



SERBIAN POLITICAL THOUGHT

О А С И М
ПОЛИТИЧКА
СРПСКА



Institute for Political Studies

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Challenging Power Politics in the *politeia* Republicanism

Abstract

In the article the author discusses the emergence and the disappearance of early connection between the strong republican aversion to power politics and the consequential anti-imperialism (which was oriented against authoritarian supranational formations ranging from Athenian hegemony to the Roman Empire). First impulses towards shaping a republican political theory (by Athenian philosophers in the 4th century B.C.) he identifies in an increased interest in the state organization of the winning party in the Peloponnesian war that had knocked down Athenian hegemony – Sparta. At the end of the article the author describes how Christian political thought took root in the bosom of the Roman Empire, with its controversial eschatology of the Kingdom of God on Earth, which would subsequently undergo versatile ideological transformations in Europe.

Keywords: republicanism, polis, empire, power, eschatology.

The republican thought, as shaped by Athenian philosophers in the 4th century B.C., showed a strong inclination to praising the *politeia*

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The first version of this paper was written a long time ago in 1997, during the study stay at Alexander von Humboldt-Universität, owing to financial support by the Fund for an Open Society in Belgrade and hospitality of Professor Dr. Herfried Münkler. At that moment the author was not satisfied with the argumentation, yet had no time to perfect it, considering that his research was focused on the modern nationalism. Final version of the paper appears now as a part of the project “Izazovi nove društvene integracije u Srbiji: koncept i akteri (Challenges of new social integration in Serbia: concepts and actors)” (179035), supported by the Ministry of education, science and technological development of the Republic of Serbia.

organisation of small city-state (*polis*), as well as the separation of powers and the rule of law. The reason for this was not the aspiration for objective description of what was going on in ancient small polis so much as it was the intention to encourage it to resist the strongest political temptation – the temptation of building hegemony or empire and practicing power politics (*Machtpolitik*), i.e. acknowledging the principle of aggressive authoritarian rule which as of Renaissance would be canonized in the doctrine of the Reason of State (*Ragione di Stato*). The disappearance of connection between the strong republican aversion to power politics (that would be renewed in the New Age by Immanuel Kant) and the consequential anti-imperialism (which emerged in the Roman Empire) was finally sanctioned when Christian political thought took root, with its controversial eschatology of the Kingdom of God on Earth, which would subsequently undergo versatile ideological transformations² in Europe. However, this connection was very important for the original republican position, and therefore in the reconstruction of the context of its development it is always important to bear in mind its reactive character in relation to the imperialistic consequences of the power politics, which got its embodiment only in the Renaissance – in the political teaching of the Reason of State, yet existed much before that as theoretically articulated phenomenon.

Thucydides and Athenian Hegemony

One of the certainly most enduring, fundamental and significant disputes in the entire history of the Western political thought is the one regarding the power politics. The period from Thucydides all to Carl Schmitt is featured by the – variable – understanding of politics as a skill

2 When republicanism was renewed in the Renaissance, it no more acknowledged this connection due to the affirmation of the Reason of State doctrine, which promoted the (re)establishment of empire (after the model of the ancient Rome) as the highest external political end (see also: Hörnqvist 2004: 38 *et passim*). In the course of the 17th century, in parallel with the growing success of the Dutch republican experiment, as testified by Spinoza's political theory, republican thought got emancipated from this political external political end, although not yet from the Reason of State on the whole, so that one of its streams now manages to pass between the Scylla of fixation on small polis and Charybdis of fascination with the empire – affirming the principle of federalism. Kant's Romanticist republicanism, which emerged at the end of the 18th century, is different not only compared to the Reason of state republicanism of an Alexander Hamilton and federalist republicanism of a Gabriel Bonnot de Mably, but also compared to him-akin Rousseau's Romanticist republicanism, mostly because of the renewed fixation on the project of the realization of the Kingdom of God on Earth.

to preserve and augment power, based on the premises of irreparably evil nature of man, feebleness (if not harmfulness) of reason, and decisionistic necessity to distinguish friends from enemies (Münkler 1987: 43; see also: Molnar 2006: 123 *et passim*). Thucydides put quite a clear formulation of power politics in the mouth of Athenian leader Pericles, when in 430 B.C., faced with Athenians' dissatisfaction due to the (bad) start of the Peloponnesian war, he gave his so called "last speech": "You should remember also that what you are fighting against is not merely slavery as an exchange for independence, but also loss of hegemony and danger from the animosities incurred in its exercise. Besides, to recede is no longer possible, if indeed any of you in the alarm of the moment has become enamoured of the honesty of such an unambitious part. For what you hold is, to speak somewhat plainly, a tyranny; to take it perhaps was wrong, but to let it go is unsafe" (Thucydides 1991: 118 /II, 63). In this speech, as reported by his contemporary and admirer Thucydides, Pericles warned Athenians of three things: that in the earlier period all of them together (under his leadership) were building a hegemonistic position of Athens (tyranny) in the Hellenic world, which brought them power, wealth and reputation; that this hegemony (as any other) is unjust and can be maintained only by power – which implies, ultimately, also by war; and that the power politics course, once when taken, cannot be revoked, because the alternative to tyranny can be either slavery (a better case)³ or complete destruction (a worse case). Once a consequent implementation of power policy is commenced, balance of powers cannot be re-established any more (for this dichotomy see: Aron 2001: 155 *et passim*), and therefore any invoking of justice or law becomes pointless (Schwarzenberger 1955: 9), so that nothing else remains but to resort to calculation and manipulations with the power.

In his analysis Thucydides did not address Pericles' peace-building, federalist, "Pan-Hellenic project". Quite rightfully so, because this project, as observed by Jacob Burckhardt remained only "a pious wish" which did not have much in common with the reality (Burckhardt 144), more specifically, with the reality of power politics, which was in the focus of Thucydides' analysis. Greeks outside Athens – and particularly Spartans – could not look upon this project otherwise than as being an ideological mask of tyranny ("centralized will"), which could not

3 This danger of becoming Spartan slaves was discussed by Edith Foster (Foster, 2010: 140 *et passim*).

be restrained any more and which, as any other power politics, became completely insatiable ⁴ leading towards the establishment of empire, as the final form of breaking resistance and optimization of domination. Admittedly, Thucydides himself regarded that “the primordial sin” of Athenians was their abandonment of (optimal) hegemony, after Pericles’ death, and reach out for (unsustainable) empire (Minkler 2009: 29), associated with concurrent denting of their own “political ethos” (Volkmann-Schluck 1977: 59). The trouble associated with the power politics, however, was that it could not be hooped: it was clear already to Pericles himself that to take hegemonic power “perhaps was wrong, but to let it go is unsafe”, where accumulation of resistance led to a spiral augmentation of fear of “dangers” and injustice in the process of eliminating those “dangers” by applying bare force, which ultimately wiped off difference between the defense of hegemony and the development of true empire. Thucydides’ attempted to introduce into his analysis, in addition to power politics, the psychological aspect of Athenian “fear of loss of the in the meantime established position” of Hegemon, defended by Pericles (Münkler 2002: 21)⁵. However, this attempt was not particularly successful, since it only covered up the *circulus vitiosus* of tyranny, which had first pushed Athens towards the “position” of Hegemon, but after having installed it there, forced it to also secure such position, which was no more achievable without building a real empire, after the model of Persia – that same one so much detested by Greeks. This is quite a legitimate comparison, not only in foreign but also in internal policy. Although Pericles, struck by plague, died already in 429 B.C., just two years after the beginning of the Peloponnesian war, dictatorship traits of his rule were already quite evident, whereby route to autocracy (of Pericles or some of his successors) was tracked. Thucydides himself observed that in those first two years of the Peloponnesian war, while Pericles was in power, Athens “was a democracy in name only and instead actually government by its first man” (Thucydides 1991: 120 / II, 65), hence a monarchy. Consolidation of hegemony – which already showed the first contours of an empire – could not proceed free from an authoritarian turn, which wrote off Athenian democracy in favor of

4 Burckhardt wrote about this quality of power politics at another place (see Burckhardt, 1958: 97).

5 When five and a half centuries afterwards, Plutarch wrote his biographies of great men of the ancient world, he reported that concord has never been reached among Greeks on whether Pericles refused to lift trade embargo imposed on Megarans – which was a *casus belli* – because he believed that “a concession” [...] would be taken for a confession of weakness” or because he wanted “to demonstrate his power” (Plutarch 1990: 86 / 31).

a government which, by all accounts, at the end of the development of empire would not be essentially different from the Persian monarchy (empire). On the whole, although even during Pericles' "golden age", or immediately thereafter, Athens was not successful in its attempt to consolidate its hegemony, and consequently either to build an actual empire⁶, there is no any doubt that power politics, already inaugurated by Pericles and (not only historically recorded, but also) theoretically founded by Thucydides, was quite consequential and that precisely this consequentialness indicated tight interwovenness of imperialist orientation with the authoritarian course of the internal policy.

Plato, Aristotle and Spartan *polis*

Ideological exposing of the "Pan-Hellenic project", unfavorable outcome of the Peloponnesian war, and ultimately also the turmoils which started already in the last two years of Pericles' reign and culminated upon the reestablishment of democracy at the turn of 5th and 4th century, tarnished not only the earlier leading role of Athens in the Hellenic world, but also its democracy as an exemplary model of state organization. In the 4th century B.C. an increased interest in the state organization of the winning party in the Peloponnesian war that had knocked down Athenian hegemony – Sparta, brought about the first impulses towards shaping a republican political theory. At that time this term was still non-existent, taking into consideration that the word "republic" came from the Latin language, and was originally inseparably linked with the Roman *res publica*. In the first republican theory – the one in *The Laws* – Plato has no term for denoting state organizations of Sparta, Crete, and his own ideal state, yet observes that, as a matter of fact, all the other – starting from two mother forms of states: democracy and monarchy – "are not polities at all" (*politeia*) (Plato 1957: 117 /IV, 5). Also Aristotle has a similar approach in his *Politics*: he names the ideal government "*politeia*, the name common to all governments" (Aristotle 1975: 64 /III, 5, 2). Thus the first manifestation of republicanism is the one of *politeia* – which stems from the very nature of the state organization (*politeia*) in city-state (*polis*).

6 Even more, the unfavorable outcome of the Peloponnesian war in 404 B.C. definitively prevented it in this, so that the Hellenic world would have to wait for yet another whole century, before Alexander Macedonian would continue from where Pericles and his Athenian successors bent their knees and, at least for a short time, establish an empire.

This leads to a key question: what should have been this nature of the state organization of polis. Putting aside all differences between (late) Plato and Aristotle, an interesting conclusion can be reached: the nature of politeia is inherently opposing to power politics, such as described by Thucydides on the example of Pericles and his immediate successors. Polis, above all, must be guided by the moral goodness, which is “neither war nor faction – they are things we should pray to be far from us – but peace and mutual good will” (Plato 1957: 20 /I, 4). Since he believed that “wars are occasioned by the love of money” (Plato 1982: 106 /I, 6) and since he regarded Pericles a poor statesman, under whom (admittedly, contrary to his intentions) the Athenian people “became wild” from the greed for money (Plato 1859: 187 /72), it is quite likely that under this “wildness” Plato implied precisely the entry of the greedy Athenians into the Peloponnesian war. Consequently from the developments during the Peloponnesian war, Plato drew a diametrically opposite historical lesson compared to Thucydides: war is the result of man’s greed which would, when given free rein and if not curbed by the moral goodness, lead to citizens’ wildness, and thereby to a negation of the politeia. To enable polis to overcome temptations of regression to a wild state, Plato argues, it is necessary to “avoid cynical realism in the service of power politics”, praised by Thucydides, and to invoke logos, which asked for a rigid class order – in *The Republic* (Münkler 1987: 40-41), but indicated an incomparably more complex republican state organization already in *The Laws*. Although (most likely because of the time distance) he did not share Plato’s utterly unfavorable opinion of Pericles,⁷ Aristotle concurred with Plato on the harmfulness of war for the life of a polis. Should it occur that a polis enters a war, the aim of the war waged must be the soonest possible establishment of peace, because perpetuating war and disaccustoming citizens of living in peace and cherishing moral goodness leads straight to a disaster (Aristotle 1975: 195/VII, 13, 15). Aristotle, regrettably, envisaged one exception to this rule: against people intended to be subjects “by nature” (i.e. Barbarians) Greeks can always wage “a just war” (*polemos dikaios*) (Aristotle, 1975: 13 /I, 3, 8) – with the aim to put them at a place which the

7 Yet however, in his *Politics* Aristotle ranked Pericles among “demagogues”, who had, little by little, perverted Athenian republican organization, as established by Solon, towards democracy, as existing in Aristotle’s time (Aristotle 1975: 52 /II, 9, 3/). Therefore, Aristotle not only excluded Pericles from the ranks of Athens’s best statesmen, but also included into those ranks Nikia, Pericles’ opponent and leader of the aristocrat party (Aristotle 1997: 56-57 /28/) – obviously because he defended the old Athenian republic against its progressive democratization.

“nature” had allegedly predetermined for them and to thereby satisfy justice. Thus, the notorious concept of “a just war” entered the history of political and social thought with quite a transparent nationalistic (or even racist) connotation, which in its subsequent evolution would assume increasingly more radical contents and increasingly more destructive proportions.

At any rate, to be able to take care of moral goodness and maintain proper state organization, Aristotle argues, polis has to be a small state, a city with its countryside, a political community which is autarchic, which has not moved far off from its beginning made by Synoikia, and in which people know each other at least through their clan affiliation (see also Mićunović 1988: 10). In *The Laws* – admittedly, guided to a great extent by the magic of the number 12 – Plato does not allow the number of households (or, more precisely, of pater familias) in a polis to exceed 5.040 (Plato 1957: 143 /V, 8/ and 178-179 /VI, 15), while Aristotle in his *Nicomachean Ethics* states lapidary: “You cannot make a city of ten men, and if there are a hundred thousand it is a city no longer” (Aristotle 1980: 246 /IX, 10, 1).

Citizens of a polis which remains small and avoids wars (except those “just”) have a chance, subjecting themselves to the effects of the moral goodness, to overcome their animal (“wild”) nature. While for Thucydides human nature is incorrigibly corrupt, Plato regarded that it can be reformed in the polis (Münkler 1987: 43), quite specifically, by means of mixed government, rule of law and popular unity. Spartan organization inspired Plato in *The Laws* to shape each government body (National assembly, Council of 360 members and Guardians of the law) by combining principles of democracy and monarchy, and Aristotle in his *Politics* to combine principles of democracy and oligarchy (Aristotle 1975: 102 /IV, 7, 4-6), in a way which already anticipated the liberal principle of separation of powers to legislative, executive and judicial (see Hefe 2009: 186). The situation is similar regarding the principle of rule of law. Although in *The Laws* he ascertained that (either monarchist or aristocratic) rule of philosophers would be the best state organization – which he advocated in *The Republic* – Plato now realized that for people (who are not gods) empirically best solution would be the rule of law (Plato 1957: 291 /IX, 14). On the other hand, in both *Nicomachean Ethics* and *Politics* Aristotle maintained the same stand: that “it is bad in any case for a man, subject as he is to all the accidents of human passion, to have the supreme power, rather than the law”

(Aristotle 1980: 128 /V, 6, 5), i.e. that in the polis “laws, when good, should be supreme” (Aristotle 1975: 71 /III, 6, 13). Here Aristotle insisted on the difference between the law and a treaty: a polis can be founded only on the law, and never on a treaty, because from treaties ensue exclusively military alliances which suppress the moral goodness (Aristotle 1975: 67 /III, 5, 11). This reflects memories of the Peloponnesian war trauma: when the contractual logic of the Attic naval alliance transcended from the international to the inner plane of the Athens polis itself, Athenians lost appreciation of the moral goodness, yielded to lust and finally trampled the laws under foot and nearly ruined their own politeia. Consequently, the politeia republicanism treated moral and law as one, parts of a single front on which polis was waging a war against the all-embracing lust, as the prime mover of not only hbris, but also of the individualism and the articulation of any interest pluralism. Therefore ethical teachings which Plato and Aristotle presented in their main works peaked in the stand that neither law nor moral are sufficient for the establishment of polis unity: only provided that there is an even more fundamental, more primordial, and stronger popular unity, polis will be able to prevent development of egoism of individuals, narrow interest groups and parties. And while in *The Republic*, he advocated revolutionary state in which power shall be taken by philosophers who are ready to expel all those above the age of ten, as incorrigibly corrupt (Plato 1976: 235-236 /VII, 18/), in *The Laws* Plato softened his stand and conceived his state as national, i.e. founded on the unity of “friendly association” which derives from “the affiliation to the same clan” (Plato 1957: 111-112 /IV, 3). The latter stand was adopted also by Aristotle, who at a certain place in the *Politics*, almost parenthetically, observed that “a state is not the growth of a day, any more than it grows out of a multitude brought together by accident” and that a threat of disunion exists all until “people of different nationality fully merge” (Aristotle 1975: 124/V, 2, 10).

This was, unfortunately, not all that the politeia republicanism had to say about the problem of creating unity in the polis. Plato’s concept from *The Laws* remained more radical than Aristotle’s due to the aspiration to realize unity also by means of communion of women and children and of property (Plato 1957: 145-146 /V, 10), which was taken over from *The Republic* (Plato 1976: 136 *et passim* /V, 1-9) and which was subjected to Aristotle’s sharp criticism (Aristotle 1975: 23 /II, 3, 1). Even worse, Plato evoked also the universal eugenic law, according to which “the shepherd or herdsman, or breeder of horses” or nation-builder will “first purify them in a manner which befits a community of

animals; he will divide the healthy and unhealthy, and the good breed and the bad breed" (Plato 1957: 140 /V, 7). This was a demonstration of genuine Social Darwinist policy before Charles Darwin, which gives Karl Popper right to accuse Plato as the first advocate of totalitarianism (Popper 1993: 1: 127 *et passim*): he postulated popular unity not as much as an ethical request, as on behalf of racial "health" and "good-breed" of the political community which exudes the spirit of tribalism. Therefore Plato's comparison of Night Council in the ideal state organization with a doctor who takes care of the "health" of state body (see Plato 1957: 386 /XII, 10) clearly indicates tyrannical component of the entire organization,⁸ completely capable of developing truly "inquisitory" activity (Molnar 2001: 65).

Thus the politeia republicanism appeared as a radical alternative to the power politics in the service of imperialistic goals and heralded important civilizational goals such as peace-building, separation of powers and rule of law, which in the new age – admittedly reconciled with the individualism and (constitutional) contractualism – will become particular characteristic of liberalism. If Plato's and Aristotle's pleading for a certain minimum of popular unity could be echoed in the subsequent liberal concessions to national state – such as, for example, Mill's skepticism regarding possibility to build free institutions in ethnically mixed state (see Mill 1989: 162) – Plato's communism and racism already manifested not negligible totalitarian potential and clearly indicated a possibility of perverting all the achievements of the politeia republicanism in the Antiquity. This segment allows for a conclusion that the politeia republicanism had already started undermining its own position and that it juxtaposed imperialistic hubris, which was indifferent to the heterogeneity of the world it subjugated, with equally appalling alternative of narrow-minded tribalism, imbued with comprehensive nivellation, xenophobia and pursuit of internal enemy.

Polybius, St. Augustine and Roman Empire

The first indications of the end of the *politeia* republicanism came with Polybius' Histories. Although in view of the separation of powers and the rule of law, Polybius adhered to the politeia republicanism can-

8 Plato assessed as an excellent feature of Sparta state organization a "tyrannical" rule of Ephorat, as the only one body capable of curbing "greedy" and "violent" monarchist government (Plato 1957: 116 /IV, 5). This was probably an unexplicated model after which he had conceived also his Night Council.

on, established by Plato and Aristotle,⁹ in the light of the rise of Rome in the Mediterranean world in 2nd century B.C., he started making the first concessions to power politics. Thus, indeed, the autarchy of *polis* and its peacefulness had no more any significance for Polybius and he even challenged them as an obstacle on the path to hegemony. Sparta, which served as an ideal of city-state to both Plato and Aristotle, was perceived by Polybius as a paradigmatic case of a polis whose legitimate hegemonial aspirations kept crashing against the rigidity and autarchy of Lycurgus laws. The more flexible Rome did not observe such limitations and was more capable to confront challenges of hegemonial policy. In contrast to Spartans (but other Hellenes as well), Romans did not despise money¹⁰ as a source of moral degradation and political corruption, but rather treated it as a necessary means for achieving goals set in their conquests. "But if anyone is ambitious of greater things, and esteems it finer and more glorious than that to be the leader of many men and to rule and lord it over many and have the eyes of all the world turned to him, it must be admitted that from this point of view the Laconian constitution is defective, while that of Rome is superior and better framed for the attainment of power;" and that is why the Romans had "in a short time brought the whole world under their sway, the abundant of supplies they had at their command conducing in no small measure to this result" (Polybius 1988: 520 /VI, 49/). In other words, although they had a superior politeia, Romans did not content themselves with the life within its boundaries, but embarked after "greater things" – among which the "greatest" indeed was fascinating bringing of "the whole world under their sway". Roman hegemony in 2nd century B.C. was a great novelty in the ancient world, which Polybius lavishly commended with no reserves, although it is quite likely that he did not expect its further strengthening and turning into a genuine, permanent and monolithic empire. Because, Polybius believed, the destiny of every polis, once it "attains to supremacy and uncontested sovereignty" is to

9 As a matter of fact, Polybius surpassed Plato and Aristotle in this regard, for which reason he was even dubbed "godfather of the checks-and-balances concept" of the American founding fathers (Nippel 1991: 40).

10 While Plato, after the model of Sparta, advocated that the value of (iron) currency should be restricted only to the *polis* that mints it (while in other poleis such money should remain worthless) (Plato 1957: 148/V, 12/, Polybius recognized as one of the most decisive causes of the fall of Spartans' hegemonial policy precisely the worthlessness of their money outside the boundaries of their city-state: as soon as they would move outside the Peloponnese Spartan military troops would stay without supplies, because their homeland was far away, and they could not buy needed commodities with their currency (Polybius 1988: 520 /VI, 49/).

sink into moral decadence, which stirs the populace to rebel against (allegedly or actually) “grasping” rulers and establish – all in the name of “freedom and democracy” – a perverted “mob-rule” (Polybius 1988: 526 /VI, 57), with which starts a swift fall, and through which continues the incessant historical rotation of state organizations. What happened to other poleis, will happen to Rome, whose hegemony will vanish in a certain specific historical constellation just the same way as it had come into being.¹¹

Historical developments, however, took a different course. In the following four centuries, social-political organization of Rome underwent deep structural changes. Firstly, already in the 1st century B.C. Rome ceased to be a polis and became the capital of Italica, as an in nuce territorial state. Until then, citizens of the Apennine Peninsula mostly spoke Latin and adopted Roman customs and *Weltanschauung*, and served in the army under the same terms as Romans, so that ultimately Rome was forced to satisfy their increasingly frequent and strong requests to be granted full citizens rights and equality in the distribution of booty in exchange for their further participation in campaigns – so that on the basis of *lex Iulia* from 90 and *lex Plautia Papiria* from 89 all Italics became part of the *populus Romanus* (Bleicken 1993: 36). Although this can be regarded a logical outcome of the logics of Rome republic political life – featured by the balancing of strong oligarchic tendency and openness of citizenship rights (Schnapper 1996: 118) – it produced a destructive retroactive effect on the very concept of that republic. Namely, if during the entire period of the republic the syntagm *res publica* accompanied ethnical (and not only political) self-determination of the *populus Romanus*¹², at the end of this period it already began to corrode both in ethnical and political terms (Molnar 1997: 28). At that time, gradually and almost imperceptibly, the amorphous *populus Italicus* started pushing back the until then sacrosanct *populus Romanus*. Since the state organization, appropriate for the needs of polis, had remained unchanged, political life started to bypass government bodies which were no more able to channel it, and to even to utilize its deficiencies. National assemblies, as a “democratic” element, were the

11 Polybius' cyclic theory, *anakyklos politeion*, was a faithful successor not only of Plato's theory from *The Republic*, but also of Thucydides' *anánke*, and concurrently it was a predecessor of Machiavelli's *necesità* (Münkler 1982: 103)

12 Once successful in their struggle to remove the yoke of foreign (Etrurian) kings, Roman people pledged to do the same in future, against any (domestic equally as foreign) pretender to restoration of royal rule.

first one to bow due to quite an obvious handicap: since the old *populus Romanus* had disappeared, and the new *populus Italicus*, with all its particularities, was not recognized – a vacuum appeared in the republican government arrangement, to where the army started stepping in. Although already Italicaly transformed, the army could not just replace the unfunctional assemblies (where pauperized Roman city mob was for sale in exchange for support to political leaders), but instead, as the main pillar of the Roman imperialism – it necessarily aspired towards blowing up the entire republican organization. Authoritarianly organized, the army needed a capable and agile commander, and the only form of (plebiscitarian) “democratism” it knew was to judge, appoint and relieve commanders. But then, since there was no such an unity as the Roman army, in practice this type of “democracy” led to flaring up fight among different military fractions (and not only them) for the commanding power, which was thereby becoming increasingly more totalitarian and destructive in relation to two remaining republican authorities (see also Wittfogel 1988: 125-126). Roman military-political concept of *imperium Romanum*, which in the 1st century B.C. started its dangerous rise from *imperium proconsulare* and which finally prevailed in the 3rd century, consumed in the meantime not only the *auctoritas* of the Senate, but also the very *imperium proconsulare* (Hinsli 2001: 50). And in order that *imperium* could hold as a designation for one, single, primarily military and entirely centralized authority in the Roman Empire it was necessary that it meet two criteria. First, it had to be universally spread over all the Roman citizens, who were no more either *populus Romanus* or *populus Italicus*, but potentially *populus Mundi*, considering that as of 212 all the free men who lived in the territory of the Empire were granted citizenship right. Second, it had to be recognized by Roman citizens as their authority, but voluntarily rendered to the emperor. It was difficult to find legitimating basis for such voluntary rendering, and the search oscillated from the notion of a mystical monarchy (see Cazenave and Auguet 1990: 121 *et passim*), headed by a deified emperor, which had been already practiced by Alexander Macedonian and which in Rome first Gaius Julius Caesar started to politically adjust, on the one hand – and the stoic theory of royal duties in cosmopolis (which fully replaced ancient polis), according to which the transfer of power from people to emperor put before the emperor a duty to act for the welfare of the entire empire/cosmopolis and all the citizens, on the other hand (Rostovcev 1990: 410; Molnar 2001: 120 *et passim*). In the end, at the period of the Dominate, a compromise

was found in the Christian religion, which reconciled stoic theory of royal duties (and moral in general) with the Caesaropapist picture of the world, in which the emperor was “living law” (*lex animata*, *nomos empsuchos*) and irresponsible tyrant – but only as long as he did not obstruct his subjects (particularly the Church) to “give to Caesar what belongs to Caesar, and give to God what belongs to God” (Mark 12: 17).

Probably just because it did not have its battle of Actium, the Peloponnesian war could bear rich political-theoretical fruits – ranging from theoretical elaboration of power politics to politeia republicanism – which Rome observably lacked from the mid 1st century B.C. Cicero, who was among the first to indicate the dusk of the politeia republicanism, had no any living example after which he could, like his predecessors Plato and Aristotle, shape a theoretical model of the republic. In his last treatise *On Duties* (44 B.C.) he could just resignedly observe: “And so in Rome only the walls of her houses remain standing — and even they wait now in fear of the most unspeakable crimes — but our republic we have lost for ever. [...] It is while we have preferred to be the object of fear rather than of love and affection, that all these misfortunes have fallen upon us. And if such retribution could overtake the Roman People for their injustice and tyranny, what ought private individuals to expect?” (Cicero 1978: 180/II, 8). And while during the period of the Principate any memory of politeia republicanism could vanish because in the reality everything that could have served to it as a foothold had vanished, the disappearance of the theory which would treat empire as a culmination and logical outcome of power politics has completely different causes. Although Roman Empire brought power politics almost to an acme, it did not have its Thucydides, who would welcome it, expose and then theoretically expound. The focus of Roman Empire deliberations shifted therefore to the moral-religious level, where the only alternative to uncritical admiration of the existing was the religiously motivated criticism, ranging from resignation over everything that is of this world in the stoicism of Marcus Aurelius, to bitter fight against everything godless in the early Patristic. However, a new critical impulse is noticeable in the latter, which shall be of great importance for the subsequent transformations of the republican political thought and that relates to conceiving the ideal of a new empire, even more superior compared to the existing – the Kingdom of God on the Earth.

In his *True Word* (around 178), Celsus attacked Christianity because it wanted to “sacrifice faith of the [Roman] fathers and Greek wisdom” for the sake of a God who first promised the Jews that they would be “masters of the whole world”; and then “left them with not so much as a patch of ground or a home”. About a quarter of century later, Christian writer Origen rebutted Celsus, saying that Romans should not shrink from the Christian God because he had punished Jews after killing Jesus Christ. Furthermore, if Romans embrace the Christian faith and pray to “overcome their enemies; or rather, to have no enemies at all” (Origenes 1926: 441 /VIII, 70), he would enable them, as a matter of fact, to be “masters of the whole world”. To this purpose, Origen even pointed at the coincidence of Jesus Christ’s birth and establishment of “Pax Augustus”, building upon this a history of salvation centered round the Roman Empire (sprout on that peace and directed to Christianity: Nippel 1991: 43). Two centuries later it turned out that the embracing of Christian God as the patron of Roman people made them neither invincible nor capable of becoming “masters of the whole world”; quite the contrary, Christian chieftain Alaric with his Visigoths plundered Rome in 410, heralding soon fall of Western Roman Empire. The more dented was Western Roman Empire by the Barbarian assaults and inner unrests, the lesser grounds Church father had to uphold Origenes’s naïve faith in God’s patronship of the Empire under Christian spiritual supremacy, and to prophesy its turning into a genuine cosmopolis, that would have anything to do with the Kingdom of God on Earth.

Teaching of Aurelius Augustinus makes a caesura in this process of the distancing of the Church from (the western part of) Roman Empire, and the “city of Man” in general. Already at the beginning of the *City of God*, in every “city of Man” he recognizes inevitable imperial ambitions, which the Roman Empire, bringing them to the extreme, has ultimately exposed as auto-destructive: “city of Man”, accordingly to its sinful nature, not only “aims at dominion, which holds nations in enslavement, but is itself dominated by that very lust of domination” (St. Augustine 1987: 5 /I, Preface). The sin upon which it was built cannot be overcome, much the same as the empire itself cannot last for eternity and incorporate in itself the whole humanity. And indeed, the larger the empire – the stronger the turmoils that shake it, the more the subjugating force gets in intensity the more grows the resistance it encounters, both outside and inside. “For although there has been, and still is, no lack of enemies among foreign nations, against whom wars have always been waged, and are still being waged, yet the very extent

of the Empire has given rise to wars of a worse kind, namely, social and civil wars” (St. Augustine 1987: 861 /XIX, 7). Augustine well understands and theoretically articulates the hopelessness of the situation in which Roman Empire got stuck, together with its power-politics, at the beginning of the 5th century: after five centuries of increasingly more disastrous eruptions of the centripetal forces, aimed at either secession of its parts, or conquering of the imperial centre, it no longer had power either to socially and politically integrate “foreign nations” over which it had already established its dominion, or to subjugate remaining “foreign nations” which (like Visigoths) were becoming an increasingly huge external threat.

Anticipating further decline of (at least one – Western – part of the already halved) Roman Empire, Aurelius Augustine abandons it, in spite of the fact that it had made early Christians’ dream true, and embraced Christianity as the state religion. To better consolidate his theoretical position, he resorts for help to old politeia republicans, as to enlist their criticism of moral degradation of Rome back in time while it was a republic, into a much more general and far-reaching settling of accounts with the “city of Man” as such. Thereby he fully adopted Sallust’s judgment that the moral erosion had started back at the time of victory over Carthage (146 B.C.), when Romans ceased fear from foreign enemies (because they had none any more that would be a genuine threat), and adds that the main sin that already then pushed Romans to the path of decline was “lust for power”, which “established its victory in a few powerful individuals, and then crushed the rest of an exhausted country beneath the yoke of slavery” (St. Augustine 1987: 42 /I, 42).¹³ In other words, the cause of fall was the same power politics, which was praised by Thucydides and Polybius and which took many centuries before it became fully developed and turned the entire world into a hostage of an unreliable, unstable and dilapidating empire. Born of sin (i.e. Romulus’ fratricide), just like any other “city of Man”, Rome could not end differently but in sin – in the perpetuation of power, that revolves back at it, in order to finally consume it completely. And all this necessarily must be so, because God punishes wicked people for their sin. The tool of his punishments are actually those same wars,

13 In his *Histories* (78-67 B.C.) Sallust described moral decline of Romans alleging, in the tradition of the politeia republicanism, that its drivers were “discord, avarice, ambition and all the other evils which arise from great good fortune” (see Sallust 1991: 195 /I, 11 M/), which could include also this “lust for dominion”, on which St. Augustine will later base his analysis of the self destructiveness of “cities of Man”.

through which tyranny manifests and which turns people into an infinite union of executioners and victims. Already at the beginning of The City of God Augustine alleges that "God's providence constantly uses war to correct and chasten the corrupt morals of mankind" (St. Augustine 1987: 6 /I, 1). Consequently, destruction of Rome by Visigoths in 410 was quite in compliance with the "customs of war" until then practiced by Romans in the building of their Empire, and its only manifested peculiarity was that Alaric spared greatest Christian "basilicas" (St. Augustine 1987: 12-13 /I, 7), thereby implementing "God's providence" that the only salvation for men is in the city of God. However, the fact that not only pagans were victims to destruction and that all Christians were not spared, is to be attributed to God's unwillingness to trade with men; embracing of the Christianity had to come from faith, and faith asked for uncertainty. God's providence should not have any association with the causality of this world, as otherwise it would make the city of God profane and compatible with sins, the same way as the "city of the Man". Therefore war history of Rome (at least from the end of Punic wars), as described by Aurelius Augustine, fits well into the universal history of "God's acts of penalty for sins", which "could always struck both those who take and those who do not take part in war" and which eliminated Cicero's earlier endeavors to subject war to strict legal rules (Kleemeier 2003: 15).

Still, all this does not mean that, by condemning power politics, St. Augustine wanted to resume the original positions of politeia republicans and advocate a utopia of small, autarchic and ethically harmonized polis. His Christian faith would not allow him this and, in spite of undisputable affinity for Plato's philosophy, he made no any attempt of theoretical synthesis in this direction. Instead, he redefines the very idea of the empire and its world historical importance: on the one hand, he emancipates the postulate of an empire-centered universal and eschatological history of the link with the Roman Empire and binds it exclusively to the Kingdom of God on the Earth while, on the other hand, does not conceive this Kingdom of God on the Earth, accordingly to the letter of the Revelation of St. John the Divine, as something that shall occur at the end of history, but postulates it as a "City of God" which continually protracts through history, in order to struggle, alone, with its own powers, even before the announced second coming of Jesus, for the ultimate victory (See Löwith 1990: 210 *et passim*; Nigg 1996: 149 *et passim*; Molnar 1997: 210 *et passim*). And to postulate something like this, Aurelius Augustine could not stop at the moral condemnation

of war, as certain Church fathers did at his time. Quite the contrary, in parallel with the exposure of war as the means of God's punishment, Aurelius Augustine further develops Aristotle's teaching on the "just war", through which he develops the apology of a specific power politics of Christian rulers, legitimized through the already mentioned "God's providence", i.e. the interpretation of signs that allegedly indicate God's will to direct historical developments. Wars waged by Christians ruler end up, admittedly, both with victories and defeats, yet in either outcome Aurelius Augustine endeavors to recognize corresponding "God's providence". When Christians are victorious, then it is a "just war" which spreads round the globe not only the word of God, but also love (because an enemy against whom a war is waged can be loved as well, but this would not lessen the resoluteness to break his power).¹⁴ If they lose, Christians are again winners. God has punished them because they became overweening, or warned them not to become overweening, or wanted to spur them to improve themselves, or triggered them to "become more spiritualized". Wars are, at any case, the best way for believers to learn current demands of their God, which solely the Church is capable to interpret. In this context, Aurelius Augustine warned, the Church must not deceive believers regarding the final fate of any "city of Man", including here the Roman Empire as well: they are all destined to disappear from this world and yield their place to the "City of God". Much the same as "cities of Man" rose and fall in wars the past, so it will be in future, all until none of them shall exist and the only one remaining "City of God", i.e. one and only Christian Church, shall confront the imperative of entering the last "just war" against the last enemy: the Antichrist and his army. Through all just and unjust wars God's intention in the history leads believers towards preparing themselves for this apocalyptic battle, to which Aurelius Augustine dedicated a good share of the 20th book of the *City of God*. This was a message to his Christian contemporaries not to attach as great importance to Roman Empire (as just one in a sequence of "cities of Man"), because it will not be able to avoid the disaster, as to the "City of God", which gets ready to defeat in this last "just war" all the powers of Evil and institute the Kingdom of God on the Earth (see also Molnar 1997: 215-218).

If Thucydides had started the antic apology of the power politics, then Aurelius Augustinus ended it, triggering the avalanche of medi-

14 Thereby Aurelius Augustine's theory of "just war" not only negates Cicero's, but actually reinstates Aristotle's theory, with the only difference that instead of Barbarians it relates to unbelievers and, in ultima linea, followers of the Antichrist.

eval anathemas on it as a sin, with the aim of its substitution with the Church project of continual building of the Kingdom of God on the Earth, on the one hand, and legitimizing self-stylization of emperor as a Katechon, on the other. In the beginning, Aurelius Augustine's inclination to deepening gap between the "City of God" and all the existing "cities of Man" – including the Roman Empire itself – will not encounter strong resonance, primarily due to the Christian thinkers approach in treating them both as parts of a single "organic whole". The organic social teaching, which developed in 5th century B.C. in Greece, was built into the foundations of the Christian understanding of the Church, only due to the initial disinclination to separate Church from the state, the organic understanding of the Church was transferred also to the Empire. The Empire was treated as a function of Corpus Christi, as a part of much more broadly understood Ecclesia, inside which there is both spiritual authority (sacerdotum) and the secular authority (regnum). Although, of course, a distinction was made between individual "organs" of this religious-political organism, the supremacy of "head" was never questioned, and until the middle of 11th century Caput Ecclesiae was the Emperor. This unity starts falling apart only as of Pope Gregory VII, and the Church and Empire (later, state in general) shall become two bodies, two organisms, each with its own "head" (Struve 1978: 5 *et passim*).¹⁵ These are the circumstances allowing to adequately use Aurelius Augustine's teaching for legitimizing Catholic Church's endeavors to recover, with the aid of hierocracy and sacred war, the "organic" unity of the Western world, but with the Pope as the "head". Aurelius Augustine's teaching both on the Empire, and on war and peace, will then become one of the chief arguments backing more militant Popes; aspirations to impose themselves, in their capacity of the Vicars of Christ (until his second coming and the final battle against the Antichrist) – as the heads of the militia Christi which shall embark into a thorough suppression of the omnipresent sins and into placing foundations for the building of the Kingdom of God on the Earth, not shrinking even from finding enemies in almost all "cities of Man".

Aurelius Augustine was not only preparing the ground for the rise of the Catholic understanding of sacerdotum and Vatican power policy in the Middle Ages, but also started with the desacralization of the very image of the empire, which was already established in the pre-Christian

15 Thus in 12th century John of Salisbury writes about the state as an organism, i.e. a hierarchized whole made of different parts subordinated to the head, i.e. ruler (who is at the same also above the law).

Roman Empire. After the Roman principes, starting already from Octavian, had established the tradition of self-deification aimed at gaining divine powers with which they would institute peace and order on the Earth, Christian Church demonstrated readiness to flirt with this practice, giving to the emperor the role of Katechon, i.e. the “guardian” of the order of this world and “preventer” of Antichrist to get loose and immediately commence the ultimate battle, which shall put an end to that world. This understanding was not to be easily suppressed and in the Middle Ages it will be meritable for the Carolingian restoration of the idea of empire, and subsequently for the creation of the concept of *sacrum imperium*, based on which Emperors, from Frederick Barbarossa onward, will legitimize themselves as the rulers of the Holy Roman Reich. And while until the 15th century this construction had prominently transnational characteristic, it shall start weakening more and more from then onward and linking the notion of Empire to the “German nation” (Nigg 1996: 149; Minkler 2009: 121; Molnar 1997: 119-120). Then, as a matter of fact, all the mentioned variants of the power politics, including the one developed within politeia republicanism itself, proved to be worn out and unusable. The new century started with the search for new theoretical and practical syntheses. The first of them (Reason of State republicanism) endeavored to harmonize elements from the legacy of pagan republicanism with the elements of anti-Christian imperialism (guided by the ideal of Roman Empire before Emperor Constantine’s conversion to Christianity) and to thereby give broadest possible impetus to power politics (canonized teaching on the Reason of State). The second one (federalist republicanism), opposed to the first one, already had to fit elements from the legacy of pagan republicanism into the newly developed tradition of “Christian republic”, which no more was either Katechon, or “Kingdom of God on Earth”, but – a pacifistic federation of the European (and potentially also of all the world) countries. Finally, the third (Romanticist republicanism), reacting to rendering the tradition of “Christian republic” senseless in secular projects (from which the United States of America, United Nations and European Union shall finally evolve), would put on the agenda return to the earliest beginnings – small polis, comprehensive Kingdom of God on the Earth, or some original creation of archaizing imagination.

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The Social Choice Theory: Can it be Considered a Complete Political Theory?

Abstract

Social choice theory (SCT) deals with the aggregation of individual preferences in order to arrive at social preference orders, i.e. at the 'general will'. The present paper examines whether SCT could be regarded as a *complete* political theory. SCT is evaluated against seven criteria, proposed by Martha Nussbaum, that a political theory needs to fulfill in order to be regarded a complete political theory. These criteria are: understanding of material need; procedural justice; liberty and its worth; racial, ethnic and religious differences; gender and family; international relations; and moral psychology. The analysis showed that SCT is strong at problems of procedural justification, distributive justice and some problems of ethics. It is weaker on the issues of moral psychology, and justice between nations. It is neglectful concerning the issues of racial, ethnic and religious inequality, and issues of gender and family. The paper concludes that the SCT can have an important place *within* more comprehensive political theories, but cannot claim itself to be a complete political theory.

Keywords: Social choice theory; social preferences; political theory; distributive justice; collective decisions.

Introduction

Social choice theory (SCT) deals with the question of "how can it be possible to arrive at cogent aggregative judgments about the society

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(for example, about “social welfare”, or “the public interest”, or “aggregate poverty”), given the diversity of preferences, concerns, and predicaments of the different individuals within the society?” (Sen 1999. See also: Arrow 1950; Craven 1992; Elster and Hylland 1986; Rowley 1993; Sen 1983). It has been claimed that social choice theory, as a theory dealing with the ‘general will’, could be regarded as a comprehensive political theory. The claim has been supported by three related reasons. They are: privileged relationship of the social choice theory to (1) economics and (2) mathematics, and (3) its concern with distributive justice. While these elements indeed constitute the essential elements of the SCT, it can be disputed whether they are sufficient to attribute it a status of a political theory in a more general sense, and especially whether it can be regarded as a complete political theory. This paper will attempt to show that social choice theory in fact is not a complete political theory, and, moreover, due to its character it cannot aspire to become one.

1. Clarification of the Criteria

Martha Nussbaum (1997), in her discussion of whether Nietzsche could be considered a political thinker, proposed “seven criteria for serious political thought: understanding of material need; procedural justification; liberty and its worth; racial, ethnic and religious differences; gender and family; justice between nations; and moral psychology” (Nussbaum 1997: 1). In her view, serious political thinkers, such as Kant, Mill, Rousseau, or Rawls, contributed to most of the listed problems. Theorists and theories that fall short of that requirement, like Nietzsche in her view, cannot be regarded as having to offer something important for “political thought in the 1990s” (*Ibid.*). The same question is asked, in this paper, concerning the social choice theory.

Before proceeding to the examination of the social choice theory, it is useful to clarify the meaning of the seven criteria proposed by Nussbaum. Material need: political theory “must show an understanding of the needs human beings have for food, drink, shelter, and other resources, including the role of these resources in supporting the development of higher human capacities, intellectual and moral”. Third primarily refers to distributive justice and corresponding ‘institutional structures’. Procedural justification concerns the “procedures through which a political structure is determined, procedures that legitimate

and/or justify resulting proposals". Liberty and its worth: Political theory has also to "give an account of the various types of human liberty that are relevant for political planing.... preferably also an account of the role of the political in creating the capacity for choice". Another important area is racial, ethnic, and religious difference. Political theory should "show an understanding of the role played in political life by differences of race, ethnicity, and religion, and make some proposals for dealing with these differences." Likewise, Gender and the family are important issues: "different ways in which society has structured the family, and of the ways in which differences of gender have been and can be regarded by political institutions". The subsequent criterion for a comprehensive political theory is Justice between nations. Political theorists "must show awareness of the fact that nations share a world of resources with other nations, and make some proposal concerning the obligations nations owe to one another, both with respect to the morality of international relations and with respect to economic obligation". Finally, the seventh area is moral psychology: "an account of human psychology - motivation, emotion, reaction - as this pertains to our interactions in the political sphere, either fostering or impeding them" (Nussbaum 1997: 2-3).

2. What is Social Choice Theory

Social choice theory has been developed by a multitude of authors. While its origin is located in Kenneth Arrow's book *Social Choice and Individual Values* (Arrow 1950), a number of later authors contributed to the development of the social choice theory in various directions.²

Social choice theory, or rather the social choice field, refers to a, occasionally loosely connected, set of problems, theories and hypotheses, concentrated around a relatively narrow problem, namely criteria and methods of arriving at 'social preference' on the basis of individual preferences. According to Craven, SCT "concerns the possibility of making a choice or judgment that is in some way based on the views or preferences of a number of individuals, given that the views or preferences of different people may conflict with each other" (Craven 1992: 1). In his view, there are four major areas of application of the SCT: elections,

2 Eighteenth century thinkers Condorcet and Borda are often quoted as early predecessors of SCT.

committees (decisions in small groups); economic contexts, and moral judgments. Craven does not claim that the SCT is primarily a political theory, even less that it is a complete political theory. In fact, he complains about the 'unjust' status assigned to the SCT, namely that it does not fully belong to any of the established disciplines, or in his words, that it is "homeless" (*Ibid.* 2).

According to Lalman *et al.* (1993: 77), SCT can be subsumed under the general group of theories, called 'formal political theory'. The focus of these theories is the "analysis of rational choices and their aggregate consequences in non-market contexts" (1993: 77). The connection to economic theory is based on a shared "set of assumptions concerning individual choice" (*Ibid.*), i.e., on the concept of rationality.

SCT is extensively dealt with in three volumes edited by Rowley (1993). The first volume presents foundations of the theory (e.g., Kenneth Arrow's work) and deals primarily with the aggregation of individual preferences. It includes a number of works on collective rationality, voting³ and strategy-proofness (Tideman and Tullock 1976), a number of early critiques of the social choice theory, and finally some new trends and developments, including the problems of interpersonal comparisons of utilities (Harsanyi 1955), cardinal welfare, 'free-riding', and enriching informational basis about individuals (Sen 1977). The second volume covers two topics: utilitarian ethics (e.g., differences between utilitarianism and welfarism), and contractarian ethics. The last volume concentrates on social justice ethics (including several texts on John Rawls, and four texts by Rawls), and on classical liberal ethics.

Finally, major contributors to the SCT also agree about its unclear identity. Amartya Sen poses the same question: "let us begin with at the beginning: what is social choice theory? This is not an easy question to answer [...]" (Sen 1986). He then distinguishes between two 'levels of specification': "social choice theory as a field of study", and social choice theory as a "particular approach or a collection of approaches typically used in that field of study" (*Ibid.* 213). He also argues that many of its criticisms come from confusing the two levels. In his words, "It is a mistake to think of social choice theory as a given set of complete ideas that are unleashed every time any problem is taken up for a 'social choice theoretic' treatment" (*Ibid.* 238).

3 Gibbard (1973) discusses how the impossibility conclusion can be overcome by different types of voting.

From this brief overview of the domain of SCT, it can be inferred that its main topics are problems of collective decision making, problems of distributive justice, and problems of ethics in general. Some of its boundaries are not clear, for example with rational choice theories in general, or game theories. Therefore, here will be examined not only the narrowly defined SCT, but also some aspects of related, closely connected approaches from the same 'scientific family'.

3. The Test

In this part, a contribution of the social choice theory to the seven problems listed by Martha Nussbaum (1997) will be examined.

3.1 Material Need, or Distributive Justice

The contribution of social choice theorists to the field of distributive justice is substantial. It consists in both formal examination of the existing theories and hypotheses, and in offering original solutions. Harsanyi, for example, was one of the first authors to apply rational choice concepts to the problems of distributive justice (Harsanyi 1955).

Concerning the 'understanding for material needs of human beings', social choice theorists generally do not deal with it in an explicit manner. In line with their context-less, hypothetical-deductive approach, human needs enter the picture as part of individual preferences, or as elements in the formulae for social utility or welfare calculation. The extensive debate about the maximin principle (Rawls 1958; Harsanyi 1975), or the analysis of distributive justice as bargaining games, are examples of how the problems of material welfare have been treated in this tradition.

Nussbaum requires that a political theory ought to say something also about the resources needed for "supporting the development of higher human capacities, intellectual and moral" (Nussbaum 1997: 2). Narrowly defined SCT hardly pays any attention to these problems, due to taking into account only abstract individual preferences and treating them as given. 'Development of higher human capacities' implies potential preferences, which are not simply 'given', but in favorable circumstances could be actualized. This problem has been recognized by

some social choice theorists. Sen suggests that “we have to go beyond looking only for the best reflection of given individual preferences, or the most acceptable procedures for choices based on those preferences” (Sen 1995: 17). He suggests, together with Elster (1986) and others, more Habermassian, public discourse approach. In any case, it cannot be disputed that the SCT significantly contributed to the analysis of problems of distributive justice.

3.2 Procedural Justification

The problem of procedural justification is a major focus of the social choice theory. Its main concern has been whether there is a procedure by which one can arrive from individual preferences to social ordering of preferences, such that it satisfies some basic criteria of ‘social rationality’. Although the result to which the SCT has arrived is negative (the ‘impossibility theorem’), its contribution to this field is fundamental.

However, according to Nussbaum, procedural justification is a broader field than simply making social choices. It should also include procedural justification of political institutions. In fact, theories of voting inspired by the Arrowian theory have been developed, as well as normative suggestions for the improvement of voting mechanisms (Gibbard 1973; Tideman and Tullock 1976; McLean 1991). Therefore, it can be concluded that social choice approach substantively contributed the problems of procedural justification and potential improvement of democratic political institutions.

3.3 Liberty and its Worth

Concern with problems of ethics, and liberty specifically, is another area in which social choice scholars extensively contributed. Emphasis on liberty was included already in the original Arrow’s formulation of the condition of collective rationality, known as the condition of ‘non-dictatorship’.

However, as the quest for adequate mechanisms for making social choices lead to the formulation of the impossibility theorem (Arrow 1950), so the application of the SCT framework to problems of liberty led to the formulation of another impossibility theorem, this time the ‘impossibility of a Paretian liberal’ (Sen 1970). Discussions about this

new ‘impossibility’, in addition to causing problems to the social choice theorists, also has led to new developments. For example, Hammond suggests the inclusion of ‘rights-inclusive social states’, i.e., “along with social states in the usual sense, both individual and group rights should themselves become the object of both individual preference and social choice” (Hammond 1995).

SCT’s, recognition of the importance and sovereignty of individual preferences is rooted in liberal thought. Yet, it could be objected that problems of liberty have been treated in a relatively narrow manner. Much theorizing has been concerned with the formalization and with problems which have arisen due to the formalization procedures. For example, commenting on the resolution of the Paretian liberal paradox, Sen argues that “there is nothing much to ‘resolve’ anyway. The impossibility of the Paretian liberal just brings out a conflict of principles - a conflict which might not have been immediately apparent. There are, of course, many such conflicts.” (Sen 1983: 28) In other words, formal methods revealed contradictions that have already been familiar to the traditional moral (political) theory.

As additional problems, one could list the lack of “an account of the role of the political in creating the capacity for choice” (Nussbaum 1997), or the relatively instrumental treatment of human beings, in line with its general utilitarian approach. Nevertheless, these problems concern specific solutions offered by the SCT, while the main concern here is finding whether it has something to offer in this field. Hence, the theory passes this test too.

3.4 Moral Psychology

While social choice theorists have written extensively on a variety of moral issues, their contribution to our understanding of moral psychology is unclear. Often, psychological research on morality is overlooked, or some references are made as a matter of courtesy.⁴ Typically, it is simply assumed that individuals are self-interested, egocentric beings. According to Elster, “Much of the social choice and public choice literature, with its assumption of universally opportunistic behavior, simply seems out of touch with the real world, in which there is a great deal of honesty and sense of duty” (Elster 1989: 179).

4 Harsanyi (1977), for instance, mentions Piaget’s work only in passing.

There are also more refined treatments. Harsanyi distinguishes different 'kinds' of rationality that are applicable to realms of economics, politics and morality. He presents four postulates "that the simplest motivational theory accommodating non-economic and nonegoistic motives must involve" (Harsanyi 1969: 125). The first is the "postulate of 'low-cost' impartiality and public spirit" (*Ibid.*), meaning that if it does not cost them much, people may behave public-spiritedly and impartially. The second postulate states that third parties in conflict situation can behave in an impartial way, and judge the situation according to the principle of maximizing "some 'social welfare function'" (*Ibid.*). The last two postulates refer to the ability of individuals to morally commit themselves, and therefore to act in other-centered way, and that individuals are motivated by the need for economic gain and for social acceptance. While this is a psychologically more sensitive approach, these are postulates, not empirical generalizations and their 'scientific' usefulness is evaluated by their operation in formal models, not against the empirical evidence on how real individuals actually make moral judgments.

In fact, Sen hints that the social choice framework may be an incomplete foundation for a moral theory (Sen 1977). For example, he discusses whether it can fully take into account the concept of liberty, or the Marxian notion of exploitation, and to what extent the SCT could be helped by enriching the informational basis. It seems that Sen believes that the answer is negative, that 'welfarism' cannot fully account for such concepts.⁵ In the end, it seems that the test of the moral psychology contribution is only partly passed by the SCT.

3.5 Racial, Ethnic and Religious Difference

This field is virtually out of the concern of the social choice theorists. However, the defense could argue that SCT indirectly addresses questions of this sort. For example, taking into account all concerned individuals, and giving equal weight to their individual preference orderings, means that ethnic and other minorities play a role in making social decisions. Moreover, if that is not enough, procedures could be devised through which the voice of minorities could be amplified, e.g.,

5 However, Roemer presented a specific framework for social choice theory basing it on the Marxist theory of exploitation (Roemer 1986).

by various weighting procedures. Also, since the notions of rights and liberties can be incorporated into this approach, it is another route to addressing the issue of minorities. Hammond's suggestion for using the "rights-inclusive social states" in social choice calculus may be applicable here (Hammond 1995: 57).

While such considerations demonstrate the flexibility of the social choice framework, and its ability to accommodate a variety of issues and problems, it is hardly sufficient. First, as aforementioned, the treatment of preferences as given creates problems. History of suppression of a group can prevent it from articulating preferences that are more favorable to itself. Hence, it may be preferable to turn to more discursive approaches, or to non-consequentialist ethical theories. Second, the theory does not deal with the problem of who is to be included or excluded from making social decisions. Discussion of issues of citizenship, voting rights and others, cannot be accommodated into the social choice framework. Obviously, the problem of racial, ethnic and religious differences has to be dealt with through other approaches, and than perhaps used as external information in social choice theory. This is as an inherent weakness of the social choice and other rational choice approaches. These problems are among the most important political issues, and therefore a complete political theory should be able to address them.

3.6 Gender and Family

Virtually all that has been argued concerning the previous point can be applied to issues of gender and family as well.

3.7 Justice Between Nations

This is another issue largely neglected by the social choice theory, though not to the same degree as the issues of gender and ethnic and racial differences. Game theories have often been applied to problems of international relations (Harsanyi 1965: Lalman *et al.*: 1993). However, it is not sure that these applications showed "awareness of the fact that nations share a world of resources with other nations, and make some proposal concerning the obligations nations owe to one another", as Nussbaum requests from a political theory (Nussbaum 1997: 3). Ra-

tional choice scholars could be found among Pentagon advisers perhaps not less often than among those committed to justice between nations.

SCT is applicable to the relationships between already existing and well defined groups, such as states, although it does not imply how the out-groups should be treated. This state of affairs fits Held's judgment that the "mainstream Western political thought has remained by and large impervious" to addressing questions "of social justice in the larger international order" (Held 1991: 2). The problem becomes urgent in the era of globalization, when choices made at one place at the globe may have very serious consequences on quite another place.

In any case, one thing is to analyze behavior and strategies of competing power groups, and quite another to provide a critique of power relations, whether within a society, or on the international scale. While rational choice theories may be good at the former, they seem to be less effective concerning the latter.

4. Final Considerations and the Conclusion

As the previous analysis shows, social choice theory, both in its narrower and broader meanings, belongs to the realm of political theories. Its major concerns, like aggregation of choices or preferences, distributive justice, liberties, constitute some of the most important problems that a political theory has to deal with. Yet, as the test against the criteria provided by Nussbaum showed, it is also clear that it covers only one part of the problems that political theory ought to address. Social choice framework could be extended to some additional areas, but it seems that it cannot aspire to become a comprehensive and complete political theory. It is strongest, as its name indicates, in the field of social choice procedures. Still, even there it does not have to serve as the only paradigm. Sen's judgment that any political theory has to offer some account of social choice problems, but that it does not necessarily have to be traditional Arrowian theory, is justified (Sen 1986). The need for public discourse, and treatment of preferences as open and changeable in the course of decision making, is a necessary complement to the formal theory.

Concerning the seven criteria, the analysis showed that SCT is particularly strong at problems of procedural justification, distributive justice and some problems of ethics (theory of liberty). It is weaker on

the issues of moral psychology, and justice between nations. It is neglectful concerning the issues of racial, ethnic and religious inequality, and issues of gender and family. Hence, the grade it has to receive is: incomplete.

As a normative theory, based on rational choice paradigm, a serious difficulty is its narrow understanding of human nature. Although Arrow specifically emphasized that his theory does not make a particular assumption about universal individual egocentrism, such hypotheses generally dominate the social choice studies. Even when a more elaborated approach to human moral psychology is adopted, it still remains based on simplifying assumptions. It is not clear whether it can be overcome, because formal models require simplifying assumptions about constant moral and motivational inclinations. The neglect of the context is also a problem. As Mouzelis argues, "game-theoretical approaches deal with macro/collective actors in a way that underemphasizes the various historical and socio-cultural contexts within which human rationality takes its specific forms" (Mouzelis 1995: 40).

With all due respect to social choice theory for the achievements in the fields of distributive justice, moral theory, social decision procedures, or sophisticated advances in the theory of voting, the present inquiry arrived at an unfavorable verdict. The main conclusion of the paper is that social choice theory can have an important place within more comprehensive political theories, but cannot claim itself to be a complete political theory.

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La politique de sécurité et de défense commune de l'UE: les effets de socialisation

Sommaire

Dans cet article, le développement de la politique de sécurité et de défense commune de l'UE (PSDC) est conçu comme le processus de socialisation diplomatique, d'apprentissage et de diffusion de normes et d'idées. Vu que la PSDC reste dans l'essentiel de nature intergouvernementale et relativement peu institutionnalisée, le processus de socialisation joue un rôle prépondérant suite à l'interaction croissante entre les acteurs dans le cadre de la PSDC. Les Etats membres ont appris, à travers l'interaction, de se comporter en commun et d'adopter les normes dans le cadre de la PSDC et cela conduit au changement de leurs intérêts et donc de leurs identités. A travers l'interaction, des règles formelles et des pratiques informelles ont été développées qui permettent le fonctionnement de la PSDC. L'article sera divisé en deux parties. Dans la première partie, l'auteur présente les traits essentiels du constructivisme social en tant qu'approche prometteuse dans l'analyse du fonctionnement de la PSDC et s'efforce de clarifier le concept de socialisation. Dans la deuxième partie, la PSDC est envisagée à travers le processus de socialisation. L'auteur conclut qu'à travers l'interaction, l'habitation de coopération conduit à l'émergence de normes et d'idées communes, qui produisent progressivement une "pensée européenne" et des actions communes dans le cadre de la politique de sécurité et de défense.

Mots-clefs: politique de sécurité et de défense commune (PSDC), socialisation, apprentissage social, normes, identité, acteurs nationaux, intérêt national, intégration européenne.

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Introduction

Dans les dix dernières années, la politique de sécurité et de défense commune a fait un progrès considérable, aussi bien sur le plan conceptuel que sur celui de l'expérience acquise. On est témoin d'une expansion des opérations militaires et civiles lancées dans le cadre de la PSDC, des arrangements institutionnels nouveaux formalisés par le traité de Lisbonne et des moyens opérationnels mis à la disposition de l'Union pour la réalisation de la PSDC. Or, l'émergence de la PSDC soulève certaines questions.

Comment comprendre le développement de la PSDC? Comment expliquer sa dynamique et son fonctionnement? Nous considérons que la PSDC peut être expliquée aux termes des facteurs idéationnels, et non exclusivement sur la base des facteurs matériels. Notre approche sera basée sur l'importance des rôles, règles, identité et idées dans la compréhension de la politique de sécurité et de défense commune. Partant de l'approche constructiviste, nous examinerons le processus du développement de la PCSD comme le processus de socialisation diplomatique, d'apprentissage et de diffusion de normes et d'idées. L'accent est mis sur l'émergence des normes et valeurs communes au sein de la PCSD. Les Etats membres ont appris, à travers l'interaction, de se comporter en commun et d'adopter les normes dans le cadre de la PCSD sous forme des droits et des obligations et cela conduit au changement de leurs intérêts et donc de leurs identités. Ce processus se réalise à travers la socialisation. Le terme "socialisation" est conçu dans cet article comme processus qui "induit les acteurs aux normes et règles d'une communauté donnée" (Checkel 2005: 804). Il s'agit donc d'un processus qui induit les acteurs à approprier les normes et les idées qui sont propres au groupe dans lequel ils interagissent. La socialisation conduit à la redéfinition des pratiques et normes existantes et à l'émergence de nouvelles normes et valeurs qui sont "internalisées" dans un environnement donné (Beyers 2010: 909), Les acteurs ainsi "transfèrent" le comportement de la logique de "conséquence" à la logique de "l'opportunité".

Le processus de socialisation est étroitement liée au concept d'eupéanisation. Dans cet article, l'eupéanisation est conçue comme "un processus qui réoriente la direction et la forme des politiques dans la mesure où les dynamiques politiques et économiques de la Communauté européenne (l'Union européenne) deviennent partie intégrante

de la logique organisationnelle des politiques et des processus décisionnels nationaux” (Ladrech 1994: 69). Ainsi, la socialisation qui se réalise au sein de la PSDC conduit à l'européanisation de la PSDC.

Cet article sera divisé en deux parties. La première partie analyse les caractéristiques essentielles du courant constructiviste par rapport au néoréalisme. Dans la deuxième partie, l'auteur tend à analyser comment la socialisation conduit à l'institutionnalisation de la politique de sécurité et de défense commune. Cette institutionnalisation de la PSDC qui se déroule par la socialisation des élites, conduit à modifier les politiques étrangères et de sécurité des acteurs diplomatiques nationaux, leurs intérêts, préférences et leur identité. Les acteurs s'adaptent aux modèles de comportements produits par les institutions européennes qui ont développé des règles formelles et des pratiques informelles en vue de permettre leur fonctionnement.

1. Le cadre théorique: le tournant constructiviste dans les relations internationales

Comment expliquer le développement de la PSDC? A première vue, la théorie du réalisme structurel peut offrir une explication valide du développement de la PESD/PSDC. A la différence du réalisme classique pour lequel la volonté de puissance, en tant que force motrice de la politique internationale, est inhérente à chaque Etat, le réalisme structurel considère que la structure du système internationale oblige les Etats à augmenter la puissance. Le système international est anarchique, puisqu'il n'y a pas une autorité centrale qui empêcherait les Etats de recourir à la force. Dans un tel système anarchique, les Etats sont des acteurs rationnels qui cherchent à survivre. Ils poursuivent leurs intérêts nationaux qui sont définis en termes de puissance. La puissance des Etats est d'une importance primordiale puisqu'elle assure la survie des Etats dans un système international anarchique. Les Etats tendent à maximiser les intérêts parce que "l'autosuffisance est une politique plus sage que l'interdépendance et la vulnérabilité" (Collard-Wexler 2006: 400).

Les facteurs structurels, tels que l'anarchie, l'intérêt, la puissance, l'équilibre des puissances sont, dans la vision réaliste, des éléments clefs pour la compréhension de la politique internationale. Le courant réaliste met l'accent sur l'exploration de la structure matérielle. Dans

l'optique réaliste, les intérêts des Etats sont "exogènes", c'est-à-dire ils sont déterminés par la structure du système international. Les Etats peuvent changer le comportement, mais leurs intérêts sont statiques, immuables. La question essentielle du rationalisme est pourquoi certaines décisions sont prises, pourquoi le comportement des acteurs les conduit à réaliser une action spécifique.

Dans la perspective réaliste, la recherche de l'intérêt national et la protection de la souveraineté nationale sont des principes structurants de toute action diplomatique des Etats. Les représentants de ce courant théorique ne rejettent pas la possibilité d'une coopération entre les Etats. Or, cette coopération est principalement liée au secteur de "low politics", tandis que dans le champ du "high politics", cette coopération est difficile à réaliser. Cette division était primordiale pour certains réalistes (Stanley Hoffmann) pour expliquer les limites du processus de l'intégration européenne. Pendant longtemps les réalistes ont considéré qu'il était impossible, pour les Etats membres de l'Union (Communauté européenne), de coopérer en matière de défense. D'où la constatation de Kenneth Waltz qu'en dépit du fait que les Etats membres de l'UE ont atteint un "succès remarquable" dans l'intégration de leurs économies nationales, le consensus comme mode de décision dans le domaine de la politique étrangère, de sécurité et de défense les empêchait de réaliser une politique véritablement européenne (Waltz 2000: 31).

La vision réaliste aboutit à une conception assez simpliste de la coopération européenne en matière de sécurité et de défense. La politique étrangère et de sécurité commune s'explique, par les réalistes, par le comportement des grandes puissances, les pays les plus puissants de l'UE, qui établissent les règles du jeu, ainsi que par leur relation avec les Etats-Unis. Dans cette optique, la PESC est réduite à un ensemble des intérêts nationaux. Cette politique ne fonctionnera que si elle est conforme aux intérêts des Etats membres les plus puissants. En cas de désaccord, elle sera paralysée.

Or, comme l'affirme John Mearsheimer, "il y a un prix à payer pour une simplification de réalité" (Miršajmer 2009: 33). En fait, il existe certaines questions essentielles devant lesquelles la théorie réaliste se trouve dans l'impasse. Comment expliquer les changements des intérêts des Etats membres dans le cadre de la PESD? Pour certains réalistes structurels, l'émergence de la PESC a été liée à la fin de la Guerre froide et à l'apparition de la puissance unipolaire (Posen 2004), pour d'autres

c'était la peur de montée en puissance d'une Allemagne unie (Art 1996: 4; Jones 2003: 125) qui devait être contenue par la création de la PESD. Les réalistes offensifs mettaient l'accent sur la présence américaine en Europe, surtout sur le plan militaire, comme variable importante pour expliquer l'émergence de la PESD (Miršajmer 2009: 454-455). Quant à l'émergence de la PESD, les réalistes ont essayé de répondre à ces questions par le développement du concept du "soft balancing". En fait, l'émergence de la PESD est conçue comme le résultat d'une tentative des Etats membres de l'UE "d'équilibrer" les Etats-Unis (Posen 2004: 8; Art 2004: 180). Aux yeux des réalistes, les Etats les plus puissants créent et forment les institutions. Ainsi, la France et le Royaume-Uni ont donné l'impulsion à la PESD. Face à la domination américaine, ces deux pays ont lancé une initiative d'équilibrer la puissance américaine par le biais de la PESD.

Est-ce que le constructivisme social peut être une approche prometteuse dans l'analyse du développement de la PSDC? Qu'est-ce que le constructivisme social? Emanuel Adler, un des leaders du constructivisme, affirme qu'il s'agit d'un courant considérant "que la façon dont le monde matériel façonne et soit façonnée par l'action humaine et l'interaction dépend des interprétations dynamiques normatives et épistémologiques du monde matériel" (Adler 1997: 322). Le constructivisme social accorde une grande attention aux structures normatives et idéationnelles qui façonnent l'identité des acteurs. Dans cette perspective, Frenck Petiteville rappelle que "le constructivisme se propose de repenser toutes les pratiques et institutions internationales, ainsi que les catégories conceptuelles qui les sous-tendent (anarchie, intérêt national, sécurité, puissance, coopération), en considérant celles-ci comme intangibles mais comme construites par des normes, valeurs, représentations collectives historiquement et sociologiquement constituées, à la fois au plan interne des Etats et dans leurs relations mutuelles" (Petiteville 2010: 68-69).

En dépit du fait qu'il s'agit d'un "mouvement intellectuel novateur (...) riche, et varié" (Telo 2010: 133), dont l'importance est incontestable, certains auteurs soulignent qu'il est difficile de déterminer l'identité de ce courant théorique (Zehfuss 2004: 6). Nonobstant les différences au sein du courant constructiviste (Reus-Smith 2005: 188), on peut distinguer certains traits communs. D'abord, les constructivistes considèrent que les structures normatives ou idéationnelles sont aussi importantes que les structures matérielles. La société internationale

n'est pas exclusivement déterminée par les intérêts matériels ou le calcul rationnel comme l'affirme le néoréalisme, mais aussi par les idées, les perceptions subjectives, le sens que les hommes donnent à ces intérêts (Telo 2010: 134). Ainsi, la société internationale est une construction sociale (Guzzini 2005: 498). A la différence du réalisme, qui situent l'acteur (Etat) au centre des relations internationales, les constructivistes mettent l'accent sur la "structure" comme le facteur constitutif de réalité et contestent la vision réaliste selon laquelle les institutions ne sont que le reflet des intérêts des grandes puissances. Ils admettent le rôle important des Etats dans le processus de construction des normes internationales, mais rejettent la primauté des grandes puissances.

L'interaction réciproque entre la structure et les acteurs est le postulat essentiel du constructivisme. La nature des acteurs dépend du contexte social, et inversement les normes sociales et les institutions dominantes existent parce que les acteurs les (re)produisent (Klotz, Lynch 1999: 53; Jupille, Caporaso, Checkel 2003: 14). Les intérêts des acteurs ne sont pas immuables mais endogènes, changeables puisqu'ils sont le produit de l'interaction sociale. De même, les structures n'existent pas d'une manière exogène, mais à travers une interaction et cela signifie que les acteurs peuvent changer les structures. Contrairement à la question réaliste "pourquoi", pour les constructivistes il est essentiel de savoir comment certaines décisions sont possibles, comment les acteurs développent les intérêts.

Comment les acteurs développent-ils les intérêts? Dans la perspective constructiviste, l'identité est à la base de l'intérêt (Wendt 1992: 398). Les identités disent à nous et aux autres qui nous sommes et qui sont les autres. Ils impliquent des intérêts spécifiques qui, de leur tour, impliquent le choix d'une action ou d'un comportement spécifique. Donc, les structures normatives ou idéationnelles façonnent l'identité des acteurs (Hopf 1998: 174). Les Etats ne possèdent les intérêts a priori, leurs identités sont construites à travers les normes qui définissent les intérêts des Etats. Les normes "construisent" les identités qui conduisent à des changements des intérêts des Etats et donc de leurs politiques. Les structures et les agents sont mutuellement constitués et déterminés.

On conclut, donc, que le constructivisme social, contrairement au réalisme, met l'accent sur les structures normatives et non seulement matérielles, sur le rôle de l'identité dans la construction des intérêts et sur la constitution mutuelle des agents et de structure. Les agents

n'agissent pas indépendamment de la structure, qui influence leur comportement et construit leurs identités et intérêts. D'autre part, les structures sociales sont construites par les idées que partagent les agents. D'où l'importance, pour les constructivistes, des "arrangements intersubjectifs" (Walters 2002: 86).

Le processus de socialisation occupe une place importante dans la relation entre les structures sociales et les acteurs (agents). En général, ce concept se réfère au processus par lequel les acteurs acquièrent différentes identités, qui conduisent à de nouveaux intérêts grâce à l'interaction dans un contexte social (Bearce, Bondanella 2007: 706). Nous avons accepté la définition de la socialisation comme le processus d'adoption (internalisation) des normes, comme "l'induction des acteurs dans les normes et règles de la communauté donnée" (Checkel 2005: 804). Suite à l'adoption des normes spécifiques d'une communauté, les acteurs changent leur comportement en allant de la logique de conséquence vers la logique de l'opportunité. Les acteurs peuvent suivre la logique de l'opportunité à travers l'apprentissage des rôles de sorte qu'ils acquièrent les connaissances qui leur permettent d'agir conformément aux attentes. Conformément à la logique de l'opportunité, les acteurs changent leur comportement du calcul stratégique, en tant que caractéristique de la logique intergouvernementale, à un jeu conscient de rôle.

Comment le processus de socialisation se réalise-t-il? Pour les constructivistes, les mécanismes de socialisation sont multiples. Il s'agit surtout du calcul stratégique, du rôle joué ou de pression normative (Checkel 2005: 805). Lorsqu'il s'agit du calcul stratégique, ce mécanisme, agissant isolément, ne peut pas conduire à la socialisation. Les acteurs agissent d'une façon rationnelle, ils calculent afin de maximiser leurs intérêts, et adaptent leur comportement aux normes et règles favorisées par la communauté internationale. Cependant, cette adaptation peut conduire à l'internalisation et au changement des préférences. Quant au rôle joué, les acteurs changent leur comportement vers la logique de l'opportunité, qui comprend un comportement non calculé. Dans ce cas, l'internalisation est plus probable si les agents sont plus longtemps et plus intensément exposés à un environnement donnée. Enfin, en ce qui concerne la pression normative, les agents internalisent activement la compréhension de la logique de l'opportunité (Checkel 2005: 809-813).

2. La PSDC et le Processus de Socialisation

Comment le processus de socialisation se réalise-t-il? Pour les constructivistes, les mécanismes de socialisation sont multiples. Il s'agit surtout du calcul stratégique, du rôle joué ou de pression normative (Checkel 2005: 805). Lorsqu'il s'agit du calcul stratégique, ce mécanisme, agissant isolément, ne peut pas conduire à la socialisation. Les acteurs agissent d'une façon rationnelle, ils calculent afin de maximiser leurs intérêts, et adaptent leur comportement aux normes et règles favorisées par la communauté internationale. Cependant, cette adaptation peut conduire à l'internalisation et au changement des préférences. Quant au rôle joué, les acteurs changent leur comportement vers la logique de l'opportunité, qui comprend un comportement non calculé. Dans ce cas, l'internalisation est plus probable si les agents sont plus longuement et plus intensément exposés à un environnement donnée. Enfin, en ce qui concerne la pression normative, les agents internalisent activement la compréhension de la logique de l'opportunité (Checkel 2005: 809-813).

Le domaine de la sécurité et de défense est un domaine spécifique, qui reste dans l'essentiel intergouvernemental. La coopération des Etats membres dans le domaine de la politique étrangère et de sécurité a débuté par la création de la coopération politique européenne, institutionnalisée par l'Acte unique européen. Progressivement, on assiste au développement de la PESC et de la PESD dans le cadre de la construction européenne. Un cadre institutionnel propre à la PSDC est institué, qui est le résultat de l'acceptation de l'UE comme le cadre de coopération en matière de sécurité et de défense.

Il est incontestable que les Etats membres de l'UE sont des acteurs importants dans le processus de développement de la PSDC. Cette politique est régie par une logique intergouvernementale dans laquelle l'unanimité est requise. Or, la PSDC, est-elle exclusivement le résultat du contrôle par les Etats de la coopération n'excédant pas ce que souhaitent les (grands) Etats? Les réalistes insistent sur le choix rationnel dans lequel les préférences et les identités des acteurs ne sont pas affectés par les institutions. Ils admettent l'importance relative aux institutions formelles (traités, organisations), mais négligent les institutions informelles telles que les idées, les normes, l'interaction sociale, l'habitation (Irondele 2009: 101). Pourtant, malgré le fait que la politique de sécurité et de défense, en tant que partie intégrante de la PESC,

ait été établie dans une perspective strictement intergouvernementale à partir des négociations des grandes puissances, “elle est devenue de plus en plus institutionnalisée (gouvernée par des règles) que ce que ses architectes avaient souhaité ou même anticipé” (Smith 2004: 99). Le développement de la PESC/PSDC est le résultat de communication des diplomaties nationales sur leurs intentions et perceptions au sujet de cette politique (Glarbo 2001: 141). En fait, le début de la coopération en matière de sécurité et de défense a été marqué par un comportement rationnel des Etats qui ont cherché le mode de coopération qui éviterait les compétences des institutions communautaires. Toutefois, les Etats de l'UE ont progressivement appris à définir leurs positions en matière de politique étrangère en termes des valeurs et objectifs collectivement déterminés (Smith 2004: 99). Une faible chaîne des institutions en matière de politique de sécurité ainsi que l'absence de la majorité qualifiée comme mode de prise de décision ont permis l'interaction régulière entre les Etats membres de l'UE dans ce domaine. La socialisation des élites a encouragé la transition progressive d'une rationalité instrumentale des acteurs à une rationalité socialement construite basée sur les positions collectives (Krotz, Maher 2011: 562). Ainsi, la PSDC représente un environnement où les intérêts et les identités des acteurs (décideurs politiques) sont dans le processus de développement et de changement permanents. A travers l'interaction, les acteurs évoluent jusqu'au moment où les identités partagées conduisent au développement des définitions communes des problèmes et l'action appropriée.

La pratique de réunions de coordination et du partage d'informations dans le domaine de la politique étrangère a progressivement mené à une diffusion de normes et de règles diplomatiques proprement européennes (Smith 2004). On peut dire qu'un acquis politique se dessine déjà dans les années 70 du XXème siècle. La coordination au sein de la CPE n'était pas l'expression des moyens délibérément choisis pour poursuivre les préférences, mais plutôt une “chose naturellement faite” (Glarbo 2001: 150). Ainsi, la création de la PESC et de la PESC/PSDC n'aurait pas été possible si les Etats membres ne s'étaient pas habitués à la concertation diplomatique dans le cadre de la CPE (Petiteville 2006: 25).

Les modes de travail entre les Etats membres dans le cadre de la PESC/PSDC conduisent à l'émergence du “réflexe de coordination” (self-obligation) qui va au-delà des échanges calculées des informations et conduit au changement des préférences et intérêts des Etats membres.

Malgré l'absence des mécanismes d'imposition formels, l'habitude de coopération et self-obligation impliquaient les "sanctions" qui ne sont pas fondées sur les règles juridiques mais sur les attentes de mutualité (Øhrgaard 2004: 31). Progressivement, l'habitude de penser en termes de consensus va au-delà des consultations diplomatiques formalisées et devient instinctive (Tonra 2001: 740). Toutefois, il ne s'agit pas du processus qualifié par les néofonctionnalistes comme le "transfert de loyauté" (Haas), mais plutôt de la redéfinition des intérêts nationaux dans un contexte européenisé. Ce processus dépasse la souveraineté nationale classique et conduit au développement d'un comportement collectif. Il s'agit d'un processus qui, sans recourir explicitement aux méthodes communautaires, dénationalise la PSDC en réduisant le rôle des Etats membres et de l'intergouvernementalisme (Müller-Brandeck-Boquet 2002). Tandis que les compétences en matière de la PSDC demeurent en dernière instance à la disposition des Etats membres, la formulation et la mise en oeuvre de cette politique sont réalisées par les fonctionnaires et les services siégeant de manière permanente à Bruxelles.

Beaucoup d'auteurs réalistes ont analysé la PESC, dont la PSDC est partie intégrante, comme un "amplificateur", un "alibi" ou comme un "légitimateur" pour les Etats membres dans la poursuite de leurs politiques étrangères nationales. Or, cette interprétation intergouvernementaliste ignore que le fait même que la PESC s'est avérée utile pour les Etats membres conduisait à sa transformation en un intérêt en soi (Øhrgaard 2004: 34).

La PSDC reste intergouvernementale et relativement peu institutionnalisée. D'où l'importance du processus de socialisation. L'apprentissage et la persuasion sont les mécanismes qui définissent le processus de socialisation dans le cadre de la PSDC et conduisent au changement des intérêts et du comportement des Etats membres. A travers le processus de socialisation, les Etats acquièrent les nouvelles idées, qui sont ensuite institutionnalisées dans les structures politiques au niveau européen et ont influence sur les politiques nationales des Etats membres. Le processus de socialisation est évidente non seulement au sein des organes étant au coeur de la structure décisionnelle de la PSDC, mais aussi au sein des organes de préparation et d'exécution. Le processus décisionnel repose en grande partie sur le travail de fonctionnaires nationaux oeuvrant dans les représentations permanentes de leur pays siégeant à Bruxelles (Mérand 2009: 36). Au coeur de la structure décisionnelle de la PSDC se trouve le Comité politique et de sécurité (COPS). Le

COPS est conçu comme la “cheville ouvrière” de la politique européenne de sécurité et de défense et de la politique étrangère et de sécurité commune. Il est chargé de suivre la situation internationale, et dans le cas des opérations militaires, d'assurer le contrôle politique et la direction stratégique des opérations. A cet égard, il a un rôle central dans la définition et le suivi de la réponse de l'UE à une crise. L'éventail de ses compétences est assez large: il peut examiner les projets de conclusions du CAG, adresser les directives au Comité militaire et au Comité pour les aspects civils de la gestion des crises, conduire le dialogue politique, coordonner, superviser et contrôler les travaux des différents groupes de travail dans le domaine de la PESC et assumer la responsabilité de la direction politique du développement des capacités militaires. Dans les situations de crise, il appartient au COPS de traiter des situations de crise et d'examiner toutes les options envisageables à une réponse de l'Union. Il peut proposer au Conseil les objectifs politiques qui devaient être poursuivis par l'Union et recommander les options pour contribuer au règlement de la crise. Dans le cas d'une opération militaire de l'UE, il exerce “le contrôle politique et la direction stratégique” de la réponse militaire de l'UE à la crise.

Le COPS représente un mode dominant d'interaction et de la recherche du consensus au sein duquel l'élément-clé représente la confiance mutuelle (Howorth 2010: 16). Les membres du COPS ont une tendance de chercher un consensus plutôt que de négocier sur les positions fixes nationales. Dans de nombreux cas, la majorité des Etats n'ont pas une position nationale stricte au sujet d'une proposition dans le cadre de la PSDC (par exemple, sur le lancement des opérations en Indonésie ou au Congo), et dans ce cas, ces Etats ont pris l'habitude du “devoir de jouer le rôle” et “d'aider” aux ceux ayant les positions fortes, en vue de réconcilier les différences (*Ibid*). Ainsi, le comportement des Etats au sein du COPS dépasse le calcul stratégique et conduit à un comportement qu'on peut qualifier comme *role playing* (Checkel). Les décisions au sein du COPS sont largement déterminées par “un devoir” en vue de parvenir à un accord entre ses membres. Le COPS représente donc un forum où les normes et les règles informelles jouent un rôle important et où l'interaction fait une différence pour les membres mais aussi pour les politiques étrangères et de sécurité nationales (Juncos, Reynolds 2007: 147). L'un des grands bénéfices de la mise en place du COPS est qu'il conduit à l'eupéanisation du dialogue politico-militaire qui est depuis toujours une prérogative nationale. En dépit du fait

que les compétences dans le domaine de la PSDC sont maintenues par les Etats membres, la formulation et la mise en œuvre de cette politique au niveau de l'Union est "européanisée" par les fonctionnaires résidant d'une manière permanente à Bruxelles. A cet égard, les membres du COPS ont une fonction importante de communiquer les positions des autres Etats membres à ses capitales. De plus, ils sont en situation de convaincre leurs capitales d'adopter une position basée sur ce qu'ils estiment comme approprié et convenu au sein de cet organe.

De même, l'Etat-major de l'UE semble être un bon exemple d'un comité où l'expertise partagée, les normes professionnelles partagées et les valeurs communes, ainsi que les réunions informelles fréquentes permettent la persuasion qui conduit à un compromis et à l'émergence d'un niveau élevé de confiance entre les membres eux-mêmes et entre les membres et leurs capitales (Cross 2010: 15). L'Etat-major de l'UE est un organe technique, chargé de fournir au Haut représentant, au COPS et au Comité militaire l'expertise militaire, y compris la planification militaire et l'identification des forces nationales et européennes et l'élaboration d'options stratégiques en cas de crise. Le rôle de cet organe a été particulièrement important dans le cas des opérations militaires Atalanta et EUFOR Tchad/RCA. La possibilité de l'EMUE de fonctionner comme le catalyseur de l'information et de l'expertise et le cadre de dialogue dans la phase du processus de planification a été essentielle pour le lancement de ces deux opérations. De même, afin d'atteindre un compromis, les représentants de l'EMUE qui étaient sceptiques quant au succès des opérations, ont décidé de ne pas bloquer l'initiative (*Ibid.* 21-22). Cet exemple illustre l'importance de la culture bureaucratique des acteurs.

Le Comité militaire regroupe les chefs d'Etats-majors des Etats membres, qui se rassemblent environ quatre fois par an et est chargé de la définition du concept général de gestion des crises, du contrôle politique et de la direction stratégique des opérations dans leurs dimensions militaires, du suivi et du contrôle des objectifs capacitaires de l'UE, destination financière des opérations et exercices, ainsi que des relations militaires de l'UE et ses partenaires. Sa tâche principale est d'émettre des avis et de formuler des recommandations au COPS. En outre, dans les phases de gestion de crises, le CMUE contribue à l'évaluation des options militaires stratégiques hiérarchisées par l'EMUE, qu'il transmet au COPS en les accompagnant de son avis. Le

fonctionnement de ce Comité repose sur la coopération et négociation continues. Les membres du Comité militaire, tout comme les fonctionnaires nationaux, s'adaptent aux modèles de comportements produits par les institutions européennes elles-mêmes qui ont développé des règles formelles et des pratiques informelles permettant leur fonctionnement (Bagayoko-Penone 2006: 59). Donc, ils sont contraints de faire l'apprentissage afin d'aboutir à une solution.

La socialisation peut aussi être trouvée au sein des groupes de travail du Conseil des ministres, qui sont également importants dans le processus décisionnel au sein de la PSDC. Ainsi, on peut trouver, dans le processus de coopération entre les bureaucrates nationaux, le comportement conforme à la logique de l'opportunité comme le résultat du processus d'apprentissage (Beyers 2005: 932). Certains modes de "comportement approprié" peuvent être trouvés au sein du Comité de représentants permanents (COREPER), tels que le "devoir de trouver une solution", "l'obligation" de respecter l'ordre du jour du Conseil des ministres, ou la pratique d'une réponse conjointe et le rejet des arguments qui ne convaincront pas le groupe.

Les membres de représentations politiques et militaires des Etats membres et ceux des organes de la PSDC interagissent dans le cadre de la PSDC et sont amenés à prendre des décisions ensemble, ainsi qu'à élaborer les positions européennes. Le dynamique de l'interaction et les normes partagées au sein des organes de la PSDC contribuent à la recherche du consensus ainsi qu'à la détermination de ce que le consensus devrait être.

Conclusion

Le processus de socialisation dans le cadre de la coopération des Etats membres dans le domaine de la politique étrangère, de sécurité et de défense a une influence sur les élites politiques de faire choix au sujet des politiques, idées et stratégies. La socialisation qui se produit au sein de la PCSD ne signifie pas l'adoption du rôle supranational au détriment des intérêts nationaux, mais l'appartenance au processus de développement des normes et règles au niveau européen, qui ont ensuite l'impact sur les politiques nationales des Etats membres. Les modes de travail entre les Etats membres dans le cadre de la politique de sécurité et de défense, l'habitude de coopération conduisent à

l'émergence de normes et d'idées communes, qui produisent progressivement une "pensée européenne" et des actions communes dans le cadre de la politique de sécurité et de défense. La logique et les normes de la PCSD influencent les intérêts des Etats membres. L'habitude de coopération entre les Etats, l'établissement des idées et des valeurs communes ainsi que la réalisation des opérations dans le cadre de la PSDC conduisent à l'européanisation de cette politique. Un esprit de corps se dessine entre les acteurs prenant part à l'élaboration et à la mise en oeuvre de la politique de sécurité et de défense de l'UE. Même si les compétences en matière de la PSDC demeurent en dernière instance à la disposition des Etats membres, la formulation et la mise en oeuvre de cette politique sont réalisées par les fonctionnaires et les services siégeant de manière permanente à Bruxelles. Toutefois, il ne s'agit pas d'un processus à sens unique. Les structures constituent des acteurs en fonction de leurs intérêts et de leur identité, mais les structures sont également le produit de la pratique discursive des acteurs.

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Common Security and Defence Policy of the EU (CSDP): The Effects of The Socialization Process

Abstract

In this article, the development of the Common Security and Defence Policy of the EU (CSDP) is seen as a process of diplomatic socialization, learning and diffusion of norms and ideas. Given that the CSDP remains essentially intergovernmental and relatively institutionalized, socialization process plays an important role due to the increasing interaction between actors. Through the process of interaction and practice the EU Member States have learned to act together and to adopt common standards in the framework of the CSDP that leads to the changes of their interests and thus their identities. Formal rules and informal practices have been developed through interaction that allow the development of the CSDP. The article will be divided into two parts. In the first part, the author presents the basic features of social constructivism and clarifies the concept of socialization. In the second part, the CSDP is envisaged through the socialization process. The author concludes that through the process of interaction the habit of cooperation leads to the emergence of common standards and ideas, which gradually produce an “Europeanized thinking” and lead to the joint actions in the field of CSDP.

Keywords: Common Security and Defence Policy (CSDP), socialization, social learning, norms, identity, national actors, national interest, european integration.



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Local Self-Government in the Municipalities of Serbia and Bulgaria After the 1878 Congress of Berlin

Abstract

According to the Berlin Treaty (1878), the Principality of Serbia became an independent state with an enlarged territory (Nish, Vranje, Pirot, Toplica). Bulgaria was divided into two legal-political units: the Principality of Bulgaria and Eastern Rumelia. The Principality of Bulgaria gained a status of a vassal state under the sovereignty of the Ottoman Empire while Eastern Rumelia obtained a status of a province without political autonomy, under complete power of the Sultan. In 1888 a new liberal-democratic Constitution was passed in Serbia. According to this Constitution, two important laws were adopted too: Law on Municipalities of 1889 and Law on Counties and Districts of 1890. They established an important level of self-government in municipalities, districts and counties. A special process of the establishment of the first state and local government was carried out in the Principality of Bulgaria by the Russian temporary government. In 1879 the first Bulgarian – Trnovo Constitution was passed. Afterwards, several important laws were also adopted. Regarding Eastern Rumelia, an international Committee made a Statute for this province being confirmed by the Sultan. The Statute provided for both institutions of the central and local authorities, based on the principle of the bureaucratic centralism. In 1885 Eastern Rumelia proclaimed the unification with the Principality of Bulgaria. After that, two important laws regarding local self-government were adopted: Law on Town Municipalities and Law on Village Municipalities, both of 1886.

Keywords: Serbia, Bulgaria, Eastern Rumelia, local self-government, municipality.

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Introduction

In their modern history, Serbia and Bulgaria had different results in the development of the idea and political institution of local self-government on the pattern of that in Western Europe especially after the Congress of Berlin in 1878. This process took place in the dramatic period for Europe and the Balkans marked by intense rivalry between Great Powers, the demise of the Ottoman Empire, and the rise of national consciousness and the consequent uprisings of the Balkan nations against the Ottoman rule. These upheavals disturbed the tranquility of the so-called Bismarck Europe, that is to say the system of international relations arranged by the German Chancellor Otto von Bismarck at the Berlin Peace Congress of 1878 (See: Kennan 1979; Roberts 2001; Lowe 2005; Ković 2007).

Due to the Berlin Treaty, Serbia became an independent state with a considerably enlarged territory.² She obtained the districts of Niš, Vranje, Pirot and Toplica. These areas were known as the New Areas.³ It took five years (1877–1882) to establish state administration and local government in these newly-liberated areas and integrate them fully into the legal system of pre-war Serbia (See Svirčević 2011: 144–164).

On the other hand, Bulgaria remained a part of Radevina Ottoman Empire and divided in two legal-political units: 1) the Principality of Bulgaria which was completely autonomous but still a vassal state and 2) East Rumelia, a special administrative unit without political autonomy and under the direct rule of the Supreme Porte, with a governor appointed by the Great Powers – the signatories of the Berlin Treaty – and approved by the Sultan (Mazower 2003: 100; Ković 2007: 342–344).

The existing studies have jumped to conclusion that Serbia and Bulgaria were committed to building a system of local administration (self-government) on the pattern of that existant in West European democratic countries. Both countries adopted the general idea but accommodated its application to their own social environment and local customs. The results were particularly visible in municipal self-govern-

2 Before the Turco-Serbian wars of 1876–78, the Principality of Serbia was under the Ottoman suzerainty and consisted of the Pashalik of Belgrade and the areas attached to it on the basis of the Sultan's decree (hatti-sherif) of 1833: Ključ, Krajina, Crna Reka, Gurgusovac, Banja, Svrlijig, Aleksinac, Ražanj, Paraćin, Kruševac, Jadar, Radjevina, a small part of the region known as Stari Vlah, and the Nahiye of Novi Pazar. See Bataković 2013: 61–62.

3 Serbia's territory considerably expanded and the population increased by 299,640 (See: Miličević 1884: xvi).

ment whereas in district (in case of Serbia) and county self-government there was no much progress. For that reason, this paper focuses only on the structure of municipal self-government in the two Balkan countries.

The Municipal Local Self-Government in Serbia 1878–1893

2.1 General political circumstances in Serbia after the Congress of Berlin

After the Serbo-Turkish wars (1876–1878) and the international recognition of Serbia at the Congress of Berlin, the Regent Constitution of 1869 was still in effect stipulating a limited legislative power of the National Assembly and preserving the dominance of the executive and bureaucracy over other constitutional factors (Svirčević 2010a: 112–117; Radojević 2010; Bataković 2013: 186–191). Law on County Prefectural System and District Prefect Office of 1839 also established the state administration, district and county government according to the principle of bureaucratic centralization (Устроение окружных начальничества... 1840: 78–83). Its distinctive feature was the subordination of district and county prefects to the central authority – Council of Ministers and Minister of Interior in particular. They were reduced to mere police agents deprived of any freedom of action. Thus, district and county prefects became rigid administrators who behaved arrogantly towards the people. The local administration was no more than a reflection of the central government's functions.

The municipal government was based on the relatively liberal Law on Municipalities of 1875 (Закон о изменама и допунама... 1878: 52–33), passed by the Ljubomir Kaljević government.⁴ This Law established

⁴ Ljubomir Kaljević (1841–1907) was a politician, diplomat, academician and Prime Minister of Serbia. He studied law sciences in Heidelberg and Paris. Upon his return to Serbia, he published newspapers Serbia 1867–1870. It was the only newspaper opposing the regime of Prince Mihailo Obrenović (1860–1868) which voiced the opinion of liberal intelligentsia. Kaljević became a member of parliament for the first time in 1871. He began to publish the political newspapers *Budućnost* (Future) in 1873. He also served as Minister of Finance from 25 November 1874 to 20 January 1875. Later he was a head of the Ministry of Finance and was one of the founders of the Serbian Progressive Party in 1881. As a supporter of the House of Karađorđević, Kaljević became Minister of Foreign Affairs in the first cabinet formed after the 1903 coup d'état (da izbegnemo objasnjanje

a limited degree of self-government in municipalities. The people voted for a mayor in their municipalities. Nevertheless, this self-government was abolished at the beginning of the Serbo-Turkish war in 1877. After the war the municipal self-government was not restored.

Serbian policy underwent radical changes in 1881. That year the first modern political parties were formed which would mark the political development of Serbia in the following period. The appearance of the first organized political parties in Serbia was a consequence of several important historical factors: 1) the Regent Constitution established a basis for the participation of broader range of ordinary people in political life of Serbia, although there was no ministerial responsibility and parliamentary democracy (Dragnich 1994: 43);⁵ 2) after the tragic death of Prince Mihailo Obrenović in 1868, the country was led by the Regency on behalf of the under aged Prince Milan, the only remaining descendent of the Obrenović dynasty; the main role in the Regency was played by Jovan Ristić (the two other members were Milivoje Petrović Blaznavac and Jovan Gavrilović) – the founder of the Liberal Party and one of the most skilful and respected diplomats; 3) the multi-party political scene was emulated by young Serbians who had graduated in Western Europe where they had acquired their knowledge of modern political parties, and finally; 4) the Serbian society reached the level of maturity necessary for party struggles and political competition.

The first organized political parties were the People's Radical Party, Progressive Party and Liberal Party. The Radicals led by Nikola Pašić were certainly the most formidable party with the very distinct political ideology and practical activity. The major tenets of their ideology were constitutional reform, introduction of parliamentarianism, self-government in local municipalities and districts, fully-fledged democracy, including the freedom of the press, association and public assembly, and a national program. Their ideological tenets may be inferred from their political programs, constitutional drafts, and numerous writings and articles (Stokes 1990; Protić 2007: 173). The mouthpiece of the Radicals was their renowned newspapers, *Самоуправа* (Self-Government).

o starom i novom kalendaru – majski prevrat u junu) and the assassination of King Alexandar Obrenović, and he remained in office until 21 September 1903.

5 Dragnich claimed that the Regent Constitution had introduced such a political system which had brought about parliamentary democracy. The author of this article, however, refuted such view in his article (Svirčević 2010: 205-218) and argued that it was the Deputy Constitution that had raised the question of ministerial responsibility and parliamentary democracy and did not establish them through its regulations.

From the very beginning, the Radicals were a highly combatant party, ready for a revolutionary change of the system of government. According to their program of 1881, they propounded that the state existed for the sake of the peasants, and not bureaucracy, but the latter abused the state authorities and turned the peasants into slaves (Milošević 1928). Instead, the first task of bureaucracy should have been to improve the life of common people. Therefore, the peasants had to join the People's Radical Party in its fight against the abuses of bureaucracy. Such agitation awakened the political consciousness of the peasant masses which gradually played a more active role in the political struggle. The peasants were not a passive and inarticulate mass anymore to be treated by county and district chiefs as they pleased. They embraced certain political principles and were willing to resolutely resist the government, and even the King, if they thought their rights were infringed on as evidenced by the famous Timok Rebellion in the fall of 1883. This rebellion was a popular uprising rather than the struggle between the King and the Radicals.⁶

Two documents, the constitutional proposal of 1883 and the Constitution of 1888, were particularly revealing as to the Radicals' view of the constitutional question.

The guiding principle of the proposal drawn up in July 1883 was the people's sovereignty (Milošević 1928: 108-128; Popović 1991: 54; Prodanović 1938: 203-205; Jovićić 1993: 487-494; Bataković 2013: 218). The people should be the sole source of power expressing their sovereign will through a national representative body – the National Assembly. The Assembly should be elected by secret ballot. General male suffrage was required. The National Assembly as the supreme legislative authority was envisaged to be at the top of the state pyramid. According to the proposal, the Assembly could take two forms: Regular and Grand. The jurisdiction of the Grand National Assembly was defined by the Constitution – it was supposed to be convened for the purpose of making a constitutional change. All legislative prerogatives were assigned to the Assembly. The sovereign was required to approve any law, but even if he refused to do so the Assembly could pass the same law

6 The Timok Rebellion of 1883 actually began as a small local radical revolt in the eastern Serbia, but it soon turned into an open war between the people and King Milan Obrenović. The rebellion was quelled by the army and the leadership of the People's Radical Party was accused of committing crimes against the state and King. For the Program of the People's Radical Party of Serbia of 1881 see: Krestić and Ljušić 1991: 101-106.

in its next session. A council of ministers acted as a mere instrument of the Assembly. In that way, the Radicals' proposal envisaged a system of government that strictly subordinated the executive branch to the legislature. The territory of the state was to be divided into districts and municipalities, all of which should enjoy an adequate level of local self-government. The proposal envisaged the so-called Convent system, an almighty National Assembly (Jovanović 1939: 43). The role of a sovereign was largely neglected. Basically, the project resembled a republic with the monarch at its head.

The system of local self-government as conceived by the Radicals was based on the division of the country into municipalities and districts, and the municipality was seen as a basic political and economic unit. Each municipality had the right to elect two representatives in District Assembly. The envisaged districts were quite large, with about 10,000 taxpayers each, and governed by three bodies: the District Assembly (the elective supreme decision-making body in a district), the District Control Committee (the executive organ of the Assembly), and the District Administrative Organ (with administrative and judicial responsibilities). All executive and administrative offices were elective and the officeholders were responsible to the respective District Assembly. The activities of a District Assembly included all educational, judicial, administrative, financial, statistical, technical, economic, and religious matters in a district (Nikić 1927: 242). In 1883, Arandel-Raša Milošević, another distinguished leader of the People's Radical Party and a member of its Central Board, wrote a booklet – District Organization according to the Principle of Self-Government and Elective Rights – thoroughly explaining the concept and system of local autonomy (Svirčević 2009: 187-195; Svirčević 2011: 347-356).

2.2. Constitutional Development and Local Self-Government in Serbia, 1878–1893

The New Areas incorporated in Serbia after the victorious Serbo-Turkish Wars of 1876-1878 were administratively divided into four districts - Niš, Pirot, Toplica and Vranje. The establishment of the state administration and local government as well as complete incorporation into the legal system of pre-war Serbia took five years (1877–1882). It was a complex process ridden with many difficulties. The intention

was to bring stability to a backward feudal region marked by a volatile political situation, specific population allocation in these areas, high population density, intense migratory movements, ethnic and religious tensions, and a very low level of economic development. Thus, the establishment of the state administration and local government in the New Areas was a three-fold process which included 1) legal organization of new local institutions, 2) the regulation of agrarian relations, and 3) the colonization of New Areas. However, the new state administration in the New Areas was not autonomous of the central government (Svirčević 2011a: 144-145).

It should be noted that political conditions in the territory of post-war Serbia, were much more favourable to the development of a municipal self-government than before 1878. Serbia was able to maintain balance more successfully between the interests of Great Powers, particularly between Russia and Austro-Hungary, and to apply herself to the development of her own statehood and national culture. In 1884, the rigid and very conservative Law on Municipalities was passed. It established a strict centralization in the state administration. Municipalities did not possess any kind of autonomy (Закон о изменама и допунама... 1884: 167-195). This took place after the Timok Rebellion when King Milan Obrenović wanted to restore his undermined authority. However, after the Serbo-Bulgarian war of 1885-1886 and the Serbian defeat, King Milan decided to carry out radical changes in the constitutional system.⁷

The liberal-democratic Constitution of 1888, based on the Belgian Constitution of 1831 and a corner stone of Serbian democracy, was a great triumph of the People's Radical Party. Legal work on the Constitution had largely been done by Radical intellectuals, and therefore it expressed Radicals' ideas, although it was agreed upon by all three po-

⁷ In 1885, Bulgaria and the semi-autonomous Ottoman province of Eastern Rumelia declared their unification in the city of Plovdiv. The unification took place against the will of the Great Powers, including Russia. The Austro-Hungarian Empire which had been expanding its influence in the Balkans was particularly opposed to this act. Serbia also feared her position in the Balkans would be diminished. In addition, Serbia's ruler Milan Obrenović resented the fact that Serbian opposition leaders like Nikola Pašić had found asylum in Bulgaria after the suppression of the Timok Rebellion. After the declaration of the unification massive protests broke out in Greece which feared the creation of a greater Bulgarian state in the Balkans and the government was called to declare war on Bulgaria. Serbia offered Greece a joint military action against Bulgaria but Greece rejected. King Milan declared war on Bulgaria on 14 November [2 November] 1885. The Serbian army was defeated at the battle of Slivnitsa on 16-19 November 1885.

litical parties. Its most significant feature was a system of parliamentary democracy. Its major characteristics may be summed up as follows:

- Guarantee of political and civil rights expressed through a multiparty system;
- Free elections (universal male suffrage) and a unicameral parliament (National Assembly);
- Dual right of legislative initiative shared between the Assembly and the King;
- The National Assembly's control over the government (interpellations, interrogations, hearings);
- Ministerial responsibility (political and criminal);
- Right of the National Assembly to pass the budget, and;
- Administrative organization of the country according to the principle of local self-government (Popović 1991: 170; Bataković 2013: 226-231).

The Constitution of 1888 showed that the Radicals' concept had fully matured; the Radicals were capable of defining their ideas, finally accepting the principle of division of power expressed/exercised through parliamentary democracy. A number of laws were adopted on the basis of this Constitution. Two of them regulated the organization of the self-government at local level: Law on Municipalities of 1889 and Law on Counties and Districts of 1890.

2.3. Law on Municipalities of 1889

This Law (Закон о општинама 1889) was passed in the National Assembly thanks to the Government led by Radical Sava Grujić. This Law did not precisely demarcate/separate the original duties/prerogatives of municipal self-government and state duties transferred to municipalities by the central government. This confused situation could complicate the practical action of the Law. That raised an important question what did the autonomy of municipalities consist of. Researching this issue, Slobodan Jovanović⁸ pointed out that for the Radicals the

8 Slobodan Jovanović (1869–1958), was born in Novi Sad, Austro-Hungary (today in Vojvodina, north part of Serbia). His father was the Serbian politician Vladimir Jovanović. He was famous Serbian scholar, historian, lawyer, literary critic, sociologist, professor and dean of the Law School in Belgrade, rector of the Belgrade University, president

term self-government was equivalent to no more than electiveness of local authorities. The extent of the autonomy of local authorities was not deemed that important (Jovanović 1991: 32). There could only be an assumption, more or less secure, municipal institutions – Mayor, Municipal Court, Municipal Council and Municipal Assembly (Article 11) – completely independent of tasks that belonged to the scope of self-government and did not receive any instructions for their work of the central state government. In respect to the exercise of the transferred business scope - the municipality had the status of a mere branch of central government bodies, without autonomy in decision-making. Separation from each other, however, it was not easy to do.

The Municipal Assembly was the most significant municipal institution according to the Law on Municipalities. It was something of a local representative body. It consisted of all male adult citizens who resided in a respective municipality and paid tax amounting to no less than 15 dinars per year. Officers and soldiers did not have the right to vote. The competence of the Municipal Assembly was regulated in Article 12. This body elected and revoked all municipal officers: the mayor, his assistant (kmet), members of the Municipal Council and the special municipal representative for the County Assembly (special organ). The Municipal Assembly was also authorized to pass decisions about the municipal tax – up to 40% of the state tax. This body also made decisions about the debt of municipality, the buying and selling of municipal real estate.

The next important municipal institution was the Municipal Court. It consisted of the mayor with the executive authorities, his assistant (kmet) and several servants (Article 26). (Article 32). President of the Municipal Court, assistants and servants could be appointed by those members of the municipality who were eligible to be a member of the Municipal Council. According to Article 23, the Municipal Court executed judicial, police, and administrative duties. The legislature considered it necessary to separate police from administrative authorities, although police authority was nothing but a part of state administration.

of the Serbian Cultural Club, president of the Yugoslav royal government in London 1942–1943. After the World War Two, the communist government sentenced him on „imprisonment with hard labor and for a period of twenty years, the loss of individual political and civil rights for a period of ten years, confiscation of all assets and the loss of citizenship.” In 2007 Slobodan Jovanović was rehabilitated by the decision of the County Court in Belgrade and the judgment sentencing him to imprisonment and loss of honor was declared null and void.

As a body of judicial authority, the Municipal Court performed negligible judicial function. It tried in both civil and criminal disputes of minor importance. For that reason, these trials were not transferred to the regular civil courts (Articles 16–17).

As police authority, a municipal court had a number of important duties: taking care of personal safety and property of citizens, environment protection, control over the real estate of municipality and various measures that served the merchants, maintaining bridges, roads, river banks, controlling all shops in the municipality (inns, butcher shops, bakeries, furriers etc.), removing all “immoral manners”, taking care of persons under tutelage, seeing that children were sent to school, taking care of the health of people and livestock in the municipality, compiling a list of foreigners, making sure there were no beggars and idlers in the municipality etc. (Article 36).

However, the Municipal Court was also authorized to cooperate with the Municipal Council in passing the municipal budget which would then be confirmed by the County Council. A decision passed by the County Council was obligatory for the Municipal Council (Article 40).

Apart from this, each member of the Municipal Court had his own official duties. Thus, the competence of the president of the Municipal Court (Mayor) included: employing and discharge of municipal officials, receiving and opening letters, storage and usage the municipal seal, signing all municipal laws, imposing disciplinary penalties etc. (Article 49).

The third important municipal institution was the Municipal Council. Its size depended on the size of municipalities, i.e. the number of municipal voters. This institution was controlled by the Municipal Court. The law stipulates that: 1) in municipalities with up to 200 taxpayers, Municipal Council had 10 members; 2) in municipalities with more than 200 and less than 500 taxpayers, the Municipal Council had 16 members; 3) Belgrade Municipal Council consisted of 32 members (Article 53). Members of the Municipal Council may be elected by all citizens who were eligible to vote at the Municipal Assembly (Article 58).

The President of a Municipal Court was also the president of a Municipal Council (Article 54). His main function was reduced to the control of the Municipal Court, but he also performed some other duties.

The Municipal Council controlled the work of the Municipal Court (Article 68). It performed the following duties: 1) creating, modifying and establishing a municipal budget, reviewing of the municipal accounts and examining whether all the expenses were incurred according to the law; 2) authorizing the Municipal Court, in extraordinary circumstances, to perform all duties without the consent of the Municipal Council; 3) issuing merit solutions in all cases which would be referred for consideration in the municipality; 4) accepting resignations of the president of the Municipal Court, and Mayors, including their assistants (Article 69).

The Municipal Council made valid decisions only if 2/3 of its members were present during the session (Article 75). In the repeated voting, an absolute majority of votes was required to reach a decision (Article 77).

All municipal institutions were under legal and political control of the County Council and the central government (Article 80).

When Municipal Assembly or Council decided on state requirements relating to the county, district or state, an official appointed by the competent national authorities could attend such meeting (Article 81). Any decision of municipal authorities could be overruled by a supervisory authority, if found to be inconsistent with the law regardless of the character of municipal competence (Article 83). Also, the supervisory authority (Permanent District Council) may have inspected the register and accounts of the Municipal Court at any time (Article 85). Municipal Assembly, Court and Council could appeal against the decisions of a supervisory authority to the State Council which would then have the last word (Article 83).

As we can see, the central government was authorized to act against the municipal authorities when necessary – fines, removal from office, and other similar administrative measures. However, the central government did not act independently: it proposed the measures to be undertaken, but the State Council had to approve. Therefore, the central government could do nothing against municipal authorities – it could only litigate with the State Council (Jovanović 1991: 33). Given that the municipal budget was approved by the County Council rather than Minister of Finance, it could be safely said that the state's control over the municipality was very limited.

Commenting on this Law, Slobodan Jovanović presented the basic characteristics as follows: 1) small municipalities with mayors who

could always be replaced by Municipal Assembly; 2) municipalities were more under the supervision of the Permanent County Council than that of the state police (Ibid.).

Passing of the Law on Municipalities of 1889 represented a major step forward in the emancipation of local institutions from the central government. This Law was a launching pad in breaking up political dependence of local authorities from the central government. This process represented a unique mode of modernization and shaping political institutions on the basis of modern political ideas, very popular in Serbia at that time. Of course, there were many problems, abuses and inconsistencies in the implementation of the Law. The old, conservative habits of pre-modern era and client manners were still deeply rooted. They hindered the consistent implementation of the Law, in particular those provisions which enshrined the electiveness of municipal authorities and their essential autonomy. Nevertheless, it can be concluded that the Law on Municipalities of 1889 introduced a limited municipal self-government. This legal act gave the Municipal Assembly the right to appoint municipal institutions and deprived the central government of the right to interfere. However, it did not grant full financial autonomy to municipal institutions, and that was its major fault. Overall, this Law was a significant improvement on the previous laws on municipalities and their legal structure.

It should be noted that the Law on Counties and Districts of 1890 (Закон о уређењу округа и срезова 1891), also established a limited form of self-government in districts and counties. Despite of that, this legal act also made a big step forward in the organization of the county and district local government.

These laws on local self-government were in effect until the first coup d'état by King Alexander Obrenović in 1893, when the Regent constitution and all the relevant laws, including those on local government, returned in effect. After the May Coup in 1903, when King Alexander and his wife Queen Draga were assassinated by their officers, a new era emerged in the constitutional history of modern Serbia. The Constitution of 1888 was back in effect, this time known as the Constitution of 1903, and all other laws that had been passed on the basis of this liberal-democratic Constitution (Svirčević 2010a: 125-130). In addition, a new law on the structure and legal status of municipalities was passed in the National Assembly. It was more liberal than the Law on Municipalities of 1889.

3. The Municipal Self-Government in Bulgaria, 1878–1886.

3.1. The Russian temporary government – the origins of the Bulgarian statehood after the Congress of Berlin

Bulgaria had somewhat different historical experience than Serbia. After the Berlin Congress, she was divided in two political units – the Principality of Bulgaria and Eastern Rumelia. According to Article 7 of the Berlin Treaty, Tsarist Russia had an international mandate to establish the first domestic government in the Principality of Bulgaria. Russia had already established a provisional government in Bulgaria which was supposed to organize the state institutions and local authorities during the period of nine months. This provisional government went through two phases: 1) during the first phase, prior to the Berlin Congress the head of the provisional government was Count Vladimir Cherkasky; 2) during the deliberations in Berlin, Cherkasky died and was succeeded by Count Alexander Dondukov-Korsakow.

The foundation for the first Bulgarian administration was laid by Count Vladimir Cherkasky (1824–1878) – an experienced Russian diplomat and governor, who had gained substantial administrative experience while implementing political and economic reforms in Russia in 1861 and then in Poland in 1864. He issued the Note of the Future Tasks of the Civil Administration in Bulgaria, which contained guidelines for Russian foreign policy towards the Balkans, including the establishment of the Bulgarian civil government in the Bulgarian areas liberated from the Turks. This document was addressed to the Minister of the Russian Army, General D. A. Miljutin, and the Russian Emperor, Alexander II (Токмичев 2004: 28-29).

Accepting this acting upon this Note, the Russian court proclaimed the establishment of the special Office with the aim of organizing civil administration in Bulgaria. Chief of General Staff of the Russian Army, General F. L. Geyden, suggested that the Office should perform the following tasks; 1) collection of statistical and historical data; 2) the gradual building of local administration in the liberated counties; 3) supplying the local population with food and other necessities; 4) setting up judicial authorities; 5) inclusion of the loyal civil servants of Bulgarian origin in the new administration; 6) assisting the Orthodox Church and ensuring freedom of religion for all citizens, including Muslims;

7) collecting taxes (Токушев 2004: 29). Russian Emperor accepted this proposal.

Finally, the decision to establish the Office of the Civil Administration within the General Command of the Russian Army in the occupied Bulgarian lands was issued on 16 November 1877. The Emperor also issued special Instructions with the twin-aims of legal nature: on one hand, they were something of a statute containing the basic principles on which to regulate the internal organization of the Office; on the other, they spelled out guidelines for the functioning of the Office in the nation-building actions. Count Vladimir Cherkasky, the first head of the Office and his subordinates worked for nearly six months (November – April 1877) to set up administrative institutions in Bulgaria.⁹ Nearly six months (November 1877 – April 1877) Count Cherkasky explored the rich archives of the Russian Ministries of Foreign Affairs and of the Army, talked to Russian scholars and politicians, and studied all the available scholarly literature. Also, he spent lots of time in discussions with the representatives of the Bulgarian emigrants from Romania and Russia hoping to recruit the necessary personnel for the future Bulgarian administration (Трифонов 2000: 8).

A bit later, the Office of Civil Administration issued three temporary legal acts which regulated the structure and jurisdiction of the first local authorities. These were: Project on Main Principles of Civil Administration in Sançaks and Counties (kazas) and Towns in Bulgarian lands (Проект за главните основания на гражданското управление в санджаците и окърузите и градовете в България) of 7 July 1877, Project on Temporary Rules for Governing Councils in Counties and Towns of Bulgaria (Проект за временни правила за управнителните съвети в окърузите и градовете в България) of 8 August 1877, and Instructions of the same year.

According to these legal documents, the provisional administrative division of the country completely coincided with the Ottoman administrative division - the old Turkish names were replaced by new domestic names: guberniya instead of sançak and county instead of kaza. The first guberniya was formed in the liberated Svishtov. Later,

⁹ The members of the Office from Russia were: general D. G. Anuchin, an assistant of Count Cherkasky, colonel N. L. Sobolev, lawyer S. I. Lukyanov, P. Neklyudov and Count S. V. Shakovsky. The members from Bulgaria were: Nayden Gerov, Marin Drinov, Todor Burmov and Hristo Stoyanov. It is interesting that the Serbian lawyer, Valtazar Bogišić, was also a member of the Office (Токушев 2004: 29–30).

the following new guberniyas were formed: Russe, Tulchen, Vidin, Trnovo, Sofia, Plovdiv and Sliven. These areas included 56 counties. These administrative-territorial units (guberniyas and counties) included centralized local organs, which was subordinated to the Office of Civil Administration.

Count Cherkasky's death on 19 February 1877 ended the provisional Russian (occupying) government in the Bulgarian lands that was marked by the formation of the first Bulgarian legal-political institutions. Prince Alexander Dondukov-Korsakov (1820–1893) was appointed the new head of the Office of Civil Administration. He was supposed to end the Russian mission in Bulgaria. His main task was to establish institutions of the central government and prepare the necessary conditions for adoption of the first Bulgarian constitution. The mission of General Pavel Kiselyev (1788–1872) who had had a similar task in the Romanian principalities of Wallachia and Moldavia several decades earlier, served as a model for Dondukov-Korsakov (Jelavich 1984: 368). As soon as Dondukov-Korsakov arrived in Bulgaria, he formed the central government which included: 1) department of interior, 2) department of finance and control, 3) judiciary department, 4) department of education, church and religious activities, 5) department of military affairs, 6) department of post, telegraph, roads and other traffic operations; 7) Office of diplomacy and foreign affairs. Its seat was in Plovdiv (Манолева 2003: 102).

During the mandate of Dondukov-Korsakov the Congress of Berlin was held. After the signing of the Berlin Peace Treaty and the subsequent division of Bulgarian lands into the autonomous Principality of Bulgaria and Eastern Rumelia, some significant political decisions were made. The capital of the Principality of Bulgaria was moved from Veliko Trnovo to Sofia in order to be closer to Macedonia which had always been treated by Bulgarians as their ethnic land. In keeping with this, the government was also moved from Plovdiv to the new Bulgarian capital.

Meanwhile Dondukov-Korsakov continued with his mission. By the end of his term, he had formed the Bulgarian army, completed the formation of the judiciary and police services, strengthened institutions of local government, and laid the foundation for the development of educational and health facilities (Трифонов 2000: 12, 40-48).

3.2. Legal and constitutional development of the Principality of Bulgaria

When the temporary Russian mission ended, the Bulgarian Constituent Assembly met in the capital of the medieval Bulgarian state – Veliko Trnovo – on 10 February 1879.¹⁰ After two months of debating a number of parliamentary constitutional projects and intense political struggle between the opposing parties, the first Bulgarian constitution was adopted on 16 April 1879. It was actually created by both Bulgarian liberals led by Dragan Tsankov (1828–1911) and Petko Slaveykov (1827–1895) and Russian advisors. It is known as Trnovo Constitution (Петров и Петрова 2000: 294–309). It established the separation of powers as the main principle of the organization of the state. The Trnovo Constitution paid particular attention to the regulation of the legal status and competence of central authorities – the monarch (Prince), National Assembly, Council of Ministers, and the constitutional rights of Bulgarian citizens. The Constitution did not regulate the legal status and competence of other institutions, including local government.

According to the Trnovo Constitution, the Principality of Bulgaria was constituted as a hereditary and constitutional monarchy with the people's representative body (Article 4). The most important state institution was a Prince. His function was three-fold. First, he acted as a head of the state, as the holder of legislative power which he shared with the National Assembly and as a chief of executive power, which he shared with his cabinet/council of ministers.

Legislative power was exercised by the National Assembly (Bulgarian: Народно Собрание). The Assembly could be regular and great (Article 85).

Regular National Assembly performed dealt with the ordinary and financial legislation. It passed all laws and a budget and finally, all other general legal laws. The legislative body was also authorized to control the work of the Council of Ministers and, if necessary, to raise the question of ministerial responsibility (Article 105). Also, the National Assembly could raise any political question with the ministers (Article 108), and receive petitions and complaints about the work of certain departments of the government (Articles 106). In both cases, the ministers were required to answer parliamentary questions and complaints of citizens (Articles 105 and 106).

¹⁰ On number and categories of representatives see in details in: Андреев 1993: 44.

Great National Assembly was twice the size of the regular one (Article 144). It met only in the special cases stipulated by the Constitution: to approve any change affecting the national territory, to amend the Constitution, or elect a new prince. As soon as it resolved the issue, the Grand National Assembly was dissolved (Articles 141, 142, 143 and 144).

The ministers had executive power, together with Prince (Article 149). They were gathered at the Council of Ministers headed by president (Prime Minister). Each minister was the head of the department of state government. According to Article 160 of the Constitution, there were six ministries: 1) Ministry of Foreign Affairs; 2) Ministry of Interior Affairs; 3) Ministry of National Education; 4) Ministry of Finance; 5) Ministry of Justice; 6) Ministry of the Army (Article 160). The ministers were subordinate to the monarch and the National Assembly (Article 153). They were politically responsible to these constitutional factors that could revoke them at any time.

There was only one constitutional stipulation pertaining to local government. Article 3 stipulated the administrative-territorial division of the country into counties, districts and municipalities. The same article stipulated the organization of municipalities based on the principle of self-government. More detailed elaboration of this provision is left to the legislature.

After the adoption of the Trnovo Constitution, the National Assembly's task was to elect the first Bulgarian Prince and pass the necessary political laws stemming from the constitutional norms.

The former was done the next day after the proclamation of the Constitution on 17 April 1879. Given the provision of Article 3 of the Berlin Treaty, which stipulated that the Bulgarian Prince must not be a member of the dynasty of any of the Great Powers which had participated at the Congress of Berlin, the Russian government proposed Alexander Battenberg (1857–1893), German Prince of the noble Hesse lineage.¹¹

Typical of the early stages of nation-building process marked by the fear for the preservation of the hard gained freedom and of descend into anarchy, the supreme political power resorted to centralization of local institutions in order to consolidate and strengthen the fledgling state apparatus. In the 1879–1885 period, several important laws were passed in Bulgaria which established a rigid centralization of local in-

11 On personality of Alexander Batenberg see in details: Koh [n.d.].

stitutions. They were the following laws: Provisional Regulations for Town and Village Municipalities of 1879 (Привремении правила за общинското градско и селско управление; Държавен вестник No. 4), Law on County and District Prefects (Законът за окръжните управители и околийските началници; Държавен вестник No. 116), Law on Municipalities and Town Government, (Законът за общините и за градското управление; Държавен вестник No. 117) and Law on County Councils (Законът за окръжните съвети; Държавен вестник No. 118); the latter three were all passed in 1882. The 1879 law was of key importance because it established a rigid bureaucratic centralism in the state administration - county and district authorities presented a mere outpost of the central government. County and district prefects carried out obediently every decision of the government and the Minister of Interior in particular; in turn, they were in a complete control over the local, and especially municipal institutions as stipulated by the Law on Municipalities and Municipal Government. The situation did not even change after the passing of the Law on County Councils. This Law also established the system of centralized state administration not giving the County Council an opportunity to discuss political issues of great importance to the county.

As discussed above, the Trnovo Constitution established the principle of ministerial responsibility. It was an important step forward in the development of the modern constitutionality in the new Balkan state. Nevertheless, Bulgaria's system of government was burdened with many difficulties and shortcomings, especially at the time of the formation of the first government led by conservative Todor Burmov¹² in 1879 until the fall of the government, led by liberal Stefan Stambolov in 1894.¹³ In

12 Todor Burmov (1834–1906) was a leader of Bulgarian Conservative Party and the first Prime Minister of the Principality of Bulgaria. Burmov was a graduate of the Theological Academy in Kiev and subsequently worked as a teacher in Gabrovo and as a newspaper editor. He was a close associate of Prince and therefore chosen as the Prime Minister on 17 July 1879 despite the relatively weak position of the Conservatives. Burmov's regime was mostly concerned with the stabilization of the country, including placing and other areas of Muslim insurgency under martial law. His government was a failure due to the lack of support for the Conservatives in the Assembly; he was removed from the office that same year. Burmov remained a leading political figure after his brief spell as Prime Minister and the Minister of Finance in the Leonid Sobolev and Archbishop Kliment Turnovsky governments. Having returned to journalism, Burmov left the Conservatives and became a member of Dragan Tsankov's Progressive Liberal Party (See in details: Crampton 2007: 102–103).

13 Stefan Stambolov (1854–1895) was a Bulgarian politician who served as Prime Minister and Regent. He is considered one of the most important and popular Founders of Modern Bulgaria, and sometimes referred to as "the Bulgarian Bismarck". Stambolov was a nationalist; as a politician, he strengthened/contributed to Bulgarian diplomacy, economy and the general political power of the state. He confronted Prince Ferdinand

can be seen many legal and political phenomena in this period, which led to gross violations of the government system. Four events were of special importance: the establishment of the full authorities Regime (Режим на пълномоштият) – the short-time suspension of the 1881 Constitution; the coup d'état of the pro-Russian officers that led to the overthrow of Prince from the Bulgarian throne in 1886; Prime Minister Stefan Stambolov's tendency to assume the absolute power in 1887; the terror of the Liberal's and National Liberal Party's regime (the so-called Circassian Regime, 1899–1903) (Манолова 2003).

The relations between the constitutional factors were also dependent on Great Power's policies, especially that of Russia. Many members of the Council of Ministers, the National Assembly, the army, civil administration and political parties were a Russian subject. Therefore, the parliamentary system in Bulgaria had a distinctive character informed by local political culture derived from the Ottoman political legacy and the Great Powers' endeavors to secure their imperial interests in the Balkans.

3.3. Legal development of East Rumelia and its unification with the Principality of Bulgaria in 1885

In accordance with Article 13 of the Berlin Treaty, the province of Eastern Rumelia was formed southwards of the Balkan mountain; it had a full administrative autonomy but remained under the formal suzerainty of the Ottoman Sultan. Eastern Rumelia soon had her own constitutive act which guarded her autonomous rights and laid foundation for legal and political institutions. This act had all the qualities of a proper constitution. However, from the standpoint of legal form - this act existed within the legal system of the Ottoman Empire - it was not a true constitution because it regulated the internal order and of a non-sovereign administrative unit. Therefore, this document was rather a statute.

and blocked his schemes to usurp additional authority. The public came to dislike him as he took increasingly drastic measures against his enemies/political opponents. He survived an assassination attempt unharmed, and then responded by having many people imprisoned and treated brutally. By 1894 the prolonged stress had taken its toll and Stambolov resigned to Ferdinand's great satisfaction. Stambolov was assassinated by political immigrants from Macedonia in 1895 (See: Трифинов 2000: 60–65).

The international Committee consisting of the representatives of all the Great Powers which deliberated at the Congress of Berlin (Russia, Germany, France, Austro-Hungary, Italy, Great Britain) produced the Organic Statute for East Rumelia confirmed also by the Sultan. The Committee began its work in Istanbul on 30 September 1878, but later moved to Philipopolis (Plovdiv), the capital of the new Ottoman administrative unit under the international protection.

The Organic Statute for Eastern Rumelia proclaimed many important constitutional rights of citizens and also regulated the legal status, competence and relationship between the political institutions in the Province: General Governor, Administrative Council (Directorate) and the Assembly (Йочев [n.d.]: 32-48).

The head of Eastern Rumelia was the General Governor – a Christian appointed by the Sultan for a period of five years with the approval of the European powers, the signatories of the Berlin Treaty (Article 7). He was the highest representative of the sultan in the Province (Article 44). He possessed executive power and shared legislative authorities.

It fell to General Governor to ensure that the Constitution was respected and the Province's laws implemented (Article 51). He appointed the members of the Administrative Council (Directorate), Supreme Court, county prefects and other officials with the consent of the Sultan (Article 7). The Governor was the commander of the police and gendarmerie and, if necessary, he could request the deployment of the Ottoman Army (in accordance with Article 14 of the Berlin Treaty).

As for his legislative power, the General Governor took part in the preparation of Province's laws according to the procedure stipulated by the Statute. He had the right to present his legislative drafts and the province budget to the Province Assembly. After the legislative proposal had been voted for at the Assembly, the governor had to formally approve it. He did so in the name of the Sultan (Article 54). The first General Governor of Eastern Rumelia was Aleko (Alexander) Bogoridi-Pasha.¹⁴

The Administrative Council represented a kind of government, a collegial executive body composed of six directors (and hence was also called Directorate), which had the status of a head of state government.

14 Aleko Bogoridi-Pasha (1823–1910) was born in Kotel. He came from the very respectable Fanar family. His father was a governor of the island of Samos after the Adrianople Peace of 1829. Bogoridi was educated in Paris. He worked in the Turkish diplomatic service serving as the Sultan's representative in Vienna. He was appointed the General Governor of East Rumelia on 15 May 1879 (See: Трифонов 2000: 35).

The Directorate assisted the General Governor in his work; in fact, its function was reduced to the execution of Governor's decisions. The Administrative Council thus had a special position in the legal and political system of Eastern Rumelia.

The Organic Statute for Eastern Rumelia also established the Province Assembly with the limited legislative power.¹⁵

According to Article 248 of the Organic Statute, Eastern Rumelia had the following judicial institutions: 1) peasant courts in the municipalities without district prefects; 2) district courts; 3) county courts; 4) the Supreme Court (Article 248).

Eastern Rumelia was administratively divided in six counties (departments) and 28 districts (Article 108). The main towns of the counties were: Plovdiv, Tatar-Pazarcik, Haskovo, Eski Zagora, Sliven and Burgas (Art. 109). The districts were divided in urban and rural municipalities which had their own local institutions (Article 111). No county could have more than six and less than four districts (Article 110). Districts were divided in town and village municipalities with their own local institutions (Article 111). These provisions were supposed to be further developed by the legislature.

On 6 September 1885, a detachment of militiamen entered Plovdiv, ousted General Governor, Gabriel Pasha-Krstevich, and proclaimed the unification of Eastern Rumelia with the Principality of Bulgaria. The provisional government, which was immediately formed, appealed to Prince Alexander Battenberg, to come to Plovdiv and accept the act of union. The National Assembly Speaker, Stefan Stambolov, told the Prince that he was going to choose between going to Plovdiv and returning to Darmstadt. Prince Battenberg had nowhere to go so he proceeded to Plovdiv and confirmed the act of unification.¹⁶ The whole legal system of the Principality of Bulgaria, including the Trnovo Constitution and the laws on local self-government, was extended to East Rumelia. This was how the modern Bulgaria came to being in 1885.

¹⁵ On the number and categories of representatives and authorities of the Assembly, see in details in: Articles 68, 69, 90, 91, 96, 99 and 101 of the Organic Statute for Eastern Rumelia, Йочев [n.d.].

¹⁶ The Serbian King Milan Obrenović was outraged. His view was clear and simple: the unification of Bulgaria clashed with Serbian national interests as that country became a dangerous rival, and might absorb Macedonia; Serbia demanded from the Great Powers to maintain the validity of the Treaty of Berlin and restore the situation that had existed before the coup - the status quo ante; otherwise, Serbia was prepared to protect the balance of power in the Balkans by force of arms.

Following the unification, the centralism in the state administration grew weaker. The need for the establishment of municipal self-government became apparent next year; this was the way forward to effectively deal with many local problems neglected by the central government. In 1886, at the time of the liberal government two laws were passed that introduced some limited forms of municipal self-government - Law on Town Municipalities and Law on Village Municipalities.

4. Law on Town Municipalities and Law on Village Municipalities of 1886

These laws established a form of limited self-government in Bulgarian towns and villages. They represented a big step forward regarding the legal-political status and structure of town and village municipalities. These laws stipulated the main authorities and duties regarding the functioning of the town and village self-government in Bulgaria. The local institutions were entrusted with the workings of municipal self-government, including communal, educational and health-sanitarian facilities.

4.1. Law on Town Municipalities of 1886

According to Article 2 of this Law (Петров-Петрова 2000a: 339–345), the Municipal Town was a legal entity obliged to protect its own interests and take care about its self-government. Every town had two institutions, Municipal Council and Municipal Government.

The Municipal Council was an executive body. Its members were elected by all the citizens residing in a respective town. Article 24 stipulated the necessary conditions for the active right to vote.

The Law laid down the conditions for the membership in this body: 1) a candidate must have resided in the respective town for at least two years, (ovo je receno u pethodnoj recenici) 2) a candidate must have been at least 30 years old, 3) a candidate must have been literate, and 4) a candidate must have possessed a real estate in the town or must have been a craftsman (Article 29).

The number of councillors depended on the number of inhabitants in the respective town. In a town with a population of up to? 15,000

people, the Municipal Council included 12 members. The term of a Municipal Council lasted three years (Article 19).

After the municipal elections, the elected councillors assumed their office which was confirmed by the special Prince's decree. They could be revoked in the same way (Article 22). Dekretom? County Prefect was authorized to convene the councillors in order to elect the mayor and his assistants.

Municipal Council could issue three kinds of municipal decrees depending on their importance and form: 1) municipal decrees carried out by the mayor without confirmation/approval of the state authorities, 2) municipal decrees confirmed/approved by state authorities and 3) municipal decrees which came into effect by Prince's decree.

If Municipal Council broke a law, it was dissolved by County Committee (Article 41). The latter body could dissolve Municipal Council on request of the Minister of Interior Affairs.

Municipal Government was something of an executive institution. It consisted of a Mayor and his assistants. The Mayor's term lasted three years, but he could be recalled by the Municipal Council's decision (Article 33). Mayor worked as the representative and executive organ of a Municipal Council. He represented the town before the state government and other municipalities. He also executed state laws and the Municipal Council's decrees (Article 87). The Law on Town Municipalities clearly defined the mayor's duties as follows: 1) to convene the Municipal Council and prepare its sessions; 2) to administer town real estate, especially town roads, bridges, streets, monuments etc; 3) to financially support schools, hospitals and churches; 4) to hold public books (Article 88).

Finally, the Law on Town Municipalities of 1886 paid particular attention to town budget to ensure that all the expenses were met. In accordance with that, no state institution did have the right to work upon the increase of expenditures of the town municipalities. In this way, both Municipal Council and Mayor were protected from the political influence/interference of the central government. However, the state institutions could often interfere with the work of Municipal Council through the agency of county prefects and central government. Pominjanje centralne vlade je ovde u kontradikciji sa prethodnom recenicom. Nevertheless, the Law singularly contributed to developing municipal self-government in the Principality of Bulgaria. But

this Law was not the only one: it was coupled by the Law on Village Municipalities of 1886.

4.2. Law on Village Municipalities of 1886

The Law on Village Municipalities (Петров-Петрова 2000a: 345-350) of 1886 had the same structure like the Law on Town Municipalities, although its provisions were adjusted to village life.

According to this Law, a village municipality was any geographic village or cottage-settlement with 100 or more houses and had its own government (Article 1). A village municipality had the status of a legal entity and was named after the respective village or cottage. Villages with less than 100 cottages had to be annexed to a neighbouring village.

The most important institutions of a village municipality were Municipal Council, Municipal Government, Municipal Court, Mayor and his assistants in “formation” municipalities. There was also a special Municipal Office for administrative duties.

The Municipal Council in villages had the same authorities like that in towns. was an executive body. The Law detailed the conditions for the exercise of the active and passive right to vote. They were in harmony with the provisions enumerated in the Law on Town Municipalities. Unlike that in the town Municipal Council, the village Municipal Council's term lasted two years.

Mayor was the most important figure in a Municipal Government. He acted as a representative and executive organ of the Municipal Government of the respective village. Village Mayor was appointed in the same way as his counterpart in town municipalities. He was charged with carrying out the decisions of Municipal Council and state administration. His term lasted two years and he could be recalled.

Mayor represented his village municipality before the central government and other villages. The Law on Village Municipalities listed the duties performed by Mayor: 1) convening the Municipal Council, 2) maintaining streets, roads, bridges, etc. in a good condition, 3) collecting village taxes, 4) preparing the village budget, 5) taking measures to prevent infections and epidemics and 5) granting permissions for coffee-houses, inns and other buildings (Article 65).

Village municipalities had their own Municipal Office for administrative matters. This Office was responsible for its work to the Mayor and Municipal Council (Articles 78, 79, 84, 85).

Finally, village municipalities had their own budgets. They were autonomous in compiling the list of income and outcome, although the state institutions could interfere with financial matters according to the government's policy.

Together with the Law of Town Municipalities, this Law went a long way to advancing the local self-government in Bulgaria. The two laws stipulated a free election of mayors and municipal councils in towns and villages without the intervention of state administration. This promoted the democratic legitimacy of local institutions within the legal-political system of Bulgaria. However, these municipal institutions operated within the framework of centralized districts and counties. Strict centralization of municipality administration was especially pronounced during the personal regime of Stefan Stambolov (1887–1894). Nevertheless, the laws were a major contribution to the development of local self-government in Bulgaria in the second half of the 19th century.

Conclusion

It can be concluded that both Serbia and Bulgaria showed a serious tendency to build a system of local self-government on the pattern of West European model. Both countries adopted West European ideas and political institutions but adopted them to their social surroundings and mentality of their peoples. The results were rather impressive despite many political, economic and social difficulties, especially in municipal self-government.

As an internationally recognized state, Serbia was in a better position to maintain the balance between the interests of Great Powers, particularly those of Russia and Austro-Hungary, and simultaneously dedicated herself to the development of her statehood and national culture. On the other hand, Bulgaria was in the early stage of nation-building which was heavily influenced by the Russian court.

However, Bulgaria did not lag behind Serbia. The development of Bulgarian statehood (in the Principality of Bulgaria under the control of Russia and in Eastern Rumelia under the administration of a Christian governor) along with the boosting of local self-government was

similar to that in the regions acquired by Serbia on the basis of the Berlin Treaty – the counties of Nis, Pirot, Vranje and Toplica.

The creation of local administration based on the principle of self-government was a gradual process riddled with numerous political and economic difficulties, party struggles and disagreements.

A liberal democratic constitution was established in Serbia in 1888, then into law – more than any other previous law – brought Serbia closer to the West European model of a genuine local self-government. This was also the case with the Law on Municipalities of 1889. Its exceptional importance lay in the fact that it provided the municipal assembly (a local representative body) with the right to appoint municipal institutions and deprived the central government of the right to interfere

The situation in Bulgaria was completely different. Since this country had just been formed, it was only natural that the central government kept a firm grip on local institutions. Thus, after the adoption of the Trnovo Constitution in 1879, Bulgarian political leaders directed their efforts to formation of the legislative, executive and judicial power in order to consolidate the just created state.

After the unification of Bulgaria in 1885 and the initial consolidation of her government, the centralism in the state administration grew weaker. The need for municipal self-government became evident as soon as next year - numerous local problems seemed to have been ignored by the central authorities. To remedy this, the Law on Town Municipalities and Law on Village Municipalities were introduced in 1886 establishing a limited self-government.

However, as far as the extent and permanence of self-government were concerned, Serbia certainly achieved more than Bulgaria, partly because the former had more political experience at the time.

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Geopolitical Processes and Ethnodemographic Changes in Serbia in the Late XX and Early XXI Century

Abstract

Results of the survey regarding the relation of students with reference to the valley in this paper will be presented the ethnic picture of the population of the Serbia and the ethnodemographic changes in period 1991-2002, caused by geopolitical processes, migration, natural movement, changed declaration on national affiliation, as well as some political and socio-economic factors. Ethnocentric migrations (voluntary and forced) primarily influenced on the change of ethnic structure of the Serbia, in the sense of creating nationally more homogeneous region, having in mind the national structure of refugee-population. On the other side, the emigration of some other nationalities which migrated to their mother countries due to political and economic reasons influenced on the ethnic structure, too. Spatial distribution of population according to nationality is an important aspect of demographic development conditioned primarily by ethnically differentiated natural growth and migrations, but also with the impact of numerous other factors. In Serbia is present an exceptional concentration and homogenization of population of certain nationalities. Due to specific territorial distribution and ethnic domination of relevant national minorities in border parts of the country, the question of their status and territorial-political organization gives special severity and significance to the minority question in Serbia. Having in mind that Serbia is a multiethnic and multiconfessional state, the protection of minorities rights and good inter-ethnic relations are necessary for peace, stability and democratic development of the Serbia and the Balkans region.

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Keywords: ethnic homogenization, geopolitical processes, spatial distribution, national minorities, census, Serbia.

Contemporary spatial distribution of population in Serbia had been formed over a long historical period under the influence of numerous factors which determined the entire socio-historic, demographic, economic, social and cultural development of the Balkan geographical region. During its eventful history, due to intensive migration of population, ethnic structure and territorial distribution changed, but at the same time the process of forming certain nations and ethnic groups progressed. Thus, "ever since the end of the 14th century, through the Turkish era and up to contemporary times, migrational currents shifted almost the whole population, whereby many ethnic and ethno-biological processes developed at the same time which significantly changed the ethnic picture of the Balkan countries" (Cvijić 1966: 123).

Due to its specific geographical position, historical heritage, political circumstances, demographic development and constant population migrations, Serbia is a multiethnic, multiconfessional and multicultural country. Radical political and economic changes occurred in the last decade of the 20th century which significantly influenced all segments of social life. The conflict between forming "pure" ethno-national countries on one side and ethnic heterogeneity of former republics on the other side brought about the Yugoslav tragedy, a large number of killed and missing persons as well as changes in the ethnic picture, whereby it was confirmed at the same time, who knows how many times in the history of the Balkan countries, that the formula "one country-one nation" is absolutely inapplicable on the Balkans (Wiberg 1996). The disintegration of SFR Yugoslavia and the creation of new ethno national countries, war and "ethnic cleansing", voluntary and forced ethnocentric migrations, a huge number of refugees and displaced persons, caused huge changes in ethno demographic development of the population of Serbia.

Apart from socio-political events and demographic factors (migrations and natural growth), it should be stressed that non-demographic variables were important determinants of changes in the ethnic composition and territorial distribution of Serbia's population. Above all, it is the principal of free declaration on national affiliation which enables change of nationality, namely a temporary one (due to political, social, psychological reasons) or a permanent one (due to assimilation pro-

cesses), which influences the population dynamics of ethnic communities. Ethno statistical data ranges may also be conditioned by applied (or changed) census-methodological solutions regarding certain nationalities, which are often a result of political circumstances and decisions. This became especially prominent with the Muslims who were treated different in the censuses.² Similar changes happened with the Yugoslavs as well. Whether they were a specific political category or an equal ethnic entity depended to a great extent on the political background and social circumstances. Yugoslavs do not have a special ethnic origin, and their mutual frame of reference is identification with the country in which they live.³ It is also important to note that the final nationality classifications differed from census to census according to modality number, and so in 1991 it was expanded with Bunjevci, Egyptians and Šokci, and in 2002 with Bosniacs, Ashkali, Gorani and Aromanian.

Ethnic Homogenization of Population in Serbia, 1991-2002

Demographic factors decisively influenced the changes in ethnic structure, spatial distribution, population density and concentration in Serbia, which is primarily manifested in differentiated demographic development of certain ethnic communities, not only in view of natural replacement but in scope and direction of migrations as well. However, as emphasized, non-demographic factors also affected the ethnic

2 The Muslims were treated as “Muslims-uncommitted” (1948) and “Yugoslavs-uncommitted” (1953), then “Muslims in the ethnic sense” (1961), and then in the next census (1971) by political decision they received the status of one of the six constitutive nations of former SFR Yugoslavia. They kept such a status until the last census (2002) when, taking into consideration momentous political changes i.e. international recognition of Bosnia and Herzegovina as an independent country, and also because of the absence of consensus among the Muslims themselves with regard to commitment, a new modality was introduced in the census classification (along with the existing term) i.e.- Bosniac, for stating an ethnic identity for the same nation in essence. Thus the Muslims, generally, went from being nationally uncommitted, to Yugoslav uncommitted, through a constitutive nation to a national minority (Raduški 2007: 13-21).

3 According to the census methodology, Yugoslavs were at the beginning in closest ties with Muslims (1953), then as “Yugoslavs-uncommitted” (1961), then they included persons who did not wish to declare themselves nationally (1971,1981), and in the last two censuses they had the status of nationally committed persons. It should be stressed that in the 1991 census they already bore the name of a country that was not what it used to be, and in the 2002 census they probably had the last chance to declare themselves as Yugoslavs, taking the large political changes into consideration, namely it was in this period that Yugoslavia disappeared from the historical-political scene. The introduction of this category into the census classification had otherwise had a significant influence on the changes in the numerosity of other nationalities (Raduški 2007: 18).

picture of Serbia to a greater or lesser degree, such as changes in national affiliation, different methodological solutions during censuses, the awakening of national conscience in certain nationalities, absence of national awareness with others, mixed marriages, assimilation and integration processes, as well as some extraordinary or specific sociopolitical circumstances. As a result of the stated factors and primarily differentiated natural growth per nationalities, certain ethnic communities increased their number and ratio over time, while others had stagnating or negative trends in the population dynamics which influenced changes in the ethnic population structure (Raduški 1996: 113-116). In the last inter-censal period (1991-2002) relevant changes happened in the ethnic structure of Serbia which were primarily conditioned by massive ethnocentric, voluntary and forced population migrations, as well as national and religious revivalism, very pronounced in certain nationalities, simultaneously with the appearance of ethnic "mimicry" present in other ethnic communities.

According to the 2002 census there were 7.6 million inhabitants registered in Serbia (without Kosovo and Metohia), out of which the Serbs, as the majority population, comprised 82.9%, and about 15% of the population belonged to one of the ethnic minorities. Nevertheless, Serbia is not considered as a country with outstanding ethnic heterogeneity and the ratio of national minorities is considerably less than in many East European countries.⁴ The most significant minorities, according to number and ratio, are Hungarians (293.3 thousand or 3.9%), then Bosniacs (136.1 thousand or 1.8%) who, together with the Muslims (19.5 thousand or 0.3%) comprise 155.6 thousand (2.1%), Roma (108.2 thousand or 1.4%) and Yugoslavs (80.7 thousand or 1.1%), while the others participate with under 1% (Table 1).

Nationalities	1991		2002		Growth index
	Number	%	Number	%	2002/1991
Total	7576837	100.0	7498001	100.0	99.0
Serbs	6061917	80.0	6212838	82.9	102.5
Montenegrins	117761	1.6	69049	0.9	58.6

4 For example, the minorities form between 20-30% of the population of Macedonia, Georgia Ukraine, Belarus, and from 30-40% in Estonia, Moldavia, 40-50% in Kyrgyzstan and Latvia, while in Bosnia and Herzegovina and Kazakhstan there actually is no majority nation (Brunner 1994).

Yugoslavs	312595	4.1	80721	1.1	25.8
Albanians	74303	1.0	61647	0.8	83.0
Bosniacs	-	-	136087	1.8	88.2*
Bulgarians	26416	0.3	20497	0.3	77.6
Bunjevci	21236	0.3	20012	0.3	94.2
Vlachs	15675	0.2	40054	0.5	255.5
Gorani	-	-	4581	0.1	-
Hungarians	337479	4.5	293299	3.9	86.9
Macedonians	44028	0.6	25847	0.3	58.7
Muslims	176401	2.3	19503	0.3	11.1
Germans	4745	0.1	3901	0.1	82.2
Roma	90853	1.2	108193	1.4	119.1
Romanians	37818	0.5	34576	0.5	91.4
Russians	2429	0.0	2588	0.0	106.5
Ruthenians	17795	0.2	15905	0.2	89.4
Slovaks	65363	0.9	59021	0.8	90.3
Slovenes	7811	0.1	5104	0.1	65.3
Ukrainians	4957	0.1	5354	0.1	108.0
Croatians	94244	1.2	70602	0.9	74.9
Czechs	2675	0.0	2211	0.0	82.7
Others	11318	0.1	11711	0.2	103.5
Undeclared, uncommitted	9988	0.1	107732	1.4	1078.6
Regional affiliation	4706	0.1	11485	0.2	244.1
Unknown	34324	0.5	75483	1.0	219.9

Table 16. Ethnic structure of Serbia (without Kosovo and Metohia), 1991-2002

Source: Census book no.1; National or ethnic affiliation; Population, household and dwellings census in 2002, Statistical Office of the Republic of Serbia, Belgrade. 2003; Statistical Almanac of Serbia 2009, Statistical Office of the Republic of Serbia, Belgrade. 2009.

Note: The table shows all nationalities according to the official classification of the Statistical Office of the Republic of Serbia with over 2000 members in Serbia (without Kosovo i Metohia) according to 2002 census.

* Growth index (88.2) refers to Bosniacs and Muslims together.

From the ethno-regional aspect, diametrically opposed differences are present between central Serbia, as a relatively homogeneous region, and Vojvodina which presents a real ethnic mosaic of many nationalities which live there. As regards the ethnic structure of central Serbia, the Serbs, as the majority nation, number 4.9 million (89.5%), which marks this region as homogeneous⁵ and almost monolith, with elements of unimodal type, considering that all the other ethnic communities participate with a very low ratio. The leading national minorities are Bosniacs/Muslims (151.5 thousand or 2.8%),⁶ Albanians (60.0 thousand or 1.1%) and Roma (79.1 thousand or 1.4%), while all others participate with less than 1%. As opposed to central Serbia, the national population structure of Vojvodina is considerably diversified. Due to numerous nationalities which live in this province, Vojvodina represents "Little Balkan". Constant migrations, immigrations and emigrations, have been and remain the main factor of the demographic development of Vojvodina, as one of the most heterogeneous regions in Europe. In 2002, 1.3 million (65.0%) Serbs were registered in Vojvodina, while the numerically most relevant national minorities were Hungarians (290.2 thousand or 14.3 %), then Slovaks (56.6 thousand or 2.8%), Croats (56.5 thousand or 2.8%), Yugoslavs (49.9 thousand or 2.5%), Montenegrins (35.5 thousand or 1.7%), Romanians (30.4 thousand or 1.5%), Roma (29.1 thousand or 1.4%) and Bunjevci (19.8 thousand or 1.0%). All the others participate with less than 1%.

Comparative survey of the results of the last two censuses shows that significant changes happened in the 1991-2002 period in the scope and ethnic composition of Serbia (without Kosovo and Metohia). The population decreased (from 7.6 million to 7.5 million), and as regards by nationality, most of them marked significant changes in the ethno demographic development. A population growth is noted in majority nationalities (by 150.9 thousand, namely from 80.0% to 82.9%) primarily because of the arrival of an enormous number of refugees (predomi-

5 Literature mentions divisions into monolith structure (when an ethnic group forms over 90%), markedly homogeneous structure (80-90%), low homogeneity, i.e. low heterogeneity (70-79%), high heterogeneity (60-69%) and very high heterogeneity of population (50-59%). Certainly, these limits can be set in other ranges as well depending on the numerical relations of ethnic groups (Petrović 1983).

6 For the purpose of comparing data in the last two censuses, these two nationalities were taken together having in mind that the modality Bosniac did not exist in the classification of nationalities in 1991, but only Muslim.

nantly Serbian nationality),⁷ which proves that strong outstanding ethnic homogenization developed through migration.

Within the minorities, the Roma recorded an absolute increase (by 17.3 thousand, namely growth index of 119.1 points) as well as relative (from 1.2% to 1.4%). The most intensive increase was made by the Vlachs (from 15.7 thousand to 40.1 thousand, namely from 0.2% to 0.5% and growth index of 255.5 points). All other minorities recorded intensive decrease, whereby with some (Croats, Macedonians, Bulgarians, Yugoslavs), it may be characterized as dramatic – the number of inhabitants decreased 22% - 41% in only 11 years.

When large regions are analyzed, the direction and intensity of ethno-demographic changes can be perceived. The number of inhabitants in central Serbia decreased (from 5.6 million to 5.5 million) in the last inter-censal period (1991-2002). The Serbian nation registered an absolute decrease (by 45.6 thousand) despite the influx of a large number of refugees due to negative growth and migrational balance, but also a relative increase (from 88.0% to 89.5%) due to a larger negative rate of increase of other nationalities. Thus, an increase trend of the degree of ethnic homogeneity of central Serbia has been present in the observed period which is also shown by the decrease of the number of nationalities with a ratio over 1%, from six (Serbs, Muslims, Yugoslavs, Montenegrins, Albanians and Roma) to four (Serbs, Bosniacs, Roma and Albanians). Population movements of the members of national minorities indicate negative trends, except with the Roma (growth rate from 1.2% to 1.5%) who owe the demographic dynamism to ethnic alternation, apart from high natural growth, while the Vlachs register an increase (from 0.3% to 0.7%) exclusively owing to the awakening of national conscience and change of national affiliation. (Raduški 2011: 331). Albanians and Bosniacs/Muslims, despite high natural growth, had a negative population rate of increase and decrease in ratio (from 1.3% to 1.1%, namely 3.1% to 2.5%) which indicates emigration.

7 The first census of refugees and war-affected persons, carried out in 1996 (by the Commissariat for Refugees of the Republic of Serbia and UNHCR), registered about 618 thousand of these persons who arrived from war-affected regions (mostly from Croatia and Bosnia and Herzegovina). Over half of them came to Central Serbia (the largest number to Belgrade, about 170 thousand), then to Vojvodina, while only a smaller number to Kosovo and Metohia. In the last period, the number of refugees decreased as some obtained citizenship (about 250 thousand), some moved abroad, while a smaller number returned to where they fled from. According to data from 2011, about 70 thousand refugees have been registered, which is why UNHCR classified Serbia among the ten countries in the world and the only one in Europe in which the status of refugees has still not been solved.

A trend in the decrease of the degree of population ethnic heterogeneity has been present in Vojvodina in the whole observed period (1991-2002). Population had increased (from 1,970 thousand to 2,031 thousand) primarily on the account of the immigration component, namely the influx of a large number of Serbian nationality refugees during the 1990s which even superseded the large colonization of Vojvodina after the Second World War. This significantly changed the ethnic picture of Vojvodina in view of ethnic homogenization and degree of majority nations, namely increasing the number and ratio of the majority nation in total population (from 1.1 to 1.3 million, namely from 57.1% to 65.0% and growth index of 117.5 points). Therefore, the absolute increase noted with the Serbs, despite their negative natural growth, is the result of intensive immigrations (refugees) and change in declaration (decision on Serbian nationality). Depopulation trends are characteristic for all nationalities (except Roma) within the minority populations. (Raduški 2009: 190). The Hungarians decreased numerically (by 43.1 thousand, growth index 87.1) and by ratio (from 16.9 to 14.3%), whereby the absolute decrease exceeded negative natural growth which indicates emigration. The Slovaks had a decrease (by 5.6 thousand, and ratio from 3.2% to 2.8%, growth index 91.0 points) due to negative trends in natural movement, while migrations were less significant. The Croats recorded absolute decrease (by 16 thousand, growth index of 78.0 points) and relative (from 3.7% to 2.8%), which is mostly due to negative migration balance. The other ethnic communities in Vojvodina are also characterized by a negative natural growth and by emigration trends as well. Namely, due to the political circumstances in that period (ethnic conflicts, friction, bombing) as well as economic reasons (UN sanctions and other) they emigrated from the country, mostly towards their home countries. Their population dynamics was also influenced by the change in national affiliation - a non-demographic factor which depends not only on the subjective feeling of the individual but on the current political situation and state politics, assimilation processes conditioned by scarcity, space dispersion and large number of mixed marriages (characteristic for Vojvodina) and other factors (Haug, Courbage, Compton 1998).

Spatial Distribution of Nationalities in Serbia, 1991-2002

Spatial distribution of nationality is conditioned by differentiated natural growth, ethnic selective migrations, as well as by economic, po-

litical, cultural and many other factors. The basic trends in territorial distribution and concentration of certain ethnic communities in Serbia is characterized by certain regional specificities as well as pronounced spatial-demographic polarization. Changes in demographic development and territorial distribution of certain nationalities are demonstrated in outstanding concentration and strengthening the process of national homogenization in certain regions, while on the other hand, there is a high degree of spatial dispersion characteristic for other ethnic communities (Spasovski 1994).

Certain regional communities are characterized by complex ethnic composition (areas around large regional centers and larger town areas), while ethnic homogenization is carried out in other areas, especially in the region of southern Serbia which is dominated by Albanians, then in the southwestern part (Sandžak) which is dominated by Bosniac/Muslim nationality, in the northwestern part in which the Bulgarians are concentrated or in the north of Vojvodina (district of Bačka) where Hungarians are ethnically dominant. Various spatial mobility of ethnic communities developed together with the population changes in Serbia.

There are distinct differences in the spatial distribution of population, so the real insight into the ethnic processes and compactness of ethnic communities are best illustrated by data from the municipalities of Serbia. We can observe the intensity and directions of ethno-spatial dynamics by following the changes in the scope of territorial coverage of the area in which an ethnic community gained majority. Thus, apart from the majority nationality, five more nationalities (Hungarians, Albanians, Bosniacs together with the Muslims, Bulgarians and Slovaks) have high territorial concentration in certain regions, with absolute or relative ethnic domination in at least one municipality. They are as follows: Serbs (majority in 144 municipalities), Hungarians (8 municipalities), Bosniacs with Muslims (3 municipalities) and finally Albanians, Bulgarians and Slovaks who form the majority in two municipalities each.

The homogenization process of the national population structure of Serbia (without Kosovo and Metohia) was notable in the 1990s, and the achieved level of ethno-spatial distribution in 2002 may best be perceived on the basis of ethno-static analysis of ethnic majorities on the municipality level.


The analysis shows that of the total number of Serbs, over three fourths are concentrated in central Serbia (4.9 million or 78.7%), and about one fifth live in Vojvodina (1.3 million or 21.3%). Very high degree of ethnic homogeneity is characterized by the Serbian population because, out of 161 municipalities, they ethnically prevail in 144 districts. Out of this number, they absolutely ethnically prevail in central Serbia in 109 municipalities (94% of the territory of the municipalities), while in the other seven municipalities they are in second place and record the smallest ratios, such as the three in which the Bosniacs/Muslims dominate (ratio of Serbs varies from 4.3% to 23.5%), two municipalities with Albanian population (ratio of Serbs from 8.5% to 34.1%) and two municipalities with Bulgarian majority (ratio of Serbs from 13.2% to 25.6%). In the last inter-censal period, ethno-demographic changes are reflected primarily in the increase of the ratio of Serbs in all municipalities of Serbia (mostly in the region of Belgrade) due to the inflow of a large number of refugees and, to a certain degree, to the declaring of certain ethnic communities (e.g. Montenegrins, Yugoslavs) for the Serbian nationality. The Serbs recorded a decreased ratio only in municipalities of eastern Serbia because a large number of persons declared themselves as Vlach nationality in the last census.

The Serbs in Vojvodina form the absolute majority in 33 out of 45 municipalities (with ratio from 52.0% to 92%) and a relative in two (Vrbas 47.8% and Bač 46.7%) which represents over three fourths (77.8%) of the territory of the municipalities in Vojvodina. In relation to the state in 1991, the Serbs ethnically prevailed in the same number of municipalities but in 32 municipalities with absolute and 3 municipalities with relative majority (Vrbas, Bač and Kula). Furthermore, there has been an increase in the ratio of majority population in all municipalities in Vojvodina which is an indirect consequence of the inflow of a large number of Serbian refugees, and the number of municipalities in which the Serbs form an outstanding majority, namely over two thirds of the population (from 20 to 25 municipalities), has significantly increased.

Therefore, as regards the proportional ratio of Serbs, certain changes have been noted, primarily in municipalities in which the Serbs represent the majority. Accordingly, in the period 1992-2002, the number of municipalities in Serbia (without Kosovo and Metohia) in which the Serbs represent the relative majority decreased (from three to two municipalities), as well as the moderate absolute majority (from 50.0% to 66.6%) from 16 to 10 municipalities. At the same time, the number of

municipalities in which the Serbs have a convincing (66.6 to 80.0%) or very large majority (over 80%) has increased. It should be mentioned that Serbs represent more than 4/5 of total population in 112 municipalities (out of 161 municipalities), and out of them they form over 95% of the population in as many as 69 municipalities (Map 1). Incidentally, ten municipalities have an exceptionally homogeneous national structure (over 99% are Serbs).

One of the essential characteristics of Serbia (excluding Kosovo and Metohia) is co-settlement of various ethnic communities in the same region, therefore, depending on the territorial-political context or angle of contemplation, it is possible for each community to find itself in the position of the majority, as well as the minority (Janjić 1995). Spatial distribution of the population shows that the ethnic space of Serbs is substantial and functionally linked, exceptionally homogeneous, whereas there is a high territorial concentration of relevant ethnic minorities in border areas of the country. Minorities settled in border-areas are in question, having specific territorial distribution and ethnic domination, therefore the issue of their status and territorial-political organization gives special weight and importance to the minority's problem (Poulton 1991).



Map 1. Spatial distribution of nationalities in Serbia, per municipalities

Numerically, Hungarians are the most important ethnic minority in Serbia (excluding Kosovo and Metohia). They are almost exclusively concentrated in Vojvodina (290.2 thousand or 98.9%), while only a small percentage out of the total number of Hungarians live in the region of central Serbia (3092 or 1.1%) where their concentration is completely negligible (approximately 0.1%) and mostly oriented towards urban settlements. Geographical distribution of the Hungarian population in Vojvodina is characterized by a tendency of concentration in a small number of municipalities with a high level of ethnic homogeneity, especially in the northern part (the District of Bačka). They absolutely prevail in six municipalities (Kanjiža 86.5%, Senta 80.5%, Ada 76.6%, Bačka Topola 58.9%, Mali Idoš 55.9% and Čoka 51.6%) and represent the relative majority in two municipalities (Bečej 48.8% and Subotica 38.5%). More than a half (59.7%) of the total number of Hungarians in Vojvodina live in these municipalities. Spatial distribution of the Hungarian minority implies high concentration and spatial polarization, taking into account that more than half of the total number of Hungarians in Vojvodina live in two districts only (of Northern Bačka and Northern Banat), where the Hungarian prevailing municipalities are located as well. On the other hand, in the District of Srem (with Serbian population prevailing) Hungarians make only 1.3%. In the observed period, a decreased number of Hungarians was recorded in all municipalities, however, they retained ethnic domination in eight municipalities, whereby in 1991 they absolutely prevailed in seven municipalities and relatively prevailed in one municipality (Subotica). In the central Serbian municipalities concentration of Hungarians is completely negligible and mostly oriented to urban settlements (up to 0.2%).

Bosniacs/Muslims are predominately settled in central Serbia (151.5 thousand or 97.4%), whereas only 4.1 thousand or 2.6% of their total number live in the region of Vojvodina. Ethno-spatial distribution shows that they absolutely prevail in three municipalities: Tutin (28.5 thousand or 94.9%), Novi Pazar (67.2 thousand or 78.2%) and Sjenica (21.2 thousand or 75.5%) where 70.5% of the total number of Bosniacs/Muslims of the region of central Serbia live, which clearly illustrates the level of their concentration in the south-western part of Serbia. In other municipalities the ratio of Bosniacs/Muslims is less than 1%, except in Prijepolje (41.1%) and Priboj (23.0%), then Nova Varoš (7.6%) and Mali Zvornik (4.3%). In the period from 1991 to 2002, changes in territorial distribution of the population are tending to strengthen the ethnic homogenization process. Thus, Novi Pazar, being the most

developed economic and cultural center of the region, records an increase of Bosniacs/Muslims (from 62.4 thousand to 67.2 thousand, i.e. from 75.4% to 78.2%), and a simultaneous decrease of Serbs ratio (from 22.5% to 20.5%). Significant inflow and homogenization of Bosniac/Muslim population took place in that municipality, so according to the data of 2002, 63.5% of the population of that municipality was absorbed (Gagić 2009). In the other two municipalities (Sjenica and Tutin) an absolute decrease was registered, while the ratio of Bosniacs/Muslims remained unchanged. Moreover, it is necessary to say that in the three above mentioned municipalities only a small number of people ethnically declared themselves as Muslims in the last census and that the Bosnian national idea was accepted to the greatest extent (e.g. in Tutin 223 Muslims, and 28.3 thousand Bosniacs). In contrast to central Serbia, the ratio of this nationality in Vojvodina, contemplated per municipalities, is insignificant (approximately 0.1%), whereby the great majority declared themselves as Muslims, and only a small part as Bosniacs.

Albanians are almost completely concentrated in central Serbia (60.0 thousand or 97.3%), and a small percentage in Vojvodina (1.7 thousand or 2.7%). From the territorial aspect, they absolutely ethnically prevail in two municipalities of the central Serbia: Preševo (31.1 thousand or 89.1%) and Bujanovac (23.7 thousand or 54.7%) while their ratio is significant in the municipality of Medveđa (2.8 thousand or 26.2%). As many as 96.1% of Albanians from the region of the central Serbia live in these municipalities, whereas in other municipalities they are dispersively settled and have very low ratios (approximately 0.1%), which indicates the distinct process of their national homogenization in the south of Serbia. In the period from 1991 to 2002 the Albanians had negative trends in the population development, but they retained absolute ethnical prevalence in the two above mentioned municipalities, whereby in one of them (Preševo) the number and ratio were decreased (from 60.1% to 54.7%). The number of Serbs decreased in these municipalities as well, although their relative ratio increased due to the higher negative rate of increase of other nationalities. In the municipalities of Vojvodina, the Albanian minority has marginal ratios and spatial distribution is oriented mostly to larger urban settlements.

Out of the total number of Slovaks on the territory of Serbia, a small number (2.4 thousand or 4.0%) live in central Serbia, whereas their main concentration zone is in Vojvodina (56.5 thousand or 96%), where, after the Hungarians, they represent numerically the most sig-

nificant ethnic minority. Despite negative trends in demographic development, they retained ethnic prevalence in two municipalities: absolute in Bački Petrovac (9.8 thousand or 66.4%) and relative in Kovačica (11.5 thousand or 41.1%). In other municipalities their ratios are low, characterized by dispersive settlement (except in Bač, 19.8% and Bačka Palanka, 9.6%) and significant mixing with other nationalities (especially with Serbs and Hungarians).

Members of the Bulgarian nationality are predominantly settled in border-area municipalities of south-eastern Serbia, towards Bulgaria. Out of the total number of Bulgarians, 91.9% live in the central Serbia, whereas 8.1% live in the territory of Vojvodina. They record a high level of ethnic homogeneity and prevail in two municipalities. These are: Bosilegrad (7.0 thousand or 70.9%), and Dimitrovgrad (5.8% thousand or 49.7%) in which over two thirds (approximately 68%) of the total number of Bulgarians from the region of the central Serbia are concentrated. Compared with the year 1991, the Bulgarian ethnic minority recorded decrease in both municipalities, whereby they retained ethnic prevalence, but in one of them (Dimitrovgrad) they lost their absolute prevalence. At the same time, Serbs recorded an increase, whereas the ratio of Yugoslavs significantly decreased, because in the last census majority changed their ethnic affiliation (they most likely declared themselves as Serbs).

Conclusions

When speaking of the population movements in Serbia, as well as on the territory of former SFR Yugoslavia, we cannot overlook large changes in the distribution caused by voluntary or forced population migrations, armed conflicts and ethnic cleansing, and one of the momentous demographic consequences of these events are territorial homogenization and decrease of the degree of ethnic heterogeneity of almost all former Yugoslav republics. Although politically motivated and ethno-centric migrations occurred even during the existence of SFRY (e.g. Serbs from Croatia and from Kosovo and Metohia), they took dramatic forms in the 1990s. In the region of former SFRY, the greatest ethnic homogenization took place in Serbia and Croatia and within Serbia primarily in the region of Vojvodina due to the inflow of Serbian refugees, but also to a certain extent due to the decline in the number of members of national minorities. Forced migrations in

which Serbs took part, mainly had ethnic homogenization of both republics as a consequence, although emigration of both non-Croatian, namely non-Serbian nationalities contributed to this as well. Is further ethnic homogenization an inevitable destiny of the former Yugoslav republics? It is uncertain whether such trends will continue or cease, but it is quite certain they will not be opposite. Although there is a certain positive correlation between political instability and ethnic heterogeneity, a high degree of homogenization is still not the most optimal for development of a country, since ethnic dynamics is missing which results from the richness of diversity, contacts with other nations and cultures (Rady 1995).

Generally observed, it may be concluded that ethnic homogenization and spatial distribution of population in Serbia at the end of the 20th and beginning of the 21st century were influenced by massive migrations, ethnically differentiated natural growth, national-religious "awakening" of many ethnic communities, more or less pronounced assimilation and integration processes, as well as a complex political and socio-economic situation in that period. It is justifiably assumed that the tendencies of changes in ethnic population structure are not finished, nor the processes which condition them. However it is not possible to foresee what the changes in ethnic composition will be in the forthcoming period, primarily because of unknown trends in population reproduction, and the even more unclosed questions of the direction and intensity of future internal and external migrations, stability of national determination of certain ethnic communities and similar. In any case, the question of ethnic structure and ethno-demographic changes is sensitive and should not be left to spontaneous demographic trends, as the consequences of such trends are numerous, diverse and long-term.

It should be emphasized that the minority question is of exceptional importance in Serbia as a multiethnic country. This refers not only to the numerosity and territorial distribution of national minorities but to the existence of large distinctions in view of their demographic development, socio-economic, religious and cultural and civilization characteristics, national emancipation and political organization. From the regional aspect, the minority matter is of great importance in central Serbia, although ethnically homogeneous, having in mind the specific spatial distribution and process of ethnic homogenization of the most relevant minorities who live in the border regions of the country, which

makes this matter additionally complex. On the other hand, Vojvodina represents a real ethnic mosaic of various nationalities exceptionally differentiated by their ethnic-cultural characteristics, so good majority-minority relations, national minority rights protection and ethnic tolerance are the key to stability in this province.

The end of the 20th century is marked as the “era of migration” due to massive global and increasingly differentiated migrational trends, as well as the “time of nationalism” having in mind the awakening of ethnicity and “explosion” of national identity with many ethnic communities. Because of this, multiculturalism, namely the policy of diversity, represents an alternative to the assimilation policy today (Yacoub 1998) The perspectives of multiculturalism in the Balkan countries will depend on multiethnic relations, respecting of human and minority rights, as well as on the political stability and strategy of democratic and economic development of Balkan region.

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Hungarian Constitutional Law and the Serbian Question in the Political Ideology of Svetozar Miletić

Abstract

In the political ideology of Svetozar Miletić and other liberal Serbian political leaders in the Habsburg Monarchy, Hungarian constitutional law represented constitutional and legal framework acceptable inasmuch as the ruling Hungarian state doctrine even partially recognised Serbian privileges, and their democratic and national rights. The initial request to form special territorial autonomy for Serbs within Hungary, which was to have considerable authority over certain aspects of social life, was redefined after the Austro-Hungarian Compromise by requesting administrative integration of Hungarian counties on national basis. Institutionally conducted Magyarisation within Hungary indicated the loss of national identity of all non-Hungarian peoples in Hungary, while the cancellation of Serbian ecclesiastical-educational autonomy meant sanctioning of Serbian privileges.

Keywords: Svetozar Miletić, Austria-Hungary, Hungary, the Annunciation Council, ecclesiastical-educational autonomy, Vojvodina.

Since the end of the 17th century legal and political status of Serbian people within the Habsburg Monarchy was regulated by imperial privileges as well as laws adopted by Hungarian Assembly up to year 1848, after which the Hungarian Parliament. Royal privileges were construed by ecclesiastical and clerical representatives of Austro-Hungarian Serbs as a constitutional and legislative contract, based on which they deduced the right of Serbs to acquire the status of an equal, historical nation in a state where that status had been continuously de-

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nied to them. On the other hand, the privileges were unacceptable for Hungarian nobility, as this act of royal mercy was considered contrary to Hungarian constitutional principle founded on medieval historical law of Hungarian people, according to which there is only one political nation – Hungarian, that is one diplomatic people in the territory of St. Stephen's Hungarian state.

Depending on political circumstances or the need to conform the interests of Hungarian feudal estates and later Hungarian liberal leaders to the dynastic conceptions of the state, Viennese court manipulated Serbian privileges as well as the expectations of Serbs that they will obtain collective and civil rights. The crucial moment in synchronising the Hungarian constitutional law with the requests of Serbs trying to ensure their civil rights in Hungary took place in 1792 when Hungarian Diet in Pozsony adopted Article 27, which guaranteed civil equality to non-Hungarians.

Namely, equality given to Serbs through Article 27 of 1791 and Article 10 of 1792 implied genuine freedom of religious confession to those of Greek, but non-Uniate rite, freedom of endowments, school system, upbringing of youth, and confirmed the existing rights, privileges and concessions that were not in disagreement with the laws of the Kingdom of Hungary. Furthermore, Serbs were guaranteed the right to acquire property and the right to be accepted in civil service. Article 10 also guaranteed Serbian right to elect the metropolitan and bishops as their representatives in the Hungarian Diet. The same article provided the termination of Illyrian court chancery (Forišković 1986: 264). The ruler kept the right to confirm the election of the metropolitan and bishops, to issue permission for the summoning of the Serbian assemblies as well as to appoint commissioners at these assemblies.

However, the full exercise of these rights guaranteed by Hungarian laws was obstructed by the Catholic nobility and Hungarian counties. What seemed to be just a question of formality, such as whether the metropolitan and the bishops were to sit together or separate from the Catholic clergy in the Upper House of the Diet, lessened the effect of the adopted laws. Metropolitan Stratimirović believed that his place should be next to the primas of Hungary, and that Serbian bishops should sit amongst the Catholic, but in front of the Uniate bishops. At the meeting of the Diet in 1792 the palatine did not allocate Serbian bishops among the Catholic clergy, but behind all the other representatives. Because of that Serbian bishops protested pointing in their

appeal that “they will only temporarily be contented with the place allocated to them by the palatine, but they keep the right to request whatever seems they are entitled for later”. The Article 7 of 1792 re-established what Article 16 of the previous year determined, and that is: the Hungarian language ought to become obligatory school subject within Hungarian state borders; the Court Chamber was solely to use Hungarian as the language of communication with Hungarian institutions. All this was requested on the basis of the imperial decree issued on the 22nd June 1792, which allowed Hungarian estates to make decisions like these in the Diet.

From the time when this law was adopted, the political life of Prečani Serbs was characterised by the resistance towards the process of Magyarisation, which primarily consisted of forcing Hungarian language as official in all segments of state life. Burning of public registers kept in Hungarian was preceded by other laws influencing Serbian political elite in the Habsburg Monarchy to determine such a course of national policy according to which the position toward Viennese court was primarily to be established. Additionally, the corpus of social, national and civil requests was to be defined, granting of which, as it seemed, would have created conditions needed for improvement of cultural and educational life, preservation of national identity and acquirement of political equality. Civil equality in the form which was legally sanctioned before the war and the Revolution of 1848, seemed insufficient and unreliable, and therefore in May 1848 at the Serbian national assembly Serbian liberals and Serbian ecclesiastic dignitaries, gathered within the circle around the metropolitan Rajačić, voted to formally acknowledge Hungarian constitutional law, political sovereignty and territorial integrity of Hungary, but they actually proclaimed a distinct political and territorial unit in the territory of Srem, Banat, Baranja and Bačka – Serbian Vojvodina. Jurisdictions and character of this unit show that while it was unacceptable to Hungarian political leaders, for Serbian people it was the finalisation of their historical efforts, and for the 20-year old Miletić and Serbian liberals who saw him as their main leader and ideologist, it was the basis for defining the party's policy, which tends to adjust Hungarian constitutional law to Serbian national requests, which ultimately formed a policy of rearrangement of the Habsburg Monarchy on the dualistic principle and the formation of a specific Serbian autonomy, which would have the form of a federal unit in accordance with the principle of dual federalism, which seemed quite achievable after the Austro-Hungarian Compromise (Mikavica 2005: 59-67).

The dominant feature of Miletić's political ideology in 1848 was the realisation of Serbian national and collective rights in Hungary, which implied obtaining a distinct territory for Prečani Serbs, who would organise themselves politically and administratively within this territory. Since 1861, and especially since 1868, Miletić's ideology on solving the Serbian national question shifted toward administrative reorganisation of Hungary by means of arondation of Hungarian counties on the basis of acknowledging the national principle. This policy would ultimately lead to the creation of such counties in which non-Hungarian peoples would be able to organise themselves and independently arrange their national, educational, cultural and social life in full. This political concept was not represented as contrary to the Hungarian constitutional law, but quite the opposite (Mikavica 2006).

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In Serbian political circles, already at the time of formal and definite repeal of Vojvodina and afterwards, particular interest was taken in texts in which Hungarians, especially Hungarian Baron of liberal provenance József Eötvös, emphasized that not only the satisfaction of national interests in Hungary was not directly opposite to Hungarian constitutional law, but also the resolving of this issue is a pre-requisite for the national and constitutional survival of the Hungarian people. At the same time, it was neglected that the realization of such justified efforts of the non-Hungarian nations were defined by Eötvös in a wider scope of general constitutional liberties of Hungary². The few elements

2 In the brochure *A nemzetiségi Kérdés*, published in Pest in 1865, József Eötvös positioned himself more precisely towards the feasibility of the idea of meeting the demands of non-Hungarian people in Hungary with a „territorial fragmentation”: „This principle may seem fine and grand, and it may seem that it could be feasible, but it is such that when it would

indicating that the compromise between Miletić's followers and Eötvös's followers was possible could have looked sufficient for the preservation of the achieved level of Serbian-Hungarian political trust. These included Eötvös's estimates that the national question in Switzerland and Belgium had been ideally resolved "through a well-organized municipal system, which should have a wide enough circle to leave room for free development of individual nationalities, tightening the boundaries just as much as the unity of state makes it necessary" (*Srbski dnevnik* 1860, issue 92). However, Eötvös was not at all ready to advocate for the practical implementation of such an "ideal" system, especially not in the Hungarian Assembly, and this is something he openly said to the Serbian liberals in Pest in 1861 (*Srbski dnevnik* 1861, issue 56).

Since the issuing of the February Patent, which "significantly modified" the October Diploma, Schmerling's policy was not perceived by Serbian liberals gathered around Svetozar Miletić as sufficiently decisive in meeting the Serbian demands, after the repeal of Vojvodina, while they were trying to present the idea of a Serbian Vojvodina within Hungary as useful and politically practical in the context of Hungarian aspiration to re-establish the constitutional order and establish new constitutional and legal order in Hungary, believing that this idea is feasible, ultimately as the result of the Serbian-Hungarian political compromise (Krestić 1980: 141-142, 145). The compromise implied that the Serbs overcome their "previous antipathies" towards Hungarians and join the "loud protests" against the centralistic policy, heard from the Hungarian Assembly at the time (Mikavica 2011: 116).

It was in the autonomy of Hungarian counties, which would in some elements attain the level of sovereignty of Swiss cantons, as well as in the luscious, affluent life in congregations in town municipalities that the Serbian Liberals saw the last real possibility to achieve an agreement with the Hungarian liberals and guarantee the preservation of Serbian national rights, whilst honouring the integrity and independence of Hungary. At the same time, they expected the Hungarian politicians "abandon the idea of a single, Hungarian political nation in Hungary, i.e. to definitely stop identifying "genetic" nationality of the Hungarians with the so-called constitutional and political nationality of Hungary. Since the Hungarians in Hungary did not make an absolute majority of the population, identifying the citizenship and nationality was consid-

come to life, it could celebrate its victory only on the ruins of the Austrian monarchy" (*Србски дневник* May 27th, 1865, Issue 42 and May 29th 1865, Issue 43).

ered unacceptable for the Serbs and all other non-Hungarian nations in Hungary. Equality of nations, which was at the time discussed with particular gravity by the leader of the Hungarian liberal nobility, Ferenc Deák, was for them considered to be a possible solution, provided only if it did not involve just civil equality, but for every nation "to govern and rule" its ecclesiastical and educational affairs. "One needn't be particularly committed to modern constitutional law," Miletić explained, "in order to know that both kinds of such equality are inherent in one truly constitutional country."

Furthermore, true equality of nationalities in Hungary, thus Serbs as well, involved, according to Serbian liberals, the right to file court documents in non-Hungarian languages, but also the right for each nationality in Hungary to manifest its national being "as a unique personality" by having a national administration in the province in question (underlined by D. M.), and consequently they found themselves in direct political opposition to the leading representatives of Hungarian state policies. Starting from the fact that the autonomy of the Hungarian counties integrally contained anyway in itself a seed of a national administration for some particular nationalities, they considered it only necessary to integrate some of the counties better, in order to enable some particular nationalities to have majority in the county in question. According to this interpretation by Serbian liberals in Hungary it was necessary first to legally determine which counties in Hungary can be considered purely Hungarian, Serbian, Romanian, Slovak, and which are mixed, paying attention not to use more than three languages in nationally mixed counties. In those counties where the national mix was a serious threat, new county borders were to be made in order to honour the national criterion.

Official language in the newly integrated counties was to be determined based on the nation, i.e. nationality which formed the majority of the county. Each county was to have county councils, which would resemble the existing congregations. Slovaks from all the Slovak counties, and Romanians from all the Romanian ones in Hungary, would enter one great congregation of its own kind, where they would conduct their purely national affairs. Authorities of these councils were to be determined under one law which was to be passed by a common (country) assembly and the exclusion of the legislative activity from the jurisdiction of these councils was understood.

Legislation was to remain unified on the level of whole Hungary, state borders unchanged and the entire “administrative body” was to remain mostly the same. Bearing in mind the large number of nationalities in Hungary and their dispersed settlement, Serbian liberals were ready, as it is evident from their treatises, articles and studies, to relinquish the consistent application of this principle to all nationalities in Hungary and to limit its application to Hungarians, Slovaks, Ruthenians, Romanians and Serbs. Despite the large number of Germans in Hungary, they did not envisage special counties for them precisely because of their dispersion throughout Hungary.³ They mostly kept special rights for Serbs, acquired on the basis of the privileges they had received from Austrian emperors, and they usually thought that these were not in opposition to the principles on which a democratic, constitutional state should rest. Privileges remained for Serbian liberals not *Privilegie juris privati*, but a constitutional and legal contract based on which Serbs represented one “historical-political individuality” within Hungary. In this way, no special rights that would exceed the authorities within the integrated counties were demanded for the Serbs, but rather a greater, historical right of Serbs to this demand was accentuated because precisely thanks to the privileges they “stood at the same time on the basis of the principle of nationality, and on the basis of historical-political individuality.” They did not acknowledge this right of historical-political individuality to other non-Hungarian peoples of Hungary, but they did not doubt that they would also “obtain this basis in time” (*Srbski dnevnik* 1861, issue 27).

By resolving the national question in the suggested manner, Serbian liberals thought it possible to secure a “permanent consolidation of Hungary” and particularly to put paid to the frequent objections of the Hungarian side that the South-Hungarian Serbs were persistently aspiring towards state fragmentation. Serbian South-Hungarian liberals compared the awaited, reorganized Hungarian counties to the existing Swiss cantons, proving that the nationalities in Hungary were stronger in numbers, more compact and less mixed than the nationalities in Switzerland, and that, therefore, land consolidation of the counties, introduction of national administrations and generally thorough implementation of the national principle in Hungary was more feasible than it was presumed.

3 With a certain exception which refers to the Saxons in Transylvania.

Equality of the nationalities in Hungary within the integrated counties was considered insufficient if reduced to the use of the national language of a nationality with majority in the county. The right to independent administration in the integrated counties was considered an issue of utmost importance. In this segment too, Miletić and those like-minded did not digress from the program of national rights, which had been established by the church hierarchy and Serbian representatives at the Timișoara Assembly at the end of the 17th century, and especially since the last church-national assembly at the end of 18th century. This primarily means that the special area for some nations in Hungary involved their right to an independent administration, political, administrative and legal institutions. Though for Serbs and their administration, they suggested and determined the territory of Banat in the end of 18th century, and following the passing of the Octroyed legal act, the October Diploma, the right to the Bacs – Bodrog and Torontal (Banat) County integrated in such a way that the non-Serbian element went to other counties, in order for this one, thusly renewed Vojvodina, to have a predominant Serbian character whilst decidedly and openly not opposing the basic constituents of the ruling Hungarian state doctrine.

However, in such this new Serbian Vojvodina was formed, via arondation of the Hungarian counties, did not significantly influence the position of the Hungarian politicians towards this historical-political legacy. Svetozar Miletić, Mihailo Polit Desančić and all the other like-minded were trying to explain unsuccessfully that Vojvodina would not be “some province Vojvodina”, but just “a large county”, which would have the same legislation and the same representation and mostly the same administration as the entire Kingdom, and that the forming of a Serbian Vojvodina in the scope of one large country would not hinder the integrity of Hungary. For the respectable Hungarian statesman and prominent political leaders, the very mention of the name “Vojvodina” itself meant the breach of the country’s integrity. Discussing the thesis of the Hungarian politician and ideologist Baron Jozsef Eötvös that the non-Hungarian nationalities in Hungary should be treated as legal entities (*als juristische Personen*), which should be provided with an independent administration in their ecclesiastical and educational affairs, founding of new schools, determining a language of teaching in them and certain financial support by the state, followers of Miletić, and especially Polit Desančić, underlined that such a thing was self-implied in a truly constitutional state and that this could not be considered a sufficient concession on Hungarian part (Mikavica 2007: 55).

Despite the overall disagreement on this matter, in the field of practical political understanding, from 1861 to 1867, Serbian liberals continued to maintain contact with the Hungarian liberals, especially with Eötvös and Ferenc Deák, never being quite sure how honest the latter were in their expressing of the desire to resolve the national issue in Hungary in a satisfactory manner. In particular, none of the Serbian liberals could have known whether Jozsef Eötvös was even ready to adjust his previous theory that a nation was not a language community, but a blend of different races, as this Hungarian politician formulated in the treatise *Influence of the ruling ideas of the 19th Century on the state* (Jozsef Eötvös, *Der Einfluss der herrschenden Ideen des 19. Jahrhunderts auf den Staat*, Wien 1851). It was formed under the influence of the work on the history of civilization by François Guizot. Eötvös developed in this work a thesis that the Hungarian people was created in the process of blending of the superior Hungarian and the inferior Slavic race, which the Christian Church assimilated over several centuries of living together. In some sections, Eötvös wrote about Serbs with open disparaging and presented them as a lower race. Sometime later, Joseph Gobineau and Ante Starčević (Ekmečić 1999: 127, 311) wrote and thought along similar lines, as well. Amongst the representatives of the political idea and advocates of the Hungarian constitutional law from that period, Laszlo Teleki should be highlighted. He wrote to Kossuth from Paris in 1849, saying that Hungarians should reach an agreement with the Serbs, Croats and Romanians.⁴ At the same time, Ferenc Toldy and Aurel Kecskemeti were referred to as the supporters of “mid-way” solutions, though they did not suggest territorial autonomy for non-Hungarians either (Katuš 1987: 107). Since autumn 1849, leaders of the Hungarian emigration were especially under the strong influence of the Polish and Romanian emigrants and Italian politicians. The common denominator of their activities was their work on the creating of a confederation of South-Eastern peoples of Europe. Back in October 1848 in Vidin, at the suggestion of the Polish emigrants Bistrunowski and Zamoycki from his entourage, Kossuth drafted a plan of the confederation which was to be joined by Hungary, Croatia, Serbia, Poland and the Romanian principalities. Afterwards, he sent his personal emissaries Heningen and Carossini (an Englishman and an Italian) to Belgrade. The following year (1850), Kossuth wrote to Teleki about his

4 He repeated the same in 1850. He intended territorial autonomy with an assembly for the non-Hungarians.

vision of the constitution of the North-Eastern Free Confederate States, where each member of the confederacy would have independent internal politics, and Hungary would be the centre of the confederation without Budapest as the capital of the confederation. During 1849 and 1850 negotiations were developed with the Polish and Romanian emigrants, the plan of Nicolae Bălcescu on the territorial autonomy was pursued,⁵ whilst on the Hungarian side, the most prominent figures of the time, apart from Teleki, were Bertalan Szemere, György Klapka, Gyula Andrásy. Szemere's manuscript (1853-1854) reads similarly as Klapka's (1855) regarding the Alliance between Hungary and Romania and Serbia, Croatia, Dalmatia and Bosnia and Herzegovina. Klapka signed an agreement of alliance with the Romanian prince Cuza (1859) with the aim of forming a confederation of the Danubian states of Serbia, Hungary and Romania. Kossuth (1862) prepared a similar solution with Pulskey and Canini and this draft was published by the Italian press. The idea of Danubian Confederation was principally accepted by Prince Mihailo Obrenović as well, during the secret negotiations with Kossuth in London. However, missing from these proposals was the handling of the question of Vojvodina, while the Hungarian ruling party and its Frigyes Podmaniczky decisively rejected even the state alliance with Serbia. despite this, Hungarian intermediaries in Belgrade continued the politics of Hungarian emigrants: Janos Ludwig, officers Sandor Gal, György Klapka, István Türr. The awaited joint uprising did not take place. What is important is that all the fractions of the Hungarian emigration (Paris, Italian, American) agreed in the fact that after the achievement of independence, Hungary should enter the confederacy with of the Balkan countries, but opinions differed on what the new state polity of Hungary should be, whilst one part of the Paris-based Hungarian emigration (Teleki, Pulskey, Klapka, Szemere) was most lenient, particularly in their attitude towards allowing national autonomy to the non-Hungarian nations. Kossuth, however, remained adamant, and with him a significant majority in the emigration, which thought that a "more favourable solution was to reach an agreement with Austria and the Habsburgs" (Katuš 1987: 115). Andrásy confirmed this to the Romanians in Paris, Teleki retreated in disappointment in 1851, Klapka continued persuading Kossuth (1861) under the conviction that autonomy of Transylvania should be recognized, and that Vojvo-

5 Bălcescu was also for the Danubian United States, but providing that in that union the territories with Romanian population in Transylvania belonged to the Romanian state.

dina should be given to the Serbs. Kossuth showed readiness for lenience in his first proposal, but in the second case – not in the least. Vojvodina opposed Kossuth's perception of the territorial integrity and political unity of Hungary, as he wrote in *KütaHYa* from 1851 Serbs in Hungary were not a political nation which had a historical and state right, according to Kossuth! Croats were thought of differently, which is why *Kvaternik* (1866) was pleased.⁶ Kossuth's positions were supported in Hungary by many Hungarians from the Virgil Szilágyi, Eden Kalay, Laszlo Böszörményi, Jozsef Madaras, Daniel Iranyi and others. Since the October Diploma, Lajos Mocsáry, Zsigmond Kemény, Moritz Lukacs, Ferenc Deák, Imre Madách, Jókai Mór tried, more than others, to impose constitutional law or to at least make it more approachable to political demands of the non-Hungarian nations. Eötvös and Kemény and Lukacs, as well as Laszlo Salay, all thought like Kossuth that the matter should not be taken further than the municipal and county autonomy for the non-Hungarian nations, civil rights in the system of public administration.

In the manifest of Miletić's party from 1869, a step was made towards a more concrete definition of Serbian collective rights, but this was precisely what manifested the deep political and ideological discrepancy of the two interpretations of the idea of statehood on Hungarian state territory. For the Hungarian side, each political concept which would imply federalization of the country was essentially unacceptable and directly opposite to the Hungarian constitutional law. Already in the first item of the *Becskekerek* Program of Miletić's people's party from 1869, which was based on the proposal of the non-Hungarian political representatives from 1867 and 1868, a demand which referred to the issue of Serbian Vojvodina was made. Serbian representatives, who were supposed to defend the principles of Serbian liberal-democratic nationalism in the Hungarian Assembly, had before them a task to "constantly challenge" the Hungarian government to "either make a proposal based on the conclusion from 1861, or to assemble a new congress, to make and submit a new proposal regarding the mentioned circumstances." In the second part of the programme, this demand was repeated by detailing those state factors from which a positive decision was expected: "To demand from the throne, the government and the assembly to thoroughly discuss the conclusions of the Serbian congress (Annunciation Council – D. M.) from 1861, either through initiative of

6 The only remaining problem was concerned with Međumurje and Rijeka.

the assembly or Serbian representatives.” Key segments of the Hungarian-Serbian negotiations which had been led up to 1867, found their place in the Becskerek Program. The following is also said in it: “...to integrate the collective municipalities as per the nationalities, minding geographic, communicational and administrative considerations...to take nationality into consideration and reorganization of higher court and political authorities...to recognize the equality of various languages at the Assembly as well (Hungarian Assembly – D. M.) and to reorganize the Upper House with reference to having the various nations represented in it... to recognize the limited unification of each nation in Hungary as educational wholes, with the right of autonomy in terms of organization, order and administration along with a right of taxation on this; the latter together with the state authorities...to recognize external mark and significance of each nationality by recognizing the flags and coats of arms of various nations.” Though Serbian Vojvodina was not explicitly highlighted here by name, nor even mentioned as an administrative or federal unit, it is clear from all of the above stated that it was considered and that its resurrection was a matter of persistent striving.

In Hungarian Assembly and outside of it, Miletić and his followers formally supported sustainability of the Hungarian constitutional law, denied any existence of the idea of Serbian Vojvodina within Hungary in front of Hungarian courts, and up to 1876 tended by all available legal, political, parliamentary and publicity means to present publicly their political concepts as democratic, loyal and concordant with the idea of Hungarian state sovereignty. At the May Assembly and afterwards, Miletić's liberals supported the politics of forming of Serbian Vojvodina, which would have numerous and significant jurisdictions in the domain of legislation and its own institutions. On the other hand, at the Annunciation Assembly (1861) a significant, historic outreach was made towards securing the trust of the Hungarian side for the Serbian demands, but without result. At the Annunciation Assembly, Miletić moved away from the opinion of the majority, adjusting his political conception to the position of Hungarian liberals and rejecting the project of relying on the Viennese court, all this with the purpose to procure issuing of the law on nationalities which failed expectations of Serbs on several repeatedly. At the Hungarian Assembly, he defined the demands of the non-Hungarian peoples as part of the proposal which was to be considered by the Hungarian Assembly with the aim of passing

the Law on nationalities. This required demanding a separate political administration and bordered counties based on national criterion. Hungarian parliamentary majority rejected these proposals and issued a series of legal acts founded on the principles of the Hungarian constitutional law and the existence of only one political nation in Hungary (Rokaji, Đere, Pal, Kasaš 2002: 498-499). While the law on Serbian educational-ecclesiastical autonomy partially recognized the justification of Serbian requests referring to their ecclesiastical and educational autonomy, the law on nationalities long-term consolidated the domination and supremacy of Hungarian political nation in Hungary (Đere 1992: 63-77).

At the Serbian church-national assemblies held after 1861, Hungarian constitutional law was in no way openly criticized nor questioned, while in the programmes of Serbian political parties in Austria-Hungary realization of Serbian national and civil rights was solely considered within the existing legislative order, but with frequent remarks to the assembly that the law on nationalities of 1868 was being violated. Institutionally conceptualized assimilation of non-Hungarian peoples compelled Miletić, and especially his followers and the like-minded, to adjust in different ways the governing Hungarian state doctrine to the pragmatic preservation of Serbian national identity and their democratic and civil demands. From 1868 to 1876 Miletić continuously advocated Serbian democratic and national interests in the Hungarian Assembly, but because of the repudiation of political immunity, in the time of the Great Eastern Crisis (the Eastern Question), the entire political activity of Prečani Serbs liberals led by Miletić was put at stake, and by several-year imprisonment Miletić himself was prevented from leading his party (Mikavica 2006: 60).

After Miletić's retreat from political life (1882), one fraction of his followers formed the Serbian People's Party, which favoured notabilities and whose programme presented Hungarian constitutional law as inviolable, while all Serbian requests were reduced to demanding exclusive respect of civil rights and consistent use of the existing laws (Miletić 2002: 879). Miletić's disciple and successor at the head of the newly-formed Liberal Party, Mihailo Polit Desančić, tried to revive the idea on the encirclement, i.e. arondation, of Hungarian counties, which was one of constituent principles of Miletić's political ideology and also the Becskerek programme adopted by Miletić's party. On the other

hand, the leader of Serbian National Radical Party, Jaša Tomić tried by preserving and respecting Hungarian sovereignty in Hungary to gain authority in the domain of Serbian ecclesiastic and school autonomy. In that way Miletić's followers found themselves divided in two fractions, liberal led by Polit and radical led by Jaša Tomić (Mikavica 2011: 247).

Overall, legal and political order in Hungary was especially important to Miletić's followers and Prečani Serbs in the terms of Magyarisation of their spiritual, educational and cultural life. By adopting and implementing the above-mentioned laws, the Hungarian state idea reached its climax, while Serbian national question was reduced to the domain of the basic respect of civil rights. The laws of 1879, 1883, 1900 and 1907 intensified Magyarisation and the supremacy and domination of Hungarian state idea was confirmed. It was only the success of the army of the Kingdom of Serbia in the Balkan Wars, and especially in the First World War, that recreated conditions for the restoration of Serbian sovereignty and preservation of their national identity north of the Sava and the Danube. Political ideology of Svetozar Miletić also had significance on another political level, as it referred to the right to self-determination of people who were at that time under the Turkish rule (Petrović 1968: 197-209). Resolving the Serbian question within the so-called Eastern Question induced the creation of the Balkan confederation fifty years before the end of the Great War and within this project defined by Mihailo Polit Desančić and Svetozar Miletić, Serbs tended to preserve the preconditions for preservation of their national identity as well as the general idea for creation of the Serbian state. The failure of these tendencies was confirmed after the dualistic reorganization of the Habsburg Monarchy, on which nor Miletić nor the representatives of other non-Hungarian nationalities in Hungary could have any influence, especially after the Great Eastern Crisis which ended in the crash of the Serbian national politics and giving of mandate to Austro-Hungary for occupying the territories of Bosnia and Herzegovina where the Serbs represented a relative majority of the population.

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Politik als Kunst der Illusion (Auf den Spuren von Hegels Ästhetik)

Zusammenfassung

In diesem Artikel man betrachtet Hegels Beitrag politischer Theorie in seinem sehr wichtigen und umfangreichen Werk „Ästhetik“. Auf den Spuren seiner Überlegungen zu Kunst und Politik wie auch aufgrund der politischen Philosophie, die vor seiner Zeit entstanden ist, kann man dennoch über Politik als Kunst der Illusion sprechen. Sie stellt keinen Bereich der Ästhetik dar, verdient aber wissenschaftliches Interesse und sie ist auch zu wissenschaftlicher Bearbeitung geeignet.

Schlagwörter: Hegel, Politik, politische, Ästhetik, Kunst, Illusion

In seinem umfangreichen Werk „Ästhetik“ hat Hegel die Politik nirgendwo als Kunst der Illusion definiert. Auf den Spuren seiner Überlegungen zu Kunst und Politik wie auch aufgrund der politischen Philosophie, die vor seiner Zeit entstanden ist, kann man dennoch über Politik als Kunst der Illusion sprechen. Sie stellt keinen Bereich der Ästhetik dar, verdient aber wissenschaftliches Interesse und sie ist auch zu wissenschaftlicher Bearbeitung geeignet.

Platon legt in „Protagoras“ dar, daß Prometheus den Menschen zusammen mit dem Feuer auch die Weisheit schenken mußte, da ohne ihr das Feuer nicht genutzt werden konnte. Die prometheische Herkunft der Kunst als Fertigkeit betont dennoch nicht das Feuer und auch nicht den weisen Umgang damit, sondern die den Menschen ge-

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schenkte Fertigkeit des Webens und Schmiedens als Ur-Kunst (Plato 1964: 320-322).

So gelangte die erste Kunst als Fertigkeit unter die Menschen.

Der Mensch erhielt die Weisheit und die Fertigkeiten, "die Politik aber nicht: denn diese war noch beim Zeus" (*Ibid*), also beim obersten der Götter.

Das, was die Menschen in ihrer Vollendung den Göttern annähert, ist Wissen, Kunst und Politik. So wie das Herrschen als höchste göttliche Eigenschaft das Entstehen von Politik initiierte, konnte es in seiner Verbindung von Menschlichem und Göttlichem nicht nur auf dem Niveau einer Fertigkeit verbleiben. Da es als Idee und Wirkung zum allgemeinem Wohl der Gemeinschaft als deren Vollkommenheit angesehen wurde, näherte es sich der Kunst, der Bedeutung nach wie auch der göttlichen Zugehörigkeit zu der Sphäre der Vollkommenheit.

Die Kriegskunst, "die von der Politik nur ein Teil sei" (Hegel 1995: 136), war für die Menschen, für ihren Selbsterhalt als unabdinglich vorgesehen, sie hatte jedoch keine gesellschaftliche Funktion, solange bis Zeus durch Hermes den Menschen Scham und Recht als Instrumente des geistigen Lebens schickte, das sich auf das Bestehen und die Entwicklung von Sitten, Gesetzen, Eigentumsrechten, Freiheit und Staat stützt.

Der antike Mythos von der Notwendigkeit der Ablösung der alten durch neue Götter ist der Mythos von der Ablösung der Herrschenden, nicht nur im Himmel, sondern auch auf Erden. Die Qualität der Machtbeibehaltung bringt die Welt der Politik durch ihre lange Dauer der göttlichen Welt näher, die von Ewigkeit gekennzeichnet ist. Die Inspirationen auf diese Illusion sind nicht zerstört, sondern der herrschend Gott. So lange und so uneingeschränkt wie nur möglich zu herrschen bedeutet, ein höherer Gott auf Erden zu sein. Die übernatürliche Gottesmacht wird von der organisierten Macht der politischen Gemeinschaft ersetzt. Die Unterlegenen erhalten als Strafe unabdinglich und in Form eines ästhetischen Urteils über das Häßliche als schlechtes Herrschen die Ungnade Gottes.

Sowohl Reelles wie auch Illusorisches werden seit damals, wie Wahrheit und Lüge, "als unbewegliche, besondere Inhalte angesehen, von denen das eine fest isoliert auf der einen Seite steht und das andere auf der anderen Seite, ohne gegenseitiger Beziehungen" (*Ibid*).

Nicht nur die Gewißheit der gegenseitigen und gemeinsamen Beziehungen, sondern weit mehr auch die unvermeidliche Verquickung von Realität und Illusion weisen auf dasselbe Argument hin, das vor Hegel bereits auch Lessing (Lessing 1997: 6) verwandte: daß geprägtes Geld weder Realität noch Wahrheit darstellt, das seit der Antike bis heute nur gesammelt und numerisch kategorisiert werden muß. Die Illusion von Politik ist in der Zeit der Helden nicht entwickelt, sondern erst in der Zeit eines geschaffenen Staates. Erst der Staat, bzw. seine Beherrschung, ermöglicht das "göttliche" Instrumentarium der Verbreitung und der Aufrechterhaltung einer politischen Illusion.

Die ausgeprägte Individualität der heroischen Zeit ohne Staat war eine ernsthafte Störung für jede, selbst auch für eine anfängliche politische Illusion, da die Politik vor dem Staat entstanden ist.

Bei der Bildung des Staates hat die Politik als Konstrukt des Respekts der Allgemeinheit die mächtigste institutionelle Grundlage für eine politische Illusion geschaffen.

Die Grundlage jeder Illusion liegt auch in der Phantasie. Die Phantasie ist zweifellos "das Vernünftige, das als Geist nur ist, insofern es sich zum Bewußtsein tätig hervortreibt" (Hegel 1995: 46).

Die illusorische Wirkung in der Politik mit geistigem Inhalt ist nie auf einer Phantasie begründet, die vollkommen von der Realität entfernt ist. Die größten und erfolgreichsten politischen Illusionen, die die Politik auch auf das Niveau von Illusionskunst anhoben, hatten die Schöpfer, von denen jeder davon ausging, daß "er vollständig weiß, worauf es im Leben ankommt, was als Substanz die Menschen zusammenhält, was sie bewegt und die Macht in ihnen ist" (*Ibid.* 143).

In der Politik kann sich die Politik als Schein oder als Täuschung äußern. Wenn es ein Versprechen und eine gewisse, ja sogar eine Halbverwirklichung einer schönen und gut geregelten Gesellschaft gibt, wenn jedoch kein besonderes Interessesziel des politischen Illusionisten besteht, dann ist die Illusion in ihrem eigentlichen Ausdruck Schein. Wenn es ein Bewußtsein und eine Wirkung des Illusionisten gibt, die von besonderen, ja sogar persönlichen Interessenszielen, Machtkarriere, Bereicherung, u.ä. geleitet werden, dann ist die politische Illusion eine Täuschung derjenigen, für welche die Illusion eigentlich bestimmt ist. Es gibt auch eine Situation, wann der Täuschende eine Täuschung nicht wegen Macht und Geld sondern der Täuschung selbst wegen ausführt, wegen seiner Befriedigung, letztendlich aber ist auch das

ein besonderes persönliches Interesse der Befriedigung eigener, enger Bedürfnisse und nicht der Bedürfnisse der politischen Gemeinschaft.

Die Illusion verlangt daher als eine der Realität angemessene Projektion oder Interpretation von Vergangenheit, Gegenwart oder Zukunft, die die Überzeugungskraft objektiver Angaben hat, ihre Ansiedlung in der Politik als Kunst, da die Aufgabe der Kunst darin liegt, etwas (das Dasein) "in seiner Erscheinung als wahr aufzufassen und darzustellen" (*Ibid.* 98), selbst wenn das nicht wahrheitsgetreu ist.

In ihrer Entscheidung für die Illusion nutzt die Politik das, was "der von allen Seiten her in Endlichkeit verstrickte Menschen sucht, ist die Region einer höheren, substantielleren Wahrheit" (*Ibid.* 40), und wenn ihm die Illusion als Wahrheit an sich selbst angeboten wird, ist er nicht in der Lage, sie vom relativ Wahren zu unterscheiden.

Am häufigsten geht die politische Illusion "aus dem Streben hervor, jenes Verhältnis der Unfreiheit aufzuheben und sich die Welt in der Vorstellung und im Denken zu eigen zu machen" (*Ibid.*). So wie es den Schein der Überflüssigkeit von Kunst gibt, so gibt es auch die Illusion der Notwendigkeit des Vorhandenseins von Politik in allem Gesellschaftlichen, eine Illusion, die die Politik selbst geschaffen hat.

Wenn die Illusion eine Täuschung ist, "beruht die Art der Einbildungskraft mehr auf Erinnerung erlebter Zustände, gemachter Erfahrungen, als daß sie selbst erzeugend wäre" (*Ibid.* 3). Für einen künstlerischen Schein ist "produktive Phantasie als die Phantasie eines großen Geistes und Gemüts" (*Ibid.*) jedoch unabdinglich, vereint mit der Auffassung "der tiefsten und allgemeinsten menschlichen Interessen" (*Ibid.*).

So unterscheiden sich Schein und Täuschung als zwei Pole der Illusion auch in der Qualität der Absicht und in der Fähigkeit zur Begründung. Wenn die Täuschung oft mehr Erfolg hat als der Schein, gibt ihr das nicht die Qualität eines größeren Wertes, sondern einer häufigeren Zufälligkeit und Erfolghaftigkeit der Täuschung. Denn Täuschung ist letztlich auch nichts anderes als beabsichtigter Betrug, zum Unterschied vom Schein, der eine absichtliche Verschönerung des Lebens und der Welt, eine Ästhetisierung von Vergangenheit, Gegenwart und Zukunft ist.

Die Frage der Wertlosigkeit von Schein und Täuschung ist gleichzeitig auch die Frage nach ihren möglichen Werten.

Hegel sagt: "Der Schein selbst ist dem Wesen wesentlich, die Wahrheit wäre nicht, wenn sie nicht schiene und erschiene, wenn sie nicht für eines wäre, für sich selbst sowohl als auch für den Geist überhaupt" (*Ibid.*). Deshalb behauptet er auch zunächst, daß der Schein nicht "als das Nichtseinsollende dürfte angesprochen werden" (*Ibid.* 98). Täuschung ist bereits etwas anderes, und über sie kann man als wertlose Illusion für jedermann außer für den Täuschenden selbst sprechen. Leider ist sie in der Politik, die durch sie "ihre Konzeptionen zum Dasein erschafft" (*Ibid.* 97), die häufigere Form der Illusion als der Schein.

Wir sind "im Leben unserer Erscheinung selber den Wert und Namen von Wirklichkeit, Realität und Wahrheit im Gegensatz der Kunst zu geben gewohnt, der solche Realität und Wahrheit fehle" (*Ibid.* 70). Aber gerade Politik als die "Sphäre der empirischen inneren und äußeren Welt ist nicht die Welt wahrhafter Wirklichkeit, sondern vielmehr in strengerem Sinne als die Kunst ein bloßer Schein und eine härtere Täuschung zu nennen" (*Ibid.* 95).

Der Wert des Scheins liegt auch darin, daß er auch eine Täuschung beseitigen kann und Erscheinungen eine gewisse gehobene, im Geiste entstandene Farbe der Wirklichkeit gibt und dadurch wird er auch selbst mehr Wirklichkeit. Dabei, versteht sich, kann dieser Grund dennoch nicht als ausreichend für die Gleichsetzung der Erscheinung von Politik und Kunst genommen werden, denn der letzteren "weit entfernt also, bloßer Schein zu sein, ist dergewöhnlichen Wirklichkeit gegenüber die höhere Realität und das wahrhaftigere Dasein zuzuschreiben" (*Ibid.* 90).

Es gibt verschiedene Arten von Schein: "In Vergleich mit dem Schein der sinnlichen unmittelbaren Existenz und dem der Geschichtsschreibung hat der Schein der Kunst den Vorzug, daß er selbst durch sich hindurch deutet und auf ein Geistiges, welches durch ihn soll zur Vorstellung kommen, auf sich hinweist; dahingegen die unmittelbare Erscheinung sich selbst nicht als täuschend gibt, sondern viel mehr als die wirkliche und wahre, während doch das Wahrhafte durch das unmittelbar Sinnliche verunreinigt und versteckt wird" (*Ibid.* 67). Auch der Schein in der Politik weist auf etwas Geistiges und Ideelles hin, was mit seiner Hilfe bis zu einer Vorstellung oder bis zur Realität gelangen soll. Die Möglichkeit der Illusion beruht darauf, "daß alle Wirklichkeit beim Menschen das Medium der Anschauung und Vorstellung hindurchgehen muß und durch dies Medium erst in Gemüt und Willen

eindringt. Hierbei nun ist es gleichgültig, ob dies durch einen anderen Weg geschieht, nämlich durch Bilder, Zeichen und Vorstellungen, welche den Inhalt der Wirklichkeit in sich haben und darstellen" (*Ibid.* 49).

Schein und Täuschung sind deshalb möglich, weil der Mensch "kann sich Dinge, welche nicht wirklich sind, vorstellen, als wenn sie wirklich wären. Ob es daher die äußere Wirklichkeit oder nur der Schein derselben ist, durch welche eine Lage, ein Verhältnis, irgendein Lebensinhalt überhaupt an uns gebracht wird: es bleibt für unser Gemüt dasselbe" (*Ibid.* 83).

Jeder Schein kann als Geistesprodukt "das Wunder der Idealität" (*Ibid.* 64) gegenüber der prosaischen Realität darstellen. Politik erhöht ebenso wie Kunst durch Schein als Idealität "die sonst wertlosen Objekte, welche sie ihres unbedeutenden Inhalts ungeachtet für sich fixiert und zum Zweck macht und auf das unsere Teilnahme richtet, woran wir sonst rücksichtslos vorübergehen würden" (*Ibid.*).

So wie Kunst z.B. in einem Bild die Illusion der Dauerhaftigkeit "eines Lächelns", einer augenblicklichen teuflischen Bewegung um den Mund", schafft, so schafft auch die Politik die Illusion der Dauerhaftigkeit: "geistige Züge im Leben der Menschen", Vorfälle, Begebenheiten, welche kommen und gehen" (*Ibid.* 73), falls sie durch politische Bedeutungen bestimmt sind. Wie "ums Scheinen gerade - und nicht um das natürliche wirkliche Sein - ist es in der Kunst zu tun" (*Ibid.* 254), ist gerade auch der Politik mehr an Illusion als an Realität gelegen, jedoch aus einem ganz anderen Grund, da die Illusion ganz in ihren Händen liegt, während die Realität das nicht tut.

Die Angst vor der Realität fordert die Illusion mehr heraus als der Durst nach ihr.

Wie die Subjektivität ist Politik am Ende hauptsächlich das, was nur für sie selbst Bedeutung hat und was nur sich selbst erklärt, statt daß es für alle Bedeutung hat, als Fertigkeit und Wissenschaft des Ausbaus und der Instandhaltung der Gemeinschaft von Allgemeingut.

Eine subjektive Erklärung seiner selbst als bestem ist immer eine Illusion. Dabei baut sich die Politik als Illusion auf, die nicht nur angenommen werden muß, sondern zuvor auch als Realität und beste Möglichkeit der Realität erklärt werden muß.

Ihre Bau- und Vorstellungsart sind der der Kunst ähnlich, jedoch entblößt das Attribut des Müssens die Politik und vereinfacht sie auf

das Niveau von Manipulation als objektiv ungewünscht, also als etwas der Kunst nicht eigenes, das aber gewöhnlicher Fertigkeit eigen ist.

Erst Originalität, Humanität und Realisierbarkeit politischer Ideen und Aufrichtigkeit und Vollständigkeit politischer Wirkung bei ihrer Realisierung zu Gunsten aller ermöglicht eine Verbindung von Subjektivität und Objektivität in der Politik. Die Illusion ist wohl eine geistige Subjektivität, die an und für sich als unendlich und für sich bestehend verstanden werden kann, die nicht voraussetzt, daß die endgültige Wirklichkeit als etwas wahrhaftiges besteht, aber wenn es ein wohlwollender Schein ist, verhält sie sich ihr gegenüber nicht nur negativ, sondern geht auf eine Versöhnung mit der Wirklichkeit zu. Im Gegenteil handelt es sich um Täuschung.

Die Illusion liegt auch in der Eigenschaft der Menschen begründet, daß sie an erster Stelle das verlangen, was äußerlich ist und erst dann die Bedeutung und den Inhalt des Betroffenen. Die Illusion erreicht leicht die äußere Bestimmtheit des Ideals, jedoch das Vordringen ins Innere der Bestimmtheit des Ideals ist, außer daß es vielen durch Mangel an Sinn und Wissen über Schönes und Wahres erschwert ist, auch oft durch sich selbst und durch seine manipulative Konstruktion der politischen Illusion erschwert. Dazu gehört die Verpflichtung zum Glauben, oft in Form eines institutionellen Zwangs, wenn es sich um politische Illusionisten handelt, die Staatsmacht besitzen, was bedeutet, daß eine Deckung der abstrakten Äußerlichkeit der politischen Ideale mit der konkreten Realität besteht und dann, wenn die Sinneserkenntnisse diesem widersprechen. Ein Bewußtsein der Sinnlosigkeit des Widerstandes gegen die Herrschenden entsteht und entwickelt sich intentional. Die Illusion über Macht als Allmacht versucht sich durch Verordnungen, Macht und Perzeption zu stärken. Wie schon Thomas Hobbes im III. Kapitel von "Leviathan" bemerkte, hängt von der Perzeption der Macht auch ihre wirkliche Größe im Sinne ihres Gebrauchswertes ab.

Wenn jemand aus der Position eines Machtobjektes die Macht von jemanden erlebt, die größer ist als sie wirklich ist, verhält er sich dann gegenüber diesem Machtträger so, als sei auch seine Macht so groß und so, wie er sie sieht, und nicht gemäß ihren wirklichen und ihm unbekannten Ausmassen. Eine massenhafte Überzeugung wie auch die Überzeugung Einzelner in eine enorme Macht, im äußersten Allmacht in der Politik, führt regelmäßig zu einem Unterwürfigkeitsverhalten gegenüber dem Subjekt dieser Macht.

Nicht geringe Probleme mit der Illusion von politischer und ewiger Allmacht liegen darin, daß man Menschen relativ leicht von etwas überzeugen kann, es ist jedoch sehr schwer, wie das auch Nikolo Macchiavelli bemerkt hat, sie in dieser Überzeugung zu behalten.

Dann kommt der Illusion gewöhnlich die Gewalt zu Hilfe, was zu einer Verlängerung der Dauer der Herrschaft, nicht aber der Illusion führt. Sie beginnt dann in der Gewaltsublimierung zu ersticken. Je mehr Gewalt, um so weniger Illusion und wirklicher Glauben an sie. Die Illusion ersetzt dann immer mehr eine Illusion als Täuschung, und da sie durch Gewalt ausgeführt wird, führt sie zu Selbsttäuschung, sowohl der Masse, die nicht mehr glaubt, sondern aus Angst vorgibt, daran zu glauben, wie auch des Herrschers selbst und an das allgemein herrschende politische Feldes, die sich mit einem formalen und nicht wesentlichem Annehmen der Illusion, die sie von sich und für sich gemacht haben, zufriedengeben. Das ist der Zeitpunkt, wann eine Illusion, die an die Masse geschickt wurde, als Bumerang an ihre Schöpfer zurückkommt. Die Kontraillusion des Glaubens an eine Illusion über Verherrlichung der Macht, welche die Untergebenen aus Not als Antwort auf die durch Gewalt gestärkte Illusion der politisch Mächtigen über deren absolute und unvergängliche Macht mit dem Ziel eines Allgemeinwohles schaffen, ist keine weniger politische Illusion und sie ist..., wenn auch als reaktives politisches Phänomen aus Angst, dennoch auf dem alten Prinzip wie auch die Initialillusion, die aus Wünschen geschaffen wurde.

Der Unterschied in der Qualität von wahren Glauben an eine Illusion und Vorspiegelung zwecks Schaffung einer gewünschten Vorstellung über die eigene tiefe Überzeugung sind am vollständigsten in der Bereitschaft zu Widerstand und Aufstand abzulesen. Diejenigen, die fast abgöttisch an die Illusion glauben, werden sich nie gegen den Bauer und Nutzer dieser Illusion erheben, zumindest nicht so lange, solange sie noch eine Harmonie zwischen der Illusion und seines und ihres Verhaltens finden. Diejenigen jedoch, die nicht glauben, egal ob sie je geglaubt haben oder ob sie zu glauben aufgehört haben, erheben sich dagegen, sobald sie sich trauen und können.

Das Nichtvorhandensein einer Illusion der Allmacht des Führers, Staatsmannes und des Staates resultiert und manifestiert sich zunächst in dessen Nichtrespektierung. Eine Nichtrespektierung der Macht ist immer deren Tod, eine Nichtrespektierung eines Politikers ist immer dessen Ende.

Ein Politiker, den niemand achtet und der keine Anhänger hat, kann als Trost seine eigene letzte Illusion als Selbsttäuschung über die Schuld aller anderen versus seiner Rechtmäßigkeit schaffen. Ein Staat und Staatsmänner, die ihre Untergebenen nicht respektieren, und die sich nicht einmal vor ihnen fürchten, schaffen oft als ihre letzte Illusion die theoretisch-politische Feststellung über die Änderung des Volkes. - "Volk gesucht!" könnte der Slogan all jener sein, denen es nicht gelungen ist, ihre Illusion in das Bewußtsein der Massen zu übertragen, oder aber derjenigen, die enttäuscht sind, weil sich die Illusion nicht im Resultat als Untertanenbewußtsein niedergeschlagen hat.

So verwandelt sich das Bewußtsein über den Bedarf, ja sogar über die Notwendigkeit der Annahme einer politischen Illusion, die jede Möglichkeit eines Widersetzens ausschließt, mit der Zeit in ihr Gegenteil, in das Bewußtsein über die Notwendigkeit von Widerstand gegen die verbrauchte Illusion und in deren endgültige Ablehnung. Chronos frißt seine Kinder auch in der Form der Illusion.

Da das stärkste Mittel des Widerstandes nicht Gewalt und Macht, womit nur die höheren Piedestalnutzer, weniger jedoch die Konstrukteure der verbrauchten Illusionen beseitigt werden, sondern eine neue, der alten entgegengesetzte Illusion ist, wird der Kreislauf der Illusion fortgesetzt, und die Politik bestätigt als unumgänglich und unersetzlich die Kunst des Schaffens einer Illusion und die dauerhafte Quelle für Illusionismus.

Sie ändert wie auch jede andere Kunst, jedoch mehr, ihre Stile und Akteure (Schaffende und Konsumenten) und auch schneller und öfter als alle wirklichen Künste. Die Suche nach einer allgemeinen und ewigen Illusion wird fortgesetzt. Aber keine einzige, was immer auch die neueste politische Illusion bedeutet, hat den Umfang als totale gesellschaftliche Gültigkeit und kann das auch nicht haben. Es besteht immer "das Individuum, das hält sich in seiner Endlichkeit gegen Gott fest" (*Ibid.* 44), und da sich die höchste Macht mit der göttlichen identifiziert, wird jeder Widerstand gegen diese Illusion als "gewollte und beabsichtigte Endlichkeit, das Böse" (*Ibid.* 93) bei Nichtannahme der Illusion erklärt. Dieses Übel hat ebenso wie das Gute die Eigenschaft der Ausbreitung unter dem Einfluß aus einem individuellen Epizentrum in Form konzentrischer Kreise. Der Stein des kritischen Zweifels des Individuums, das kräftig und lautstark genug auf die glänzende Fläche der politischen Illusion schlägt, schafft soziale Kreise des Zweifels, die

bei der Feststellung des Rechts auf Zweifel ihre eigenen immer weiteren Kreise der Nichtannahme der Illusion schaffen.

Obwohl ein Zweifel des breitesten Kreises in vielem nicht dem Zweifel des Zentrums gleichkommt, sind beide gleichartige Sünden der Nichtannahme der dominanten Illusion.

Außer rechtlichen und eventuellen Brachialgewalt-Sanktionen zur Ablehnung einer Illusion bemüht sich die Politik vom "ästhetischen Aspekt" aus immer, auch das Urteil auszusprechen, daß solche "Auswüchse" etwas wie "Das Schlechte, Sündliche, Böse der sich in sich verhausenden Subjektivität ist" (*Ibid*), mit anderen Worten, daß sie keine allgemeine gesellschaftliche Gültigkeit haben können, die jede Politik anstrebt, wobei sie sich bemüht, diese zu minorisieren und ablehnend oder zumindest weniger anziehend für mögliche Anhänger zu machen.

Das nächste Problem der Politik als Kunst der Illusion ist die Stufe der Ideelichkeit. Je ideenloser die Illusion ist, um so mehr ist sie Täuschung.

Nur die Ideelichkeit ermöglicht Schein als Form der Existenz einer Illusion. Hier sieht man, wie wichtig die Verquickung von Illusion und Wirklichkeit ist, von Gelogenem und Wahrem, wovon zu Beginn dieses Textes gesprochen wurde. Da "die Idee nicht ohne ihre Wirklichkeit und außerhalb derselben wahrhaft Idee ist" (*Ibid*), ist die Verquickung von Illusion und Wirklichkeit entweder so, daß sie ermöglicht, daß "die Idee muß deshalb zur Wirklichkeit fortgehen" (*Ibid*), oder aber so, daß die Idee von der reellen Subjektivität nicht genügend Bestätigung erfährt und die Eigenschaft als Idee infolge Nichtentsprechens dem Begriff des idealen Wesens verliert. Wenn jedoch die Idee in ihrem Vormarsch zur Wirklichkeit zu weit geht, verliert die Illusion ihre Existenzgrundlage. In dem Maße, in dem die politische Grundidee, von der sie durchdrungen ist, Realität wird, hört die Illusion auf zu bestehen. Dies, versteht sich, kann manchmal gut für die Gesellschaft sein, aber meistens ist sie das nie auch für Politiker, denen Illusionen über vieles wichtiger sind als die Umwandlung von Versprechungen in Wirklichkeit.

Das Verschwinden einer Illusion kann also gleichzeitig auch die Forderung nach einer neuen bedeuten, und während eine Illusion mehrere politische Generationen übertragen können, tragen jede neue Illusion gewöhnlich neue Leute. Daher auch so viele Nichterfüllungen von Idealen in der politischen Zivilisationsgeschichte, nicht als Aus-

druck der Unfähigkeit von Politikern, sondern als deren Angst vor ihrer Verbrauchtheit infolge Mangel an Illusionen, in denen ihnen die Hauptrolle zugebracht ist.

Man muß dennoch die Situation unterscheiden, wenn ein Politiker eine Illusion schafft und pflegt, mit der er an die Realität gelangen möchte, von der Situation, in der die Illusion zu einem geschlossenen Selbstzweck wird, ohne Möglichkeit, ihre Berührungspunkte mit der Realität in Brücken zu dieser umzuwandeln.

Diese geschlossenen oder offenen Brücken sind öfter Ausdruck des Charakters des Schöpfers, Trägers oder Vorkämpfers der Illusion als günstigere oder ungünstigere gesellschaftliche Umstände, auf die alles so leicht und gern abgewälzt wird, wenn der Zusammenbruch einer Illusion, auf die wir gesetzt haben, üble gesellschaftliche Folgen bewirkt.

Wie für Hegel ein schlechter Charakter überhaupt kein Charakter ist, auch wenn es sich um einen Politiker handelt, "zu einem echten Charakter gehört, daß er etwas Wirkliches zu wollen und anzufassen Mut und Kraft in sich trage. Das Interesse für dergleichen Subjektivitäten, die immer nur in sich selber bleiben, ist ein leeres Interesse" (*Ibid.* 274).

Der oft dem Volk versprochene Wohlstand, Freiheit, Frieden, Gerechtigkeit und jedes anderes Glück sind nicht selten oder eher wegen Mangel an Charakter derjenigen ausgeblieben, die im Namen von vielversprechenden Projekten herrschten, und nicht wegen mangelnder Verbindbarkeit der Illusion (mit der sie ihre Herrschaft legitimiert oder gerechtfertigt haben) mit der Wirklichkeit.

Der Schlüssel für die Lösung der Widersprüchlichkeit von Illusion und Wirklichkeit liegt auch nicht in der Feststellung ihrer Gegensätzlichkeit und auch nicht in der Entscheidung für eine von beiden, sondern in ihrer Aussöhnung.

Diese Aussöhnung wird dadurch erschwert, weil so wie die Entdeckung der Wahrheit der Höhepunkt der Kunst ist, auch das Verstecken der Wahrheit durch eine Illusion das Ziel der Politik ist. Obwohl die Wahrheit im Prinzip eine Übereinstimmung zwischen Begriff und Realität verlangt, muß man die Wahrheit der Kunst sehr von der Wahrhaftigkeit allgemein und insbesondere von einer möglichen Wahrhaftigkeit der Politik unterscheiden.

Darüber, was wesentlich und wahr ist in der Politik, wird von Interessenspositionen an der Machtpitze im ewigen Schatten von Mul-

tigeheimhaltung entschieden, in der gewisse "dunkle Mächte" vorherrschen. Das Problem ist dann auch, daß die "dunklen Mächte", mit denen die Politik voll ist, und in denen "eine unentzifferbare Wahrheit des Schauerlichen liegen, das sich nicht greifen und fassen lasse" (*Ibid.* 178), nicht in das Reich der Kunst fallen. Die Politik ist, so wie sie nun einmal ist, nicht in der Lage, ohne beängstigender Geheimhaltung, ohne ihrer dunklen Instrumente, die nicht so sehr zu einer Verbreitung der Illusion wie zu der Kontrolle ihrer Ausbreitung dienen, zu funktionieren. Aus dem Bereich der Politik "die dunklen Mächte zu verbannten" (*Ibid.* 176) würde bedeuten, sie mehr zu einer wirklichen Kunst und weniger zu einer "Kunst der Illusion" zu machen. Die Politik ist jedoch so sehr von ihren "dunklen Mächten" abhängig, daß sie nicht nur ohne diesen überhaupt nicht kann, sondern diese kommandieren oftmals aus dem Schatten über die ganze politische Gemeinschaft, was bedeutet, auch über diejenigen, die formell die höchste Macht haben. Da in einem illusorischen Vergleich mit Gott angenommen wird, daß Gott der Wissende ist und die Herrscher sich bemühen, den Staat und ihre öffentlichen und geheimen Dienste für die Beschaffung von Informationen über alles verwenden. Der Unterschied besteht darin, daß die Herrschenden dennoch die meisten Informationen darüber beschaffen, was ihre Macht und überhaupt die höhere gesellschaftliche Position bedroht, wodurch sie alle ihre Anstrengungen um nachzuweisen, daß ihre Macht ewig, "göttlich" ist, negieren.

Wenn bereits die Rede von der Illusion der Gottwerdung in der Kunst ist, z.B. in der bildenden Kunst, so werden Götter nicht in menschlicher Gestalt als einfacher Gestalt dargestellt, da sich das Menschliche im inneren Inhalt und in der Bedeutung befindet, und in der Politik wird die Gottwerdung politisch Mächtiger durch die Illusion geschaffen, wo gerade die "Einbildungskraft nur äußerlich diesem Inhalt umgetan wird" (*Ibid.* 232). Die Verleihung göttlicher Merkmale an Politiker ist nicht nur in alten sondern in allen Zeiten vorhanden. Wenn es sich z. B. um die Unsterblichkeit von Herrschern in der SFRJ handelt, so haben viele geglaubt, daß der große Illusionist und Diktator Tito nicht sterben kann.

Während sie in der Kunst Ausdruck des Göttlichen ist, ist die Symbolik in der Politik Gottwerdung als offene Gier nach unendlicher Macht.

Die Gottwerdung ist auch in unklaren, doppeldeutigen Versprechungen sichtbar, die wie göttliche Prophezeiungen die Illusion der

Unfehlbarkeit von Politikern und die Unfähigkeit der apolitischen Welt unterstützen soll, ihre Gedanken zu interpretieren. Die Doppeldeutigkeit politischer Botschaften als Imitation von Prophezeiungen ermöglicht, daß diejenigen, die sie ausgesprochen haben, nie an Fehlinterpretationen schuld sind. Ihnen, ebenso wie den Göttern, bleibt immer die zweite Version der "Prophezeiung" als die richtige.

Auch die Illusion über die eigene, sich selbst gegebene als absolute Freiheit, wenn diese anderen in derselben politischen Gemeinschaft verweigert wird, ist eng mit der Illusion über eine übermenschliche oder sogar göttliche Mission von Politikern verbunden.

Die absolute Freiheit für einen oder einige wird mit Hilfe des Staates als Errungenschaft des Geistes vorgestellt, der alle folgen sollen, wenn ihnen das auch nicht ermöglicht wird.

Hegel sagt: "Im wahrhaft vernünftig gegliederten Staat sind alle Gesetze und Einrichtungen nichts als eine Realisation der Freiheit nach deren wesentlichen Bestimmungen" (*Ibid.* 132), die Bestimmungen sind jedoch oft so, daß durch sie eine Illusion von Freiheit als Ausdruck von Selbstwillen oder Täuschung hergestellt wird, und "Willkür heißt man zwar oft gleichfalls" (*Ibid.* 29), und Täuschung ist es bereits deshalb, da "Willkür nur die unvernünftige Freiheit, das Wählen und Selbstbestimmen nicht aus der Vernunft des Willens, sondern aus zufälligen Trieben und deren Abhängigkeit von Sinnlichem und Äußerem" (*Ibid.* 33) ist.

Sowie "insofern der Leib seine Idealität und Beseelung nicht vollständig vollbringt, wie bei der Krankheit, z.B., dann herrscht der Begriff nicht als alleinige Macht" (*Ibid.* 43), so wird auch der Staat, wenn er seine Idealität infolge innerer und äußerer Probleme nicht erfüllt, zu einem Begriff, mit dem andere Mächte die Herrschaft teilen. Hier zeigt sich die Macht der Illusion, die durch ihre Kraft nicht zuläßt, daß die Förmlichkeit zwischen Begriff und Realität vollkommen sondern "nur relativ" aufgehoben wird.

Eine gewisse Überlappung zwischen Begriff und Wirklichkeit ist ein wesentliches Merkmal der politischen Illusion. Wenn es das nicht gibt, zerfällt die politische Gemeinschaft. Ein frischeres Beispiel dafür ist der Zerfall der früheren sozialistischen Länder und insbesondere der SFRJ, in der das Verschwinden der Überlappung zwischen dem Begriff einer mehrnationalen harmonischen sozialistischen Gemeinschaft und der Realität ethnischer Reibungen deren Zusammenbruch verursachte. Es ist ganz einfach zu einer richtigen Organisation gekommen und ihre

“erste Identität” und das Leben der politischen Form der Gemeinschaft hat sich umgeformt “in den Tod, der das selbständig auseinanderfallen läßt, was die Beseelung in ungetrennter Einheit zusammenhält” (*Ibid.* 381).

Wenn in einem Staat ein Gott nur für ein Volk zuständig ist, ordnet er immer an, daß alle anderen als falsche Idole angesehen werden, im Himmel und auf Erden, und nicht nur bei seinem sondern bei allen Völkern, da “dieser harte Nationalgott so gierig ist und in seiner Eifersucht befiehlt” (*Ibid.* 430), daß in seiner nationalen Enge die Illusion der Einheitlichkeit zu schaffen.

Die Illusion von der Verhinderung der Verwirklichung von Interessen einer politischen Gemeinschaft als Ursache für wirkliche Konflikte verursacht das Gefühl von Beleidigung und Befriedigung als abstrakte Befreiung (die auf alle Fälle die Grundlage des Geistes ist) von wirklichen Problemen, die durch abstrakte Bedrohung geschaffen wurden.

Durch Illusion wird der Willen zur Ermordung anderer, “Schuldiger” angespornt und es wird die Scham wegen der getanen Greueltaten im Namen der Politik genommen, indem die Greuel zu Heldentaten ernannt werden, aber durch Illusion kann man auch Scham verhindern, denn sie ist “ganz allgemein genommen, ein Beginn des Zorns über etwas, was nicht sein soll” (*Ibid.* 433), und damit vielleicht auch gegen die Folgen der Illusion oder sogar der politischen Macht selbst.

Da Gewalt und Krieg untrennbarer Teil der Politik sind, findet sie im Wunsch, deren ästhetische Verurteilung als häßliche Worte zu vermeiden, deren Häßlichkeit aus der Folge der Taten abgeleitet wird, ihre Rechtfertigung in der Illusion ihrer außerordentlichen Nützlichkeit. Zu diesem Zweck nutzt die Politik reichlich die Wissenschaft. Das Verhältnis von Wissenschaft und Politik zu Gunsten der letzteren führt zu wissenschaftlichen Rechtfertigungen von Krieg und Gewalt als Ergänzung der politischen Illusion. Im übrigen, wenn es vielen großen Denkern und selbst Hegel nicht gelungen ist, ein Urteil über die Nützlichkeit eines Eroberungskrieges zu vermeiden, wenn er ihn z.B. als entscheidenden Faktor der Homogenisierung eines Volkes, bzw. einer politischen Gemeinschaft ansieht, indem er die Griechen als Beispiel anführt, die erst “im trojanischen Krieg als ein Volk kämpften und siegten” (*Ibid.* 413).

Es bedarf keiner kleinen Illusion, sich einen Eroberungskrieg als national nützlich vorzustellen, und noch mehr, ihn moralisch darzustellen, was gemacht wurde und auch heute machen andere tun.

Durch reelle Verfeindung bis zu einer Illusion über Harmonie und Nicht-Verfeindung, durch wirkliche Gewalt bis zu einem illusorischen Frieden, durch reelle Vorherrschaft bis zu der Illusion der Notwendigkeitin der Zeit der Gleichberechtigung, durch Ignorieren der Vermehrung der Bevölkerung und anderem bis zu größeren Störungen bei der Verwirklichung von Idealen nicht nur der unmittelbaren sondern jeder Demokratie bestätigt die Politik, daß der Bereich der empirischen Welt nicht die Welt der wahren Wirklichkeit, sondern Frucht unserer Gewohnheiten, Dinge und Vorstellungen mit falschen Namen zu nennen, ist. Die Illusion der Politik ist immer eine Illusion nicht nur von anderen, sondern vor allem über sich selbst. So hat z.B. die OUN heute in der Welt kein einziges Regime, das sich nicht als demokratisch deklariert und betrachtet, und das - versteht sich - von seinen Untertanen Überzeugtheit davon erwartet.

Die Illusion über die Möglichkeiten der Herstellung und Teilung allgemeiner Gerechtigkeit aus einem Zentrum politischer Macht wird in der Eigenheit der Kollektivschuld dargestellt. Dabei ist das Besondere nicht in der Schuld, sondern in der Bestimmtheit der Schuld. Wenn diese Illusion nicht auch unsere Zeit durchziehen würde, würden nicht nur Deutsche vor dem Nürnberger Gericht stehen, da auch andere Völker faschistische Staaten und Vorgehen hatten, und beim Haager Tribunal wären nicht die Serben als die bei weitem am häufigsten Angeklagten, obwohl alle drei Seiten im Bürgerkrieg in Bosnien gleichartige Verbrechen begangen haben. Dies ist gleichzeitig auch ein Beispiel, wie sich die Illusion mancher Völker über die eigene Eigenheit und Auserwähltheit durch die Illusion anderer über deren besondere Schuld zu ihrer reellen Verantwortung für das Getane verwandelt.

In diesem Sinne ist auch jede politische Verurteilung militärisch Unterlegener nichts anderes als eine vorägyptische Verurteilung der Toten. Ist der Unterschied nur in der ästhetischen Inversion, wenn es sich um die Verurteilung Unterlegener wie politisch Toter und Toter als nicht vollkommen politisch Unterlegener handelt, oder handelt es sich um die Macht der Illusion, daß ein Nichtunterliegen stärker als der Tod ist?

Die Illusion vom göttlichen Status politisch Mächtiger ist auch im Ritual der Ehrerweisung bei Toten zu sehen, nicht so sehr bei der Beerdigung als bei der Instandhaltung der Leiche durch physiologische und memorielle Balsamierung.

Die Verurteilung verstorbener Mächtiger ist auch heute, oft in Form von Medien- oder ideologisch-politischem Lynch, der aus der altägyptischen Zeit stammt, als jeder nach dem Tod eines Herrschers öffentlich seine Klagen gegen ihn einbringen konnte, ein Schlag ins Leere, ein Ausdruck der Machtlosigkeit der Realität vor der Illusion. Tote Mächtige sind unberührbar, nicht weil sie tot sind, sondern weil sie nicht unterlegen diese Welt verlassen haben. Eine Verurteilung solcher Toten ist auch eine gewisse Annäherung der Realität an die Illusion, aber auch ein sichtliches Zeichen der Dauer einer Illusion über das Eintreten des außerirdischen Bestehens von jemanden, also über das Bestehen einer übernatürlichen Eigenschaft.

Eine Verurteilung von jemandem, der uns in der Realität nichts mehr kann, bedeutet, daß wir uns so verhalten, als ob er es wirklich könnte, wir gestehen, daß er am Leben ist auch nach dem Tod wie eine Gottheit, uns das ist nicht Ausdruck unserer sondern seiner Übermacht, die perfekt in unser Bewußtsein eingebaut ist, so daß die Illusion dauert, nicht solange er ist, sondern so lange wir am Leben sind.

Die Illusion ist ein Teil des Glaubens an Wunder, gestern der Glaube an die Unsterblichkeit der Stalin-Politiker und deren Politik, heute der Glaube an eine schnelle und effektive "über Nacht" Verwirklichung der Wirtschaftsumwandlung und Demokratisierung rückständiger und armer Staaten des Ostens, als Glaube, an den selbst seine Schöpfer im Westen nicht aufrichtig glauben, der aber als Unumgänglichkeit für die Annahme der global dominantesten Illusion erscheint. Am dominantesten ist immer die, die die stärkste politische Unterstützung hat, und das muß nicht immer die Unterstützung des Staates sein, aber es muß immer eine organisierte politische Unterstützung sein.

Die Beibehaltung einer Illusion hängt von der Stärke ihrer Anziehungskraft ab. Daher stellt die Anziehungskraft politischer Ideen und politischer Vorgehen eines der wichtigsten konstruktiven Elemente der Illusion dar, da alle nicht nur den anderen sondern auch sich selbst eine freiere, fortschrittlichere, reichere, sicherere und in allem bessere Gesellschaft wünschen und nicht umhin können, nicht jene zu unterstützen oder sie zumindest nicht zu behindern, die am überzeugendsten den Weg zu all dem aufzeigen.

Die Schönheit des Scheins hilft, leichter zu leben. Eine Illusion, die keine Täuschung ist, ist möglichst tief verankert auch in der Tugend von Gutem und Schöнем, wobei jedoch Hegels Anmerkung nicht zu vergessen ist, daß ihr.... keine Tugend ist. Während die Nöte des Leb-

ens in der idealen Kunst beseitigt werden müssen, schafft die Politik bei der Schaffung des Scheins ihrer Idealität, auch Schein oder Täuschung ihrer jetzigen oder künftigen Abschaffung aus der Gesellschaft, obwohl sie weiß, das dies nicht wahrheitsgemäß ist, doch eben das ist die Voraussetzung für ihre Dauer.

Eine politische Illusion äußert offensichtlich ihre Vorherrschaft über die Objektivität, in welcher der Sinn der Politik verwirklicht wird.

Demnach nähert sich die Politik, was für eine Wahrhaftigkeit der Politik einfach nicht eine einfache Genauigkeit darstellen darf, damit diese nicht die Vollkommenheit der Illusion zerstört, der wirklichen Kunst. Außerdem, da "das Geistige manifestiert sich, indem es selber seine Außenform bestimmt" (*Ibid.* 412), äußert sich die Politik als Teil der geistigen Gesamtheit, indem sie ihre äußere Form als Illusion bestimmt, unwillig wie auch willig, als Kunst der Illusion.

Im übrigen ist dem Entstehen nach, insbesondere nach der Art der Konstituierung ihrer selbst als Selbstillusion, die Politik Kunst, ihrer Zweckmäßigkeit nach jedoch ist sie das nicht. Die Politik ist deshalb immer an der Kreuzung von Natur und Kunst. Als dauerhafter, geistiger und ideeller sind politische Ideen der Kunst näher, während die politische Wirkung als natürliche schnell vergeht und im Detail schnell vergessen wird, wenn auch nicht in der Allgemeinheit.

Während bei der wirklichen Kunst ihr Glanz niemals irgendeinen einfachen Schein und Abglanz darstellt, und während ihr Geist eine Täuschung ausschließt, kann die Politik nie bis zum Ende als wirkliche Kunst aufgefaßt werden, sondern nur als Kunst der Illusion, denn zum Unterschied von der wirklichen Kunst ist sie voll mit falschem Glanz und Schein und Täuschungen.

Sie ist der Kunst in dem Maße verwandt, in dem sie eine relative und artifizielle Mitte zwischen Natur und Geist, Sinnlichkeit und Denken, äußerer und innerer Vorstellung ist. Man kann sagen, daß die Politik das höchste Niveau der Kunst der Illusion erreicht, wenn sie ganz der Form nach und keineswegs dem Inhalt nach die höchste und absolute Art darstellt, dem Geist seine wirklichen Interessen bewußt zumachen. Auf jedem Fall ist das allzu häufige Fehlen der Einheit von Bedeutung (Inhalt) und Form in der Politik ihr dauerhaftes Merkmal.

Auch ein Politiker, besonders ein Schöpfer einer Illusion, braucht wie auch ein (*Ibid.* 222) Künstler, einen Freiraum des Geistes, der nicht

auf die Wahl von Form eingeschränkt sein kann, sondern er muß auch "wahrhaften Ernst" als "wahres seines eigenen Bewußtseins" (*Ibid*) nehmen, da der Definition nach beide nicht für sich sondern für andere wirken, für alle oder für eine ausreichende Zahl anderer, die die Behauptung zuläßt, daß sie für das Allgemeinwohl tätig sind.

Zum Unterschied von dem Künstler, dem "Philosophie nicht notwendig ist" (*Ibid*), sollte sie dem Schöpfer von Politik immer eine unabdingliche Stütze sein, wenn er etwas ideelles ausdenkt und dieses Erdachte in die Wirklichkeit umsetzt. Trunkenheit mit verschiedenen Arten der Macht als Ankündigungen oder später Effekten der politischen Illusion führt ihn meistens dazu, wenn auch offensichtlich aus einem ganz anderen Grund als dem künstlerischen, die Philosophie aufzugeben.

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Book review

Serbian Political Thought
No. 2/2013,
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pp. 137-140

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National Interest

Petar Matić

Nacionalni interes, Institut za političke studije, Beograd, 1/2012

Scientific journal “National Interest”, published three times a year by the Institute for Political Studies, was launched in 2004 in Belgrade. One of the main symbolical reasons for starting the journal was to

mark the bicentennial of Serbian revolution –start of First Serbian Uprising in 1804 and consecutive liberation after the centuries-long Ottoman rule, followed by restoration of statehood and creation of modern Serbia. This symbolism is thematically embodied in the topics covered by the journal, which is mostly oriented on dealing with national and state issues, that is, with issues of so-called “high politics”.

First edition for the year 2012 is, like most of the other issues of “National Interest”, dedicated to the exploration of one specific theme. For the mentioned edition, the selected topic is “Political theory and Identity”. The theme is not often analyzed and dealt with in Serbian scientific circles, making this issue of the journal more significant.



Opening article, titled "The Crisis of the National State in the Age of Globalization", is authored by Anastasia Vladimirovna Mitrofanova, Head of the Centre for Euroatlantic Research on the Diplomatic Academy of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Russian Federation and professor at the Russian State University for Humanities (RGGU). The author explores connections between political disintegration and economic integration, with special reference to the period following the end of the Cold war. Article starts with intriguing discussion on the genesis of globalization process, and continues with an overview of mechanisms of disintegration models visible in certain national states. Mitrofanova specifies two different models of disintegration: the first being contained in economic integration, which leads to the impoverishment of unprepared nations. Subsequently, the situation of economic despair creates a fertile ground for resurfacing of ethnic and religious differences and conflicts. The second model consists of pure political integration of smaller (poorer) states in supranational or transnational formations, where the decision making process is simply transferred to higher, non-national instances, in that way weakening the national state by cancelling its sovereignty.

Author examines both models on the examples of historical and current processes visible in eastern parts of the European continent: especially on the examples of creation and dissolution of multinational federations like Socialist Yugoslavia and the Soviet Union. In the engaged attempt to preclude the "apocalyptic" consequences of seemingly unstoppable globalization process, Mitrofanova presents several alternative solutions. Starting with the claim that ethnic and religious conflicts, especially in Eurasian political space, cannot be completely explained by Huntingtonian model of inherited civilization clashes, she finds the key reasons for these conflicts to be economic in their causes, with cultural component being only a secondary cause, merely a byproduct of economic developments. Therefore, it is necessary to find more humane alternatives to globalization, in order to correct these byproducts. These corrections, according to Mitrofanova, must be shaped in a model which would include all those who feel excluded in the global processes, taking their specific needs in consideration. One of the possible solutions is so called new regionalism, i.e. evolution of a number of regional organizations, as a way of avoiding the global domination currently imposed by the

globalization from one political center, which she finds extremely harmful.

The article authored by the Institute for Political Studies' Đorđe Stojanović deals with different conceptual approaches to the phenomenon of patriotism. The author analyzes key elements and extreme positions of patriotism, with special regard to the relation between particularism and universalism in the practical manifestations of patriotism. Extremely significant for researches, this article provides a detailed overview of authors and theories concerning patriotism. Moreover, the author claims that, among other things, patriotism is not inevitably concerned with history, thus addressing only the past, but can also be a force for the future, especially when containing the part of liberal core values. This is peculiarly true in the context of republican patriotism and republican morale of loyalty, where patriotism is considered as a voluntary commitment to the nation of citizens. This cosmopolitan patriotism, or even liberal nationalism, implying the respect of every particularity and avoiding ideological one-sidedness, stands out from ethnical components of patriotism in the strict sense. Author concludes the article with an interesting debate on the possible positions of patriotism in today's

world, finding that place in the conflict between "blind" and constructive versions of patriotism, and placing it in the function of establishing the democratic self-government.

"Significance and Sustainability of National Identity within Modern Globalization and Integration processes" is a title of article written by Aleksandra Mirović. It provides significant definitions of globalization, partially defined in the context of denationalization and deethnification of modern societies, which is especially visible in the process of transnational or supranational integrations, one of them being the European Union. In this regard, the author examines the possibilities for creation of common European identity, correlating it with the universal values and inclusive nature of western democracies. Furthermore, the author emphasizes bitter lessons drawn from the former Yugoslav area and the supposed creation of Yugoslav identity, regarding in particular to the modern divisions in Serbian society. Namely, she identifies the inherited social cleavage between conservatives and nationalists on one side, and liberal and civil-oriented on the other. Analysis of this cleavage conveniently introduces the text coauthored by Dušan Vuicević and Petar Matić, dealing with

the nature of social cleavages in Serbia, with special regard to the traditionalism-modernism axis. The authors are defining the main lines of conflict between social groups and are finding the lack of consensus, even the bitter confrontation, when it comes to the questions of modernization and social transformation in Serbia. They find the cleavage is also a significant obstacle to the process of democratic consolidation of Serbia. This paper holds the claim that Serbian society, mostly due to historical circumstances, holds permanent cleavages when it comes to the basic issues of one state. Political parties are crucial for resolving of this conflict situation. Their responsibility is to mobilize the citizens and to direct their sentiments, in order to remove the pressure away from the fragile political system. It would be extremely interesting to examine these claims on today's situation in Serbian political system, where it seems that, for the first time in twenty years, most of the political parties surpassed their differences when it comes to the strategic direction of the country. This is especially true in regard to the most important cleavages in Serbian society – modernism and traditionalism, symbolically embodied within the “Kosovo or EU” dilemma, which seems to be

resolved by most of the political parties in Serbia.

Among other articles present in this issue, it is worth to mention “Neoliberalism, rationality and imperialism”, authored by Zoran Vidojević from the Institute of Social Sciences, but also the text authored by Đuro Bodrožić, dealing with the earliest historical foundations and sources of Serbian national identity, as well as the article by Irina Kovačević, engaged in examining the sources of ecological crisis in the context of modern relations between human civilization and environment. Finally, the issue ends with two reviews, presenting the books “Corporative Nostalgia” by Aleksandar Gajić and “Diplomacy and Chess” by Vladislav Jovanović.

To conclude, “National Interest” is a journal significant not only for the researchers of social sciences, but also to all those in broader public interested in current national and state-related questions emerging in Serbia and in the World as a whole. Valuable scientific potential of the researchers from the publishing entity (Institute for Political Studies), along with the consistent editorial policy and approachable manner of the authors, make this journal an important read both in academic circles and general public alike.

Citing and Referencing

We welcome articles reporting research on substantive topic, concepts, and/or methodologies in all fields of political science. Authors of single country cases are strongly advised to consider the theoretical and comparative implications of the case. All articles are refereed by domestic and international experts in the field. Deadlines for sending the manuscripts are: **March 15** (for Issue 1) and **September 15** (for Issue 2).

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Any intext reference should include the authorship and the year of the work.

Model: (Author year: page).

Example: (Przeworski 1991: 28)

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Use the title page, not the book cover, for the reference details. Only include the edition where it is not the first. A book with no edition statement is most commonly a first edition. The required elements for a book reference are:

Author, Initials. (Year) *Title of book*. Edition. (only include this if not the first edition) Place of publication (this must be a town or city, not a country): Publisher.

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Journal articles

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Example: Schulzinger, R. D. (ed.) (2003) *A Companion to American Foreign Relations*. Malden, MA: Blackwell Publishing.

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Example: Parekh, B. (1996) "Political theory: Traditions in political philosophy". In: Goodin, R. E., Klingemann, H. (eds.) *A New Handbook of Political Science*. Oxford: Oxford University Press. pp. 503-518.

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