reflected in implementation of safe origin country and safe third country concepts (Article 2, para 11 and 12). In accordance to that, in 2009

13 First instance authority is the Department for asylum that makes decisions.

14 See: European Commission COM(2009) 554 final, amendments to Article 23.3.

the Decision on establishment of a list of safe countries of origin and safe third countries was adopted. Also, the Law defines the reasons for groundlessness of asylum requests, but not the examination procedure, although the Council of Europe adopted the regulation for expeditious examination of groundless asylum requests. In addition to these concepts, the Law on asylum stipulates principles of asylum proceedings the aim of which is warranty, or protection of rights of an asylum seeker, first of all in providing free legal aid and information, translation servies, free access to UNHCR, advocating unaccompanied minors and handicapped, as well as an obligation of hearing an asylum seeker in the shortest possible period (Janjević 2003: 191).

Even though the Serbian asylum system is mostly harmonised with the European legislation, the key challenge is the lack of experience, or institutional and human resources.

In the field of institutional famework, apart from responsible ministries dealing with these issues (Ministry of Internal Affairs, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Ministry of Labour and Social Policy, Ministry of Human and Minority Rights and Ministry of Religion and Diaspora), the new authorities have been established for a more efficient approach to the problem. Significant roles in national politics have the Council for fight against human trafficking, established in 2004, Council for integration of returnees based on the Agreement on readmission, formed in 2008, and the Coordination body for migration monitoring and management, founded a year later, within which the Commissariat for refugees carries out professional, operational and administrative and technical jobs. However, during the process of reform implementation and harmonisation with the Union laws, Serbia did not identify services that would serve for implementation of provisions related to determing responsible states for examination of asylum requests and for record keeping and finger print processing of asylum seekers, considering that it is not a signatory to the Dublin II regulation nor a user of Eurodoc system that was introduced for easier implementation of the Dublin Convention (Janjević 2003).

Insufficient acommodation capacities for asylum seekers are a particular problem having in mind current, but also perceived, greater influxes due to political upheavals in the North Africa. Besides, there has not been an adequate answer to the problem of false asylum seekers to whom Serbia is just a transit country towards the countries of the European Union, so many of them "disappear" before their applications even get examined.

Basis of Integration Policy in Serbia

Diversity behind integration trends of migrants overcomes national borders of a state and becomes a general issue of many European institutions at all levels. From the very beginning, integration made the essence of the European policies. As one of the main goals of the European integration was internal market, integration itself was understood as a process of facilitating mobility of the European Union workers over the member states borders, in which they enjoy equality, indiscrimination, the right to family reunion and the right to a safe status. The EU has considerably modified its understanding of integration through the development of a common framework for integration related to the third countries citizens as part of the area of freedom, safety and justice.

Integration of so-called third-country nationals in the European Union became a matter of multilateral normative and developmental political processes of the policies starting from 1999. However, the principle of subsidiarity is still leading in this area, which led to the occurrence of alternative policy frameworks that are based on the knowledge and information sharing (Carrera 2008). Integration policies are currently in a phase of designing, major modifications and development.

Although the previous decade is characterised by relatively slow development of integration framework, its progressiveness cannot be denied. Common integration framework is an innovative network management in the area of integrations related to third-country nationals at the Union level and comprises a package of non-compulsory regulatory instruments and various supranational networks.

As employment is the key principle[15] of integration process (one of total 11 adopted basic integration principles in 2004) which is "a dynamic, two-way process of common harmonisation" of both immigrants and nationals of a member state (Council of the European

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15 The main integration principles were adopted on 19th November 2004at the meeting of the Council of justice and internal affairs with the aim to help formulating integration policy, as simple, non-binding guides through which a member state can evaluate its policy. These principles relate to key elements and mechanisms of a successful integration of immigrants in the EU member states, such as: respect for the main EU values, basic knowledge of a language, history and institutions of the host society, education, access of immigrants to institutions and services, frequent interaction between immigrants and EU nationals, participation of immigrants in the democratic process and formulation of integration policy and measures, appreciation of different cultures and religions and so on.

Union, 2004: 17), it could be said that Serbia has mostly approached the Union measures exactly in terms of economic integration measures.

Namely, the main principle of foreign nationals integration in Serbia is achievement of the rights arising from labour, and above all: the right to work and employment, professional development and education, access to labour and services market, the right to social and medical insurance, the right to social welfare, freedom of association, connection and membership in organisations that advocate the interests of workers and employers. An unemployed foreign national with permanent residence is entitled to active employment policy measures like our nationals, if registered with the National employment service.

Since education is an important factor of efficient economic integration, following the efforts of the EU member states in providing the same rights for immigrants and domicile population, Serbia has foreseen favourable legal regulations guaranteeing that the rights to education be exercised under the same conditions as for the nationals of the Republic of Serbia. However, what makes Serbia quite different from the European Union member countries is absence of compulsory language learning, or language courses,[16] but possibility of mother tongue and culture education for the European nationals' children in an institution determined by a local authorities based on the principle of reciprocity is provided.

The rights from the social insurance system are exercised on the basis of bilateral agreements[17] on social insurance coordinating the social insurance system. These agreements significantly respect European principles, allowing summation of insurance periods for exercising the rights from social insurance, payment of pensions in the territory of the other contracting state, equal treatment of the other contracting state nationals, proportionate part of benefits (*pro rata temporis* principle) etc.

In the pension and invalidity insurance system, foreign nationals employed in our country are entirely equalized with the nationals of Serbia in rights and obligations.

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16 Except for the displaced persons and refugees for whom the school arranges language courses, or additional classes according to a special programme for activities relevant for further education.

17 Serbia has concluded agreements on social insurance with 27 countries of which 16 are the European union countries. Most agreements were concluded during the time of Yugoslavia.

Family care and social welfare are regulated by the Law on social welfare (2011), Familiy with children income support law (2009) and Family law (2005).

Assistance and support to foreign nationals within family protection and children care is provided only under the conditions set out in bilateral agreements on social insurance. According to the Family with children income support law "a foreign national working in the territory of the Republic of Serbia is entitled to the children support, providing it is determined by the international agreement, under the conditions prescribed by this Law" (Article 17 para 4).

Apart from the Republic of Serbia nationals, the Law on social welfare also specifies, as beneficiaries of the social welfare, "foreign nationals and persons without citizenship, in accordance with the law and international agreements" (Article 6 para 1 and 2.). Most services of the social welfare, which at the same time also represents social inclusion measures, are carried out at local level, so local authorities provide these serices for all the residents of a certain local community.

Integration framework for asylum seekers, as one of the groups of foreign nationals, has been contained in the Law on asylum and the mentioned adopted regulations. Namely, asylum seekers in Serbia have the right to health care and social welfare. Should they be granted a refuge, these persons shall have rights equal to those of permanently residing foreign nationals with respect to the right to work, freedom of movement, movable and immovable property and the right of association. Furthermore, a person seeking asylum has the right to free primary and secondary education and accommodation for up to one year upon being granted asylum, which is also in line with the principles of the EU regulations.

However, even with these efforts to harmonise integration policy as much as possible with the principles of the European policies in this area, the specificity of Serbia is the focus on integration of refugees and displaced persons, which is regulated by the Law on refugees and the National strategy for resolving the problems of refugees and internally displaced persons. Internally displaced persons are legally and formally nationals of Serbia, meaning that they have the same rights and obligations like all other nationals. In reality, due to poverty, complicated administrative procedures, unresolved property relations, many of them have troubles to exercise their own rights. Regulated residence is of a vital importance for their realisation, so the lack of personal documents, be it because they never had one (Roma) or because they were

destroyed or burned in Kosovo and Metohija, excludes them from re-alisation of various guaranteed rights (Brkić 2007).

Refugees are holders of the rights to health care, education and work under the same conditions as domestic nationals, as well as the right to local services and accommodation in the social care institutions. What is lacking at this level are integration support services which are not suf-ficiently developed. Even with the guaranteed rights, the problem is that most of them they exercise with their refugee identification without the personal identity number, which is the condition for resolving many statutory and administrative issues (Brkić 2007).

Most of the integration measures for this category of foreign nation-als are primarily directed to their social, however much less to their economic integration. In the first years after the war, they implied per-manent solution of housing issues, while in the last years they are di-rected towards a new form of social protection – social housing in pro-tected conditions. For better economic integration, different programs and trainings have been developed in order to increase competitiveness on the labour market and achieve financial independence.

In general, adoption of the new Law on citizenship (2007) contrib-uted to the social, economic and political integration of all foreign na-tionals, which simplified the requirements for acquisition of citizenship and created the possibility to achieve more rights.

Conclusion

At the EU level, immigration and integration issues are on the top of agendas of the member states and are inextricably linked to the ideals of freedom, safety and justice. Although all member countries are coping with the growing aging of population, but also with the new immigra-tion pressures despite the contrary expectations at the beginning of the world economic crises, it cannot be said that there exists a political or social consensus on the best migration policy and cultural and ethnic diversity (Angenendt 2008).

However, there are still differences present in the number of asylum seekers, rates of approved asylum applications, and the guaranteed sta-tus of immigrants in a member country and at the EU level. There is still a long way of harmonisation process ahead of some member states in order that asylum seekers have the same treatment (Richt 2006).

In light of the accession process, there is a number of preconditions placed in front of Serbia, as a state aiming for membership in the European Union, relating to reforms of legislative system and its harmonisation with the European legislation. Migration control is only one of the principles, priorities and conditions defined by the National plan for integration of the Republic of Serbia into the EU.

Serbia has achieved the greatest progress in the asylum system, as far as harmonisation of legislation in this area is concerned. Also, a progress has been noted in the areas of visa regime and process of re-admission, despite certain issues such as: a lack of precise evidence, as far as returnees from the European Union countries are concerned, and insufficient coordination at all levels in order to secure admission and reintegration. Besides, many returnees do not have personal documents, which is why they are unable to exercise their rights, and some of them (even 30% according to some information) are trying to go back to some European countries upon return in spite of stimulation by Union countries given for a voluntary return as a kind of financial support.[18] This indicates that Serbia has not gone far from the inceptive measures in the inegration policy that would primarily be directed to the social integration of refugees from the former SFRY republics after the war developments in the nineties.

The farthest "distance" from the European regulative system of these policies (asylum system and integration policy) is the lack of initiative at the local level because inclusion institutions and services, whose availability and responsibility lie with the local authorities, are an important factor of successfull and complete integration. As a frequent interaction between migrants and member countries nationals are one of main mechanisms of integration in the countries of the European Union, many practices at the local level aim to make these interactions less conflict, fostering a sense of belonging and changing perspection. Projects aiming to decrease tensions and stimulate communication are implemented in many European cities.

The speed of the accession process of Serbia to the European Union will directly depend on overcoming these disadvantages. The membership will not be possible without a firm commitment and intensive work of Serbia on adoption of principles and values that the European society is based on.

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18 Ibid.

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G20 and the World Economic Policy: Agenda Development

Abstract

Current financial crisis has seen numerous intergovernmental organisations' declarations and plans to handle international finance in order to create conditions for strong, sustainable and balanced growth, with G20 leading this way. The crisis spill-over has clearly demonstrated a rising level of interdependence in the world economy. In spite of that, a unilateral state-level approach has so far been firmly in place and primarily national packages were implemented to minimise the adverse crisis effects to the real (national/regional) economies. This paper aims at evaluating the progress in creating a global regulatory scheme since the 2008 G20 Washington Summit, through reviewing shifts in political responses and changing agendas. The financial crisis of 2008 might have been a direct motive to start a global political interplay regarding regulation, but it was also a unique opportunity for numerous actors to start pressing their own agenda vis-à-vis a global economic (and political) order. Even though G20 efforts to coordinate policies and agree on regulatory common denominators have to be welcomed, the present level of discrepancy among national/regional agendas is still too significant for longer term and sustainable effects on the world economy to be foreseen. Nevertheless, the group's unique position and the evolution of its agenda may point to a new form of informal minilateralism emerging in international relations.

Key words: crisis, global economy, international cooperation, international regulatio.

Introduction

In March 2010, Anton Valukas, appointed by a US court to examine the Lehman Brothers failure in September 2008, made his report

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available to the general public. One of the key findings was that significant regulatory differences between the US and the UK systems, in the area of repo operations, presented (and still do) excellent opportunities to be used for financial malversations.[2] This was an extreme case with catastrophic consequences but most illustrative for the issue of international (non)cooperation in the area of financial regulation.

With the emergence of transnational banking and definitely since the beginning of the current crisis, the issue of international financial regulation has been among the most contentious ones on the global agenda. From the pictures taken, it seems that major actors on the scene have the same goal: stabilising the financial world and designing new mechanisms that could prevent future turbulence on a global economic/financial scale. Nevertheless, declarations produced at intergovernmental fora did not in any way point to a regulatory/legal framework through which such global actions would or could be implemented. This was evidently the case at least until the Greek crisis in December 2011 when the actors suddenly took their focus away from global cooperation in financial regulation. Since then, the global agenda seems to diverge in several directions: the EU dealing with the Euro problems, the US coping with an Executive-Legislative stalemate and the budget cutting and developing countries trying to manage their own economic hardships, etc. One way of looking into the possibilities to devise a global economic/financial policy is to analyse the work done by and within the Group of Twenty (G20) since the onset of the crisis.

II. Politics of International Regulation

The severity and scope of the present crisis have not only seriously affected most national economies but also exhibited an opportunity to question, test and change basic principles of the dominance of neoliberalism and even capitalism itself.

Since the crisis outbreak in September 2008, governments in developed market economies have implemented actions aimed at supporting individual institutions (so-called 'too-big-to-fail' institutions) and programmes directed to the system as a whole. National measures have included, inter alia, injecting the capital to the banks, taking over contaminated assets or extending guarantees to help reduce the banks' exposure to large losses, strengthening deposit insurance schemes, cutting

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2   For details see: http://lehmanreport.jenner.com.

reference rates and nationalising banks. In 2011, new measures were introduced in a great number of economies, aimed at reducing government and private debt, raising new finance, cutting the budgets, etc.

International financial institutions have also stepped in to provide additional lending at more favourable conditions, especially for developing countries (Panetta 2009). At the same time, a plethora of diverse political ideas, plans, statements and declarations were made on the causes, effects and prospects of the current crisis.

Regardless of their differences, the intensity of national and international political debates, particularly around the issues of interdependence and global linkages, may point out that a new global/transnational social space is coming into being and all social, political and economic activities are becoming affected by its logic. Such a supraterritorial social space seems not to be bound by territory, distance or legal systems, and structural change occurs independently of agency, frequently used by political leaders to justify their decisions as inevitable (Scholte 2002: 7).

Furthermore, structural changes today allow for potential different, multiple equilibriums because actors' strategic and tactical choices interact with such changes, thus creating a number of potential outcomes. In the present world, and this is even truer for global capital, numerous and interlinked processes design the global scene: internationalisation, transnationalisation, translocalisation and so on. In addition, a multitude of actors (emerge) have emerged on a supranational scene that (has) had previously been strictly reserved for governmental actors, what Cerny calls multinodal politics (Cerny 2007: 2) and Underhill and Zhang describe as a relative disarmament of public authorities (Underhill and Xiaoke 2006: 29). Cohen (2010) goes further and describes the structural changes as favourable conditions for the emergence of public-private hybrid regulatory regimes. Even though non-governmental actors have gained importance, the extent and consequences of the current crisis have proved excellent opportunities for the authorities to invest in regaining the strength of their 'arms'.

Is this crisis just a final nudge to 'destroy' the dominant neoliberal economic order or are we witnessing a time frame wherein the level of world 'fluidity' requires a total remake (Ruggie 1993: 2)? Certainly beyond doubt is the fact that global capital today presents one of the major areas of concern for the world economy as a whole and there is a pressing demand for new/updated regulatory arrangements to be made (Sorensen 2006: 7-9). Still, the very notion of regulation deserves

a brief explanation because it has always been regarded as belonging to the (national) state domain. However, as Jordana and Levi-Faur describe (2004), recent global economic developments have emphasised an expansive use of the notion, broadening to include all mechanisms of social control (in contrast to a narrow understanding limited to specific forms of governance with authoritative rules, monitoring and compliance enforcement). From this perspective, a new regulation for global problems is characterised by partially voluntary agreements, the lack of strong monitoring and enforcement rules and obvious disregard for the concept of national sovereignty. Kobrin (2002) attributes the rise of new regulatory arrangements in today's world to 'patchwork' political structures: in an interdependent world, actors stretch across fluid boundaries, adapt themselves and liaise with other actors in order to achieve their goals. As interdependence increases, the need to coordinate actions across (the ?) states and regions also increases; hence, there becomes a greater need for international regulation.

III. The G20 and the Crisis

Since 2008, the G20 has placed itself at the centre of worldwide debates and actions in order to design (and implement) a new global financial/economic order. According to Ocampo and Griffith-Jones (2010: 1), such an order should regulate all financial and capital markets worldwide, offer emergency financing, manage excessive indebtedness, guide national economic policies toward global stability and guarantee a fair and effective international monetary system. The processes of global political deliberations were directed to several culminating points: the G20 summit meetings in Washington (2008), London and Pittsburgh (2009), Toronto and Seoul (2010) and Cannes (2011). What had been planned as a show-room for united and orchestrated action actually resulted in a serious compromise between the different agendas of the Anglo-Saxon pole and the continental European 'league', while only a few of the developing countries' proposals were adopted. Once again, their overlapping but differing agendas pointed out that contemporary politics is one of detachment (Kratochwil 2007: 5) of 'cool loyalties' and 'thin' patterns of solidarity.

A number of action plans and numerous proposals and measures to counter the current crisis were adopted at the summits. The analysis that follows aims at presenting the evolution of the G20 agenda as crisis effects widened in scope and depth. These changes not only involved

changing agenda items (e.g., from private actors' risk taking to sovereign financing) and rankings (e.g., from the prominence of financial regulation in 2008 to that of employment in 2011), but also changes to the agenda's comprehensiveness (from financial regulation in 2008 to monetary and fiscal coordination in 2011), its geographic focus (from the US in 2008 to Europe and the East in 2011) and modes of the Group's functioning (from the top leaders to specific ministerial meetings).

Cooperation and Coordination in Financial Regulation: Washington, London and Pittsburgh 2008/2009

The 2008 Washington Summit was the first in a series of such meetings and it was held at time when the current crisis was still developing its full force. During the previous months, numerous countries had started implementing urgent measures to stabilise their financial markets and institutions but it was soon realised that the challenges were too comprehensive for any country to act on its own.

The leaders discussed the causes of the crisis and shared opinions on the needed regulatory reform and macroeconomic policies in the short- and medium-terms. The final document of the summit[3] presented an Action Plan focused on several objectives, such as improving transparency and accountability, developing sound regulation, promoting financial markets' integrity, strengthening international cooperation and reforming international financial organisations. At the time, a general opinion was that stronger support for market principles, open trade and investment regimes and sound financial regulation would yield positive results in the global economy. For the purpose of this paper, a part of the official Statement from G20 Summit is very illustrative: 'Major underlying factors to the current situation were, among others, inconsistent and insufficiently coordinated macroeconomic policies, inadequate structural reforms, which led to unsustainable global macroeconomic outcomes'.[4] So, even at the debut summit, the leaders acknowledged that changes in regulation to prevent excessive risk-taking, the initial motive for gathering, would not suffice.

Following numerous formal and informal meetings within and outside the group, the G20 London Summit in April 2009 resulted in three

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3   Full text of the document available at http://www.g20.org/images/stories/docs/eng/washington.pdf.

4   http://www.nytimes.com/2008/11/16/washington/summit-text.html?pagewanted=all.

declarations on the recovery plan, the financial system and resources to implement the plan.[5] The Global Plan for Recovery and Reform underscores that fairness/equality in enjoying indivisible growth and its sustainability are the leading values. In order to achieve them, two basic components are agreed: an effectively regulated market economy and strong, supranational institutions. Promoting global trade and rejecting protectionism fall well behind the goals to restore confidence, growth, employment and lending, but ahead of an inclusive, green and sustainable recovery. A commitment was made to implement a $1.1 trillion programme in support of credit markets, growth and employment in the world economy.

Without needing much elaboration, one must pay particular attention to different levels of norms planned to guide further actions. Four different types (or levels) of norms can be identified in the documents: global standards (most binding, applicable to all countries: related to accounting standards and principles), internationally-agreed norms (subject to separate agreements: financial system regulation), best practice (desirable, recommended: activities of credit rating agencies) and a consistent approach (most flexible: basic principles of national financial regulation, for example, coverage and boundaries). The core of the documents focuses on strengthening financial supervision and regulation. In order to secure a much greater consistency and systematic cooperation, a new international body should be established: a Financial Stability Board. It would encompass a wider membership and work closely with the IMF to provide early warning of macroeconomic and financial risks.

The London G20 communiqué resulted from an ongoing political process lasting for many months and encompassing a variety of issues, stances, interlinked and conflicting values as well as diverse proposals of how to structure new (regulatory) arrangements.

The G20 Summit in Pittsburgh proved that leaders decided to keep the spotlight on their actions, at least in the short-term. Though not yielding many results in terms of structural transformations (output side) as the London Summit did, this event brought forward two major changes. First, the G20, as a precursor to expanding the political community, should take over from the G8 the role of being the central forum for creating a new international economic architecture. Secondly, leading intergovernmental financial institutions should be reformed in a way that would give more voting power to dynamic emerging econo-

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5   Official text of the documents available at http://www.number10.gov.uk/Page18914.

mies, thus enhancing the probability of a successful future implementation of global norms. Reaching a consensus on incorporating macroprudential concerns about system wide risks into international regulation is one of the most significant accomplishments.

Perhaps most important, the Pittsburgh Summit initiated a 'regulatory race to the top' for reaching international agreement and then for implementing new standards nationally. One must not forget, in the 1970s a similar state competition (though in an opposite direction of deregulation) created an impetus for a sometimes high-risk search for a friendly environment and very short-term economic restructuring.

From Responding to Steering Macroeconomics: Toronto and Seoul 2010

The Toronto Summit in 2010 showed the first signs of declining unity in dealing with the world economic problems. The sovereign debt crisis that emerged in the European Union especially affected the EU-US stance regarding the need for further spending to spur growth. Not surprisingly, China and India supported the US in favour of larger spending while Europe presented its ideas on significant deficit cuts. Once again, continental European ideas, primarily German and French, confronted Anglo-Saxon ideas.

The summit agenda simultaneously focused on both critical components of any macroeconomic policy: monetary and fiscal policy. In order to consolidate economic recovery, fiscal sustainability issues were placed high on the agenda. Reducing medium-term fiscal deficits and reducing debt were targeted as promising achievements of the summit, but later proved unachievable and/or politically unsustainable. The main developed G20 countries' reluctance to coordinate fiscal policies, regardless of a significant economic potential of doing so, might have defined the final frontier in developing the Group's joint policies. Still, the Group reached a common understanding that financial supervision should improve its effectiveness, specific resolution mechanisms for financial institutions should be developed and particular attention should be paid to systemically important financial institutions (SIFIs). A much contested issue of a new global bank tax (financial transaction tax) was removed from the agenda but it was concluded that banks should participate in bearing the costs of crisis. It was nevertheless left to governments to decide how to implement this. Even before the

summit, the UK, France and Germany had decided to introduce a type of bank tax. In addition, further commitments were made to enlarge resources of multilateral development banks to support the financing needs of members as well as to reform the World Bank's voting system. The Toronto Summit agenda also included deliberations and commitments on issues outside the financial domain, such as climate change, development and the elimination of subsidies for fossil fuels.

The fifth G20 Summit in Seoul was the first summit held in Asia and hosted by a newly industrialised country. The importance of this venue for the G20 was further emphasised by the fact that it was organised together with the Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC). Even more than before and during the previous summits, the global economic/financial climate at the time was very challenging: the recovery was uneven, Europe faced the possibility of another financial crisis, currency management in major centers started to deviate from previously agreed principles, etc. It was no longer possible to 'mask' the large debts of several eurozone members (Greece, Portugal and Ireland), so other members started preparing for severe austerity measures in order to calm markets as much as possible.

Contrary to the previous meetings, the G20 agenda in Seoul focused more on a number of developmental issues and growth revival, particularly emphasizing employment and social protection.[6] Rising inequalities and unbalanced growth pushed the need to accelerate growth in low income countries higher on the agenda. Surprisingly, the leaders committed to developing a common view of global economic problems, in stark contrast to the conclusions from the previous summits when they sought to develop particular norms/practical standards to handle the crisis. This new, common view should have macroeconomic policy as its centre, especially fiscal policy and debt reduction, as well as market-based currency policy. In conjunction with this new common view, a mutual assessment of the group members should be enhanced. Although general conclusions were made that 'rescue' capital should be provided, it was not meant for the troubled Eurozone and the US and Canada clearly dismissed calls for more resources to be allocated for this purpose. This development later induced strong efforts by Germany and France toward building a European monetary fund and moving the European focus away from the G20 agenda.

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6   Full text of the final document available at http://www.g20.org/images/stories/docs/eng/seoul.pdf.

In developing its global governance structure, the Seoul Summit resulted in the creation of several institutions around the G20, such as regional consultative groups for its Financial Stability Board, in order to more comprehensively include the problems and issues of developing countries. In addition, one can detect certain signs of the inevitable strengthening of multinodal politics (Cerny: 2007), as the G20 promised that in the future more influence on its agenda would be allowed from other types of actors, such as the corporate sector, civil society and the academic world in general.

From a number of perspectives, the Seoul Summit was assessed as successful due to its 'globally predominant, internally equalizing capabilities among members of the group' (Kirton 2010: 7). This is particularly true if advances in national financial regulation and safety nets are reviewed but much less true for reforms of international financial organisations. Once again, the arguments of Higgot (2004) and Mueller and Lederer (2003) that discursive organisations such as the G20 (as opposed to decisional organisations) may be building a new road to multilateralism are supported.

**From Saving Banks to Saving States: Cannes 2011**

The economic and political climate of the 2011 G20 Summit in Cannes did not favour further developing the Group's 'premier economic forum' role: the EU economic recession was deepening, investors were losing confidence and Greek debt was overshadowing Eurozone prospects. At the same time, BRIC countries were unsuccessfully invited to finance Europe's recovery while the US was slowly distancing itself from bailing out the EU.

Amidst such disarray, the leaders nevertheless managed to form an agenda and discuss various issues. The final declaration of the Cannes Summit[7] reiterates members' growing concerns about the slow recovery, high unemployment and rising sovereign risks in the Euro area. Its focus on a renewed collective action for the 'common future' may imply certain changes of the Group's 2008 objectives: regulating finance and harmonizing rules may be critical for future crisis prevention but are far from sufficient for a global economic revival in today's interdependent world. A G20 Task Force on Employment has been set up and the Group has invited other multilateral organizations (e.g., IMF, ILO

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7   Available at http://www.g20.org/images/stories/docs/eng/cannes.pdf.

and World Bank) to assess the Group's impact on job creation. After employment, international monetary stability was prioritized on the agenda, particularly regarding currency and (procyclical) capital flow management. Furthermore, excessive currency reserves (most probably regarding China) have been identified as one of the causes of imbalanced global liquidity and capital flow volatility; thus, their reduction is necessary. With regard to financial regulation, there were not many changes to the 2008 Washington objectives: to have an internationally-consistent and non-discriminatory regulation of all markets and participants. Still, it is planned to have another regulatory category of market participants: global systemically important financial institutions (G-SIFIs) will have an additional safety net as of 2016. In this way, the 'too-big-to-fail' principle has not been abandoned; rather, its scope has been broadened across national boundaries. Notably, when it comes

G20 Compliance by Member, 2008-2010 Summits

Note: score 1= full compliance, -1= failure, 0=partial compliance
Source: Ellis, S. et al, 2010 Seoul G20 Summit Final Compliance Report, November 2011.

to submitting national to internationally agreed rules, the term 'double standard' still falls short. For example, (only) a framework will be developed for national macro-prudential policies but a single set of global accounting standards are planned.

It was planned to further develop the Seoul Consensus on the new development agenda, improve food security on the global scale and fur-

ther deliberate on a controversial financial transaction tax in order to raise funds for G20 objectives in the areas of development and environment protection. The latter became the major stumbling block as it was proposed by France and supported by Germany but strongly opposed by other developed countries, such as the US and the UK. Regarding trade, the summit recognized that the Doha Round 'would never be completed' and hence turned to short-term objectives of opening developed countries' markets for imports from developing countries. Further institutional development of the G20 itself was evident: the first meetings of new bodies (Agriculture Ministers and Development Ministers) were held.

When the Cannes final document is analyzed compared with the G20's previous ones, one of the most striking differences is its repeated reference to a great number of international organizations, such as the IMF, World Bank, ILO, OECD, IOSCO, BIS, etc. One may understand this as a new 'reality-check' for the G20: although it has positioned itself as a global economic-policy centre and comprises 90% of world GDP, the issues may be beyond reach of such an informal, minilateral group (Grevi 2010: 3).

Minimal Common Denominator or a World Government?

Since 2009, the G20 Research Group at the University of Toronto and the International Organizations Research Institute of National Research University Higher School of Economics in Moscow have analyzed the progress of each G20 member in implementing the main commitments of each G20 Summit. Monitoring each country's efforts is based on publicly available information and the latest report was made in November 2011 (Ellis et al.: 2011).

More than 150 commitments can be drawn from the official G20 Seoul Summit Leaders' Declaration and the Seoul Summit Document. On that basis, 13 issue areas can be identified including macroeconomics, finance, development, trade, reform of international financial institutions, employment and growth, international cooperation, institutional development, etc. Most commitments belong to the area of macroeconomics (market-determined exchange rate systems and credible medium-term fiscal consolidation), finance (bank capital, risks, sound regulation and important financial institutions) and development (assistance to poorest countries and mobilization of domestic resources).

Far fewer promises have been made regarding summit institutionalization, international cooperation and environment.

If the period between the Seoul and Cannes summits is analyzed, the level of compliance varies considerably among the issues. It has been assessed that significant progress has been achieved (by advanced economies of the G20) regarding fiscal consolidation and improving infrastructure, while there has been much less compliance related to the issues of international cooperation (partnership with international organizations) and trade (completion of the Doha round).

The report (Ellis et al, 2011) strives to quantify deliverables against the G20 commitments (compliance-relevant actions) for issue-specific areas and for each member of the group. The methodology is based on a scale from -1 to +1 (+1 indicating full compliance with commitment, -1 showing a compliance failure or a counterproductive action taken and 0 indicates partial compliance or work in progress). In this way, compliance progress of the members and in the issue areas can be compared. Also, different analyses can be made combining issue-specific and member-specific scores. For example, regarding the Seoul commitment to resort to a market-driven exchange rate mechanism, some members have started to deliver (partial compliance); some have fully complied with the commitment while Japan, Mexico and Brazil have undertaken action completely opposite from the commitment. The least data is available for another macroeconomic commitment, fiscal consolidation, but overall the compliance of those members who supplied information is very high, except for the US score of 0 (G20 average of +0.89). The G20 members almost completely failed the Seoul commitment in the area of international cooperation. Australia has delivered majority of promises and has taken actions related to most of the Seoul commitments (a score of +0.85), followed by the EU. On the other hand, Turkey, Saudi Arabia and Argentina received the lowest scores. The US has not made any counterproductive action regarding the Seoul commitments but has fully complied with only a few of the commitments (mainly related to finance). Trade has actually shown retrogression (a score of -0.05) due to counterproductive actions taken by Argentina, Brazil, Russia, China and South Africa.

If a general view (average G20) of the five summits' commitments and compliance is taken, one can conclude that a very significant decline is evident after the 2008 Washington Summit. That summit was later assessed as the most successful, followed by counterproductive actions. It must be mentioned though, that almost all the issues deliber-

ated during the Washington Summit focused on financial regulation and immediate measures to be implemented in response to the crisis.

After the Washington Summit, the general level of compliance with the commitments more than halved but some degree of progress was evident after the summits in London, Pittsburgh and Toronto. The Seoul Summit resulted in much more commitment-related actions, despite the fact that the agenda has been broadening all along. Nevertheless, one still has to wait and see the effects (if any) of the Cannes Summit at the end of 2011.

From another perspective (Ocampo and Griffith-Jones: 2010), the effects of the G20 summits have not been that profound with respect to specific issue-areas. The most significant advances have been made in the areas of national financial regulation (bank supervision and capital base) and emergency financing (complement to central bank financing). Also, certain improvements have been made regarding the co-ordination of national economic policies in order to avoid (as much as possible) policies with adverse and harmful effects on other countries. This could be attributed less to a developing common view on the global economy among the G20 members and more to harsh economic consequences of deteriorating trade and capital flows. Substantial reforms of the existing monetary system and proposals for creating an international debt resolution mechanism have not received proper attention. The issue of coordinating the core of any macroeconomic policy, i.e. its fiscal mechanism, on the global scale has met significant resistance. The issue, however, moved to the top of the EU agenda with a new fiscal agreement drafted and to be entered into by 26 EU member states later in 2012. But most important, the issues of development and more appropriate inclusion of small- and medium-sized developing countries are where the least advances have been made. Recent G20 meetings have nevertheless widened the scope of deliberation by emphasising economic issues in addition to finance, e.g. development, trade, environmental costs, employment, agriculture, etc.

Not surprisingly, those proposals were quite comprehensive and focused on issues beyond a 'classical' monetary/fiscal policy approach to macroeconomic stability. The comprehensiveness of the G20 proposals also derives from linking various issues, such as poverty reduction, social inclusion, emerging and low income countries, aid flows, climate change and cooperation with the private sector. The G20's current status as a discursive organisation is in this way contrasted with the more strongly decisional types of other intergovernmental actors, such as the

IMF (Higott 2004) and may shed more light on the future of multilateralism. Following the arguments of Muller and Lederer (2003), the power and activities of the G20 may point to a new developing form of managing global affairs, with specific actors, instruments and practices. Hence, this organization may be the centre point from which new, soft-law instruments of international financial and economic regulation would appear.

Despite its contentious policy effects, the G20 has certainly impacted improving global governance with respect to its own institutional development and a greater involvement of some developing countries. At the Pittsburgh Summit, the G20 unequivocally took a role of the premier forum for global economic cooperation. At the London Summit, the Special Drawing Rights (SDR) mechanism was somewhat revived to draw on some developing countries' resources. New bodies (FSB) and new ways of operation (specific ministerial meetings) have been created.

Let us return to possibilities for the G20 to build a road toward economic and financial regulation on a global scale. In 2008, all the major actors gathered in Washington with their own agendas which they have been pushing ever since. Not only did they have their own sets of goals but those particular agendas have been changing and transforming since the first summit (Filipovic 2011). For instance, the EU was pressing for building new rules for a new capitalism, which should create conditions for an increase of its endangered competitiveness. Four years after the first summit, the EU's agenda has changed dramatically and includes contentious issues of fiscal unity and states' bail-outs. The US had been pushing for allocating more responsibility to other members of the group, which finally became explicit after the Cannes Summit: the US stated it had no intention to provide financial assistance to the troubled Eurozone. BRIC countries had taken the G20 summit road with plans to press for numerous changes in the international monetary system and the world economy, giving more rights and chances to the developing world. At the end of 2011, although certain progress was made in that respect, China and Brazil have revoked their offers to provide additional resources to the EU. Other factors influencing changes of the global agenda or those of the major actors may be growing regionalism, a shift of the US toward the East, economic turbulence in Europe, the rising economic and financial strength of the BRIC countries, yet unknown consequences of the 'Arab spring', etc.

As the analysis of the London Summit documents shows, the participating states have basically agreed to have binding norms only in the

field of accounting principles. Other important aspects of international financial and economic regulation were left out, waiting for future, separate agreements to be negotiated and designed. This clearly reflects that, beyond group photos and statements, the G20 leaders have set a particular 'scale' of submitting their own policies and principles to global harmonisation. Unless the norms and the policies in which they manifest themselves are perceived by the community as authoritative and they can be justified in terms of shared beliefs (Underhill and Zhang, 10), there is still a long way for new, global governance in the field of economy to emerge. Taking this into the picture, one may see certain possibilities in creating an economic regulatory framework in the future. As globalisation progresses, the challenges significantly influence domestic politics. Failure to recognise the overlap and trade-offs between domestic and international/global policies undoubtedly result in losses for the whole world economy's welfare (Freytag et al.: 2011).

Conclusion

The G20 summits from 2008 to 2011 clearly show significant efforts invested in creating, organising and supervising international responses to the current crisis. The G20 agenda has been evolving to include more and more issues which seem very relevant to the world economy and finance, or at least to the major actors in the group. The 2008 Washington Summit focused only on a limited set of particular issues directly related to global financial trends: stronger (national) supervision, hedge funds, tax havens, bankers' remuneration, and so on. National policy actions implemented in that time were more comprehensive. Most of those actions, implicitly or explicitly, relied on some sort of protectionism which by its nature contravenes globalisation and international cooperation. In 2009 and particularly in 2010, the G20 summits were directed toward a number of issue areas: macroeconomics, development, finance, trade, energy, intergovernmental cooperation, the Group's institutionalisation and cooperation with other international organisations, etc. Still, one commitment ran through all the summits: most of the world leaders, groups and organisations felt obliged to point out that in the present world, cooperation and joint efforts are unavoidable if the global economy is to resume its 'normal' functioning.

And here comes the critical part: what should normal functioning of the world economy or a condition for that be? Is it a completely new

world economic system, based on non-neoliberal principles (though proponents of these ideas do not offer alternative principles)? Should such a change necessarily involve a change of global leadership (though the proponents have not openly submitted their candidacy)? Should a new social order ('new' capitalism) be based on social welfare, strong state presence and ownership? Is that perhaps a return to traditional (Protestant) ethics of honesty, hard work and a responsible way of living? Or does a normal functioning of the world economy depend on the development of public-private partnerships and a critical re-modelling of the governance concept? So far, the leaders have agreed jointly to support the global economy with a number of financial injections. From the perspective of unbalanced world growth and rising economic problems of developing countries, this may not seem like much but it is certainly a beginning. What lies ahead, after the pledged resources are spent, is maybe a long process of building a set of shared values that may create a basis for legitimate and efficient governance.

Despite all the criticism, the G20 has managed to induce numerous and somewhat coordinated national policy responses to the crisis. There are many possible reasons behind such an improved level of measures implemented in accordance with the summit's declaration. One of the reasons may be the severity and outreach of the crisis in today's world of rising interdependence. Another factor may be related to the institutional development of the group itself in terms of better profiling of its role: from a financial crisis management group (its primary role in 2008) it is being transformed into a steering committee to propose design for new global economic order. This change has been clearly reflected in the agenda evolution. Another factor may be that the G20 has adequately used opportunities for collaboration, relying more on strengthened pressure and the reputation of the actors. 'If the G20 can continue to improve its performance on delivering on its promises, it can validate its claim for legitimacy as a global governance institution' (Ellis et al, 2010: 8). But having in mind the different 'scale' of readiness of individual governments to accept global standards, it is very unclear how such an extension of supranational regulation will be designed and put in practice.

Years ago Kenneth Waltz (1979, 141) wrote that it was not possible to understand an economy or explain its functioning without considering the rules that have been politically laid down. This paper presented an overview of the official G20 declarations at the beginning of and during the crisis. Future research related to international financial and economic governance should focus on three major areas: political pro-

cesses to allow a convergence of various agendas, implementation of the agreed norms and structures and the developments in global economic flows. Irreversibly transterritorial economic activities have started to exert such a significant pressure to heads of states that some sort of heterarchical compromise may be expected in years to come. The G20 might have a unique opportunity to use the prerogatives of an official-dom it strives to become and create conditions for a new global framework to emerge. Despite all the criticism, the G20 may be in a position to (at least partially) provide a new forum to discuss and confront complex issues of today's world economy – a remedy for the shortcomings of the Bretton Woods institutions which have been too issue-oriented and specific in their operations (Freytag et al.: 2011). Also, the G20 may serve as an example of new forms of 'informal minilateralism' that could complement the larger multilateral system and enhance the effectiveness of its responses to increasing global interdependence (Grevi 2010: 3). Bearing in mind that an order's legitimacy strongly depends on the body of shared beliefs, what remains to be seen is to which of today's multiple agendas (input side) new or adapted global rules and norms (output side) will be closer.

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Waltz, K. N. (1979) *Theory of International Politics*. New York: Random House.

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Anatomy of the Modern State

Djordje Stojanović, Živojin Djurić
Anatomija savremene države (Anatomy of the Modern State)
Institut za političke studije, Beograd, 2012.

The ancient Greeks called the ones who lived out of state i.e. stateless persons idiots. This word, that has taken on another meaning today, is therefore, etymologically derived from the word idiotes meaning: alone, stateless. The extent to which living in a state, i.e. belonging to a polis was an essential element of identity for the ancient Greeks is obvious in the existence of the institutions of ostracism and excommunication. Therefore, since ancient times the state as a concept and entity has been a subject of theoretical (and not just theoretical) interest, and even today the issue has not lost on its actuality, intrigue and relevance (both on the planes of vita contemplativa, and vita activa). The state as a subject has also always played a role in theoretical debates on the eternal struggle between liberty and order. In the history of ideas this protean word,

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therefore, has an important role, thus making the significance of this monograph titled Anatomy of the Modern State undeniable. Relevance of the problem of the state is also illustrated by the position of the authors in which a state can be seen as an "ideological cage", i.e. as something neither ourselves nor others, can be perceived without, either as individuals or as members of a collectivity (Stojanović and Djurić 2012: 5). This is not a purely academic issue, as shown by a bit of a rhetorical question asked by the authors in the preface to their monograph, which reads: "Is our state really our fate?" (Stojanovic and Djuric 2012: 5). This question also tells us of the authors' incentive and inspiration to address this issue.

The monograph titled Anatomy of the Modern State by Djordje Stojanović and Živojin Djurić, published by the Institute for Political Studies in Belgrade represents a significant contribution to the clarification of key issues related to the theory of the state. As the title suggests, this monograph contains all relevant elements i.e. aspects of this complex and multidisciplinary theoretical question. The authors have raised many important questions and issues, and elaborated on the answers to them. Among them, particularly prominent are questions like: what is the position of the state within the framework of different theoretical approaches, whether one can speak of the universal theory of state, and finally, what is the position of the nation state in the globalization process. Also analyzed were relevant issues and phenomena of contemporary political theory and practice, such as: the complex relationship between the state and the society, the concept of state capacity and its relationship to the processes of democratization, modernization and globalization, followed by the phenomenon of public bureaucracy, and the concepts of weak and strong state.

The monograph Anatomy of the Modern State consists of five thematic sections titled: Theoretical Approaches to the Modern State, Problem of State Capacity, Phenomenon of Public Bureaucracy, Responsibility, Implementation, Weak and Strong States, and Serbia as a Weak State. The first part, as the very title suggests, discusses the definition and determination of the state, and emphasizes the theoretical novelty in the conceptualization of the modern State. In this section the authors also cover the relationship between the state and the society, despotic and infrastructural power of the state, as well as the culturological perspective on the perception of the state. First of all, definitions of the state are given, as they have evolved throughout history, from pre-modern for-

mulations of Plato and Aristotle, through Weber's definition, a classical reasoning of the Modernism, to the formulations of relevant contemporary authors. According to these analyses, the authors come to the conclusion on the inability to scientifically establish a universal theory of state; one can not talk about the theory of state that would be valid regardless of time and space. As the authors note, the concept of state is somewhat elusive and complex, because the state can not be identified neither with an individual nor a group, as it can not even identify with its citizens, its Constitution, neither with its powers nor purposes. And yet, it is undeniably real, as real as taxation, punishment, or warfare, so it can be talked of certain ambivalence in the concept of the state (Stojanović and Djurić 2012: 15). The distinctive features of the modern state by Christopher Pierson are: monopoly of the means of violence, territory, sovereignty, constitutionality, impersonal power, public bureaucracy, authority/legitimacy, citizenship and taxation (Stojanović and Djurić 2012: 26).

As the product of the process of modernization commenced by the Enlightenment, there is a principled separation of state and civil society, and their relationship is one of the fundamental issues of political science. One of the inspiring definitions of civil society is that it presents an ethical vision of civil life, so it can be said that there is a certain juxtaposition of the state to civil society. The next question that arises is what is the position of the nation state in the era of globalization: is it discredited or just in need of a radical change in its role and function? The authors point out: "Somewhat unexpectedly, the conceptual and value-related fatality of the state (is) intensified by the globalization paradigm" (Stojanović and Djurić 2012: 5). Further, they present their conclusion: "Alteration of the political efficiency of the nation state does not suggest that the politics or sovereignty are in the shadow of economy: politics is not gone, gone is any perception of autonomy of the political. The novelty is that sovereignty acquires the form composed of a number of national and supranational organisms connected by a unique logic of governance" (Stojanović and Djurić 2012: 93).

The second part of the book, titled Problem of State Capacity is devoted to the analysis of the concepts of modernization and national capacity, followed by the concepts of functional and dysfunctional state, as well as the analysis of the relations between state capacity and the process of democratization, modernization and globalization. The authors here offer different conceptualizations of state capacity, emphasiz-

ing the importance of studying the issue. Two aspects stand out as main aspects of capacity: the relative autonomy of the state in relation to social stakeholders and professionalization i.e. "weberization" of state bureaucracy. The high level of state capacity is manifested through the following indicators: monopoly of the means of violence; secure environment for the conclusion and implementation of contractual obligations; harmonization and regulation of institutions, distribution and extraction of resources, as well as continuous production and delivery of public goods. (Stojanović and Djurić 2012: 116). State capacity is, therefore, reflected in the institutions: capacity building involves the institutionalization and empowerment. It proves to be relevant to the explanation of a number of different phenomena: economic growth and development, democratization, political culture, and civil violence.

In this chapter, the authors also attempt to identify the nature of modern social institutions, demonstrating where they present continuity and where discontinuity in comparison to the traditional social order. New institutionalism, according to the authors, insists on a more autonomous role of political institutions, without neglecting the importance of social context and motives of individual stakeholders. (Stojanović

and Djurić 2012: 105). The state is not only influenced by the society any longer, but it also affects it. What new institutionalism also brings is the view that political democracy is not just based on economic and social conditions, but also on the design of political institutions. The authors note that institutions are important because they shape people's behavior and give legitimacy to certain rules, as well as establish cultural and social norms.

The third chapter of the monograph titled Phenomenon of Public Bureaucracy is dedicated to the analysis of the historical genesis and the modern understanding of bureaucracy, and to an analysis of the politicization of the democratic legitimization of the public bureaucracy, as well as the analysis of the concepts of the new public management and public administration. In the fourth section of the book named Responsibility, Implementation, Weak and Strong States the authors provide a comprehensive analysis of the concept of democratic accountability, good public policy and implementation process, as well as the concepts of strong, weak and failed states.

Based on these fundamental studies, in the fifth and final chapter of the monograph the authors deal with the analysis of the democratic transformation of the Serbian state and society, assessing

Serbia as a weak state. Here the authors cite numerous problems faced by Serbia at the beginning of its democratic metamorphosis: incomplete democratization of the political system, political instability, the so-called party Ottomanization, lack of strategic consensus, and finally, political corruption that is so widespread that, as the authors note, it gained the status of the "cultural code" (Stojanović and Djurić 2012: 260). Also present, as the authors bravely note, is the so-called criminalization of politics i.e. instrumentation of institutions for private purposes by both political management structure, and cryptic, parallel power structures located around it (Stojanović and Djurić 2012: 259). The authors, therefore, assess Serbia as a weak state, citing the following factors: structural economic crisis and dependence on loans and grants; corruption; discrepancy between the state and the society, with very low levels of social cohesion, as well as the problem of ethnic and regional fragmentation; the party Ottomanization; political suitability of bureaucracy, and finally, the problem with territorial definition, and a high degree of external conditionality and pressures (Stojanović and Djurić 2012: 267). According to the foregoing, the authors conclude on the need for reconstruction of the Serbian state, by proposing the following measures: security against exter-nal and internal threats, legitimate representation within the liberal-democratic order on the grounds of social justice, as well as the increase of the overall and individual economic well-being and prosperity (Stojanović and Djurić 2012: 251).

Summa summarum, in this monograph the authors deal with the issue of the state in a fruitful and comprehensive manner, the issue under discussion since ancient times, that is more than current in contemporary circumstances. Revealing of the state is for the authors, as they put it in the preface to their book, a "risky" exploratory adventure, for its image is, paradoxically, both strong and kaleidoscopic (Stojanović and Djurić 2012:7). The aim of this monograph is, the authors continue, to critically present this power and medley of the state, which it manages to do. The book Anatomy of the Modern State provides answers to many important questions of modern political theory, drawing on relevant global and domestic literature in this field, so it can be concluded that it will be inspiring to all those intrigued by this topic.

Citing and Referencing

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