SERBIAN POLITICAL THOUGHT

Institute for Political Studies

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The Budgetary Process: An Analysis of the Legislative Measures In Serbia and Croatia

Abstract

This paper looks into the effects of political institutions on government fiscal policy. Our aim is to establish whether a legislative body has the power to influence the budget proposal tabled by the government. This leverage is measured in the analysis of the six indicators (so-called Wehner scale) which combined, make up the index of parliamentary power in Serbia and in Croatia. In the final section, the results obtained from our analysis are presented in a comparative perspective. Our assessment refers exclusively to legislative measures, not practice

Keywords: budget; the executive; the legislative; economic policy; fiscal policy; public spending.

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1. Previous Research

A large body of previous research on political institututions and economic policy was focused on examining the behavior and internal dynamics of executive bodies. One group of arguments claimed that ever greater number of actors in the cabinet blocks policy change. If spending is already high, it is unlikely to be reduced, as a growing number of parties in the cabinet strengthen a public policy status quo (Tsebelis 1995; 2002). The second set of arguments is grounded in the concept of the common pool resource problem or the 1/*n* law, which makes it possible for each actor to avoid internalisation of the overall levels of public spending, thus increasing the overall levels (Weingast *et al*. 1981). Persson and Tabelini argue that the trend of high public spending is a consequence of electoral rules. Electoral systems generate coalition cabinets, and such cabinets tend to spend more (Persson and Tabelini 2003). In our previous research, we introduced the concept of the Budget dilemma, which also correlates the number of actors in the cabinet with the level of public spending (Pavlović and Stanojević 2011a).

2. A Simple Model

In this paper we broaden the existing body of research in two ways. We start from the assumption that proportional representation creates coalition governments in which coalition partners have the potential to blackmail each other in terms of their use of budget funds for their party or own needs. Here, we try to investigate if it is possible to remove the negative effects of the electoral system on public spending by designing institutions that would reverse or at least mitigate the trend created by proportional representation.

A possible way to do this is to design a legislative body (Crain and Muris 1995). We deploy the model constructed by Joachim Wehner in his book *Legislatures and the Budget Process: The Myth of Fiscal Control* (Wehner 2010). The effects of the budget dilemma can be reversed if a legislature (or some other control) body has the capacity to balance budget spending. The institutional design model that would address overspending should look somewhat like this. Assume that at a given point in time, t_0, a realistic and balanced budget (e.g. adjusted to the annual GDP growth rate or to some other reasonable fiscal rule) for the

following year should equal the amount *x*. As a result of bargaining within the coalition, the government drafts a budget proposal *x+y* in t_1. If the Parliament is bound to pass the budget proposed by the government, i.e. if it has no powers of amendment or revise the proposal, the budget passes in t_2, and it will be *x+y*.

However, assume that after the government submits the proposal, the Parliament in t_2' has the authority to propose budget amendments or apply some other institutional mechanism that makes it possible to reduce the extravagant spending contained in the proposal, i.e. restore budget to *x* or modify its structure to *x+z* (where *z<y*), or even lower the level of spending by *z* (where *x>z*). The budget in t_2' could then become *x–z* rather than *x+y*. In that case, the effects of the Budget dilemma from t_1 would be reversed in t_2.

In broadest terms, the legislative-executive relationship can be visually presented as in graph 1. Assume that the budget contains only two items, *X* and *Y*. Line *YX* represents the budget line. Point *E* represents the ideal position of the executive. L_1 represents the ideal position of the legislative which aims to spend more than the executive under both items (x and y). By contrast, L_2 represents the ideal point of the legislative which aims to spend less than the executive under both items. There are three possible outcomes of this relationship. If the executive prevails, the outcome will be *E* (ideal spending level of the executive). If the parliament prevails, the outcome could be twofold: (1) if the legislative is fiscally more responsible than the executive, the outcome can be situated anywhere *along* the budget line *YX*. In that case, the



Graph 1: A model of parliamentary control of the executive

legislative reduces spending. On the other hand, (2) if the legislative is fiscally less responsible than the executive, the outcome will be situated at L_1, as well as at any other point *outside* the budget line *YX*.

3. Fiscal Control and the Legislative Body

The second contribution of this paper is in expanding our previous research on the subject. In our previous works, we focused on the legislative measures and parliament power indicators for Serbia (Pavlović and Stanojević 2011b). Here we present the findings for Croatia and compare them to our previous findings for Serbia (which we repeat from our previous research). Each indicator's value (coded on the scale 0-10) obtained for Croatia is numerically and descriptively compared to the values obtained for Serbia. Finally, results obtained for Croatia and Serbia are included among the results obtained for 17 countries (section 4). The list of indicators and coding methodology are taken from Joachim Wehner (Wehner 2010: 18–63).

The scores obtained and aalyzed in section 3 and presented in Table 1 were calculated after the analysis of the legal solutions found in the fiscal legislation in Serbia and Croatia in 2012 and 2014, respectively. The scores for other countries, presented in graph 2, were taken the OECD survey conducted in 2003 (Wehner 2006).

We emphasize that here, we only look into *legislative* measures for each of the indicators. In many Western democracies, there is consistency between legislative provisions and practice. The results of Wehner's research relate only to legislative measures in the countries analyzed (see graph 2 at the end of this paper). Many specific situations that deviate from legislative measures can be found in practice. (A more detailed discussion on the empirical findings for Serbia can be found in: Pavlović and Stanojević 2011c; 2012).

a. Amendment Powers

If a legislative body has the authority to amend the government's budget proposal, it can modify the budget structure. The coding of this indicator looks like this: if the parliament can only reject or adopt the budget, the indicator's value is [0], as the lowest form of parliamentary leverage on the executive; if it can lower the level of spending by

amendments, it is [2.5]; if it can reallocate funds without increasing the budget [5] or deficit [7.5]; if it has unlimited budget-amending powers [10] (Wehner 2010: 20-27).

In our previous research, we found that Serbia, in terms of its legislative measures, receives the score of 8.75 for this indicator (Pavlović and Stanojević 2011b: 45-46). The Serbian Assembly can modify the budget amount (increase or reduce it), but only within the limits of deficit or suficit defined by the Government. An identical measure can be found in the Croatian legislation (the Budget Act, Article 38). Neither the Serbian Assembly, nor the Croatian Parliament have unlimited powers to amend the budget as they have to adhere to the deficit or suficit levels projected by the Government. Yet, since they do have budget-amending powers, in both cases we assign them a score of [8.75] on the Wehner scale.

b. Reversionary Budget

Reversionary mechanism comes into play once the old budget has expired and the new one has not been passed yet. This means that the legislative has the right to veto the budget. In that case, it is possible to reverse the budget to zero (i.e. no budget until the legislative and the executive agree on the new budget); restore it to its previous condition (i.e. to the previous year's level of spending) until the sides agree; or resort to partial spending of the previous budget (e.g. 25%) to ensure the minimum functioning of the state administration (public service, police, army, courts, etc.).

If the parliament fails to pass the budget and consequently, the government's proposal is adopted or new elections follow, the indicator is worth [0]; if the overall budget is rejected and only its part is adopted (temporary financing), the indicator coding is [3.3]; if last year's budget is adopted - [6.7]; if "zero budget" is adopted[2], [10].[3] (Wehner, 2010: 28-31)

2 „Zero budget" implies that for all budget items the starting point is zero and that spending for each item needs to be justified from scratch. Traditionally, last year's budget represents the baseline and only increase or deviation from it are subject to justification.

3 However, this case, as well as the previous one, shows how higher score correlated with greater fiscal responsibility only if the legislative is fiscally more conservative than the parliament. Otherwise, then greater indicatora value can suggest fiscal excess. As in the previous case, it is impossible to know in advance how the legislative will behave.

If the Assembly of Serbia vetoes the budget, temporary financing is introduced and the Government is due to operate on the basis of the previous year's budget. On the Wehner scale, this indicator for Serbia is worth [5] (Pavlović and Stanojević 2011b: 47). From the legal point of view, the situation in Croatia is identical: in the case that the budget is not passed by the beginning of the fiscal year for which it is adopted, temporary financing takes effect under the Budget Act (Article 42). Temporary financing is introduced for a maximum period of three months and implies the level of spending identical previous year's, provided that it does not exceed one fourth of the previous year's expenditures without outlays. During temporary financing, financing is limited to the same programmes as in the previous year, and budget users may not increase the number of their employees above the count on 31 December of the previous year. This indicator for Croatia is also worth [5].

c. Executive Flexibility During Execution

In the previous two cases, depending on the scope of authority of the legislative, the executive can be forced to act strategically between the budget submission and passing (between t_1 and t_2). However, imagine that a legislative body has the powers of amending the budget in t_2 (section 2), but that the executive has the authority to change the levels of spending in t_3, i.e. during budget execution. In this case, legislative powers would not amount to much as the entire budget process would be dependent on the executive, which would render it useless (Wehner 2010: 32).

To code this indicator, it is possible to pose several questions: can the government reallocate funds during execution (move them from one item to another), without parliamentary approval?; can the government deny funds committed to spending without the parliamentary approval?; are there resources *outside* budget items that the government can utilize during execution by using discretionary right without parliamentary approval? The actual question is – can the government during execution *increase* the budget? (Wehner, 2010a: 31-38, 48). Affirmative answer to each of these questions is coded with [0], since it shows that the legislative body does not play a significant role in the budget process. The negative answer scores [3.3]. The total value

for this indicator is obtained by adding the values for all three questions together (Wehner 2010: 31-38)

Legally, the Government of Serbia has the option to manipulate budget funds through the mechanism of appropriation and discretionary use of the current budget reserve, but has no legal possibility to utilize funds not contained in the budget items without the approval of the Assembly of Serbia. For this indicator, Serbia received the score of [6.7] on the Wehner scale (Pavlović and Stanojević, 2011b: 48-50)

The Government of Croatia can redistribute resources during budget execution without the approval of the Parliament [0]. This mechanism is called "reallocation of funds" (the Budget Act, Article 46). Reallocation of funds is a discretionary right of the Minister of Finance to execute budget reallocation up to 5% of funds committed for expenditure under the item to be reduced in order to divert the funds to another item. [0]. Further, the Budget Act defines the measure of "temporary suspension of execution" (Article 43) that the Government can apply to suspend payments of expenditures envisaged in the budget. Temporary suspension of execution represents a discretionary measure authorizing the Government to suspend payment of budget expenditures for a maximum of 45 days due to "the occurrence of new liabilities for the state budget or changes in the economic developments". The Government does not need approval of the Parliament to apply this measure, but is only obliged to notify the Parliament on its application [0]. Finally, the Government of Croatia has no legal basis for the use of extra budgetary funds [3.3]. In sum, Croatia receives a score of [3.3] for this indicator on the Wehner scale.

d. Timing of the Budget Submission and Debate

The timing of the budget submission to the Parliament for consideration is not irrelevant. If the Parliament has sufficient time to deliberate, chances are higher that it will be thoroughly prepared and amendments passed; if the time is short, the Parliament practically faces a deadlock and has to pass the budget in the version submitted by the government or reject it. If the time between submission and passing is shorter than two months, the indicator is worth [0]; if it is shorter than four months [3.3]; if it is shorter than six months [6.7]; if it is longer than six months [10] (Wehner 2010: 39-40).

Legally, the Serbian Assembly has *45 days* to pass the budget, which is less then Wehner's minimum to grant the indicator any value above 0. Hence this indicator for Serbia is worth [0] (Pavlović and Stanojević 2011b: 50-51). The situation is similar in Croatia, where the Government of Croatia has a very flexible position in the process of budget adoption. Pursuant to the Budget Act (Article 37), the Ministry of Finance is due to submit the budget proposal for the next year, with projections for the following two years to the Government by October 15. In the case of a disagreement between the Minister of Finance and a representative of the budget users, the Prime Minister has the final say. When the disagreement is settled and the final budget proposal with projections is adopted, the Government of Croatia is due to submit them to the Parliament by November 15, so the deputies have one and a half months to discuss the proposal and adopt it. In this manner, the Government creates a deadlock for the Parliament, for which the Wehner assigns the score of [0].

e. The Capacity of Parliamentary Committees

In this case we attempt to establish whether committees in the Parliaments of Serbia and Croatia have any leverage on the budget process. There are three questions to ask here:

- Does the Parliament Committee on Finance have the right to request clarification from the Government member responsible for the budget before the budget reaches the Parliament?;
- Can each single committee request the same for the part of the budget within its competency (for example, Committee on Education for the part concerning education)?;
- Does the Committee on Finance, or some other committee, have a legal basis to request evidence on the budget execution?

Affirmative answer to each question assigns a score of [3.3]; and negative a score of [0] (Wehner, 2010: 40).

In the case of Serbia, the Committee on Finance can take part in the budget debate [3.3], but other committees (also dependent on the budget) are unable to do so [0]. The Committee on Finance has the right to control budget execution [3.3]. The total score of Serbia for this indicator according to the Wehner scale is [6,7] (Pavlović and Stanojević, 2011b: 51-52).

During the budget hearing before the Committee on Finance, and pursuant to the Standing Orders of the Croatian Parliament, the Committee members have the right to pose questions to the Government representative who is obliged to attend the Committee, participate in its work, declare the position of the Government, provide notifications and expert explanations, adopt a position on the opinions of the Committee members and submitted amendments if so authorized by the Government (Article 121) [3.3]. On the other hand, representatives of other committees do not have the right to review the budget nor ask questions about the budget in their respective portfolio [0]. Under the Standing Orders, the Committee is also in charge of the final settlement of the state budget [3.3]. Accordingly, this indicator for Croatia receives the score of [6.7] on the Wehner scale.

f. Access to Budget Information

The issue of access to information is actually about budget transparency. The important question is: is there an independent parliamentary body able to analyze budget items, seek clarification regarding specific items, and inform a legislative body about it? The score for this indicator actually uses some practices that appear in the previous indicator since committees partially perform the budget process transparency function (Von Hagen 2006). If that body does not exist, the indicator is coded with [0]; if it has up to ten members, [2.5]; for up to 25 members, [5]; for up to 50, [7.5], and for above 100, [10] (Wehner, 2010: 40-41).

In the Serbian political system, there is only one body with the formal and legal grounds to monitor the budgetary process and the Government's role in it: the Assembly Committee on Finance, State Budget and Control of Public Spending. The Committee comprises 17 members. Another working body of the Assembly, Fiscal Council, has been operating since 2011, and also has very specific tasks *vis-à-vis* the fiscal policy, but only has three members. Therefore, we gave this indicator the score of [5] on the Wehner scale (Pavlović and Stanojević 2011b; 52).

The Croatian Parliament constitutes two bodies whose objective is to oversee the budget process. These are: The Finance and Central Budget Committee and Commission on Fiscal Policy. Pursuant to the Croatian Parliament Standing Orders (Article 73), the Finance

and Central Budget Committee has 19 members and is the principal working body of the Parliament in matters pertaining to the financing of public needs, the central budget and its final settlement, budgetary policy, international financial relations and the like. The committee debates draft legislation that gives rise to financial commitments and reports to the Assembly on its opinions, positions and proposals.

On the other hand, the Parliament also constitutes the Commission on Fiscal Policy (Decision on the Establishment of the Commission on Fiscal Policy). The Commission has seven members and is chaired by the Chairman of the Finance and Central Budget Committee, while non-parliamentary experts from important economic and legal institutions are elected to the remaining six seats. The task of the Commission is to control the implementation of fiscal rule enacted by the Law on Fiscal Responsibility (Article 4). It is also within the Commission's competency to establish if, in the event of economic crisis, the fiscal rule is to be suspended. Although not explicitly accountable to the members of Parliament, the Commission does it implicitly by reporting to the public, and is thus mentioned as a body contributing to the transparency of the budget process. Jointly, the Committee and the Commission have 26 members (the Chairman of the Finance Committee is a member of both). Hence, we gave this indicator for Croatia [7.5] on the Wehner scale.

4. Comparison With Other Countries

Before we compare Serbia and Croatia to other countries, we present separate data for Serbia and Croatia in Table 1. The data has been obtained by the analysis elaborated in the previous section. The first three indicators (a–c) together make the power indicator; the other three indicators (d–f) make the organization indicator. Indices are aggregated in two groups as the first three indicators are often incorporated in the Constitution or some organic law (e.g., Law on the Budget System), while the other three indicators point to the organisational capacity of the legislature and are defined by the laws on the legislature (parliament act, rules of procedure, etc.) (Wehner 2010a: 52). As we can see from Table 1, the analysis of the legal acts gives Serbia the total score of [53.6], while for Croatia it is [52.1].

	Pow. a	Rever. b	Flex. c	Time d	Committees e	Research f	Powers g=(a+b+c)	Organization h=(d+e+f)	Index i=g+h
Serbia	8.75	5	6.7	0	6.7	5	34.1	19.5	53.6
Croatia	8.75	5	3.3	0	6.7	7.5	28.4	23.7	52.1

Table 1. Power and organization indicators for Serbia and Croatia. The sum of sub-indicator values for power and organization have been divided by 0.6 to normalize the index at 100.

If the results obtained for Serbia and Croatia were compared to the results for the 17 countries[4] from Wehner's research, both countries would be ranked in the middle of the list (see Graph 2).



Graph 2. The Index of legislative budget institutions. (Adopted from: Wehner, 2010: 54).

4 More detailed data on each sub-indicator for every country presented in Wehner's graph can be found in: Wehner (2006).

5. Conclusion

The discussion in this paper points to an important conclusion: while mechanisms of the common pool resource problem, the Budget dilemma, and the 1/*n* Law have adverse effects on the level of public spending in parliamentary regimes with proportional representation, this still does not mean that a prudent fiscal policy in those regimes is impossible.

Namely, from the ranking presented in Graph 1, it is evident (if we omit the top-ranking US) that parliamentary democracies with proportional representation, too, can develop the institutional design that can limit public spending. As can be seen from Graph 2, a large number of countries with a high index (though not as high as in the case of US), do not have a presidential or even semi-presidential system.

In other words, although parliamentary regimes with proportional representation show a tendency for higher spending, with an adequate institutional design it is also possible to create rules in these regimes that could eliminate the effects of mechanisms that create a tendency for higher public spending. Those rules should not imply the discretionary power of any branch of government, but rather pre-define the level of spending, deficit and public debt (Ferejohn and Krehbiel 1987).

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Charismatic Dimension of Political Leadership: The Case of Serbia

Abstract

The paper addresses the problem of relationship between charismatic political leadership and democracy. In that sense, the charismatic foundation of the present Serbian political leadership is defined through the "de-charismatisation" of cultural codes of malignant charismatic movements, embodied in ideological constructs of "Seseljism" and "Slobism", and through changes in symbolic charismatic content, expressed by promotion of democratic values and discursive recoding of the enemy and corruption culture. In other words, the scientific paper analyzes metamorphosis of Serbian "charismatic discourse"- from institutional charisma to personal charisma and from charismatic institutions to charismatic personality.

Keywords: Charisma, Charismatic Politics, Charismatic Political Leadership, Democracy, "Titoism", "Slobism", Serbia.

Introduction

The war that took place in the territory of the former Yugoslav republics, now independent states, was marked with a specific type of political leaders and, consequently, specific types of political leadership. This specificity can be identified at the analytical level of the examination of the leadership phenomenon in the most extreme

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social context of crisis- war, seen primarily as the culmination of the set of crisis moments, as well as the level of detection of some new attributes of the political leadership *in genere*. This especially refers to the examination of the concept of charismatic political leadership. If we assume that the ex-Yugoslav political leadership was dominantly charismatic by nature, at least in the case of Slobodan Milosevic and Franjo Tudjman, then the war in the former Yugoslavia can be seen as a unique "collision of charismatic leaders." This does not suggest an *a priori* assessment of "ethical correctness" or "national usefulness" of a "charisma", but alludes to the legitimization of political systems of the warring nation states, at least in the initial moments of their separation and "proto-institutional" (re)constitution of the newly formed states, namely in the case of Serbia and Croatia.

The matter gains importance and complexity with the fact that the new charismas arose under the auspices of an earlier routinized or institutionalized charismatic leadership, the one headed by Josip Broz Tito, and that in the territory of Serbia, a sort of a parallel "war of charismas" was led, which was not as extremely characteristic of the other participants in the conflict. The charismatic leadership of Slobodan Milosevic, on one hand, prevailed over at least one potential charismatic opponent- Vuk Draskovic, and, on the other hand, was "charismatically congenial" with another potential Serbian charismatic, Vojislav Seselj. Is it at all possible for several charismatic groups or movements with different charismatic constructs to exist at the same time, in the same territory, the same social and historical context, and even in one and the same "political pole", i.e. despite the success of a charismatic leader, is it possible for at least one important (opponent or congenial) charismatic leader to exist simultaneously? This implies that the charismatic message is semantically compatible with a given social situation, and that it is affirmatively evaluated by (a part of) social groups, i.e. it is recognized and not considered peculiar or deviant (Friedland, 1964), not at the level of "social pathology", a self-proclaimed charismatic "eccentricity" unconfirmed by a group (socially).

The foregoing implies several analytical concerns, which will not be the main theme of this paper, but their acknowledgment in the beginning is relevant, for they suggest a remarkable complexity in the characterization of charismatic political leadership. Ergo, the analytical focus of this study will actually be, firstly, the metamorphosis of Slobodan Milosevic's charisma from its institutional to its authentic

version. In other words, whether the charismatic status of Slobodan Milosevic that had emerged in the embrace of the socialist Yugoslavia (institutional charismatic position) was simply "transferred" to a new situation or was it transformed into a new charismatic status (orthodox charismatic position), and if it was transformed, what was the symbolic content of the new charismatic position? Secondly, this paper will additionally deal with the genesis of the charisma of the current democratically elected leadership of the Republic of Serbia, also along the line of distinction and possible transfers between institutional and genuine charisma, i.e. the charismatic process that has been reversed in comparison to the case of Slobodan Milosevic. In other words, is it possible for democratic rituals, ceremonies, symbols and iconography-the democratic cultural matrix, to create space for the metamorphosis of operational and executive political (party) figures in the direction of formulating a charismatic political entity? It is important to stress that this kind of charisma refers to the transmission of the system of charismatic attributes to an individual who occupies a particular institutional position, regardless of his/her individual charismatic potential.

At one level, I believe that the charismatic position of the post-Titoist official and apparatchik Slobodan Milosevic, with its set of institutionalized charismatic attributes, transformed into a personally profiled charisma, but ideological framework of that transformation has never been described well enough analytically, it has always been implied. At another level, my opinion is that charisma is a social relationship that is generated situationally (contextually), and is not a pre-democratic (anachronistic) or anti-democratic phenomenon (associated with, for example, neo-populism or social radicalism), i.e. it has capacity compatible with the democratic cultural algorithm, and with the apparent role in democratically structured systems. Charisma can therefore be interpreted as an ever-present functional principle as well as a fundamental quality of certain democratic institutions. I will also add that for an examination of charismatic leadership the principal analytic point is the initiation of the charismatic leader, and not the peak of his/her political power, because the former represents the zone where his/her charismatic synthetic code (or construct) can be understood as an amalgam of personal, indirectly structural and ideational, value and cultural factors. As suggested above, this certainly does not mean that the peak of political power does not necessarily coincide with the charismatic initiation.

1. Weber's Concept of Charismatic Political Leadership

Diachronically speaking, the word charisma *(χάρισμα),* the result of St. Paul's semantic innovative intervention in the mid first century AD, is derived from the ancient Greek word *charis (χάρις)* that has a wide range of connotative meanings. Most of that etymological constellation is related to the three levels of meaning of the word "grace": the one referring to personal beauty and charm, the one referring to benevolence or love, and the one referring to a gift or favour "under protection" of an entity with divine attributes (Nida and Louw 1992: 62-68; Spicq 1994: 500-503). Religious denotativity of charisma is, therefore, the product of St Paul's (re)conceptualization, and for him charisma, freed from the Hellenic-Hellenistic-Roman system of reciprocal gift-giving between people and gods, is a clearly differentiated concept in relation to *charis*. In fact, it is a direct result of the particular and concrete actualization of *charis*, that is, divine mercy and grace that includes various attributes (supernatural powers), is manifested in ecstatic behaviour or extraordinary abilities, and is predominantly directed to the benefit of the Christian community, rather than to personal reputation of an individual (Potts 2009: 36, 46). And although it seems that the aforementioned would be enough for certain conclusions in the direction of current perceptions of charisma, still, such an attempt would be quite inadequate and parabolic because the modern concept of charisma cannot be understood without the secular-pragmatic reconceptualization of the phenomenon done by Max Weber.

Weber's understanding of charisma (see Constans 1958; Dow 1978; Eisenstadt 1968; Kim 2004; Smith 2000; Spencer 1973; Tucker 1968; Turner, S. P. and Factor, R. A. 1994; and Wilner, A. R. and Wilner, D. 1965) is different from that encountered in St. Paul in two respects: it is primarily spiritually individualized (it is distanced in relation to "plural" subjectivity of the community), and includes the "horizontal" and "vertical" dimensions of dispersion throughout history and different cultures. According to Weber, charisma is a term that refers to certain personality qualities (not accessible to "ordinary" people), in terms of special endowment with supernatural, superhuman, or ("at least") exceptional powers or qualities that form the basis for treating someone as a leader (Weber [1922] 1978: 241). In its ideal form, it is totally opposed to bureaucratic organization (it is not rational) and is self-defining and self-limiting (*Ibidem*: 1112). This definition of charisma

does not address the nature and characteristics of charisma, but only states that it is individual and extraordinary. Weber did not limit the use of the concept of charisma to manifestations of the divine, he did not aspire to the essentialist observance of disposal or endowment of an individual with supernatural qualities, what is relevant is the fact that an individual is perceived or defined as someone who possesses these qualities. Consequently, it is someone who does not necessarily believe in his/her divine inspiration, and who, thanks to his/her above average powers imposes himself/herself on his/her environment through extraordinary courage, determination, influence, perspicacity or energy.

One of possible paradoxes in interpreting Weber's idea of charisma is that, on one hand, charisma is clearly a definition of leadership through its psychological and individualized dimensions, and is the result of divine grace that does not require external verification, while, on the other hand, it does not exist at all without social confirmation, that is, it becomes insignificant (*Ibidem*: 241, 242). If we add to it the idea of permanent presence (production) of charismatics and their, proportionally very often unconfirmed charismatic recognition, it creates space for speculation on characteristics of their social validation. In fact, only when the charismatic message is conveyed by the charismatic individual to the social group, we can talk about its significance and importance within the social frame where the authority (power) occurs. In order for real charisma to be understood, that is to be recognized and positioned outside of the bizarre and irrational, it has to be viewed within social context of the charismatic's activity and quality (content) of the charismatic message, that should be "proved" as relevant to the social group in order to be accepted and become the basis for the action, which entails that it must not deviate from the "collective" success determined by the group (Friedland 1964: 25). No less important is the fact, typical for Weber's discourse, that effective and stable political domination, before gaining legitimacy (and supported by a new institutional and legal organization), first needs to be transformed into a certain authentic symbolic system.

In this regard, charismatic politics presupposes the existence of a form of substantial meanings and ethical values, while the existence of conflicting symbolic components, let's say, various charismatic movements, results in competing beliefs for the sake of justifying the establishment of a new order. This indicates that, with Weber,

charismatic movements are not primarily focused on the realization of economic and political objectives, nor are they charismatic solely due to extraordinary or supernatural qualities of their leaders; what makes them charismatic is actually the struggle over control of the symbolic foundation of authority through creating and recreating the current cultural structures that define good or bad use of power in a particular historical and spatial realities of a some political community (Kalyvas 2002: 79). Charismatic movements, therefore, challenge the core value beliefs and the normative foundation on which the legitimacy of the political and legal system of a particular historical instance are based, before replacing them with their own radicalized version of the institutional and legal organization. Charismatic or charismatics, charismatic individual as well as charismatic movement, survive due to loyalty and authority arising from the mission that is believed or perceived that they embody, and the mission does not necessarily have to be revolutionary, but in most cases is oriented towards inversion of values and dismissal of practices (Weber [1922] 1978: 1117). In this context, for a complete understanding of the phenomenon of charisma, the concept of symbolic politics is also important. Namely, according to Alison Brysk (1995: 561), it can be said of symbolic politics that it includes maintenance or transformation of power relationship through the communication of normative and affective representations, it does not approach to interests as fixed needs, but treats them as narratives on the needs, where participants mobilized through the symbolic can create new political opportunities by discovering, examining and transforming narratives on interests and identities.

By expanding Weber's setting, Edward Shils (1975: 127), who is primarily concerned with the phenomenon of charisma in the field of non-ecclesiastical institutions that are conventionally assumed to be completely devoid of charismatic qualities, defines charisma as the quality of individuals, processes, roles, institutions, symbols and material objects that arises in the supposed connection with the necessary, authentic and "vital" powers, or powers crucial for determination of the order; which can be additionally understood as the primordial or the proto, as the essential order of things that stands in relation to the transcendent order. No society can avoid a certain association with the (Durkheimian oriented) sacred, all of societies hold certain standards of evaluation, rules of conduct and opinions as sacred, and forms of activity, value of individuality, truth, and even professional achievements can be marked by varying degrees of presence of sanctity

or of charisma (Shils 1958: 156). Shils believes that Weber is primarily focused on the observation of charisma in its most concentrated and intense forms (via specific roles, actions and occasions), and that he is completely negatively oriented towards its dispersion, that for him it cannot become an integral element of secular institutionalization (Shils, 1965: 202). Shils starts from the assumption that great power is manifested and self-announced through the power of discovery, creation, maintenance or destruction of the order. Certainly, there is a relationship between the highest authority in a society, embodied by kings, presidents, prime ministers, party secretaries, judges or law-makers, as holders of the highest earthly power, and a transcendent order. The existence of this order, for the sake of legitimacy, also means a connection with some transcendent powers, that is with something which is far more important than himself/herself, and by: (1) primordial contact with a charismatic person (hereditary kingship); (2) cumulative and continuous traditional insight into (a) the nature of existence, (b) ethical imperatives or (c) prudential considerations disclosed by long-enduring of existence; and (3) the most interesting for this paper, popular sovereignty, the will of those who constitute a particular political community (Ibidem: 205).

For "charismatic politics" it is not, therefore, necessary to be perceived as a God-gifted (self-proclaimed and accepted) individual ("a great man"), but is enough to be charismatically legitimized by a higher, I would say perfected or idealized, order of things. Thus, in the very democracies, as already noted, the source of charismatic legitimation may be the will of people (that is democratic electorate), charisma is transferred and dispersed to the system of roles that make the order (as an expression of the nucleus of power, authority that is "the power of powers"), that is, to affiliation to corporate bodies or institutions. According to Weber, each transposition of charisma into something that can be defined as institutional leads to its transformation, that is routinization (or objectification), pure or personal ("concentrated") charisma enters the process of traditionalization, of rationalization, or the process that combines these two possibilities (Weber [1922] 1978: 246). Routinization thus manifests standardization of a unique contact with the "transcendent" in the everyday life. When it comes to the issue of the succession of charisma, two issues can be noted (Allen 2004: 108-109; Weber [1922] 1978: 246-247): (1) the succession can be solved through traditional mechanisms- (a) revelation, implies selection of oracles or sages, (b) appointment, involves the selection of a new leader

by the charismatic leader before his own death and pursuits, involves finding the person (the charismatic) with a specific set of qualities, and (2) charisma can be depersonalized and transferred to blood relations or a separate institution. Charisma is therefore inherently unstable, from the beginning of its life it is decreasing and is under pressure by material interests, and also transient. When economic and organizational, i.e. structural, issues become prevalent, its reversal into a legal-rational legitimization is initiated. Accordingly, charisma is a quality that characterizes political movements in the early stages of their formation, when the control over masses is implemented, it is displaced to the administrative-bureaucratic routinization (Weber [1922] 1978: 246, 252, 1120): pure extract of charisma exists only in the moment of a charismatic "Big Bang".

Note also in this orientational and conceptual "croquis" of charismatic and charismatics, that Robert J. House and Jane M. Howell divide charismatic leaders into personalized ("bad") charismatic leaders, those characterized by an enhanced need for power, authoritarianism, selfishness, exploitation and disregard for the rights and feelings of others, and socialized ("good") charismatic leaders, those who are in the service of collective interests, willing for two-way communicate, follow the moral standards of followers, support them and respect their rights and feelings (House and Howell 1992: 84), and that as elements of charismatic leadership the following can be defined (Starratt, 1993: 44): (1) vision; (2) understanding of the purpose, identity and mission of groups or institutions and commitment to these; (3) persuasive articulation of the vision and purpose of the institution; (4) routinization of the vision and mission in administrative and organizational structures, services or offices, and institutional procedures; and (5) the use of imagination (imagery), language, stories and symbols related to the institution that is the basis of the message of the charismatic leader. Here, too, should be emphasized that although charisma can be analytically distinguished as a separate form of government, it remains present in other types of authority, that the hallmarks of charisma are subject to change in relation to the transformation of features of the social structure, that is, in relation to contextual angle, a charismatic fully functional in one situation can become completely dysfunctional in another situation (Oommen 1967: 87-88).

For explanatory balance, there are opinions such as Pierre Bourdieu's view that the concept of charisma does not represent anything other than a mere theoretical construct with a function of an apologia or

justification of certain power relations, and that individual leadership is the result of social influence on an individual, the charismatic leader not being the one who "pulls the strings" but the one who interprets the existing (typically- crisis) situation (Bourdieu 1987: 129-130). According to Carl Friedrich, the explanatory potential of charisma is insignificant, given the fact that in the modern world belief in the transcendent is insufficiently general or intense to be characterized as a foundation for the legitimization of any political leadership (Friedrich 1961: 23), whereas for Anthony Giddens the influence of a charismatic leader "attacks" the regressive side of the personality, which ends with the suppression of independent moral evaluations (Giddens 1985: 305).

Weber's view of charisma implies (Trice, H. M. and Beyer J. M. 1991: 151-152): (1) exceptional qualities of the charismatic leader, (2) a crisis situation (a kind of social disbalance), (3) followers who believe that the charismatic leader is connected with transcendent powers; (4) the existence of certain radical vision and mission, manifested to the followers through emotionally profiled ideas, the expression of some "cultural substance", (5) the existence of the administrative structure and activities for the realization of the charismatic mission, (6) the transfer of charisma to others through rituals, symbols, narratives and other cultural forms, (7) the inclusion of charismatic vision and mission in the oral and written tradition of the organization (potential for building a cult). I would like add some implicit corrective or new elements to the existing ones: (1) clearly visible "analytical corollary", connection of charisma with myths by rewriting the existing ones (interpreting in relation with the charismatic) and creating (the charismatic takes the central role), charisma, therefore, cannot be treated as a universal model free from cultural peculiarity, it is always "passively or actively mythologizing"; (2) for "charismatic politics" a person does not need to be perceived as a God-gifted (self-proclaimed and accepted) individual ("a great man"), but it is enough to legitimize him/her charismatically by direct connections and centrality of his/her position, with a higher, I would say, perfected and idealized order of things, and while in the first case, the mystique is "socially exogenous", in the second one it is "socially endogenous"; (3) charismatic message is always associated with the promotion of certain values that are collectively perceived, and expressed as an autonomous symbolic structure with its own logic at the cultural level, and a narrative of redemption with a structural distinction between good and evil is actually imposed (Smith 2000: 101, 103), a man needs the concept and participation in the symbolic order,

manifested in the idea of a "good society", which results in structural focus on charismatic activities, group symbols and institutions (Eisenstad 1968: XLI), that is the charismatic community is always self-perceived as some kind of moral community that is constantly fighting for a transcendent (ideological) setting; (4) radicalism of a charismatic mission may not necessarily be manifested by the ultra-revolutionary, but it certainly has to be more significant values reprogramming of the society; and (5) there is a separate question to what extent the need of the followers for "charismatic symbolic acknowledgment" may interfere with, alter or compromise their unconditional commitment to "charismatic duty" (once recognized as charismatic, a charismatic should always be charismatic), that is to what extent may self-declared exceptional powers or qualities of charismatic leaders be distorted, altered or affected by the action, which, by default, is interpreted as evidence of their own charismatic eligibility (Bendix 1967: 344).

I believe that Shils unlike Weber finds the sovereign will of people, embodied in democratic elections, automatically qualified as the source of the charismatic, that is I consider that in Shils' works the triadic setting of the charismatic can be registered: (1) "primary" charisma that allows the existence of institutions at the level of the original (proto) social and political integration (this even applies to the institution of civil society) and is oriented towards the transcendent order, that is towards the socially perceived proximity and the nucleus of the highest ("living") power, and, based on it, charismatic attribution of power in large mass societies for the preservation and stabilization of the system itself (with charisma not evenly distributed to the whole society, but with tendency to); (2) "secondary" charisma, a special "charismatic political division", manifested in the need for performers of the transcendent order, representatives of the earthly order, and the people themselves, despite the fact that they need each other for the verification of their own charisma, to participate in the process of constant competition for their "version" of charisma, that is for its position that is not socially petrified but constantly fluctuates to one of the above listed centers of gravity; and (3) "tertiary" charisma that is positioned as an individual charisma, and can be (a) "static or inert" charisma- extracted from the primary charisma, that is from an affiliation to an institution or a role (rank) in an institution, making it socially conserving, or (b) an authentic, Weberian oriented, "dynamic and mobile" individual charisma- that, by the perception of others or

self-perception, proclaims connection with the supernatural (divine) or transcendent, with something that can initiate, maintain or destroy something that is formative for human existence, thus ends in the top position that opens up opportunities for the creation of new institutions. It turns out that in a complex democratic situation we can talk about someone who has larger or smaller amount of charisma by a mere act of belonging to a particular institution, position or role he/she occupies in a particular institution and, regardless of the previous two moments, by his/her declared and accepted charismatic specificity. Institutional ascertainment of charisma certainly does not mean that the "charismatic of charismatics" necessarily obtains characteristics of a progressive and positive historical force in the service of human freedom, while the "charismatic of routinization (or institutions)" represents something retrograde and negative: for charisma, however, it can be said that it is an ever-present historical opportunity that in any case needs to be investigated separately (Bendix 1977: 328-329), and not only and exclusively as a form of resistance to capitalism and bureaucracy (Gerth and Mills 1946a: 72-73).

2. Antebellum- Yugoslavia- Institutionalized Charismatic Code of Josip Broz Tito

Slobodan Milosevic was one of the bearers of the institutionalized charisma of Josip Broz Tito. It can be said of Josip Broz Tito that at the beginning of his rule from 1941 to 1948, he was a part of Stalin's institutionalized charisma (Kuljic 1995: 63) with elements of a revolutionary war commander's charisma. This suggests the possibility that the institutionalization of charisma may have supranational, international features, especially if certain international institutions (the Comintern, later Cominform, i.e. Informbureau) stand behind it. The phenomenon gains further momentum with the advent to power of a charismatic who was "institutionalized" in this way. At the same time, Stalin's charisma directly resulted from the "divinization" of Lenin and the "canonization" of his works as the chief means of the succession struggle and the subsequent political disputes of his direct (closest) followers, among whom, more broadly, non-Soviet communist leaders can also be included.

In the second phase, from 1949 until the death of Josip Broz Tito in 1980, his authority was marked by the creation of a distinct personal charisma and a parallel construction of a personality cult (*Loc. Cit.*). The turning point, the sign of a genuine charismatic leader was his "big No" to the Informbureau as a concentrated symbolic-ideological charismatic code, it is the point of "charismatic epiphany", "inaugural charismatic promotion" from which he will emerge as an orthodox charismatic leader, definitely dissociating his charismatic position in comparison to other war heroes and global carriers of the ideas of socialism, with a clear general acknowledgment of charisma, decoding of charismatic codes or a designation by close associates and "class-national" plebiscitary approval. Thus, at the Fifth Congress of the Communist Party of Yugoslavia, Josip Broz said (according to Stanojevic and Markovic 1981: 294): "I, comrades, here underline that the Communist Party of Yugoslavia has also honorably performed its historical mission to date and it will, I am deeply convinced, perform it in future by means of its victory in the construction of socialism in our country, and that it will, by its firmness and unity, its unwavering loyalty to learnings of Marx-Engels-Lenin in action, prove that it has not strayed from the path of these learnings." In any case, the existence of a charismatic movement before the appearance of charismatic leadership, in this case the movement with clearly accepted Stalin's charisma, usually results in a schism (Tucker 1968: 738), schism to those who accept the charismatic leader, that is, followers of the newly created charisma of Josip Broz Tito, and those who do not accept the charismatic leader, that is, those who remained loyal to Stalin's charismatic authority. His messiahship thus received an integral, "triune" form, it absorbed: (1) the salvation from the suffering by the hands of Nazi Germany and traitors; (2) the salvation from the "Stalinist scourge"; (3) the salvation from "immanent" injustice of life and the world. Each of the constituent elements had a clear setting of evil against which it fought.

From that moment on, Josip Broz Tito, will record various political moves ("miracles") to his "charismatic account", as links of his "charismatic continuity and credibility", the most prominent one (in addition to the introduction of the concepts of workers' self management, associated labor and market socialism, and the most important lesson of the "Titoist agathology": brotherhood and unity) being the position of the most important political figure of the first Conference of Non-Aligned heads of state and government held in Belgrade in 1961. In this regard, his charismatic qualifications were also shown in the plane of completely

"authentic" Titoist interpretation of the transcendent communist-socialist ideal of salvation or redemption. Titoism was marked by certain moral imperatives, determinism, urgency, conceptual inclusivity (answer to all questions) and social exclusivity (its acceptance signified its elitist positioning), thus representing the "only way" to the specific method of transformation (Lalich 2004: 226). That "authenticity", Tito's *qualitas occulta*, will be his particular mark of giftedness, it will in the best possible way reflect his mystical knowledge of the "higher" transcendent set of values, the proto operational principles of the world, and will be, at regular intervals, time and again, "served" to his followers as a new confirmation ("palingenesis") of his charismatic talents ("proskynesis" of his followers was never questioned), to the point where the existence of followers is equated to the existence of a beloved leader.

Charismatic-cult omnipresence, omnipotence and omniscience of Josip Broz Tito was, of course, accompanied by the omnicontrol of the totality of formal structures that were created in the way he wanted and that existed only up to the moment he wanted. The League of Communists of Yugoslavia- SKJ (i.e. the Communist Party of Yugoslavia- CPY) as an institutional constant of the regime was standardized so that Josip Broz Tito could always do whatever he wanted; improvisation was the only organizational standard. Although he controlled everything, he was not subject to any control, no one could limit Josip Broz Tito, neither the party, nor the elite stratum of his closest "associates". After all, the party functioning coincides with the definition of the cult given by Janja Lalich according to which a cult, either as a sharply bounded social group or a diffusely bounded social movement is characterized by shared commitment to a charismatic leader, that is a certain transcendent ideology (not always religious in nature) and a high level of personal commitment from its members in words and deeds (Lalich 2004: 5).

I believe that the institutionalization of the charisma of Josip Broz Tito, its transfer into organizational and administrative structure and institutional procedures, its clicheization in the everyday life, was followed by two processes. On the one hand, it essentially marked the fall of intensity of his personal charisma, by the fact that the whole combination of operations and actions had to be transferred to certain institutions that were difficult to control directly, the entire system was viewed through the lens of instrumental rationality: it became bureaucratized. On the other hand, the process of objectification, raising of charisma to the level of impersonality and abstraction (Friedrich

1961: 13), also included the recruitment of a range of hierarchized party "managers" who were at the forefront of all major economic as well as public institutions, and not only had the institutionalized charisma at their disposal, but were also sorted in relation to their proximity to the charismatic center- Josip Broz Tito. It was possible therefore to compensate or strengthen the institutional position by frequency of contacts with the charismatic leader, where the transfer of charisma was "immediate". In this sense, mere act of photography with the "beloved President," was a "magical" social act treated as a reference *par excellence*. Demagogic-apologetic narratives were imposed as the structural quality of public action, formal loyalty and servility to the undisputed party and the leader were positioned as a higher duty and a moral imperative. On the one hand the system of "cadre-cratic" benefits was built on that loyalty: it was implicit that each ideological zeal had its counterpart or "price" in status, while, on the other hand, the whole "code of desirable social immorality" was built, embodied in denunciations, scheming, foisting and stealing of public property. The logic by which the whole charismatic system in itself is an expression of an authentic Marxist-Leninist critique of the entire reality has resulted in that only public panegyrists could be treated as of legitimate value, while the very official criticism had a hallmark of a strictly supervised small ideological play of "straying from the right path". Criticizing the criticque meant being automatically classified into the ranks of an "evil enemy".

As already suggested, in the case of the matter of the succession of charisma two problems may be identified (Allen 2004: 108-109; Weber [1922] 1978: 246-249): (1) it may be solved through traditional mechanisms- (a) revelation, implies the selection of a charismatic by oracles or sages, (b) appointment, involves the selection of a new leader by the charismatic leader before his own death, and (c) search, involves finding the person (a charismatic) with a specific set of traits; and (2) *through the depersonalization* of charisma and its transfer on the principle of kinship, or to a separate institution. In the former Yugoslavia, the entire system was operated in such a way that the issue of charismatic succession was permanently postponed so that the cult of Josip Broz Tito was tendentiously built during his life. This process was set so that his mystical eruditeness, monumentality and deification, manifested in various "hagiographic" writings, were not taken as optional guidelines but as a duty, it was presumed that his prospective successor will have to apply Tito's revolutionary ideological postulates. In that sense, mandates for supporting party and state

functions were constrained, the emergence of new of charisma had to be obstructed. Tito's "totemization", monuments across the city, city names, photographs in schools and public institutions, it culminated even in pop-art iconography (t-shirts, badges, dishes and the rest of kitsch production).

The posthumous state of affairs in terms of "indisturbability" of the charisma of Josip Broz Tito was expressed in the most obvious and pregnant way by the worn-out maxim of the public discourse of the time: "After Tito comes Tito". More or less, if we assume that there is a difference between ideologized bureaucracy as a result of charismatic routinization, and neutral bureaucracy, positioned as an element in legal-rational orders within a democratic (pluralistic) power structure (Constans 1958: 400-401), my opinion is that the whole combination of succession activity was set up to displace the charisma to the level of the Yugoslav bureaucracy, with the "spirit" of Josip Broz Tito as the "personalized social and integrative content of the fragile multi-ethnic unity" (Kuljic 2009: 330). However, that non-Weberian bureaucracy torn between the level of normative prescription and the level of means-end, as features of everyday life, oriented towards itself and not enough (or nearly at all) bounded, charismatic bureaucracy as a ruling class, not only did it not accept its programmed charismatic status, but it played a key role in the breakup of Yugoslavia.

3. Metamorphosis of Serbian "Charismatic Discourse"- From Institutional Charisma to Personal Charisma and from Charismatic Institutions to Charismatic Personality

Slobodan Milosevic, born on 20 August 1940 in Pozarevac, was, as previously mentioned, one of the members of an elite stratum of the "charismatic bureaucratic class" of the former Yugoslavia. His personal qualities were not the crucial moment that would qualify him as a charismatic leader, which proves the fact that the personal traits alone, abstracted from the social and political context and personal strategies, are not a decisive factor of the charismatic "enthronement" (Smith 2000: 105; Pappas 2005: 194). After all, some of his moves, such as personal risk-taking that will be identified later in the text, can be treated as a consequence of his "moderate" disposal of certain qualities and behaviour characteristic of a charismatic leader (Riggio and Riggio 2008: 38). He was not too good an orator, nor was he bestowed with

charm or a sense of humour (LeBor, A. 2004: 30), but he had a sense of fabricated partisan determination and vigor, and also rigor, dishonesty and stubbornness of an archetypal party apparatchik (he had become a member of the Communist Party of Yugoslavia in January 1959).

The metamorphosis of Slobodan Milosevic, his charismatic initiation from a standard overly ambitious party "practitioner" to a charismatic leader took place in April 1987 after his famous line spoken in Kosovo Polje: "No one can beat you," which would represent his version of Tito's "big No," his own concentrated symbolic-ideological charismatic code. Kosovo Polje is a town and a geographical area of the Autonomous Province of Kosovo, referred to as the site of the Battle of Kosovo, that resulted in the loss of the medieval Serbian state and fall into slavery under the Ottoman Empire for a period of five hundred years. The myth of Kosovo was constructed around this historical event, and in addition to the myth of Saint Sava, it makes an extremely important, formative instance of the Serbian identity. In order to fully understand the profile of the swift political career of Slobodan Milosevic, we should note that in 1983 he became involved in politics professionally, that in 1984 he became the Head of the City Committee of the League of Communists of Belgrade, and that in 1986 he became the Chairman of the Central Committee of the League of Communists of Serbia. Before his "crucial charismatic turning point", the most important moment of Serbian political life was the Memorandum of the Serbian Academy of Sciences and Arts published by Vecernje novosti in two parts on 25 and 26 September 1986, and it is considered a strategic act of Serbian intellectuals. Pursuant to the Memorandum, the base of the Yugoslav social crisis was located in the irresponsible and nationalist-tinged politics of the leaders of the Yugoslav communists, especially Edvard Kardelj and Josip Broz Tito (Memorandum Srpske akademije nauka i umetnosti 1986: 20), which resulted in the preferential treatment of Slovenian and Croatian national interests and had represented a continuation of the Comminterian fight against the alleged Serbian hegemony over other "Yugoslav" nations (*Ibidem*: 18).

To this should be added decisions from the Constitution of 1974 that reduced the jurisdiction of Serbia to its territory without provinces, assigning a pseudo-republic status to the provinces of Kosovo and Vojvodina. This means that: "In order to satisfy the legitimate interests of Serbia the revision of the constitution inevitably arises. The autonomous provinces must become real integral parts of the Republic

of Serbia, by giving them the degree of autonomy that does not violate the integrity of the Republic and facilitating achievement of the general interests of the wider community (*Ibidem*: 31). The Memorandum states that the Kosovo Serbs had been subject to a genocide (*Ibidem*: 18), that resulted in a mass exodus of more than 200 000 Serbs during the postwar period (*Ibidem*: 24). The Memorandum ends with an observation that a solution to this situation should be sought within the principles of AVNOJ but that "Serbia must reckon with the fact that it depends not only on her, that others may have some other alternatives (Ibidem: 31)", and that "because of that it has been set a task of seeing its economic and national interests clearly so that it would not be surprised by events" (*Ibidem*: 31-32).

After the "crucial charismatic turning point" political moves aimed at consolidation of power occurred at an astronomical speed. Slobodan Milosevic acquired full control of the Serbian Communist Party, emerging victorious in the duel with Dragisa Pavlovic, the leader of the Belgrade party organization, and annihilating his political mentor Ivan Stambolic, the President of Serbia. These were followed by solidarity rallies in Vojvodina that turned into a public manifestation of discontent with local elites and acclamation of the charismatic politics of Slobodan Milosevic, and the rally of Brotherhood and Unity held in November 1988, that, according to Susan Woodward, by leaving room for a liberal, Europeanist and pro-Yugoslav option (Woodward 1995: 97), brought together a wide range of nationalists of all strata, ranging from communists and anticommunists, skilled and semiskilled workers, police, junior officers of the Yugoslav People's Army of predominantly Serbian nationality, anti-Titoist victims of various purges, country people and local party bosses (*Ibidem*: 92-93). The following year, on 28 March 1989 in Belgrade, the amendments to the Constitution of Serbia were adopted, that stripped the provinces of the veto power over constitutional changes in Serbia and part of the legislative, administrative and judicial functions, including control of the police, education, economic policy and the choice of an official language. The constitutional amendments were accompanied by conflicts of Albanians with the police that killed 22 protesters and 2 policemen in Kosovo.

Although the events "of the charismatic apparition of Slobodan Milosevic" in Kosovo Polje can be evaluated as a product of chance, as the absence of awakened charismatic self-promotion, they were

perceived as a higher transcendental turn that determined his true charismatic habitus. The symbolic context was more than indicative: where the suffering of the Serbian people began in 1389, a revelation also occurred: the inauguration of a new Serbian messiah. Salvation was finally offered to the Serbian people, along with the simultaneous process of divinization of Slobodan Milosevic and the demonization of all those forces that opposed his political project. Although at the beginning of his political career he was more a communist operative, Slobodan Milosevic slowly started to become a charismatic tribune, his charismatic rhetoric not only able to rule emotions of the masses, but also the masses. Here his ability of public simulation of all dimensions of the charismatic leadership should certainly be pointed out, from the manifestation of extraordinary giftedness of the leader to unconditional devotion, worshipping of followers, full occupation of all communication channels, that is, the mass media, so that no one can escape the charismatically programmed message (Bendix 1967: 348; Pappas 2005: 204). Although "media hagiographies" can be a double-edged sword, as they can initiate strategies for their avoidance by end consumers, they still remain an exceptionally powerful tool for validation and affirmation of high charismatic results even without the existence of miracles. Slobodan Milosevic confirmed the ability of the functioning of charisma under circumstances of high media manipulation. His charismatic credibility was consistently built and/or renovated by forcing testimonies of his extraordinary achievements and by projecting his own steadfastness into the promoted charismatic mission (Bendix 1967: 349), that is, even when media manipulation became a factor of disruption of his charismatic credibility, his charisma survived thanks to the formed charismatic relationships (*Loc. cit.*)

With this in mind, the last part of this paper will be dedicated to the "charismatic breviary" of Slobodan Milosevic (1989), his book *Godine raspleta (The Years of Unraveling)*. Leaving aside the position of Aleksa Djilas that it argues for narrow intellectual horizons and limited vocabulary of its author (Djilas 1993: 81), in my opinion its "martyric" simplicity and terseness, rituality in the construction of sentences and oscillating rhythm of the text and platitudes is the perfect stylistic backdrop for a "classic" charismatic narrative. It finally confirms that the charismatic "Slobism" was a specific abstruse ideological blend, a complement of Titoism with national elements; the ideals of equality, non-alignment, market socialism, avant-garde, equality, principles of AVNOJ, class justice and anti-bureaucratic revolution were adjusted or

replaced with national suffering, national fear for existence, national justice and national predestination. It was a confusing, at times absurd, intellectual setting, a world view politicized by the Memorandum of the Serbian Academy of Sciences and Arts (cf. Mihailovic and Krestic 1995), with the addition of a fanatical devotion to the cult of Josip Broz Tito. In this sense, the charismatic *differentia specifica* of Slobodan Milosevic lies in the fact that he is a self-proclaimed successor of the charisma of Josip Broz Tito and his charismatic community the successor to Yugoslavism.

Although the crisis situation is cited as the structural position that best favors the emergence of charismatic leadership, it is essentially a special form of crisis. In fact, it is a generalized crisis, acute crisis of full intensity, the one (Pappas 2007: 9; Tucker 1968: 743-744): (1) that endangers the whole of the population; (2) that has already occurred or is imminent; and (3) whose expected or actual consequences are substantial or material damage. In this sense, Takis Pappas identifies (*Loc. cit.*) as examples of such a crisis context: regular wars, sudden and violent changes of the political regime and a global economic crisis. About the crisis that he will permanently perpetuate and deepen, in his pre-charismatic stage Slobodan Milosevic said: "The economic crisis has undoubtedly strained the current, and caused new and more pronounced social problems. They are known. They are expressed by a large reduction of both personal and collective consumption; dramatic drop in the standard of some social classes in particular; unemployment; more widespread social differences with reasonable and alarming suspicion that they were not formed on the basis of work and work results, and finally- as in such situations almost regularly happens - by the visible erosion of morality and legality and confusion of moral values (Milosevic 1989: 49)". But in his post-charismatic stage, in addition to continually accentuated crisis, he envisions Serbia "with 10 000 dollars per capita (*Ibidem*: 316)", because "we cannot, either as individuals or as a society, be constantly poor and remain so in the prospects (Ibidem: 266)."

Furthermore, Slobodan Milosevic believes that: "Every nation has that eternal love that warms its heart. For Serbia it is Kosovo. That is why Kosovo will remain in Serbia (*Ibidem*: 275)", and that Serbs, Albanians and Montenegrins will continue to live in Yugoslavia (*Ibidem*: 343). At the same time, "Serbs should return to Kosovo from Smederevo and Kraljevo, and from other regions where they moved to, but they should

also return to Serbia and from Frankfurt and Vienna. They cannot develop their country by building German and Austrian roads and hospitals (*Ibidem*: 245)". Democracy "in both historical and theoretical meaning" is the establishment of the authority of the working class and all working people (*Ibidem*: 197)". It is certainly contributed to by the fact that "in revolution and war the Serbian people was not led by nationalists, informers and cowards, but communists, members of SKOJ, heroes (*Ibidem*: 183)." Enemies and evil are always at work because dissatisfaction with the Conclusions on Kosovo was expected from separatists, not the participants of the 8th Session of the League of Communists of Serbia (*Ibidem*: 170).

Opposition to post-titoistic bureaucracy was best manifested in Vojvodina, that was "an example of how this step was performed at the last moment, how the growing democratic forces of the society stopped, broke the bureaucratic-aristocratic circle that had a tendency towards the strong concentration of economic, political and every other authority in the decreasing circle of individuals (*Ibidem*: 303)." It is, therefore, important to know that: "In Serbia, unity was not established on hatred towards innocent people, but on solidarity with victims of violence (*Ibidem*: 334)", and in that sense "it is a positive, progressive, humane and historically justified unity not only of one nation, but most citizens, and it usually happens when a nation or a society is faced with the need to rectify this injustice (*Ibidem*: 334)." Finally, Slobodan Milosevic sees the solution to the crisis of Yugoslavia in the following way: "On our common future, and particularly the present, we need to agree calmly and friendly, without accusations, without suspicion and without inferior intolerance. There is no doubt that we can. But as long as anyone lives under delusion that someone can impose something on somebody through the so-called balance of power and coalitions, we will not move from a standstill in solving the crisis in Yugoslav society. For solving it through the so-called balance of power ignores the important fact that we are a federation (*Ibidem*: 329-330)."

It did not take long to get from such a formulated pacified narrative to the transparent war discourse. In addition to the clearly discernible transfer of the principle of peaceful coexistence of the Nonaligned Movement to the internal political sphere of self-management agreement, it also contained a latent, rhetorical announcement of an unbridgeable conflict hotspot. The idea of the protection of the socialist-Yugoslav idea, converted to the idea of the protection of Serbian nation, was always

accompanied by a "higher" quasi-antinationalistic, that is quasi-class and quasi-socialist, ideological matrix. Essentially related to this was the conceptual formulation of the enemy that was substantially built around the Kosovo myth, and the related set of ideas about the abstract "ultimate" enemy – a high mounted national metaphor of an anonymous, non-concretized enemy (in terms of its perceptual sublimated timeless model), that has to be resisted or Serbian identity will necessarily be lost. As main implications of Milosevic's interpretation of the Kosovo myth on this level I determine: (1) the idea of "heavenly enemy" based on the idea of "heavenly people"; (2) "heavenly enemy" represents something more unjust, making a higher, "diabolical or great injustice" an important prerequisite of all Serbian enemies, they are morally positioned as evil *per se*; (3) "heavenly enemy" is not only a national enemy, it is also evil in general, to beat the enemy would mean to restore justice to the whole Christian world; (4) regarding the fact that Serbian "heavenly people" fights against a "heavenly enemy", it is also a "people of liberation", "liberation people", and a "just people" *a priori*. Let us add to this: (1) the idea of self-importance- due to the fact that Serbian living space has always been in the field of interest of the dominant global powers in the region that have always tended to take away its freedom, Serbs have essentially been at "permanent" war, and have developed a strongly based collective identity; (2) the idea of the importance and sacrifice- Serbs do not wage wars with small, "epigones and satellites" of the great powers, but always with the most powerful, and every victim is justified if it leads to its preservation or struggle for independence; and (3) the idea of "civilization amalgam" and ingratitude of neighboring nations- Serbs always represented the Occident for the Orient and the Orient for the Occident, while those to whom they brought freedom always found reasons to declare them tyrants.

The authoritarian charismatic order of Slobodan Milosevic, regardless of its nationalistic basis, was actually based on instrumentalized mythological constructions of war as an "armageddonic" collision between "capitalism and socialism," "liberalism and social-democracy of the Swedish type", and the final showdown with the new world order, which resulted in treating the nations in the region as indirect champions of great evil who thus became enemies against whom everything is allowed and against whom ruthlessness is asked and requested. The ideal of Milosevic's enemy was an absolute enemy, materialized in the United States and the European Union, clearly marked as global and ultimate evil in a binary moral code, the pole

of "Milosevic's Serbian good" marked by ideological populist premises based on selective use of history and metaphors of fight against class and neo-colonial oppression, typical of the discourse of the second Yugoslavia. Milosevic's narrative of hatred was made up of emotional pathos, that on symbolic level always inclined toward being anational in explaining all actions that have been taken in the direction of the war (he only protected the rights of Serbs), while his dramatics always implied vengeful rhetoric of a man unfairly attacked by domestic traitors, ustasha-like[2] elements and Islamic fundamentalists. Finally, the path that began at the celebration of 600 anniversary of the Battle of Kosovo in 1989 ended with the loss of that same Kosovo, 11 years later, in an environment defined by mortal enemies.

Things changed with the democratic transformation that took place in Serbia. These transformations can be interpreted from the Weberian and Shilsian perspective. In fact, in modern (mass) democracies, status and functioning of political parties is perhaps the most striking example of possible Weberian installation (institutionalization) of the charismatic principle in the political life of a community. Due to the fact that the position of a party as opposed to an administrative bureaucracy is marked by the absence of coercion, it must win the elections in order to achieve its own goals through extrapolation (appropriation) of state funds and power. Agents of change in the setting of political values of a particular democratic system are, therefore, political leaders and their parties, they are the only ones able to control and alter a particular institutional structure. Those who take an electoral victory are able to legitimize the proclaimed values, first at the charismatic level and later at the legal-rational level, those who fail must wait for the next election cycle. The participation of masses in the political process results in two political arrangements: "democracy with a leader" and "democracy without a leader". The contemporary Serbia can be seen as "democracy without a leader".

Liberal "democracy without a leader" annuls the competition for fundamental political values, symbolic (political-cultural) frame of a regime, the electoral process is in a "political hibernation", reduced to a public applause, adulation to or manipulation with masses for the sake of state functions or, in other words, of authority, and the problem of

2 Ustaša – a member of Croatian Revolutionary Movement, fascist and terrorist organization which was active before, during and after World War II.

accountability is significantly increased. On the one hand, the template of such a position of political charisma implies that every time a (liberal) value structure of a democratic leadership (that is far below the threshold of a revolution, but certainly above the threshold of political reformism) is overlooked, when it is taken as unquestionable in the architecture of democratic systems, the entire democratic model is in danger of bureaucratization, i.e. the value treatment of the bureaucratic system *per se* (this certainly implies the view of democracy as a constant inquiring value and normative concept). On the other hand, this suggests the co-existence of democratically profiled charismatic value and symbolic templates that are in a state of constant competition and even conflict of different charismas in democratic institutions- the one that has yet to enter the process of routinization and the one that has already been institutionalized, and also the possibility of the emergence of charisma not only in crisis situations but also in the regular functioning of the democratic system.

As mentioned above, Shils' setting suggests that in a complex democratic situation we can speak of someone who gets a larger or smaller amount of charisma by the very act of belonging to a certain institution (and it expresses its closeness to the "transcendent" state of affairs), by the position (higher or lower) or role (significant or more marginal) he/she takes in a certain institution (at that: charisma tends to be spread across the whole institutional distribution of a socio-political order) and, independently of the previous two elements that position charismatic principle as value, symbolic and ideological connective tissue of a social-political order, by his/her individually proclaimed and collectively accepted charismatic singularity as a generator of institutional (social and political) changes. In my opinion, such conceptual positioning of charisma in democracies cannot be marked as "obfuscation" of the balance of powers, but as inevitable trait of a democratically acquired authority. When extreme, the state force (coercion) is a democratic legitimate power, if it was partly charismatically (valuably) verified by the will of the people. For Shils, if my interpretation is correct, there is a difference between being charismatic and a charismatic, that is, someone is charismatic for being, for example, a holder of the role of the state president, because the institution of the state president is already charismatic, and because he/she won the votes of the charismatic electorate or the people (citizens). Anyone who is institutionally charismatic may not be a charismatic,

in terms of special giftedness and the change of institutions. For Weber, if we accept the previous distinction, a charismatic precedes being charismatic, that is, the institutionalization or routinization of charisma; charisma is partly cyclical: it ranges from one charismatic to another, with declines in intensity through the process of routinization or institutionalization, but never so it completely disappears as an institutional element.

The current political leadership of Serbia draws its charismatic background almost entirely from the realized democratic metamorphosis on the line of Shils' systemic charismatic matrix. Ergo, the separation of the Serbian Progressive Party from the Serbian Radical Party, led in September 2008 by Tomislav Nikolic, the President of the Republic of Serbia, and Aleksandar Vucic, the First Deputy Prime Minister and Minister of Defence of the Republic of Serbia, and also the European "turn" of Ivica Dacic, the Prime Minister and Minister of Interior of the Republic of Serbia and the former Deputy Prime Minister and Minister of Internal Affairs of the Republic of Serbia in the Government of Mirko Cvetkovic, shouldn't actually be treated as charismatic turning points, acts of individual charismatic "inauguration". The idea is that in the above cases it is the case of the final shift away from "bad" charismatic leaders, negation of radicalistic premises of the "Seseljism" of Vojislav Seselj and the "Slobism" of Slobodan Milosevic, than of promoting new and authentic charismatic figures, of distancing that was more or less a mere political survival tactic. More precisely: it was more of a process of a unique "de-charismatisation", of subversion of charismatic movements whose followers they were, in the direction of the inversion of a personal charismatic potential with the charismatic background of an emerging democratic socio-political context. Such political moves implied a new historical instance in the Serbian political space. It is about a democratic value matrix that axiomatically profiled and postulated a possible cultural and symbolic content of their "pseudo-charismatic" manifestation determined by a democratic institutional structure, that is by a democratic political system. At play, therefore, is not a personal charisma or institutional charisma of Weberian provenance, but the identification of a potential personal charismatic code with the democratic systemic charismatic code, Shils' systemic charisma manifested through two narrative, content interventions.

On the one hand, a discursive recoding of enemies is taking place. All efforts for full political consolidation of the former Yugoslav region

are associated with the redefinition of the cultural code of the enemy, subject to promoting national iconography, as a result of persuasive action of still dominant elites of the war era. However, the Serbian political elite, that for the most part accepted the democratic value postulates, has, since the collapse of the regime of Slobodan Milosevic, been focused on the ways for founding relations among the nations of the former Yugoslavia on new assumptions. For this process, that is significantly burdened with war crimes, bombing of Serbia, the departure of Montenegro from the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia and the proclamation of the independence of Kosovo, it can be said that as far as the attribute "evil" appears in the definition of an enemy as a part of the national identity profiling, the likelihood of violence increases, while the syntagm "dangerous enemy" objectifies risk. Ergo, malice, as "pure malice" is deterministic and risk is probabilistic. Danger also creates space for non-violent engagements, and the newly established Serbian perception of the constituent nations of the former Yugoslavia as "absolute or natural enemies" goes toward "normal enemies" or opponents (rivals) with whom it is possible and necessary to negotiate, regardless of any potential disputes and disagreements.

On the other hand, a discursive recoding of corruption is taking place. Even before the authoritarian regime of Slobodan Milosevic Serbia was burdened with the problem of corruption, and the problem has, since the collapse of the former Yugoslavia to the present day, in addition to even more harmful and dangerous phenomenon of the criminalization of politics (most powerfully manifested by instrumentalization of the state for privately profiled objectives-usually through cryptic, parallel power structures located around the very top of the political establishment, and for the sake of a wide range of privileges and illegal preferential treatment), escalated to the level of a widespread trait of daily cultural functioning and cultural transactions of its citizens. When corruption is so widespread, whereby it is known that it is impossible to completely eradicate corruption even in the most organized societies, when it receives the status of a "cultural code" (an "implied public-operative norm"), then the interaction between the state and society, that is maximally freed of corruption and manifests benefits to all, may be slowed down by the fact that individuals fighting against corruption can consider their actions counterproductive- a government freed of corruption can have a negative impact to their employment and status. More or less, the "cleptocratic" setting of the functioning of the Serbian state became a public defect that does not

characterize only the nominally powerful, thus associating one of the most important forms of systemic charismatic manifestation with the symbolic deconstruction or "de-culturization" of corruption as the default transactional norm of institutional functioning and everyday life.

Conclusions

It is my opinion that in the case of Slobodan Milosevic there should be no talk about the process of ideological and symbolic creation of genuine charisma, but of the process of ideological and symbolic authentication of charisma. By this process I imply: (1) the possibility that someone who is not a non-institutional figure becomes a truly charismatic leader in the context of an institutionalized charisma; (2) the composition of a new symbolic structure, that will, if not "symbolically destroy", certainly reconstruct the symbolical complex of the routinized charisma that is abandoned; (3) the utilization of institutions with a declining intensity of the institutionalized charismatic authority of Josip Broz Tito, by Slobodan Milosevic, for the purpose of their "reintensification" in the sense of creating a new authentic charismatic leader; (4) the release of "the war charisma" of the apparatchik Slobodan Milosevic through the syncretic ideological merger of nationalism (of low or high intensity) with Titoism; (5) the perpetuation of charismatic qualities, ceremonies and rituals by persistent media manipulation.

Placing the current political leadership of the Republic of Serbia into spotlight, I think that if we accept the general democratic and charismatic foundations as the transformed integrative base of the Serbian society, we cannot register neither the generating of authentic charismatic leaders, nor the appropriation, inheritance of the institutionalized charisma, but the phenomenon of the charismatic stylization of the political leadership. Under the previous I include: (1) the initial "de-charismatisation" of personalized (malignant) charismatic movements to which they belonged; (2) the acceptance of the democratic value and symbolic complex and the rejection of the authoritarian radicalistic charismatic apperception of "Seseljism" and "Slobism"; (3) the inversion of the individual element with the systemic "charismatic" code, the attempt of taking the position of the interpreter of the transcendent charismatic order as democratically charismatic; (4) the social and political mobilization of actors by proclaiming a "peace charisma"

manifested through the symbolic and cultural recoding of the narrative of the enemy and the narrative of corruption; and (5) the simulation of a genuine personal charisma, a "pseudo-charismatic" status usually oriented toward the charismatic legitimization extracted from the will of the electorate and supported by media manipulation.

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Belgrade Confluence: Geographical Predispositions and Geopolitical Significance

Abstract

Geotectonic descent along the Sava fault caused the obliquity of the Pannonian Basin to the southeast, and consequently, the orientation of more river flows towards that zone. At its centre is Belgrade, the place of confluence of the Sava and Danube, and the focal point of a wider area where even more of their important tributaries flow in, the Drina, Kolubara, Morava, Mlava, Tamiš, Tisa, Begej ... Along their river valleys the communications have been routed, linking the Central European Pannonian, Carpatho-Balkan, Vardar-Aegean and the Dinaric-Adriatic entities, and flow into the Belgrade region. The same directions have routed the continuous migration flows, civilization contacts and economic trends. Thus, the area of the Belgrade confluence have become a zone of multidimensional concentration of - population, settlements, roads, economy, trade, education, culture, political power. The Belgrade confluence area is characterized by distinctive geopoliticality because it is located at the contact of large strategic entities and hub of key strategic vectors. Traditionally,

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the primate had a northwest-southeast direction, which, at the same time, barraged a competitive northeast-southwest direction. The valleys of the Danube, Sava and Velika Morava are the primary „axis" of these directions and their geopolitical functionis complemented by secondary passages, which also gravitate toward the southeastern of the Pannonian rim and Belgrade (Tisa, Drina, Kolubara ...). It is the geographical basis of forming *the Balkan geopolitical hub* – the historically continuous crossing of interests of the great powers. Therefore, the area of the Belgrade confluence has always been the subject of struggle for military-political-economic control. Along the Danube-Sava axis, there was a long fluctuation of the imperial transgresion-regression frontier, but there was also formed a central territory with the capital of the restored Serbia. Will the area of the Belgrade confluence remain the *centre* of the Serbian state and southeast of Europe or will again turn into a postmodern limes-split *periphery* of refeudalized Europe – this will be a key issue of its geopolitical future.

Keywords: convergence of rivers, Pannonian-Balkan contact, strategic areas, geopolitical vectors, Belgrade.

Introduction

In Serbian thesaurus of physical geography, there are different names for a place where two watercourses meet. These names mostly depend on the size of a watercourse, and thus a place where two stream, streamlets or small rivers meet is called *sastavci*, a place where two medium-sized rivers meet is called – *sutoka*, and a place where two large rivers meet is called – *stava*. For a place where one watercourse flows into another (or a sea or lake) usually one name is used – *ušće (confluence)* (Dukić, Gavrilović 2006: 71). A meeting of two river flows usually occur in one, more or less stationary point, however it is not rare that it moves under the influence of natural factors (tectonic movements, sediment accumulation, landslides, climate disasters, floods...) or anthropogenic activity (diverting of the river course, damming of a river, draining a terrain...).

A specific geotectonic and geomorphological assembly can cause gravitation of more river flows not towards one point, but towards one smaller geographic area or zone. That is how a „swarm" (system) of river confluences occurs at a relatively small distance. There is no adequate term for this phenomenon in the categorical apparatus of the Serbian physical geography (primarily potamology). *Porečje* or *višerečje* denote an area of high concentration of watercourses, but not their convergence towards one point or smaller area. From a logical-linguistic point of view, the most adequate Serbian term

would be *sutok(a)*, however, it has already been used for the joining of two medium-sized rivers – therefore, for the bifluvial phenomenon. Hence, for the spatial gravitation of more river flows (multifluvial phenomenon) the term *confluence* (lat. *con* – to, towards; *fluvio* – river) would be most adequate, although in foreign glossaries it is used for both bi-fluvial and multi-fluvial convergence.

There are not many examples of significant, major and multiple confluences in the world: in North America, in the city of St. Louis converge the Mississippi, Missouri and Illinois rivers...; in South America, towards Manaus are oriented the Amazon, Rio Negra, Madeira, Purus rivers..., and towards Buenos Aires the Parana, Uruguay, Negro rivers...; in Asia, enormous spatial and hydrographic proportions has the Indus, Bengali and Punjab confluence (many rivers that converge towards the Indus, Ganges, Jamuni, Brahmaputra...)... In Europe, there is no hydrographically more distinctive, historically more turbulent, anthropogeographically more complex and geopolitically more significant confluence than the Belgrade confluence. From geological, physical and geographical point of view, the Belgrade confluence was formed as a result of tectonic descent along the Sava fault, the obliquity of the Pannonian Basin to the southeast, and the Internal Dinarides to the north. Consequently, the orientation of more river flows of different quantitative and qualitative features was logically directed towards that area, where the altitutudes are lowest.

In the centre of that contact geographical area is Belgrade, a place of the Sava and Danube rivers confluence, but also a focal point of a wider area, where their larger tributaries flow in, such as the Velika Morava, Drina, Tisa, Tamiš, Begej, Kolubara, Mlava and Bosut rivers. The existence of confluence is the key physical and geographic determinant of the complex continental (European) and regional (Balkan) position of Belgrade, however it has not received a scientific and expert value judgement so far, nor has it been practically geopolitically and geoeconomically valorised. As a rule, the micro position of Belgrade in the northern part of the *Šumadijska greda* has been asserted, along the confluence of the Sava into Danube river on one side, and the macro position at the contact of the two major European entities, the Balkan Peninsula and Pannonic Basin, on the other. However, the meso-position as a chain of micro and macro positions, which is exactly the result of the complex Belgrade confluence, has been neglected.

Convergence of large rivers, as Belgrade's comparative advantage in relation to other cities in the Central and Southeastern Europe, was not taken much into account by the spatial planning of its position and development. This significance has mostly been embedded in the idea of the Belgrade metropolitan, but its projected spatiality is considerably larger. In some phases of spatial plans designing, the importance of the confluence for the future development of Belgrade has been pointed out. Thus, it has been stated that there are predispositions for achieving the status of „Belgrade as one of the more important cities of Europe" (Vučićević 2002: 107), emphasising that Belgrade is „located in the centre of the zone of extreme convergence of important European rivers (the Danube, Sava, Tisa, Tamiš, Velika Morava, Drina rivers), whose role through the history oscilated from integrative to barrier" (Vučićević 2002: 107). However, the final spatial planning visions were not based upon these properties, but, since at that time conjuncturally laced with the EU phanaticism, they almost entirely only pushed for the Danube axle in the documents (Vučićević 2004: 10).

Historical and Anthropogeographical „Magnetism" of the Belgrade Confluence

Although Serbian ruler Stefan Lazarević found Belgrade „destroyed and abandoned" at the beginning of the 15th century, he called it „the most beautiful place since ancient times". More than five centuries later, the glorius Le Corbusier[3] characterised it as the „ugliest city in the world at the most beautiful place on earth". Its *ugliness* is a paradoxical consequence of *the beauty of the place* which it is situated at. The history of conquests or defeats, destruction or chaotic reconstruction, status of the centre or a border posts, results from its *developmental place* – a unique phenomenon consisted of interdependance of a social and political surrounding and a territory that it occupies.[4] Although physical and geographic properties do not define the position of Belgrade deterministically, but possibilistically, they are the key predisposition – from sacral and geographic foundations to geopolitical complexity.

3 *Le Corbusier* is a pseudonym of the famous French architect (originally from Switzerland), whose real name was *Charles-Édouard Jeanneret-Gris* (1887-1965).

4 One of the founders of the Russian geopolitics P. N. Savicki (Петр Николаевич Савицкий) by the term developmental place (*месторазвитие*) defined the historical function of the space, considering that it arises from the specificity of the geographic position (*place*) and its influence on social processes (*development*) (see Савицкий 1927: 219-232).

However, they should not be considered separately but in comparison with predispositions of the positions of other, rival cities (of similar size and importance) in the Pannonian Basin and the Balkan Peninsula.

Which city along the Vienna-Bratislava-Budapest-Belgrade-Niš-Sofia-Constantinopole axis is comparable with Belgrade? On one side, it is not Constantinopole on a potamological („*river*-like") Bosphorus Strait, which is considered to be „the empress of cities", „the mistress of the world", „the eye of the Universe"[5], whose position of the Balkan-Asia Minor, or European-Asian „buckle" cannot be compared to any city in the world. On the other side, it is neither Sofia nor Niš, built along the small river flows, with a transit and junction role of only the Balkans rank. It cannot be the border city of Bratislava, or Budapest, to which only one part of the Pannonian Basin gravitates, although both are the Danube cities. A multi-dimensional antipode to Belgrade can only be Vienna. (*Map 1*)



Map 1: Vienna and Belgrade „gateway" – physical and geographic predispositions.

5 In the context of historical continuity, Istanbul (Constantinople), according to the majority of indicators, is considered a city with the best geographic position in the world during its long-time historical duration. A Byzantine writer Maximus Planudes called it „the empress of cities" and „the mistress of the world", and one of the most famous minds of the Byzantine world, John Eugenikos, „the eye of the Universe". D. Vukić used Evgenikos's lyrical syntagma for the title of his book *Constantinople – the eye of the Universe* (Vukić 2010).

- *Vienna* is situated along the „beautiful, blue Danube" breaking through the outermost eastern slopes of the Alps (Vienna Woods) and the western hillsides of the Carpathians (the Little Carpathians). Between them is the Viennese „gateway", as a passage that controls the Danube connection between the German northwestern Europe and mainly Slavic-Ugric part of the Pannonian Basin. The Viennese gateway is the place of contact of identitiy symbols of the continental (telurocratic) sacral and geographic duality – of the Pannonian „Plain" and „Steppe" in the southeast, and the Alpine-Carpathian „Mountains" and „Forests" in the northwest.
- *Belgrade* is „at the confluence of two rivers, under Avala", where, in its wider area, two large mountain masses converge – Carpathian–Balkanides in the east and Dinarides (Internal) in the southwest. That confluence of the mountain ranges formes the Belgrade „gateway", which is situated in the area where the Danube river valley is joined by the Sava river valley from the west and, a little further up, by the Morava river valley from the south. The Belgrade „gateway" is also in the continental (telurocratic) sacral and geographical contact analogue to the Viennese „gateway", however, it is inversely positioned – the Pannonian „Plain" and „Steppe" is in the north, and the Balkan „Mountain" and „Forest" is in the south. Belgrade is a paradigm of duality of not only Serbian sacral and geographical, but also geopolitical identity[6].

The Vienna - Belgrade axis routed military crusades, territorial conquests, epidemics of deadly diseases, expulsion of population and attempts of religious and national conversion, but also traffic, trade, economic migrations, cultural influences... Penetrations of the steppe, cavalry and nomadic people and warriors from the inland Asia could not reach further than the Viennese „gateway", however, for the German „*Drang nach (Süd)Osten*" they were always wide open. In contrast to that, the Belgrade „gateway" was much more passable on both sides and through them would usually blow the „historic draft". Belgrade remained the synonym not only for „the character of isolation and separation", but also „the traits of connection and permeation" (Cvijić 1991: 25,31) even when the deposited border of allochthonous (non-Balkan) empires and civilisations along the Sava and Danube rivers were forcibly established.

Passability and „magnetism" of Belgrade were predisposed by two key geographic characteristics of the Balkan Peninsula that make

6 Duality of the Serbian geopolitical identity is the result of a long action and interaction of many natural and social factors (see Stepić 2012a: 11-40)

it essentially different from the other two large southern European peninsulas:

- *The first* differentia specifica is that the Iberian and Apennine Peninsulas end as a „dead-end street" („*blind alley*") in the south, i.e. with relatively wide straits, on the African side of which, after a narrow Mediterranian belt, arises the endless and inhospitable Sahara desert. The origination of the Balkan Peninsula is not only Constantinopole, with the narrow, passable and in the second half of the 20th century, brigded straits of Bosphorus (660 m) and Dardanelles (1.300 m), but the southeastern vector continues further, to the centre of the old civilisations, holly places of the great world religions and largest planeraty oil fields.
- *The second* difference is that the Iberian and Appennine Peninsulas are separated from the „thorso" of Europe by a barrier of high mountain ranges of the Pyrenees and Alps, whereas the connection of the Balkan Peninsula and the rest of Europe is transient, contact – it consists of slightly ruffled hillsides, which in the north becomes the great Pannonian Basin. Furthermore, the Balkan Peninsula „neck" between Trieste and Odessa is a lot wider even than the eastern European (Odessa-Kaliningrad), central European (Trieste-Szczecin; Trieste-Hamburg) and western European (Marseille-Rotterdam) continental narrowing. It causes polemics among geographers even today whether or not the Balkan Peninsula is a peninsula at all.[7] Valleys of Sava and Danube, the rivers which outline the Balkan – Pannonian touch, together with the valleys of their tributaries as integral parts of the Belgrade confluence system, are physically and geographically predisposed for axes of political and territorial integration and multidimensional concentration (population, settlements, economy, traffic routes, capital, investments, overall power...), and not for barriers, as it often happened throughout history.

Geopolitical Aspects of the Belgrade Confluence

Position and significance of the geographic area in which the Belgrade confluence is situated, arises from a set of geopolitical

7 The specifics of the Balkan Peninsula compared to the Iberian and Apenine Peninsulas demand a detailed explanation, being the only way possible to understand the complex history and geopolitics of the Balkans (see Stepić 2012c: 13-15).

constants and variables. Among main and unchangeable facts falls its Balkan – Pannonian contact, which has a physical and geographic as well as anthropogeographic dimension. The other, important and unchangeable characteristic is the continentality (distance from the sea) of the space to which converge the Danube, Sava, Velika Morava, Tisa, Tamiš, Begej, Drina, Kolubara, Mlava and Bosut rivers. Along their river valleys tradicionally operate communication corridors, connecting the Central European-Pannonian, Carpathian-Balkan, Vardar-Aegean and Dinaride-Adriatic entities, confluencing in Belgrade. Along the same routes continuosly move migration and economic flows. According to that, the area of Belgrade confluence has always had a distinguished gravitation capacity.

Interests of the great powers are also constant, whose vectors networked the entire Balkans. They are especially thick and intersected in the territory of the central Balkan state – Serbia. Constant is also the epicentre of that „Balkan geopolitical knot" – Belgrade. However, the intensity of geopolitical, geoeconomic and geostrategic influence is historically changeable. It most frequently and strongly came from the northwestern (Germanic-Hungarian „block") and southeastern sector (Turkish-Islamic „block"), but it never ceased to be exerted in a specific way from the western hemisphere as well (Roman Catholic „block"). They are united by the newer vectors of the western maritime forces (earlier France and Great Briatin, and now the USA), which battling for the European, Euro-Asian and global domination, are trying to prevent the penetration from the northeastern sector, i.e. the Russian „block" (Stepić 2001: 99-101). The Belgrade confluence is an object of obsession, symbol and „key" of the struggle for dominance of the great powers in the southeastern Europe, but also the aim of Serbs to position their capital city in such „bleakness", to get involved in the international processes and become more of their active subject than manipulative object.

According to „the first law of geopolitics" (Dugin 2004: 139), relating to mutual confrontation of the „sea power" (thallasocracy) and „land power" (telurocracy), positioning of the Belgrade confluence, at first sight, should not be problematic. It should, according to its continentality and belonging to Serbia as one of only 44 states in the world (out of 193 UN members) without access to the sea, logically have telurocratic geopolitical identity. Moreover, not only to Belgrade, but all of Serbia

and all the Serbian countries as a „vent" for LLC-complex[8] served a big „land water" – Danube itself, which has often been self-deceptively proclaimed „the Serbian sea".

However, the already mentioned continentalistic, telurocratic code of the Belgrade confluence has been relativized owing to the wider geographic context, which gives to all of Europe, as a large western peninsula of the Euro-Asia mega continent, a maritime character. It is particularly evident when „the second law of geopolitics" is applied (Dugin 2004: 143), relating to historical-geographic urge towards territorial expansion and formation of strategic blocks. Thallasocratic transatlantic western integration under the leadership of the USA, formed and successively expanded after the World War II (NATO-EU), proved to be especially expansive after the end of the Cold War. With the joining of (besides other countries) Hungary, then Romania and Bulgaria, and finally Croatia, it completely surrounded Serbia and Belgrade confluence in its composition. Although it has (still) not shown clear intentions to "absorb" it in the near future, transatlantism does not hide its interest to have the full control of it, at the price of fragmenting it for that reason.

Historical and geographical peculiarity of the Belgrade confluence area is the oscillation between being on the border and centrality. Its status as well as its geopolitical function depends on it:

Fragmentation phase began when the border along the Sava and Danube rivers was traced. Instead of a geographic, demographic, economic, traffic and culturally logical cohesional role, militaristically and politically imposed fracture of the Belgrade confluence causes peripherality both of the part north and south of the Sava and Danube rivers. Even if the border was formally abolished, its relict influence would stay visible in the anthropo-landscape and collective menthal

8 *Land locked country* (LLC) is a term used in geopolitics to define a country of a handicapped position due to the lack of access to the sea. That deficiency is reflected in a reduced volume and level of diversification of the traffic activity, trade, turism and fishing, in lagging behind in modernisation processes and scientific and technological progress, country's sensitivity to economic and political blockade and marginalisation in international relations, especially in the post-Columbian period of the world's history. Confronted with continuous prevention to participate at sea, both in the ethno-spatial and state-territorial sense, the Serbian factor has started to treat the maritime orientation even as „sour grapes", and to seek the alternative in the Danube river as a trans-European, integrative „spine". Because of that induced, however justified „fear of the sea", Serbs have changed litoralisation with fluvialisation, concentrating more on the Danube, Sava, Drina, Una, Morava basins... (see Stepić 2004: 165)

map of the population for a long time. It happens despite the fact that on both sides of the (former) border are Serbian countries and people as a „buckle" that connects the peninsular and Pannonian space, i.e. the one that transforms physical-geographic Balkan Peninsula into geopolitical Balkans. (Stepić 2001: 161). Even today, the attempts are not given up to split the Belgrade confluence area by reviving the old, long non-existant border between the Islamic Otoman and Roman Catholic Habsburg (Austro-Hungarian) empires. Ideas have been actualised that, along the Sava and Danube rivers, through integral Orthodox Serbian space, a geopolitical „fissure line" is nostalgically activated between the (Neo)Mitteleurope[9] and (Neo)Orient. Immediately after the end of the Cold War and bipolar order, western theorists of civilisations, as the intellectual logistics of creators of the unipolar, globalistic „new world order", hurried to promote the necessity of reinstalling the border between the Western and Orthodox civilisations right on the Sava and Danube rivers, although it is, in reality, much further north and west.[10]

Integrality phase involves politically-territorial position of the Belgrade confluence area within the borders of one country. After

9 Term *Mitteleuropa* was first used by the famous German geographer Carl Ritter in the 1820s, however he did not precisely define it. Pioneers of the *mitteleuropa* concept were Friedrich List and Karl Ludwig von Bruck in the 1840s, however it is mostly linked to Friedrich Naumann, who elaborated its settings in the book *Mitteleuropa* (Berlin, 1915.). There were traditional however different geographic views of *Mitteleurope*, dominated by German and Austrian views. Compromised due to its aggressive, militaristic politics of Vienna and Berlin, the idea of integrating the heterogenic Central European space into pro-German sphere of interest in the second half of the 20th century was pushed aside. Furthermore, there were attempts (truth to be told unsuccessful attempts) to use more neutral terms of the Central Europe (*Zentraleuropa*) or Internal Europe (*Zwischeneuropa*) as well. From 1980s, especially after the fall of the Berlin Wall and the birth of the unified „German giant at the heart of Europe", the idea of *mitteleuropa* experienced a renaissance, and the German (Berlin-Viennese) ambitions of the great sphere of interest with the Danube river as an axis became increasingly apparent reality (see Orel 2012: 152-155; 322-337).

10 According to Huntington's (Samuel Phillips Huntington) concept of „the clash of civilisations", there is a contact of three out of eight or nine world civilisations in the Balkans, however the border between the Orthodox and Western civilisations (Slovenia and Croatia are in the Western, whereas the rest of the Balkan countries are in the Orthodox civilisations) is of crucial importance. In his famous article (Huntington 1993: 30), followed by the book (Huntington 1996: 26-27), he uses the map taken from the book *The Transformation of Western Europe* by William Wallace published in 1990, which was, before the collapse of the Soviet sphere of interest in the Eastern Europe, disintegration of the USSR and the war-shattered breakup of Yugoslavia, was interpreted as a proof of the pre-projected partial engagement of the West. The map shows the border dividing Belarus, Ukraine and Yugoslavia and joins its western parts to the Western civilisations (including Vojvodina, which it separates from Serbia).

the World War I, it was within a few variants of the complex Yugoslav state formation, then from the beginning of the 21st century again the independent Serbia as a residual post-Yugoslav country. Only if it is integral, non-fragmented by borders and part of one state territory, the Belgrade confluence integrates the northern edge of the Balkan Penninsula and southern edge of the Pannonian Basin, and gives an opportunity for its physicall and geographical predisponed potencial to be maximally used. Today it is „the heart" of the central Serbian territory – the elliptical areal comprising Novi Sad in the north, and Kragujevac in the south, composed of the referential statehood points of the modern Serbia (places of uprisings, the most important battlefields for the liberation and defence of the country, religious and cultural centres, traffic hubs, economically most developed regions, capital city...) (Vučićević 2002: 111)[11]. The Belgrade confluence partly belongs to the Administrative area of the City of Belgrade (so-called Statistical region of Belgrade) with 17 municipalities, it is partly located in the constitutional and legal amorphous central Serbia and partly in the more and more centrifugally disposed AP Vojvodina, while the western edge enters even into Semberija in the Republic of Srpska (the left side of the lower Drina river basin). Such spatial organisation is projected by numerous suggestions of transforming Serbia into a regional state. However, there are those who promote the idea of slightly expanding the Belgrade region and its constitution into „the capital city district" (Stepić 2003: 21-33), which would, with one trans-Sava (in the west) and trans-Danube (in the east) region not only encompass almost entire area of the Belgrade confluence, but also contribute to the reintegration of the Serbian state territory (Stepić 2012b: 25, 33).

The Belgrade confluence is a contact areal for three strategic zones (Stepić 2001: 150), the significance of which reaches not only regional, but also continental (European) and transcontinental (Euro-Asian) proportions. One is the *Pannonian zone*, which is often called the „Pannonian fan" for its radial bifurkation of strategic direction – until the fall of the Berlin Wall in the function of the Warsaw Pact, and now in the NATO service. The other is the *Dinaride zone*, in the capacity of mountainous strategic stronghold and the mediator between the Pannonian and Adriatic basins, which is why it is treated as the „Dinaride fortress". The third is the *Central zone of the Balkans*, with the Morava – Vardar valley as a strategic pivot, and Cvijić's „Central

11 See map „City of Belgrade – core in the territory of Serbia today", p. 112.

region" and „Territorial core of the Balkan Penninsula" (Cvijić 1987: 112)[12] in its composition. Through them penetrate, integrate and connect to the further strategic zones, vectors traced by river valleys forming the Belgrade confluence. But, they have different importance and hierarchical level (*map 2*):



Map 2: Belgrade confluence and key geopolitical vectors

- *Primary vectors* are Danube, Morava-Vardar and Sava vectors. Their river flows are largest, and their valleys are widest, longest and cut the strategic zones connecting them with other river flows. They already have historically confirmed geopolitic significance and trans-European (Euro-Asian) rang. Along them for centuries were oriented great military crusades, constant geopolitical ambitions of the great powers, (trans)national and great state projects, economic interests, traffic corridors, trade routes and cultural influences, but also established front lines, borders, quarantines, economically-political blockades, and „spring bords", bridgeheads and transgressional frontiers for further conquests. Trans-European Corridors 7 and 10 are determined along these vectors today as well, connecting the continental Central Europe with its south-eastern part.

12 See map at the back of Cvijić's book.

- The Danube vector has the highest significance as it allows integrative connections with many Europe regions. It does not have only terrestrial character, but the Danube river, together with the Rhine River and the Rhine-Main-Danube canal, presents the navigable "spine" of Europe connecting different, yet complementary outcomes on the shores of the North Sea and Black Sea.[13] Traffic and geopolitical importance of that diagonal is huge, primarily for the interests of the powerful Germany. Back in the first half of the 19th century, its south-eastern interests were projected with the *only justified direction – to the Danube river basin* (F. List). A hundred years later, those interests were precisely designed and in the World War II (unsucessfully) applied. However, its actuality is witnessed by projects and plans at the end of the 20th and beginning of the 21st century.[14]
- Morava-Vardar vector is an extension of the Danube vector to the south and the Aegean basin. It is the best physically and geographically predisposed trans-Balkan passage, however it is not without an alternative. The Post-Cold War expansion of the NATO

13 The channel from Rotterdam (the biggest European port) at the confluence of the Rhine river into the North Sea to Sulina at the confluence of the Danube river into the Black Sea is about 3.500 km long, significantly shortened by the Romanian channel from Cernavoda (on the Danube river) to Constanta (a port on the Black Sea). The important vector of that transversal, connecting 11 countries, is in Serbia (588 km) with its centre in Belgrade. The digging of the Rhine-Main-Danube Canal was a very expensive and complicated project, however, the integrative significance of the navigable European diagonal will be invaluable in the future (see Foucher 1993: 286).

14 A comprehensive plan of the Nazi Germany's expansion to the east and southeast of Europe aimed at „encompassing the space as a whole" (Ristović 1991: 271-289). Inter alia, it implied the regulation of waterways system in the Danube river basin, that would serve not only for military but also economic purposes (transportation of ore, oil, agricultural products…). Digging of the Rhine-Main-Danube, Danube-Morava-Odra-Baltik, Danube-Sava (Vukovar-Šamac), Danube-Morava-Vardar-Aegean sea (Smederevo-Solun) canals was planned, regulation of the Drava, Tisa, Begej, Sava rivers valleys, and the lower flows of the Sava river right tributatires valleys... (in the above-mentioned Ristović's book, between pages 280 and 281, see the map „Die Wasserstraßen des Donaugebietes und der Nahe Osten" from 1941). The most important of these ideas „the European Germany" realized immediately after the fall of the Berlin Wall and unification – in 1992 the digging of the Rhine-Main-Danube canal was finalized (the European Canal or RMD Canal). By 16 locks, the boats are lifted from 231 mamsl on the Main at Bamberg to the watershed at 406 mamsl, and then lowered to 336 mamsl on the Danube at Kelheim. The canal is 171 km long, 55 m wide and 4 m deep. Also, in Croatia, the digging of the canal between Danube at Vukovar and Sava across Šamac (in the Republic of Srpska) is starting, by which a mediation position of the Belgrade confluence would be avoided not only in the traffic sense of it, but also geopoitical. As one of the most important projects of the Government of Serbia (in 2012-2014 mandate) to launch the Serbian economy, building of the Danube-Morava-Vardar-Aegean Sea canal was publicly promoted.

and EU, i.e. inclusion of Hungary, Romania, Bulgaria and Croatia, actualized the competitive Corridors 4, 5 i 8, which are longer, more expensive and more unfavorably traced, however preferred because they bypass Serbia.

- Sava vector from the west joins the Danube-Morava-Vardar vector. After the breakup of SFRY, it became international, but its handicap is that it connects mutually confronted countries, including Slovenia and Croatia in the NATO and EU, and excluding Bosna and Hercegovina and Serbia. Therefore, for now it cannot maximally develop all its potentials (especially navigable and integrative).
- *Secondary vectors* are the Drina, Kolubara, Mlava, Tisa, Tamiš, Begej and Bosut vectors. These rivers are smaller, their valleys are narrower, shorter, connecting a few countries (1-3) and only partly cut the strategic zones. They are not navigable for larger ships and do not have the trans-European transit role. However, they are important for linking the Balkan-Pannonian contact zone and for geopolitical integration of the eastern part of the Serbian countries.
- The Drina and Kolubara vectors join the Sava vector from the south, from the direction of the Dinarides. Although the Drina vector has better natural predispositions (longer river valley, goes deeper into the Dinaride range, higher hydropower potentials...), the Kolubara vector is more important as it is closer to Belgrade and there is no border traced along it.
- Kolubara vector connects the southeastern parts of the Pannonian and Adriatic basins, and along that route the road and railway corridor Belgrade–Bar was traced (potencial Corridor 11).
- Tisa, Tamiš and Begej vectors complete the Belgrade confluence from the north and northeast, from the eastern – Pannonian direction (Banat). They mediate between Serbia, eastern Hungary and western Romania, whereas by extending the Belgrade –Bar direction to Temisvar, the potential Corridor 11 would not only integrate itself with the network of trans-European (it would connect with the Corridor 4), but it would also become important for the Russian southwestern („warm waters“) interests directed towards the Adriatic and Mediterranian Sea. In the future, along this corridor, forming of an integral vector, whose hierarchical level would turn into primary, is possible.
- Mlava and Bosut vectors are less signifcant, however their potential is high. The Mlava vector is a link with the Carpathian–Timok

Serbia and further with the lower part of the Danube basin. The Bosut vector is directed towards the Serbian parts in the western -Srem, eastern Slavonia and Baranja parts of Croatia (eastern part of the former Republic of Serbian Krajina).

Instead of a Conclusion: Geopolitical Future of the Belgrade Confluence Area

The Belgrade confluence area has always been geopolitically dynamic. In the future as well, its position and role will depend upon the processes at the national and international level.

Within Serbia, the Belgrade confluence area could keep its current role of a multi-dimensional centre and junction, with the administrative border of AP Vojvodina that cuts through it, but does not have a high degree of a barrier. In case the process of centralisation and concentration continues, Belgrade will become a hypertrophied city („big head on a small body"). However, such condition can change. If centrifugal trends in Vojvodina continue to stregthen, or aspirations towards the federal status or the separation from Serbia, and even a separatist incorporation in another country or integration (EU), its southern administrative border will become a political border. In that case, the role of the border as a barrier will increase. The area of Belgrade confluence will become fragmented, and the hallo-effect of the border will inevitably influence functional atrophy of not only Belgrade but Pančevo, Smederevo, Kovin, Stara Pazova, Sremska Mitrovica, Obrenovac, Šabac as well... In geopolitical sense they might, like until a hundred years ago, become vulnerable border cities. In another case, if Serbia transforms itself into a more integrated unitary or regional state (without autonomous provinces), the significance of the Belgrade confluence will be more expressed. According to that, it will be very important how, in the territorial and status sense, the administrative unit will be organised, and what will be its relation to other units in Serbia (especially to those in the Danube and Sava basins).

At the international level, the future of the Belgrade confluence is linked to the geopolitical future and status of Serbia. Should Serbia remain outside military, political and economic supranational integrations (primarily NATO and EU), Belgrade would not be able to use some advantages of its membership neither. However, both Serbia and

Belgrade would thus avoid the growing problems those organisations face as a whole, as well as, even more, their poor members with their capital cities. Despite that, the Belgrade confluence area will not remain isolated and marginalised. Even if Serbia should be admitted in the so-called Euro-Atlantic integrations, it will belong only to the third or forth hierarchycal level and periphery spatial „ring". In that case, Belgrade will have a role as one of the centres of the group of poor countries. It will build its position in the competition with Zagreb, Budapest, Bukurest and Sofia. If geopolitical and geoeconomic evolution of „Europe of different speed" goes towards creation of few macro-units or a more highlighted fragmentation, regionalisation and refeudalism, the Belgrade confluence has all predispositions to become gravitacional centre for political and territorial space constitution in the middle Danube basin, i.e. central and western parts of the Balkans. At the same time, on geopolitical „magnetism" of the Belgrade confluence count also anti-atlantistic, continentalistic, telurocratically oriented concepts. In the variants of reshaping the world from unipolar into multi-polar, some concepts of the Pan-Orthodox, neo (Bizantine) and neo (European) integration perceive Belgrade as one of the strongholds.

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– Road to Great War – Serbian Intellectuals and Austro-Hungarian Policy in the Balkans (1894–1914)

Abstract

The generation of Serbian Intellectuals who were active in the political and public life of Serbia at the turn of 19th and 20th century were considering problems of maintaining the attained independence of Serbia, a search for reliable support in foreign policy, integration of the nation and further economic, social, and cultural development. In the Europe characterized with complex relationships between the great powers, ambitious imperialist plans, instability and conflicts which were leading to the Great War (1914–1918), the Serbian intelligentsia, prevailingly educated in European university centers, was striving to find ways of accomplishing the idea of liberation and unification. The change of orientation in Serbian foreign policy, which began in the last decade of 19th century and was definitely confirmed with the raise of the Karadjordjević Dynasty to the Serbian throne (1903), was a manifestation of the need of Serbian politicians and intellectuals to facilitate liberation from economic dependence, development of the state and the national idea, by edging away from the reliance on Austria-Hungary. From the Congress of Berlin (1878), via the Customs War (1906–1911), the Annexation Crisis (1908) and the Balkan Wars (1912–1913), the interest of Serbian intellectuals in the policy of Austria-Hungary in the Balkans was growing and intermingling with issues of the overall further

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development of Serbia. The aim of this paper is to shed a light onto the origins and development of the interest and the thinking of Serbian intellectuals regarding the policy and interests of Austria-Hungary in the Balkans in the period which immediately preceded World War I. The attitudes and thoughts of Serbian intellectuals which were published in periodicals (the Serbian Literary Gazette /Srpski književni glasnik/ and the Work /Delo/), press, brochures and books, are viewed in the context of Austro-Hungarian imperial thrust into the Balkans, which started with the occupation of Bosnia and Herzegovina, and was definitely confirmed with the act of annexation and war plans. The efforts of Austria-Hungary to control the entire Balkans and occupy its central areas have also been studied in light of the confrontation between the two blocs of European powers, perception of the place of the Serbs and Serbia in the complicated international relations of the time, as well as in light of development of the Yugoslav idea, which was present among Serbian intellectuals prior to World War I.

Keywords: Serbian intellectuals, Serbia, Austria-Hungary, the Balkans, the late 19th and early 20th century, the Great War (1914–1918).

Serbian Intellectuals at Start of 20th Century

At the turn of 19th and 20th century, Serbian intellectuals were facing great challenges of preservation and further development of the Serbian state in the complicated international relations of the epoch of imperialism. The important feature of development of the Serbian state at the turn of 19th and 20th century was manifested through a powerful influence of the educated elite in political and social life (Grol 1939: 9–15; Radojević, Dimić 2014: 29–30). The periods of crises (turbulence and persecution in the Old Serbia – in Kosovo and Metohija, as well as in Macedonia, the Customs War, the Annexation Crisis, the Friedjung Process and the Balkan Wars) at the start of 20th century did not hinder cultural and intellectual development of Serbia. The number of educated Serbs increased with the progress of trade and industrialisation, through upgrading of the school system and planned sending of state protégés to foreign schools (Nemanjić 2001: 67). The belief in the importance of education and the state intervention in assisting the education of individuals who lacked financial means, resulted in the creation of a citizen ready to embrace and affirm the ideas of the epoch. Since the end of 19th century already, Serbian scholars and artists were successfully collaborating with their European colleagues, promoting their country at the same time. They published their views on the contemporary foreign policy issues, as well as the views of their European colleagues –

in periodicals, in the press, in brochures and in books. In this way, their ideas were paving the roads of further progress of the Serbian state, culture and nation.

The building of a modern Serbian state and the accomplishment of Serbian national objectives were priority tasks of Serbian intellectuals in the end of 19th and in the beginning of 20th century. By establishing national institutions – National Theatre (1869), Serbian Royal Academy (1886), Serbian Literary Association (1892), and other, foundations were laid for the first original scientific contributions in Serbian society. The most significant portion of educated Serbs were belonging to the generation which was educated or which gained higher education in European cultural centres. About 70% of the autochthonous Serbian intellectuals were educated within the three cultural circles: French, Central European and Russian (Trgovčević 2003: 44). Their knowledge and the ties they established during their studies enabled the Serbian society to build a state apparatus, reinforce the state and start the struggle for achievement of national objectives. The majority of the most prominent Serbian politicians and statesmen were educated in France and Switzerland in the end of 19th and the beginning of 20th century (Pavlović 2001: 159). Vienna and German university centres (Halle, Leipzig, Jena, Berlin and Munich) were the favourite studying sites up until 1905. France was given advantage only since 1913-1914, but Paris had had a special allure for Serbian students even before that time, because it was 'far from the absolutist regime of Austria' (Pavlović 1987: 189). In the second half of 19th century, it was customary for a student from Serbia to finalise his/her education in Paris, after the completion of graduate studies in Berlin or Heidelberg. Paris had therefore become the most important university centre for Serbs by the beginning of 20th century, which also coincided with political rapprochement to France(Bataković 1997: 73–95; Trgovčević 2003: 60). Due to education in a number of countries, Serbian intellectuals developed a more selective approach to foreign influences and they affected the influx of pluralist tendencies in Serbian culture.

At the start of 20thcentury, Serbia had 11,750 citizens with university education, out of whom there were 1,195 freelancers; however, if only those who exercised influence on public life through their activities and public engagement, are counted, their number would be 232

(Trgovčević 1996: 262).[2] In the *La Belle Époque* period, spiritual and intellectual views of Serbian intellectuals educated in Europe were in harmony with the norms of modern European civilisation. The Serbs educated in European cultural centres assumed important positions in the state apparatus, and in schools; they were founders of various associations and initiators of journals. The most important journals in which Serbian intellectuals were publishing their literary, scientific, as well as political works were the *Serbian Literary Gazette* and the *Work*(Palavestra 1992: 17–22; Ković 2001: 595–628; Ković 2003a: 363–378; Ković 2003b: 404–418; Kolaković 2010: 129–148). By integrating their professions with their political activities, Serbian intellectuals were leaving the boundaries of the sciences they studied. They were striving to aid and support educational and cultural elevation of Serbs – and not only of those in Serbia, but also of those living outside the motherland. The Serbian intellectuals involved in politics were organised in political parties (the Liberals, the Progressives, the Radicals, the Independent, the Socialists) (Nemanjić 2008: 43). They originated from different ideological and notional frameworks and they had different views upon foreign policy. It could therefore be said that the generation of Serbian intellectuals ahead of World War I (1914–1918) was heterogeneous in every aspect (Trgovčević 2003: 33). Still, the Serbian intellectuals at the start of 20th century were united behind the same objective – to steer the social and cultural development of Serbia towards a formation of the integrity of national identity and national consciousness (Palavestra 1986: 24–25)

Shift in Serbian Foreign Policy – Distancing from Austria-Hungary

Pursuant to the decisions of the Congress of Berlin in 1878, Serbia gained independence, and it was declared a Kingdom in 1882. However, its international position remained difficult. The Old Serbia (Raška, Kosovo and Metohija, Northern Macedonia) and Bosnia and Herzegovina still remained outside the Serbian borders, while – in accordance with the decisions of the Congress of Berlin, Austria-Hungary received the governance over Bosnia and Herzegovina, where the so-called Kállay's regime was instituted soon (Čubrilović 1982: 272; Kraljačić 1987; Ekmečić 1989: 330). Due to the policy of King Mi-

2 *Popis stanovništva u Kraljevini Srbiji , 31. decembar 1900. godine, drugi deo sa tri kartograma i tri diagrama*, Beograd 1905, CCV.

lan Obrenović (1882–1889) and the signing of the Trade Agreement and the Secret Convention in 1881, Serbia became vastly dependent on Austria-Hungary, both politically and economically (Ljušić 2001: 181–182; Rajić 2009: 43–58). Serbia took upon itself to pursue a foreign policy in accord with Austro-Hungarian interests, which entailed abandoning the Serbian interests in Bosnia and Herzegovina. Only Prince Milan Obrenović, Prime Minister Milutin Garašanin and Minister of Foreign Affairs Čedomilj Mijatović knew of the Secret Convention. When it became publicly known in the end of 19th century, the prevailing public opinion in Serbia was that renouncing the right to pursue independent foreign policy considerably compromised the state sovereignty (Radojević, Dimić 2014: 12). At the turn of the centuries, assessments of the decisions and consequences of the Congress of Berlin and the Secret Convention also prompted the reviewing of the Serbian foreign policy course. The prevailing sentiment among the Serbs with regard to consequences of the Congress of Berlin could be illustrated by the judgement written by one of the most prominent Serbian scholar, Jovan Cvijić, who – in the period of Annexation Crisis, when Serbia had already changed its foreign policy course, and when the plans of Germanic push to the South had been apparent, wrote the following: 'There is no state in Europe which would have so distinctively bad economic position as Serbia got it at the Congress of Berlin. After this Congress, Serbia virtually became an almost besieged country, and we became arrested people' (Cvijić 1908: 8).

The first attempt in making a move away from Austria-Hungary was encouraged by the intellectuals assembled around the Radical Party(Krestić and Ljušić 1991; Protić 2007, 189).[3] The conclusion of

3 National Radical Party or the Radical Party was founded on 21 January 1881 when its political programme was published in the party newspaper *Samouprava* (Self-Government). Its motto 'Intra-national welfare and freedom, external state independence and liberation, and unification of other parts of the Serbian nation' summed up the most important objectives of the programme. Constitutional reform; strengthening of the legislative power of the Assembly; simplified administration, the abolition of counties and the introduction of local self-government in districts and municipalities; progressive taxation; a people's army; general, compulsory and free education; support to the as yet unliberated Serbs; laws on the freedom of the press, public assembly and association, personal and property safety, those were the goals aspired for by the Radicals led by Nikola Pašić, one of the most important political figures in the history of modern Serbia. The Radical leaders were Swiss-educated (Nikola Pašić) or trained only at Serbian schools (Stojan Protić), their ideological core was made up in France (Milovan Milovanović). The Radical movement in Serbia functioned as a bridge betwen European ideas and the Serbian realities.

the Franco-Russian Alliance (1893) prompted Serbian intellectuals to concentrate on analysing relations with the great powers and defining Serbian expectations in view of the alliance of Russia and France. With strong ties to Russia and to the French Radicals at the same time, the Radical Party circles received the news of the Franco-Russian Alliance coming into effect (1894) with great jubilation (Protić 1990). The idealist expectations with regard to the Franco-Russian Alliance were expressed by Serbian intellectuals in a number of original texts, academic publications as well as in translations of texts from European press which spoke in favour of the support of the above-mentioned Alliance to Slavic peoples. In the Work, which was initiated by the Serbian elites close to the Radical Party, the conclusion of the Franco-Russian Alliance was greeted with jubilation and with the conclusion that a balance in Europe was regained.[4] Initiated by the Radicals, the standpoint that putting the Serbian issue on European agenda and its resolving could be achieved by relying on Russia and France, was gradually gaining followers among the wider Serbian public.

Since the end of 19th century, the Serbian elite – divided in a number of political parties, among which the Radicals had the crucial influence on political life of the country, was increasingly resolutely advocating the standpoint on the need of distancing from Austria-Hungary (Vojvodić 1999: 217–218). The weakening of authority of the Obrenović Dynasty, the conflict of King Milan with the Radical Party and the increase of popularity of the Radical Party, were gradually creating preconditions for a shift of Serbian foreign policy (Vojvodić 1999: 62–63; Kovačević 2004: 213–221; Vojvodić 2007: 190; Rajić 2009: 43–58). The arrival of Albert Malet in Belgrade in 1892, to be engaged as a professor to the future Serbian King, Aleksandar Obrenović, in the period when Nikola Pašić was the Prime Minister, had a clear political background and a support of the French Radicals, with the aim of neutralising the Austro-Hungarian and reinforcing the French influence in Serbia.[5] The first gradual move towards Russia and the West European countries – France before all, began with the Government of Stojan Novaković, from the Progressive Party, in 1895 (Vojvodić 1988: 153–155; Rajić 2010: 137–166). A politician of conservative orientation, Novaković

4 *Delo*, book 1(1894), 183.

5 Archives des Ministère des Affaires étrangères, Paris (AMAE), Correspodance politique, Serbie, vol. 13, tel. № 65, Paris 12juillet1892; V. Tambourini„Un Français en Serbie“,*Le Figaro*, 10 mai 1893.

turned towards France, an important factor of supporting the economic development of Serbia. At the same time, he believed it would lead towards gaining its diplomatic support.[6] With the shift of the foreign policy support to Russia and France, Serbian intellectuals were also pointing out the necessity of finding common grounds with the other Balkan countries, as a key to further activities.[7] However, the development of international relations was not in harmony with the needs of Serbia. Russia and France did not wish the raising of the Eastern Issue, but rather a preservation of the status quo in the Balkans.

Economic pressure exercised by Austria-Hungary resulted in the fall of Novaković's Government, and King Milan, as the commander of active army, returned to the country, together with the pro-Austrian Government of Vladan Djordjević.[8] Nevertheless, since the marriage of King Aleksandar with Draga Mašin, in July 1900, King Milan retreated from the political life of Serbia which created conditions a policy of approaching Russia and cooling the relations with Austria-Hungary(Jovanović 1990, 195, 198, 200–204, 221–242, 262, 276, 286, 338, 353, 359–364). At the same time, the Serbian state was attempting to get closer ties with France; however, Novaković, Serbian envoy to Paris in 1900, reported that apart from 'local issues'and a couple of colonial ones, 'no political agenda was pursued in Paris at all'.[9] Still, the Government of Mihailo Vujić was actively working on gaining Russian and French support during 1901, in the matter of construction of the Adriatic Railway, which would have eliminated the frequent obstructions to the Serbian trade and the isolation of Serbia imposed by Austria-Hungary (Vojvodić 1999: 152).[10]

As the battles were fought in the field of diplomacy, Serbian intellectuals were also observing the standpoints of European, before all of the French intellectuals on Austria-Hungary. The books of Charles Loiseau and André Chéradame drew special attention.[11] Loiseau's idea on the unity of South Slavs which appeared in the bookSlavic Balkans and

6 "Jedan srpski ministarski program (1895)", *Nedeljni pregled,* № 6 (43), 8. februar 1909, 84–87.

7 M. Milovanović, "Istočno pitanje", *Delo*, book 3(1894), 427–429.

8 Arhiv Srbije (AS), MID, PO, 1899, f. X, d. II, pov. № 3152, S. Novaković – V. Djordjević, Carigrad, 21. oktobar 1899.

9 AS, MID, PO, 1900, f. III, d. I, pov. № 1046, S. Novaković – V. Djordjević, 11. april 1900.

10 DDF, II, 1, Desportes de la Fossé à Delcassé, Belgrade, le 14 mars 1901.

11 *Srpski književni glasnik,*book 2 (1901).

Austrian Crisis (1898) instigated the idea of the necessity of creating one nation, which would be an ally of France and a powerful barrier against the thrust of Germany to the East. Loiseau's views were greeted with momentous approval among Serbian intellectuals. Hence, one of the first works presented in the Serbian Literary Gazette by Serbian politician, lawyer and historian Slobodan Jovanović, was Loiseau's Adriatic Equilibrium.[12]In Europe and Austrian Problem at Start of 20th Century, Chéradame indicated the internal problems of Austria-Hungary, its relying on Germany, the development of Pan-Germanic plans and a possible route of German push to the East, which would lead across the Balkans. Serbian intellectuals found confirmations of their views in the quoted works, as well as conceptual incentives for further analyses of relations with Austria-Hungary, which led to a definite shift of foreign policy at the start of 20th century, beginning with the dynastic upheaval in Serbia (1903) and the taking of the throne by Petar Karadjordjević (Vojvodić 1999: 225).

Serbs and Austro-Hungarian 'Civilising Mission' in Bosnia and Herzegovina

Facing the end of the Ottoman power in the Balkans and strengthening of the Serbian state, in its endeavour to reduce the Russian influence, Austria-Hungary secured the right to occupy Bosnia and Herzegovina at the Congress of Berlin. The head of administration in the occupied Bosnia and Herzegovina was Governor Benjamin *Kállay*, the former Austrian Consul to Belgrade (1870) (Ćorović 1939: 31–42). Although*Kállay* had learnt Serbian and written an affirmative history of Serbia in 1880's, he did not show much understanding for the Serbs as the Governor of Bosnia and Herzegovina. He established a regime of denationalisation, i.e. creating one unique – Bosnian nation. The*Kállay's regime* involved a strict control by the police, who were 'suspicious of everyone, constantly spying; there were places – luckily not many of them, where almost one third of the population were engaged in spying; he had an entire system of little resources on his disposal which he would use to spread fear, exercise pressure, provoke, kill any free movement and

12 N., "Charles Loiseau Les chemins de fer du Balkan occidental", *Srpski književni glasnik*, book 2 (1901), 395–396; N., "Charles Loiseau. La question du Simplon", *Srpski književni glasnik*, book 4 (1901), 470–480; S. Jovanović, "*Ravnoteža na Jadranskom Moru*od Šarla Loazoa, 1901", *Srpski književni glasnik*, book 3(1901), 61–67.

often bring individuals or entire groups of population in despair' (Cvijić 1908: 28). One of the primary features of the Austrian administration system in Bosnia and Herzegovina was 'systematic stir of envy between certain elements in the country' (Ćorović 1999: 78).

The terms often used in historiography to describe the Austro-Hungarian administration of Bosnia and Herzegovina were: 'modernisation', 'burden of the white man', and 'Civilising Mission'. The nature of the Austro-Hungarian administration in Bosnia and Herzegovina has been assessed in many ways within the profession (Tomlinson 2002; Said 2008; Todorova, 2006. Tejlor 2001; Ković 2011: 366 – 367). Some professionals see it as a positive process of modernisation and a project of civilising the Balkan population. However, the opinions based on post-colonial theoretical reasoning, which are searching for roots of imperialism and colonialism in art and science, do not agree with such attitudes. Historian Miloš Ković points out that the notion of 'Civilising Mission' in the 'semi-savage' Balkans was used as an ideological rationale for Austro-Hungarian imperial crusades, which the Serbian intellectual circle gathered around the *Serbian Literary Gazette* observed in the first decade of 20th century already (Ković 2011: 367–377). Using the 'Cultural Mission'phrase, Austria-Hungary was concealing plans of exercising a complete influence in the Balkans, in addition to Bosnia and Herzegovina and the areas of Sandžak of Novi Pazar. The extent to which the 'progress of modern civilisation'was brought to Bosnia and Herzegovina can be illustrated by an insight into the data on opening of new schools and numbers of literate people. There were five grammar schools and two secondary modern schools attended by 38% of Orthodox Christian students (Ćorović 1999: 129). By the year 1910, no girls' schools were opened. Literacy courses were banned at the same time, which resulted in 85.9% of illiterate population, while only 351,962 Orthodox Christians out of 800,000 had the opportunity to attend school (Ćorović 1999: 129). Obviously, education – as one of the principal development indicators of a society, was not on the priority list of Austro-Hungarian authorities in Bosnia and Herzegovina.

The field of culture was the only possible area of national activity for the Serbs who lived outside Serbia (Ekmečić 1983: 582). Individually, aided by the *Education* /Prosveta/ Association, or by scholarships granted by the Serbian Government, Serbian intellectuals from Bosnia and Herzegovina were educated in European centres (Ćorović 1999:

130). They were investing efforts to contribute to the development of the area in which they were born and to create cultural links with the intellectuals in their motherland. The de-nationalisation pressure, exercised by the *Kállay's regime*, met with resistance of Serbian intellectuals, notably: Aleksa Šantić, Svetozar Ćorović, Jovan Dučić and Atnasije Šola. Since 1895, these intellectuals assumed leadership over the *Gusle* cultural and educational association in Mostar and initiated the *Dawn* /Zora/ periodical, which specialised in culture and literature (Ilić 2011: 39, 56). At the same time, the *Bosnian Fairy* /Bosanska Vila/, which had started as a bulletin for educating masses with a limited field of influence, grew into a periodical which reflected the new cultural and political currents by the end of 19th century (Palavestra 2002: 407; Djuričković 1975; Rizvić, 1973). Edited by Nikola Kašiković, in collaboration with Osman Djikić, who was engaged on improving the cultural and educational life of Muslims, despite the persecutions, the periodical managed to outgrow the national boundaries of influence and contribute to the spreading of Yugoslav idea. In the period when literature was the main national activity, through which the middle class was able to determine strategic goals of the entire people, the activities of Serbian intellectuals form Bosnia and Herzegovina were of significant importance in the resistance against the 'Civilising Mission' of Austria-Hungary at the turn of the centuries.

Austro-Hungarian Imperialism and the Serbian Issue

When a group of officers, who did not agree with the policy of King Aleksandar Obrenović and the inferior position of Serbia to Austria-Hungary, carried out the change of dynasties, a definite change in the relations between Austria-Hungary and Serbia ensued. Divided into blocs, the great powers saw the changes in the Balkans, where the Ottoman Empire was counting its last days, as a serious threat to their imperial objectives. Austria-Hungary feared that, led by the Karadjordjević Dynasty and with the dominant political influence of the Radicals and the Independent Radicals, Serbia could become an exponent of the policy of the other bloc of powers – Russia and France, especially in view of the fact that England had abandoned the policy of 'Splendid Isolation' (Radojević, Dimić 2014: 51). The internal problems of Austria-Hungary, caused by the decay of agriculture, and the industrialisation process, which were generating nationalism in

middle classes, determined its foreign policy as well. The conflict with Hungarian nationalism and the development of Yugoslav idea were worrying the ruling elites in Austria-Hungary (Tejlor 2001: 237–239; Bled 1998: 563; Radojević, Dimić 2014: 49–51). Serbia was increasingly emerging as a 'summoning centre of pro-Yugoslav inclinations, as a brotherly, free and independent state' (Djordjević 1957: 215). The imperial Balkan campaign of Austria-Hungary, which had gradually been attuned with the German plans of Push to the East, was jeopardised by this, and Serbia became the main enemy.

Planning to destroy the Serbian state, towards which the pro-Yugoslav movements were inclining as to a 'Provenance of national unification', Austria-Hungary resorted to discrediting these movements and Serbia and instigating Croatian chauvinism (supporters of Josip Frank and the Croatian Party of Rights)(Radojević, Dimić 2014: 50–51; Krestić 1995: 644–650).Serbian intellectuals recognised this new phase in the fulfilment of Austro-Hungarian plan of assuming control over the entire Balkans and occupying its central areas. The pro-Russian policy of Serbia, championed by the Radicals led by Nikola Pašić,and the insistingof the Independent Radicals on shifting towards West European states in resolving the issues of local and international development additionally confronted the two countries. The intellectuals gathered around the *Serbian Literary Gazette*recognised that the imperialist – conqueror's ambitions and the pan-Germanic threat were lurking behind the 'Civilising Mission' of Austria-Hungary in Bosnia and Herzegovina and in the Balkans. After the Mürzsteg Agreement between Austria-Hungary and Russia in 1903,one of them, Kosta Kumanudi, warned that 'its entire policy has conqueror's ambitions in itself'.[13] Already in his student days in Lausanne,the founder of modern Serbian culture, Jovan Skerlić, had encountered theoretical explanations of imperialism and the attitudes of European – before all the French leading scholars, that Austria-Hungary, which had no colonies, was seeing the Balkans as its potential colony, about which Skerlić wrote in the *Serbian Literary Gazette*(Ković 2011: 368–369).[14]Adopting the 'Western' cultural matrices, proving the Western cultural identity and the 'cultural abilities' became the

13 K. Kumanudi, "Pogled na ulogu Rusije i Austrije u Istočnom Pitanju", *Srpski književni glasnik,* book 8(1903), 604–605.

14 J. Skerlić, "Omladinski Kongresi", *Srpski književni glasnik*, book 13 (1904), 126–127; *Ibid*, "Načelo solidarnosti", *Srpski književni glasnik*, book 11 (1904), 592.

chief precondition of a defence against the 'civilising'arguments of Austria-Hungary and in winning the support of France and the United Kingdomfor defending independence (Ković 2011: 369). At the same time, the Serbian intellectuals gathered around the *Work*, although they were not exercising the rigid devotion to West European cultural models, as the group gathered around the *Serbian Literary Gazette* did, also recognised the imperial ambitions of Austria-Hungary and their threat to Serbian survival. Although divided in their political and ideological preferences, Serbian intellectuals in the first decade of 20th century were able to notice and highlight the particular Austro-Hungarian interests in the Balkans.

The division into blocs could already be sensed in the Balkans during theMoroccan crisis in 1905. It was reflected in Serbia through resisting the Austro-Hungarian economic and political pressure by accepting the influx of French capital in the form of loan (Djordjević 1994: 142, 154). The predominant political influence of Russia and France, with the loans taken and weapons purchased, caused discontent in Austro-Hungarian political and economic centres, while the Serbian purchase of artillery guns in France in 1905, contributed to the closing of Serbian borders and the beginning of the Customs War between Austria-Hungary and Serbia (1906–1911) (Djordjević 1962: 210–248).[15] Dimitrije Djordjević identifies three types of manifestation of the offensive policy of Austro-Hungarian ruling elites towards Serbiain the period between 1903 and 1908. The Customs War, the Novi Pazar Railroad and the Annexation of Bosnia and Herzegovina were the key elements of the offensive policy of the military party and the clerical and capitalist circles, led by the Minister of Foreign Affairs Alois Lexa von Aehrenthal(Djordjević 1957: 215).The prerequisite of Austro-Hungarian imperialistpolicy of Push to the South was to secure thetraffic and political monopoly in the Balkans, before achieving a territorial one. Aehrenthaltherefore simultaneously initiated carrying out of the railway and the annexation plans (Djordjević 1957: 215). Serbian intellectuals realised the threat and they filled the pages of daily and periodical press writing about all the above-mentioned Austro-Hungarian projects. The *Politika*wrote: 'The Sword of Damocles will come even lower than it has been until now above the head of our tribe'.[16]The *Politika* was followed by the *Echo/Odjek/*which pointed out that the Novi Pazar Railway was a

15 *Odjek*, 29. decembar 1906.

16 *Politika*, № 1453, 2.februar 1908.

'mathematical formula of the Austrian Drang nach Osten /Push to the East/'.[17]

The break of the Customs War and the Annexation Crisis encouraged the Serbian elite to strengthen the backbone of its foreign policy, relying on Russia, by winning the support of Western European countries through economic integrations. For that purpose and in hope they would secure a favourable solution to the Serbian issue, Serbian Minister of Foreign Affairs Milovan Milovanović and other leading Serbian politicians were going to Berlin, London, Paris, and Rome.[18]In France, they were making efforts to present the Serbian requests as European interest of restraining Austria-Hungary. Nevertheless, France was cautious in granting loans, since it did not want a confrontation with Austria-Hungary, or preparations of Serbia for a war (Aleksić-Pejković 1965: 223).[19]The relations between France and Germany were important for Serbia, as part of the further relations of Serbia and the European Central Powers, namely Austria-Hungary. Milovanović was therefore highlighting the German support to Austria-Hungary, and the belief that the alliance between Germany and Austria-Hungary would remain strong for as long as Russia and France, together with the Great Britain, fail to resolutely oppose this alliance.[20]In the period of Annexation Crisis, the priority of the Serbian elite was to pull out Serbia without material and moral consequences and losses, 'with an increased moral esteemof Serbiaand strengthened international sympathies for Serbia'.[21]Milovanović agreed with the generally accepted belief in the circles of European diplomats, that France, Russia and Italy could not compromise their relations with Germany and Austria-

17 *Odjek,* № 34. 8. 2. 1908; *Odjek,* № 35, 9. januar 1908.

18 AS, Lični fond Milovan Milovanović (MM), MM–32, Beleške, 30. novembar 1908.

19 Serbian diplomat Milenko Vesnić sent reports from Paris in which he analysed the French press and concluded that France was not in the position to 'tighten the strings' with Germany. Elaborating the above-stated attitude in his letter to Jovan Žujović, Vesnić mentions the public support 'due to the increasing strengthtening of socialist and internationalist aspirations, and secondly, due to the fact that now it would be difficult to dissuade the French that the Moroccan issue would not be the main motive for a possible confrontation, and then again, under present circumstances, it is virtually impossible to wage a war because of it'. AS, MID, pov. № 180, M. Vesnić – J. Žujović, 1. juni 1905.

20 AS, MM–32, Beleške, 28. Oktobar – 10. novembar 1908; AS, MM–32, Beleške, 21. juni 1909; Centre des Archives diplomatiques de Nantes (CADN), Légation de Belgrade, № 168, Parisle 8. janvier 1909.

21 CADN, Légation de Belgrade, № 168, Parisle 8. janvier 1909; AS, MM–32, *Moja politika u bosanskoj krizi*, 29. novembar 1909.

Hungary because they were not ready for a war.[22] 'Europe does not want a war. The opposite side has more self-reliance and more reliance on its own power if it comes to a war […] There are other means but war; means of diplomacy […] Europe should be engaged on advocating our cause by diplomatic means', wrote Milovanović after consultations with the diplomats of the great powers.[23]The aim of all those visits, numerous meetings and consultations of Serbian intellectuals, as well as of the powerful action in Paris, where a group of French intellectuals supported the Serbian protest against the annexation, was presenting the Serbian issue to Europe.

At the time when all the Serbian statesmen were aware – as it was pointed out in the *Work,* 'that Austria-Hungary was a constant and living barrieragainst the economic and financial consolidation and development of Serbia',the activities of Serbian scholars and journalists in political and public life significantly influenced the confrontation of Austria-Hungary and Serbia.[24]This road, which several years later would be confirmed to have led to the Great War, was paved with Austro-Hungarian imperialistic ambitions and with the intentions of Serbian intellectuals to position the Serbian issue as a priority issue of international relations, by publishing texts in foreign languages. In addition to the information on geographic and economic position of Serbia after the Congress of Berlin and its aftermath, in his essay *Annexation of Bosnia and Herzegovina and Serbian Problem*, the Serbian scholar of European range, Jovan Cvijić,indicated the importance of Bosnia and Herzegovina for the Serbian people, described the 'spirit and meaningof Austro-Hungarian administration in Bosnia' and presented the Serbian problem. Among other, Cvijić warned Europe: 'Austria-Hungary is going to continue its aggressive policy towards the South. On its south border, it cannot stand the little Serbia, which is an opposition to it by the very fact of its existence, which must raise hopes for national independence in Serbian and Croatian peoples'(Cvijić 1908: 14).[25]Preventing a further incursion of Austria-Hungary into the Balkans was a priority and joint task of all the powers opposed to the

22 AS, MM–32, 28. oktobar/10. novembar 1908.

23 AS, MM–17, *Beleške*, 6. mart 1909; *Retrospektiva*, 20. mart 1909.

24 St. M. Protić, "Tajna konvencija izmedju Srbije i Austro-Ugarske jedan list iz novije istorije Srbije", *Delo*, book 50(1909), 21.

25 See: Cvijić, J. (1909) *L´annexion de la Bosnie et la question Serbe*. Paris: Librairie Hachette et Cie.

Central Powers. Cvijić therefore proposed that 'if due to the opposition of Austria-Hungary, Bosnia and Herzegovina cannot be united with Serbia and Montenegro – which would only be just, then they should be awarded such an international status which would facilitate their free national development' (Cvijić 1908: 47). In Cvijić's brochure, there werehints of the attitude of Serbian intellectuals that the solution to the Serbian problem should be linked to the imperialplans of the great powers and to resolve the issue of further development of Serbia in such complicated international relations, the issue which was turning into the issue of survival since the Annexation Crisis.

Austro-Hungarian Interests in Balkans at Time of Balkan Wars (1912–1913)

The declaration of annexation of Bosnia and Herzegovina in 1908, by which Austria-Hungary broke the provisions of the Congress of Berlin, changed the balance of powers in Europe and posed a definite threat to the European peace. The meeting of the Council of Ministers of 19th August 1908 was the key moment in which a political decision was made to destroy Serbia (Mitrović 1981: 76). Still, due to internal policy reasons, Austria-Hungary temporarily postponed the war with Serbia immediately after the annexation of Bosnia and Herzegovina. It chose to accuse Serbian politicians and a part of Yugoslav politicians for treason, and to organise show trials (The High Treason Process in Zagreb, the Friedjung Process in Vienna) by which 'the fabric of civilised behaviour, which used to give it an honourable appearance, fell to pieces' (Radojević, Dimić 2014: 62). Already since the Annexation Crisis, the French Doctor of Law and the Serbian statesman, Milovan Milovanović, pointed out in his encounters with foreign diplomats that the Balkans, i.e. Serbia was a point in which the interests of Austria were intermingling and colliding with those of Russia and Italy, as well as the interests of Germany with those of England. He was especially trying to draw the attention of France upon the fact that via Austria, Germany was penetrating into the Balkans, and then further east.[26] Nevertheless, France before all sought to maintain its economic interests in the Ottoman Empire and did not want further tensions in relations with Germany and Austria-Hungary (Vojvodić 1999: 226).

26 AS, MM–32, 23. mart 1909.

After the crisis caused by the annexation, Milovanović directed the Serbian political and diplomatic activities towards the fulfilment of national objectives in the South, as part of which the Balkan states were drawn closer to each other. With an active support of Russian diplomacy and due to openly conqueror's intentions of Austria-Hungary and the Greater-Albanian movement, conditions were created for establishing the First Balkan League in 1912(Cvijić 1912; Perović 1959; Djordjević 1994: 184–188; Aleksić-Pejković 1991: 25–32; Rastović 2013).[27] Interested in undermining the incursion of Austria-Hungary and Germany to the East, France – in which the Serbian intellectuals saw an important point of support for their diplomatic activities, accepted the Serbian-Bulgarian Agreement; however, it did not support a war option, although later it complied with the victories of the Balkan allies and the division of Turkish territory, expressing the interest in maintaining the anti-German character of the Alliance (Vojvodić 1968: 413–429).[28] In order to win as much support as possible in France, Serbia launched an energetic diplomatic action together with the other Balkan countries. Within the framework of this diplomatic action, French student Grgur Jakšić arrived in Paris in December 1912. As a representative of Serbian journalism, Jakšić's task was to use his contacts and connections in the French capital and to advocate Serbian interests before the French and European public.[29] Jakšić's mission in Paris was especially significant when a problem appeared between the Balkan allies and when the Bulgarian-Serbian conflict escalated and resulted in a new war in 1913. Public activities – through press and through a system of personal contacts and connections were the Serbian answer to the forceful Austro-Hungarian diplomatic offensivein this period behind which war preparations were concealed.

The victory of Balkan allies in the First Balkan War, and their subsequent mutual conflict in the Second Balkan War changed the political map of Europe. Serbia emerged out of the Balkan Wars with territorial extensions, having simultaneously raised its esteem among the South Slavs. After the period of Balkan Wars (1912–1913), the Austro-Hungarian hegemony was no longer jeopardised by Serbia

27 AS, MM–17, Beleške: Augarska, Srbija i Bugarska, Beograd, 30. maj 1909; AS, MM-6, 3. januar 1911.

28 *Dokumenti o spoljnoj politici Kraljevine Srbije 1903–1914*, t. V, v. 3, Beograd 1986, № 50, 80, 83, 86.

29 Narodna biblioteka Srbije(NBS), Hartije Grgura Jakšića, G.Jakšić – N. Pašić, R558/ IX/1619, nedatirano.

only, but also by the bloc of Balkan allies, with Serbia retaining the role of the 'central challenger' (Radojević, Dimić 2014: 63). The creation of Albania and the attitude of Austria-Hungary during the Skadar Crisis were the issues in which Serbian intellectuals could clearly notice the intentions of Austria-Hungary to assume control over the Balkans. In the 'Political Review' of the *Serbian Literary Gazette* The Foreign/ Jovan M. Jovanović/ maintains that the year 1912 was 'one of the most important years in the history of Balkan peoples', but that it was also important for the history of Europe.[30] In addition to the importance and the success of the Balkan allies, he also emphasised the success of Austria-Hungary in creating a new Balkan state – Albania. In his opinion, the other European powers accepted the Austro-Hungarian proposal due to the military preparations of Austria-Hungary, namely 'in order to avoid a war the results of which could have had serious consequences for many European states'.[31] The scenarios and confrontations manifested at the London Conference indicated to Serbian intellectuals that new challenges were looming before the Serbian state.[32]Serbianintellectuals close to the *Work*considered the followingon the standpoint of Austria-Hungary with regard to the Skadar Crisis: 'What Serbs and Montenegrins have won with all those casualties as well as what they have almost won is brutally taken from them and given to a new state – Albania. In fact, it is given to Austria. It is a well known fact, which Vienna is now not even trying to conceal, that the autonomous Albania has been created exclusively in the political interest and for the political objectives of Austria'.[33] By recognising the routes of actions of Austro-Hungarian diplomacy, the Serbian intellectual circles around the *Serbian Literary Gazette* and the *Work* were able to spot the seriously deteriorated relations and points of conflict between Austria-Hungary and Serbia.

Searching for Serbian answers to Austrian imperialist ambitions in the Balkans, Serbian intellectuals were consulting foreign authors. They showed interest in the work of French author Charles Loiseau, who was

30 Inostrani /Jovan M. Jovanović/, "Politički pregled 1912. godina", *Srpski književni glasnik*, book 30 (1913), 65.

31 *Ibid*, 67.

32 Inostrani /Jovan M. Jovanović/, "Politički pregled – Bugarska, Srbija i Crna Gora i balkanska politika", *Srpski književni glasnik*, book 28, (1912), 951; Inostrani /Jovan M. Jovanović/, "Politički pregled 1912. godina", *Srpski književni glasnik*, book 30 (1913), 68.

33 Politicus, "Politički pregled,Savezničke pobede Intervencja Evrope u Balkanskom ratu, Nelojalnost evropske diplomatije", Delo, book 66 (1913), 476.

close to Yugoslav circles, and when the issue of the new Albanian state was open, also the work of French professor and lecturer at the Belgrade University, Gaston Gravier.[34] The above-mentioned authors influenced the standpoints of Serbian intellectuals, and at the same time – in French publications which were also read outside the French borders, they were highlighting the problems in the Balkans in a scholarly supported and unbiased manner. The collaboration between Serbian and French intellectuals in the period of Balkan wars was one of the methods of struggle of the Serbian state against the Austro-Hungarian war plans, which were presented to the members of the Triple Alliance at the time of the Treaty of Bucharest. The outcome of the Balkan Wars and the British standpoint to avert a German predominance, were gradually turning Germany towards supporting Austria-Hungary (Radojević, Dimić 2014: 71).

Serbian Intellectuals and Start of Great War in 1914

Serbia ended the Balkan Wars (1912–1913) territorially larger and reinforced with an aura of victory, which also influenced the reinforcement of the esteem of Serbia. The echo of Serbian victories in the Balkan Wars spread to the Austro-Hungarian provinces and gave further impetus to the Yugoslav idea (Djordjević 1994:197). Intensified Yugoslav oriented activities of Serbian intellectuals gathered around the *Serbian Literary Gazette* and the *Work* were more noticeable on the eve of the World War I, in thereviewson new books of South Slavs and the works of prominent French scholars Émile Haumant and Andre Cheradame, who wrote about the crisis of Austria-Hungary and the Yugoslav idea.[35] As the two most widely read and most influential periodicals among Serbian intellectual circles, albeit with different agendas, the *Serbian Literary* Gazette and the *Work* viewed the Austro-Hungarian imperialist plans in the Balkans and the position of Serbia in a similar manner. The political texts published in the above-mentioned

34 Inostrani /Jovan M. Jovanović/, "Politički pregled 1912. godina", *Srpski književni glasnik*, book 30 (1913), 80; Inostrani,/Jovan M. Jovanović/, "Politički pregled Nerešena pitanja", *Srpski književni glasnik*, book 30 (1913), 151–152; "Beleške", *Srpski književni glasnik*, book 30 (1913), 239.

35 E. Oman, "Srpsko-hrvatska narodnost", *Srpski književni glasnik*, book 32 (1914), 359 – 374; M. "Balkanski rat i austrijska intervencija", book 32 (1914), 477; "Političke perspektive u Novoj godini", *Delo*, book 70 (1914), 154.

periodicals served as public rostrums where views were presented, as well as new information and proposals.

In spite of the political and economic crisis in which the Serbian state found itself in the *fin de siècle* period, a constant social development and cultural rise of the Kingdom of Serbia was noticeable, and therefore the Serbian intelligentsia turned the public disappointment and discontent, prompted by the external pressure exercised by Austria-Hungary, into the national agenda at the start of 20th century. Educated in Europe, Serbian intellectuals adopted the values of modern European civilisation and upon the return to Serbia, they would convey the knowledge and experience acquired in the course of their education and through the engagement in ministries, political parties, scientific and educational institutions, at the university or at schools, in newspapers and periodicals. On the eve of the First World War, Serbian intellectuals were active in a number of parallel, but interrelated fields, with the intention of strengthening and developing the Serbian state, as well as facilitating its survival under the attack of Austro-Hungarian imperialist campaign in the Balkans, concealed under the veil of 'Cultural Mission' in Bosnia and Herzegovina and accompanied by constant emphasising of the 'Serbian Danger', which needed to be 'neutralised'. Therefore, the internal activities of Serbian intellectuals (cultural development in Serbia and aiding the cultural development of the Serbs outside Serbia), as well as their foreign policy activities (diplomatic and propaganda activities in France) were the response to the Austro-Hungarian plan of controlling the Balkans.

The plans of Serbian intellectuals involved in the Serbian political and public life were directed towards the cultural development of Serbs, aiding the cultural progress of Serbs outside the Serbian borders, development of cooperation among the Yugoslav-oriented intellectuals, as well as the cooperation with French intellectuals. In the end of 19th and the beginning of 20th century, the Serbian intellectuals from the territory of Bosnia and Herzegovina , gathered around the *Bosnian Fairy*, the *Young Bosnia/Mlada Bosna/* and the *Dawn,* together with the groups gathered around the *Work* and the *Serbian Literary Gazette*, introduced Serbian culture and nation into a new era. Before World War I, the movement of *Young Bosnia* also appeared in Bosnia and Herzegovina. According to Vladimir Ćorović, the members of the movement were 'an interesting mixture of literary pickers and choosers, pure aesthetes, and national revolutionaries, who were very active and

whose ranks hatched some of the assassins' (Ćorović 1999: 117). The ground for diplomatic manoeuvres was built on the foundations of the cultural revival and development of the Serbian people.

As a consequence of the political and economic pressure of Austria-Hungary after the Congress of Berlin, which affected both its administration in Bosnia and Herzegovina, and the influence it had in Serbia after the signing of the Secret Convention, the idea of abandoning the reliance upon Austria-Hungary was conceived among the Serbian intellectuals, mostly those in favour of the Radical Party. The change of foreign policy was gradually gaining support among other political groups as well, and it was especially encouraged with the concluding of the Franco-Russian Alliance (1894). The diplomatic field of activities involved the search for support of Russia and France, and later that of the Great Britain. Serbian intellectuals who were involved in the political life of Serbia, Milovan Milovanović before all, were spreading their activities in diplomatic circles of the great powers gradually and systematically, using the knowledge, experience and contacts they had acquired in the course of their schooling abroad.

For the purpose of protection of Serbian interests, jeopardised by Austro-Hungarian ambitions to gain the absolute advantage in the Balkans, which became fully prominent in the period of the Customs War, the project of Novi Pazar Railroad and the annexation of Bosnia and Herzegovina, Serbian intellectuals firmly concentrated their field of diplomatic activities around accentuating the Serbian issue in the public and intellectual spheres of the Western countries, France before all. Paris became the centre of propaganda activities, and the first results of the collaboration between the Serbian and the French intellectuals were visible in the activities of a group of French intellectuals, who also recognised an indirect incursion of pan-Germanism in the Austro-Hungarian policy in the Balkans. With the power of academic arguments of Jovan Cvijić, diplomatic skills of Milovan Milovanović and Milenko Vesnić, and contacts in the journalist and author circles of Grgur Jakšić, Serbian intellectuals succeeded in getting the European public – and gradually also the diplomacy, interested in the Serbian issue. In the period of the Balkan Wars already, the French intellectuals saw the correlation between the Serbian issue was and the German push to the East and this lay the foundations of understanding the Serbian position and the development of Yugoslav idea on the eve of a war, which was to obtain a world war proportions.

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The Energy Policy of Russia in the 21St Century

Abstract

The desire to restore the role of a world power, as the Soviet Union once had, the Russian Federation under the new conditions could and will fulfil using its energy wealth. Two factors favouring that: first of all Russia's richness in natural gas and other energy sources, and second, the growing needs in the world, and especially in Europe, for oil, and even more for natural gas. For achieving its goal of Russia has developed a number of projects which primarily covers a wider Eurasian and Mediterranean area, as well as other global directions. In this paper, a detailed analysis of these factors and projects is provided.

In the implementation of its energy policy Russia is guided primarily by their economic interests that serve the specific aim to become a world power in international relations. This is indicated by a differentiated pricing of natural gas solely from Russia's economic interests.

The paper in this regard points to unwarranted expectations, often present in our community about the existence of emotional factors upon which Russia gave benefits to Serbia or any other Orthodox, Slavic, etc. country.

The general conclusion of the paper is that the partnership from both sides, not just the Russian, must be based on economic calculations, whereby, this countries where energy from Russia, particularly natural gas required, must reconcile with the fact that they serve to achievement of the political-strategic

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goals of Russia, but it cannot be avoided. However, they could call for fairer prices, even though the notion of fairness in economics is debatable. But there is no other way out, especially in a situation where even the rich countries are not investing enough in the discovery and development of alternative and renewable energy. It is left for the time when oil and gas reserves in the world will be exhausted to a greater extent.

Keywords: Russia, Europe, European Union, Middle East, Mediterranean, energy policy, energy, natural gas, oil, international relations.

Introduction

Countries owning natural resources have always used this comparative advantage as an instrument in their international relations with other countries. That said, traditionally the strongest assets in the international political arena are geographic location, population, military and economic power However, in recent times, due to increasing demand for energy sources, the energy sector emerged as one of the most important political leverage in international relations. This is especially pronounced in the relation of Russia with the European Union, as well as the rest of the European continent. Russia as a significant fossil fuel producer places energy resources at the centre of its foreign policy. This pertains especially to natural gas which Russia supplies to many European countries. Russia receives lots of criticism because of alleged protectionism and violation of the principle of free trade, especially from the USA and some other countries. Thus, energy policy as an instrument of Russian foreign policy is the subject of many political and expert analysis examining and investigating energy relations (deposits on one side and needs on the other), political relations and methods of using energy sources as instruments of political influence as well as defence from energy-political dependency.

In the past energy sources were used as a political tool especially during the Arab-Israeli conflicts in the 1970s. At that time, the Arab countries as fuel (petroleum and liquefied gas) producers and exporters tried to force the USA and its European allies to abandon their support for Israel. To that end the Arab countries drastically raised the price of petroleum. This attempt failed in its main intention, but caused significant changes in the energy sector of Europe and the USA. The importers started searches and scientific investigation of new energy sources. Especially in the automotive industry there was a re-orientation of production towards cost-effectiveness and saving, and abandoning the production of motor vehicles with large consumption. (Even Formula

One, with great resistance, introduced a limit of 300 litres of gasoline per car per race.) All these measures proved to be useful and became a general standard.

Russia used its energy potential as a foreign policy instrument in the past and uses it today. In the time of the Soviet Union, despite the bloc division and the sharp bloc rhetoric, the Russian energy sources and the European needs represented a positive connecting tie between the two parties.

Today, in the economic domain, the European Union sees Russia a resource base, which brings Russia more into a position of partnership than that of a political rival. Due to this, at the beginning of the 21st century, the antagonisms between Russia and Europe have been reduced to a low level.

The large deposits of energy sources, especially natural gas, in Russia, that Europe needs, makes their relation 'mutually attractive', which amortizes the political connotations of classic dependency relations in the negative sense.



Map 1: (Eke, 2009)

However, the criticism Russia receives for using energy sources as a means of influence and increase of political power in its surroundings and in Europe are not without base. The influence of political objec-

tives on the economy in Russia is in essence the extension of the theory and praxis of the real-socialism epoch and is the current inheritance of almost all countries of the former Eastern bloc.

The mutual intertwining of energy resources and needs on the relation Russia – Europe relies not only on the mentioned elements of physical connection and other mentioned factors, but also on the fact that Russia is the third global producer by the quantity of fuel produced, right after the USA and Chine, and also the third global consumer after USA and China. In total, Russia produces yearly 54071 quadrillion BTU (British thermal unit - contains 1.055 J) of energy, mostly petroleum and natural gas. China produces 79108, USA 73423. This fact presents Russia as a long-term trustworthy energy supplier to Europe. For its own needs, Russia consumes 30426 quadrillion BTU energy, mostly from solid fuels (coal and wood). This means that about 25000 quadrillion BTU remains available for export and supplies to the high-demand European space (World Almanac 2012: 114).

These relations confirm that Europe is the main and strategic economic partner of Russia in the energy industry. Arguments that Russia could direct natural gas in other directions, specifically China, have no economic base. China as the world's largest producer of energy sources has no significant need for import of natural gas. China imports large quantities of petroleum and 'a certain share of natural gas' (Petrović, 2010). 'Certain share' means that China mostly needs for natural gas from its own production. Things are different between Russian and China when it comes to petroleum. Russia signed in 2011 a contract with China according to which China will finance Russian petroleum companies with USD 25 billion, while Russia will supply China during the next 20 years with large quantities of crude oil through new pipelines (Antevski et al. 2012: 72). For finishing the East Siberia – Pacific pipeline almost USD 15 billion further investment is necessary. (Goodrich and Lanthemann 2013)

Russia has no other consumers of natural gas in its surroundings apart from Europe. Chinese needs for natural gas are insignificant, thus there is no economic justification for building natural gas pipelines in that direction. At the same time, there are neither technical conditions nor practical habits of use, and thus no need for the export of natural gas to South Asia. In contrast to petroleum, natural gas is a specific fuel. Serbia, compared to its neighbours Bulgaria, Romania, Hungary and Croatia, has not yet built technical conditions for a larger consumption of natural gas.

Regarding the dependency and interdependency of the European Union and Europe on one hand and Russia on the other, for Russia it is one entity. In the European space the dependency on Russian gas starts in Central Europe, that is, from Germany to the east and south-east. The countries of Western Europe are not dependant on Russian gas because they cover their needs for this fuel through pipelines from African sources of natural gas and import of fluid gas from the Middle East. On the other hand, Germany began building appropriate storage facilities only in 2010, cautioned by the experience of deadlocks in delivery of natural gas through Ukraine and Poland.

Russia, that is *Gazprom*, is the majority owner of all for gas pipelines directed to Europe. The controversy with Ukraine over the gas transport, ownership of the pipeline and storage of natural gas continues further without a final solution. The main question is contested ownership over natural gas storage facilities and pipelines built during the Soviet Union, which are almost entirely on Ukrainian territory. There are also historical and ownership controversy between Russia and Poland. Confronted with this problem, Russia started to build domestically located storage facilities, because currently due to lack of storage, 95% of natural gas has to be directly conducted into the gas pipeline network.



Map 2: (East European Gas, 2011)

The main stakeholders of the *Nord Stream* are Russia as majority owner and Germany with the Netherlands. The main stakeholders of the *South Stream* are Russia as majority owner and Italy. The owner of

the *South Stream* branch across Bulgaria and Serbia is also Russia, that is, *Gazprom*.

In Central Asia, *Gazprom* has, through agreements of Russia with in 2007, broadened its business capacity. As VoR (Voice of Russia, 2008) said, under the *Caspian shore agreement - project Gazprom* took the obligation to modernise and expand the capacity of gas pipelines on the eastern Kazakh and Turkmen shore of the Caspian Sea. The project agreement signed about in 2007 by Russia, Turkmenistan and Kazakhstan envisions the creation of a new route for transporting the Central Asian natural gas into Russia and further to European countries. 'The blue fuel for the *Caspian Shore* pipeline will be provided by the largest Turkmen source South Yeloten, with reserves are estimated at 4 to 14 billion cubic metres of gas' (Voice of Russia, 2008).

With this Russia will be able to double the transport of the Central Asian gas pipeline up to 90 billion cubic metres. Also, Kazakhstan will supply the first Russian petroleum pipeline to the EU area. This is the pipeline to *Burgas* (Bulgaria) and *Alexandroupoli* (Greece), 280 kilometres long (Petrović 2010).

It is estimated that by 2030 the consumption of natural gas will reach 22% to 29% of the overall world energy consumption. Also, it is estimated that natural gas will become the second most important fuel in Europe, after petroleum, while the third will be coal. Nuclear and renewable energy sources significantly lag behind (Poillard, 2013).

The supply of Europe with natural gas from Russia will depend in the future mostly on the Nord Stream and South Stream with extensions from the countries of western and southern Europe. Due to the Russian-Ukrainian crisis in 2006 and 2009, as well as the recent one in 2014, and the dispute with Poland, both Russia and the European Union wish to rely on these two new pipelines (Goodrich and Lanthemann 2013).

Vis-a-vis large energy resources of Russia are the long-term intensive needs of the EU and the entire Europe. Therefore Russia directed all its' surplus energy resources towards Europe. This is especially true with regard to natural gas which is much needed in Europe. China, as stated above, is not competing for the gas needed by Europe, and will not do so in the foreseeable future.

The strategic energy relations of Russia and Europe are not based solely on fuels. Tightly linked with fuels are the technological components produced by developed European countries, which are

used by Russia, i.e. *Gazprom* for the construction and renovation of gas pipelines and petroleum facilities. For these purposes *Gazprom* uses so called 'western technologies'. *Gazprom* renovated the refineries in Bosanski Brod and Modriča (Bosnia and Herzegovina) as well as the refinery in Pančevo (Serbia) etc. Also, for the construction of gas pipelines seamless pipes are used, from EU countries, especially Germany. Also, Russia uses western technologies for its own needs on land and sea for accessing and exploiting the sources in polar areas. This form of energy technology connection of Russia and Europe harkens back to the Soviet era when the USSR started the construction of pipelines to Europe, that is, former West Germany. The first natural gas pipeline was built with seamless pipes from the German company *Mannesmann* in exchange for natural gas.

The inter-connection of energy sources, energy needs and technologies between Russia and Europe feature not only mutual attraction and partnership but also synergy of positive effects.

Europe consumes, according to certain data, 17% of world energy and produces only half of that. According to the estimates of the *International Energy Agency* (IEA), in 2030 the European Union will import 90% of the petroleum needed, 70% of natural gas needed and 100% of coal needed. At the middle of the first decade of the 21st century dependency of the European Union from natural gas imported from Russia was 26%, and from petroleum imported from the Middle East 45% (Poillard 2013).

Energy components of the Russian foreign policy towards Europe

Russia, i.e. *Gazprom* is the single largest supplier of natural gas to Europe with 121 billion cubic metres supplied. However, larger quantity comes from other sources, a total of 155.5 billion cubic metres, from: Norway 86, Algeria 43.2, Qatar 15.9, Nigeria 14.4, Libya 10 billion cubic metres of gas (Poillard 2013). Because of this it is an important political goal of Russia to suppress other suppliers, especially those that are geographically further away and separated from Europe, through gas pipelines of large capacity and their extensions towards the west of the continent. Also, an important political instrument of the Russian energy foreign policy is the conclusion of individual contracts with European countries regarding the natural gas supply. In the present conditions,

whether just seemingly or for real, Russia controls the energy policy towards Europe. Criticism that Russia is trying to dilute and weaken the political homogeneity of the European Union through concluding individual contracts with European countries and diversifying the price of natural gas is confirmed exactly by this component of the relations between Russia and the EU, because the prices of Russian gas show a difference of up to USD 200 from country to country.

Although *Gazprom* never publicly discloses prices at which the natural gas is supplied to individual European countries, according to the estimates of the portal *izvestia.ru*, based on information from sources close to the company, the average price for European countries in the first half of 2012 was USD 413.1 for 1000 cubic metres. However, for five countries the price of natural gas is over 500 dollars: *Gazprom* exported at the highest price to Macedonia, USD 564.3 for 1000 cubic metres, than to Poland USD 525.5, to Bosnia and Herzegovina USD 515.2, to Czech Republic USD 503.1 and to Bulgaria USD 501 for 1000 cubic metres (Energy Observer 2013).

The other group consists of developed and semi-developed countries, with Serbia as an exception (based on personal income levels Serbia is among the poorest European countries). In the second group are: Slovenia USD 485,6, Greece USD 476,7, Serbia USD 457,3, Switzerland USD 442,2, Italy USD 440, Romania USD 431,8, Slovakia USD 429. In the third group are: Austria USD 397.4, France USD 393.7, Finland USD 384.8, Germany USD 379.3, Netherlands USD 371.4, Great Britain USD 313.4 for 1000 cubic metres of natural gas. Evidently the price of Russian gas in Europe progresses downwards from East to West. The criteria upon which the prices were settled are not disclosed and are probably known only to the contract negotiators and signers. The only certain thing is that, in addition to the economic criteria – to achieve the largest possible profit for *Gazprom* – an important role was given also to the political criteria, that is the political dimension similar to the one applied by Russia in the countries in its immediate surroundings. This dimension includes especially political proximity to Russia, that is to say political suitability or non-suitability. This can partly explain the above stated higher prices of Russian gas in Eastern European countries – the former members of the Eastern bloc. On the other hand, there is a logical economic explanation, indicated also by the explanation of experts close to *Gazprom*, on the example of the lowest price for Great Britain. Namely, Great Britain is the most competitive market in

Europe and *Gazprom*'s share on this market is only 10%, thus there is great interest to increase the market share with attractive lower prices (Energy Observer 2013).

In this context the situation of Serbia is interesting, who is in the second group after Slovenia and Greece with relatively high gas price. An analysis of Serbia's energy situation including South Stream gas pipeline project, which is designed to bring Russian gas to central Europe via the Balkans shows that instead completely relay on Russian gas it would be worth to develop own resources of renewable energy sources (Stojić-Karanović 2013: 224-226). In Serbia sympathy and affiliation to Russia is quite widespread among the population as well as among some politician, whether for emotional, ideological or tactical reasons. Probably Russia has adequate relation to Serbia producing the continuous expectation that Russia will provide concrete benefits based on mutual affiliation. The population's sympathies and affiliation are based especially on the shared orthodox religion and Slav heritage. However, the agreed upon prices of natural gas show that the factors of affiliation, shared religion and heritage do not create preferential treatment, i.e. benefits, because the above mentioned data shows that exactly the orthodox and the Slavic countries pay highest gas prices: Macedonia, Bulgaria, Poland etc. On the contrary the data shows that it is the highly developed countries who receive preferential treatment, like Great Britain, Netherlands and Germany (with the lowest gas prices), as well as Finland, France and Austria (with prices below USD 400 for 1000 cubic metres of gas). These comparisons are important also to reveal some misapprehensions that are widespread in Serbia, that is, to show that religious orientations and the Slavic heritage are not among the criteria of energy policy as component of Russian foreign policy. The agreed upon prices of natural gas, together with the infrastructural monopoly, manifest the main components of Russian foreign policy regarding the energy industry. Natural gas is sold at highest prices to countries that are most dependant on Russian sources. These are Eastern European countries, whose dependency is complete or near complete. The prices are adjusted to the level of dependency.

That is, according to Vladimir Putin, 'Russian power in Eastern Europe depends on its role as Europe's energy arbiter' (Ghaleb 2011: 87).

Priority of the Russian energy foreign policy towards Europe is to keep the ability to use natural gas as 'political weapon' in relations with the countries of the region. The dispute with Ukraine in 2009 about the

ownership over the gas infrastructure (pipeline and storage) endangered this ability and initiated the construction of the Nord Stream and South Stream. The British foreign policy expert Mark Leonard emphasises that 'Russia's power is growing because of its proven ability and willingness to use its natural resources, particularly its monopoly on natural gas, to weaken the EU' (Ghaleb 2011: 105).

It is exactly the Russian monopoly over infrastructure and gas supply that secures for Russia the bilateral agreements and differentiating European countries according to its own interests as not privileged, less privileged and privileged. Because of complete or great dependency on Russian gas, including the setting of prices, East European countries are on the viewpoint and demand protection from the EU in consolidation and integration of energy strategy towards Russia, that is to say the European Union should pressure for and obtain a uniform price of Russian gas for all members. However, these voices did not find support.

Instead of a Conclusion: Weighing Political and Economic *Pros* and *Contras*

For the construction of the Nord Stream and South Stream Russia secured strategic partners among the leading countries of the European Union. The most significant and key strategic partner is also the biggest economic power of the EU - Germany. The energy partnership between Germany and Russia harkens back to the days of the Cold War, that is, the Soviet era, surviving all crises, solidifying and developing to a high degree. With this Russia gains the opportunity to coerce the consuming countries (Ghaleb 2011: 66). However, the question is: is it only Russian coercion? The construction of the Nord Stream manifests the synergy of the two largest European nations. Despite opposition from the USA and some other Western and East-European countries (especially transit countries: Poland, Belarus and Ukraine), Germany and Russia signed the agreement and constructed the gas pipeline through the Baltic Sea directly from the Russian to the German shore. The agreement even contained a secret clause according to which Germany, for the construction of this pipeline, gives Russia a loan of EUR 1 billion. In a study of the Strategic Studies Institute of the U.S. Army this agreement was marked with the following words: 'Nord Stream is the child of the most notorious diplomatic alliance in Europe's modern history' (Ghaleb 2011: 119).

Therefore, the gas pipeline was constructed despite of opposition, just as Russia imposed, also in face of opposition, on the European Union and Europe different natural gas prices to each individual country. Intensive demands on part of the Eastern European countries, which are the least developed and at the same time exposed to the highest natural gas prices for the EU to establish a unified energy and political strategy towards Russia on the issue of natural gas are recklessly ignored. Germany was the first to reject those demands with support from several other European countries, especially France and Italy. Russia increased fuel export and strengthened the ability to 'coerce' with the construction of the Ust-Luga petroleum terminal in the Baltic Sea, which facilitates the circumvention of the Belarus system of fuel pipelines and the shipping of crude petroleum and petroleum products directly to the consumer countries (Goodrich and Lanthemann 2013).

The vulnerabilities of the transport of Russian natural gas to Europe will be eliminated with the construction of the South Stream. The primary strategic partners for the placement the increase of export of Russian natural gas, Germany and in extension the Netherlands create the possibility for Russia to enter West European countries, which were not until now consumers of Russian gas. The secondary strategic partner, Italy and the South Stream are bearers of Russian strategy for penetrating and extending energy power of Russia to the area of African pipelines. The goal of Russia here is also to increase energy dominance and political influence all over Europe, through competitive prices of natural gas and extension of pipeline networks to the Atlantic.

The dominant factor of Russian energy policy is natural gas, which will make Russia an 'energy super power' of the 21st century, but only in natural gas, not in petroleum, therefore international experts agree that Russia's energy future is in natural gas: "As the next decade unfolds, continued crises in the Middle East and growing concern about pollution and global climate change will inevitably focus attention on Russia's vast reserves of cheaper, cleaner natural gas." (Hill 2002)

Since the export of natural gas is used for political objectives, fuels and maintaining the monopoly on gas pipeline in East and Central Europe are of utmost importance for the Russian leadership. At the same time Russia's energy dominance and, with it, political influence in Europe are supported by the growing energy needs of Europe. According to current statistics in 2030 Europe will import over 60% of natural gas from Russia. The dependency of Europe from Russian

natural gas from pipelines will increase due to the foreseen decrease of natural gas production in Europe while the consumption is expected to increase (Goodrich and Lanthemann 2013).

The inevitable conclusion in short is that in gas trade there is a significant economic dependency on both sides, Russia and Europe as well. Having that in mind in weighing the political and economic dependency, the recently signed agreement between Russia and Serbia concerning the construction of the South Stream pipeline shows today unavoidable, and also useful not only for the contracting parties, but also for Europe. The realization of widely usage of renewable energy resources, that could ensure independence from oil and gas – remain in dreams of ecologists.

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Book review

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Srbija u Velikom ratu 1914–1918 [Serbia in the Great War 1914–1918], Belgrade, Srpska književna zadruga, Beogradski forum za svet ravnopravnih, special editions, Belgrade 2014, 300 p.

In the year of marking the 100th anniversary of the Great War (1914–1918), Serbian historiography has been enriched with a short history of the event that marked the 20th century, whose contours and indirect influences in the long historical processes can be recognised today as well. Mira Radojević, Ph.D., an associate professor at the History Department of the Faculty of Philosophy in Belgrade and Ljubodrag Dimić, Ph. D., a corresponding member of *SANU* (Serbian Academy of Sciences and Arts) and professor at the History Department of the Faculty of Philosophy in Belgrade, motivated by the need to affirm the academic findings of Serbian historiography and their integration into the existing results of the European and global historiography, have prepared both for the academic and a wider readership a book about the event that ended one historical epoch. Being aware that only nations knowing the truth about themselves have a future, as they highlighted in the Preface, they delivered to the readers a short history of Serbia's

position in the Great War. At the same time, the authors also decided to share the acquired historical knowledge of the First World War with the foreign readers, since it is expected that the book *Srbija u Velikom ratu 1914–1918* will be published in different languages.

The First World War is characterised by a powerful image in the collective memory which is also reflected through an increased interest in this topic, not only of the academic but also a wider public, even one hundred years later. A rebirth of the need to interpret the past is encouraged by the consequences of the First World War that outlined the history of the 20th century and impact the world of today. Events that occured during the turbulent 20th century created oscillations in the collective memory, so that selections and simplifications of the historical events and processes appeared. At the time of marking 100 years since the beginning of the First World War, we are witnessing an attempt to revise the history embodied in manipulation of historical events, occurences and processes for political interests and aims. The use of unsubstantiated and unverified facts, or willfully connecting historical facts in an order that would lead to an already preset hypothessis is a great danger of modern society. Through six chapters and a conclusion devoted to the Yugoslav unification, the book *Srbija u Velikom ratu 1914–1918* enables going back to the historical sources, historiographical heritage and academically argumented dialogue in highlighting the complex causes of the First World War outbreak, the course of the war operations, relations between the countries involved in the conflict and the consequences of the first worldwide conflict in the history of mankind.

A long prehistory of the beginning of the First World War encompasses the period from the Congress of Berlin (1878), decisions of which influenced the development of Serbia and its relations with other countries, primarily with Austria-Hungary. Although a several decades long process of the renewal of Serbian statehood was ended in 1878, the Serbian elite had a task to keep and strengthen the acquired independance, ensure fast economic development, modernisation, integrate the nation, and find the foreign political support and a guarantee of Serbian interests in the Europe of increased conflicts and imperial ambitions. How the Serbian politicians responded to these challenges and what was the development of the Kingdom of Serbia like until shots were fired

by Gavrilo Princip in Sarajevo in 1914, is part of Chapter One titled „From the Congress of Berlin to Sarajevo Assasination". Special attention in this part of the book has been dedicated to the influence that the Serbian elite, sprung from an almost illiterate background and educated mostly at the European University centres, had on Serbia's political and social life. Creators of Serbian foreign and internal policy reached the level of the European science and, regardless of political and social differences, nourished a common ideal in defending the state's independance and gathering parts of the Serbian nation that lived outside the Serbian state. Observation of Serbia's position in international relations at the begining of the 20th century through the issues of block devision, Moroccan Crisis (1905, 1911), Annexation Crisis (1908) and Balkan Wars (1912–1913), is linked to „reaching for the world power" and relations among the Great Powers, as well as the condition of their society and state apparatus. Processes leading up to the war are highlighted, particularly the increase of funds intended for military purposes and the outlines of the new military alliance of France, Russia and Great Britain, that changed the foreign policy position of Germany. The Habsburg Monarchy (Austria-Hungary), the crisis of its rulling structure, problems of the Balkan politics, positions towards the Yugoslav idea and Serbia are also viewed within a combination of complicated international relations.

The Annexation crisis, the staged High Treason Process and Frid-jung process, as well as the Balkan Wars, in the book *Srbija u Velikom ratu 1914–1918* are seen as crucial events that built the "obsession about Serbian danger" in Austria-Hungary. Under the influence of a war party behind which was the generalate, one of the main Austro-Hungarian foreign policy aims was to destroy Serbia by military force. Although Germany did not fully support the position of Vienna for a shorter period of time, the outcome of the Balkan Wars, the breakdown of the Ottoman Empire and the announcement of Great Britain that it wouldn't be a passive observer of the conflict between Germany and France, made it opt for the war. Military reinforcement of the Entente Powers in the autumn of 1913, influenced the consolidation of Germany's alliance with Austria-Hungary and the forming of position that the first next crisis was to be used for war. The issue of destroying Serbia or attracting it to the Central Powers, was „open" for Germany

when the Council of Ministers in October 1913 in Vienna gave approval to start the preparations for a war with Serbia. A motive to start the war was found in the assassination of the Austrian heir to the throne Franz Ferdinand on *Vidovdan* (St. Vitus Day), 1914, in Sarajevo. In Chapter Two titled „The Beginning of the Great War", based on sources and literature, the authors laid out the events, occurences and processes in relation to the Sarajevo Assassination and July Crisis. A secret, youth and revolutionary organisation *Mlada Bosna* (Young Bosnia), whose members carried out the assassination, the situation in Austria-Hungary and its relation with Germany, preparations for the war and relations between the Great Powers at the time of the Austro-Hungarian ultimatum being sent to Serbia on 23 July 1914, are in the focus of attention of the authors. The discontent with Austro-Hungarian regime in Bosnia and Herzegovina, implementing strict police control, performing a „civilizing mission", closing down Serbian national societies and not addressing the issue of serfdom, along with an idea of cultural unification of Yugoslavs, was reflected through the shots fired by Gavrilo Princip, that became a spark thrown in a „storage full of gunpowder". Serbian government was not aware of the Sarajevo Assassination preparations and was in conflict with some officers gathered around the secret organisation called *Ujedinjenje ili smrt* (*Crna ruka*) (Unification or Death (Black hand), led by lieutenant colonel Dragutin Dimitrijević Apis, Chief of Intelligence Department of the Serbian Army's General Staff. Nevertheless, already in the first days following the assassination, propaganda accusations about the involvement of the official Serbia in this act, as well as calling for responsibility, were started, with simultaneous preparations for the war in military and diplomatic circles in Vienna and mass expulsions of Serbs from the Habsburg Monarchy.

Srbija u Velikom ratu 1914–1918 sheds light on significant issues that are still the subject of polemics among historians today. First of all, it concerns the organisation and execution of the Sarajevo Assassination, France, Russia and Great Britain's response to the crisis, Germany's entry into the war, or its support to the Austrian „war current", led by General Conrad von Hötzendorf, Chief of the General Staff, which turned the war of potentially local character into the war between two blocks of powers. Chapter Two of the book, along with the situ-

ation on the frontlines (Western, Eastern and Balkan), discusses the issues such as the reach of coalitions, alliances and agreements signed in the decades before Austria-Hungary declared the war on Serbia on 28 July 1914 and before the Great Powers got engaged in the conflict. The attention is focused on the situation in Serbia in a year of war 1914 and problems that the Serbian army and state had when invaded by Austria-Hungary, with which it did not want to be at war. At the same time, the authors also point out the importance of the Serbian state programme. In war circumstances, with *Niška Deklaracija (Niš Declaration),* the Serbian elite equated the idea of the „three tribes of one nation" to „fighting for the liberation of home" and incorporated it into the state war programme and foundations of the future statehood.

Chapter Three titled „A Year of War 1915" describes war operations on land and sea with most attention oriented towards Serbia's military victories. Although the victories induced pride and the competence of the Serbian soldiers caused admiration, in 1915 Serbia was exhausted. Resistance offered by Serbia against a superior enemy attracted the sympathy of the general public following the visits paid by foreign military missions and intellectuals, reports written by Archibald Reiss, newspaper articles by John Reed and Henry Barby, missions by Henry Wickham Steed and Richard Seton-Watson as well as the French intellectuals Victor Bérard and Emile Owen who advocated for Serbs. The text of the book *Srbija u Velikom ratu 1914–1918* has been enriched with their testimonies of the traces of war and death from the entire territory of Serbia. Troubled by economic crisis, high costs of financing the war and epidemics of contageous diseases, destroyed roads and communications, in the year of war 1915 Serbia had no agreement outlining obligations and rights with the allied countires. The authors think that Serbia back then was „streched between aggressive enemies and selfish allies", who realised that it would be a long war and that, due to the unfavorable situation in major battlefields, it was necessary to attract the neutral countries – Italy and Bulgaria. The analyses of the allied diplomacy indicates that Balkan capital cities were „stock markets" in which the Entente Powers competed with the Central Powers. In such circumstances and without a more detailed knowledge of the signing of the Treaty of London between the allied countries and Italy, at the end of 1915 Serbia

confronted the combined invasion of the Central Powers and, after the government's refusal to capitulate, started to retreat and evacuate through Albania to Corfu, which one part of the third chapter is dedicated to.

The greatest battles of the First World War were waged in 1916, so the authors dedicated Chapter Four titled „A Year of War 1916" to the analyses of military operations and conditions on the frontlines, as well as to the forming of the Macedonian (Salonika) Front. The image of occupied Serbia, division of interest spheres and the plan of separation between Austria-Hungary and Bulgaria are argumentatively presented. The work of the Occupation Administration was based on ensuring economic exploitation, realisation of plans on permanent acquisition of occupied territories, and intimidation of Serbia's population. Intelligentsia and elite were to be destroyed, the use of Serbian personal names, inscriptions and language was forbidden, Serbian church buildings were desecreated, even the cultural treasures (treasuries of the Dečani, Ravanica and Manasija monasteries, Dušan's Code, archive materials) became the spoils of war. Relationship with the Allies, organisation of the Macedonian Front, as well as keeping the statehood continuity were issues of vital importance for a military broken and occupied Serbia. *Srbija u Velikom ratu 1914–1918* also actualises the issue of attitudes of French, Russian and British military and political leadership towards Serbia, i.e. how their plans in the Balkans and events in the major battlefields in Europe influenced the forming of positions towards the efforts of the Serbian government to protect Serbian interests.

Following the unsuccessful „peace offers" at the end of 1916, countries exhausted by the war and burdened with problems in internal politics, faced the new challenges. In Chapter Five titled „War and Revolution", the authors dedicate their attention to the major turning points of the war – the revolution in Russia and the USA's entry into the war, and the influence of these events on the course of the war and the position of Serbia. Already in the early 1917, members of the Triple Alliance and Tripartite Treaty started to observe the war aims of the Allies together with giving promises to the existing or new allies in terms of territorial concessions and support in the postwar period. The Inter-Allied Conference in Rome in January 1917, assembled to discuss the conditions of peace, implementation of war aims and battlefields in the

Balkans, and the London Conference in August 1917, were of multiple importance for Serbia with regards to the engagement of the Allies in the Macedonian Front. Knowlingly combining historical sources and literature, the authors decided to paralelly present the efforts made by the Serbian government in exile to maintain the Macedonian front, recognition of the Kingdom of Serbia's statehood continuity and support to the Yugoslav programme, as well as the life in occupied Serbia. The issue of Solunski proces (Thesaloniki Process), that ended the conflict between military and civilian authorities, members of the Black Hand organisation and the government and regent Aleksandar Karađorđević, has also been lightened. The outbreak of the revolution in Russia, abdication of Tsar Nicholas II Romanov, Vladimir Ilyich Lenin's coming to power and his proposals for the conclusion of peace, as well as economic, financial, military and diplomatic aspects of the USA entering into the war, made the government of Nikola Pašić engage more actively diplomatically in order to gain favor of the new war ally, internalise the Yugoslav issue and implement Serbian war aims. The authors of the book Srbija u Velikom ratu 1914–1918 associate the military and political position of Serbia, epitomised through a diplomatic offensive of the Pašić's government, with the adoption of the Corfu Declaration in 1917, as the foundation of the internal organisation of the future Yugoslav community. Thus, they opened the issue relating to the attitude of the allied governments towards the Declaration adopted in Corfu, as well as the issue of relationship between two Serbian states, Serbia and Montenegro.

Chapter Six titled „The Last Year of the War" encompasses the position of the warring parties, further course of war operations and the breakthrough of the Macedonian Front, as well as the issue of Serbo-Croato-Slovenian unification. In a concise and clear style, the authors described the difficult situation on the frontlines, social riots and demands that brought Austria-Hungary into existence, as well as the consequence that internal political conflicts in Germany had on the continuation of the war. At the beginning of 1918, the Peace Treaty in Brest-Litovsk disintegrating the Eastern front was signed, which made it possible for Germany and Austria-Hungary to concentrate their army units, outnumbering for the first time, in the west. The preparations for the Macedonian Front breakthrough, relationship between Serbia and the Allies, as

well as the course of the operation itself, are singled out as a separate part of Chapter Six in Srbija u Velikom ratu 1914–1918. It proved that Germany, even with three offensives, did not have enough power to win. By the signing of the act of surrender on 11 November 1918, the First World War, in which ten million people were killed, as many died, and twice as many were wounded, was brought to an end. By presenting the information on the number of victims, invalids, prisoners in the camps, material damage estimated at 360 billion dollars, as well as the change of borders, decreased economic development and the new world order, that the winners of the war tried to make according to their own interests, the authors motivate a reader to think about how the horrors of the First World war left a mark on the lives of contemporaries and future generations.

Parallely with the description of the course of the war, warfare operations, analysis of the relationship between Serbia and the Allies, the book Srbija u Velikom ratu (1914–1918) follows the development and implementation of the Yugoslav Unification idea, which, since the Niš Declaration, became part of the Serbian war plan. The final chapter „Yugoslav Unification" considers the issue of the Allied Powers's attitude towards the unificiation of Serbs, Croats and Slovenes into one independant and free country. Early at the begining of the 20th century, a perception that the unification was, basically, the issue of existence in the future, prevailed among the Serbian politicians, as the authors of the book Srbija u Velikom ratu (1914–1918) pointed out. Aware of the fact that destiny of the regions in the international relations is decided by the interests of the Great Powers, the Serbian elite opted for a strong action. The programme and course of the Yugoslav unification in the book Srbija u Velikom ratu (1914–1918) are viewed in line with its Balkan, Mediterranean and Central European dimension and diplomatic attitudes of the winning powers. For a new state to be created, which marked the change in the structure of the postwar Europe as well, it was necessary to have a consent from the Great Powers that Austria-Hungary should disappear from the political map, which was definitive in the last months of the war. Therefore, it is important that the book Srbija u Velikom ratu (1914–1918) re-examines the issue of the Yugoslav unification through a conference of the representatives of the Serbian government, Yugoslav Board, National

Council of Slovenes, Croats and Serbs and Serbian opposition in Geneva, in November 1918, the analysis of relationship between the Kingdom of Serbia and the National Council of Slovenes, Croats and Serbs, which was filled with distrust, a political dilemma whether to affiliate Vojvodina directly to Serbia and the resolution of the unification issue of Serbia and Montenegro. At the end of the book, the history of Serbia in the First World War, which Serbia entered into for the reason of self-defense, goes into the history of the creation of the Kingdom of Serbs, Croats and Slovenes, in which Serbia invested its statehood, built in the foundations of its entire history and tradition, sacrificing more than a quarter of its population.

The book Srbija u Velikom ratu (1914–1918) is a continuation of the Serbian Literary Cooperative's tradition of publishing books that are based on science and have educational purposes. At the same time, it is also about the academic response of the Serbian historiography to the attempts of making the role and function of history and historians in society meaningless. The need for a book that would enable understanding of the place and and role of Serbia in the First World War was recognised by the Diaspora, which helped the printing of the work made by two experts of the modern history of Serbia and Yugoslavia, through the Belgrade Forum for a World of Equals. Sublimation of experiences gathered by the Serbian historiography, which the authors prepared and enriched with their opinions, offers an image of the time and events, recognised as the most glorious in the Serbian history for its heroic feats, but also as the most tragic, as almost one quarter of the population of the Kingdom of Serbia died in the war. A multi-annual reasearch carried out by the authors on the subjects of the Serbian and Yugoslav history, primarily the history of the Yugoslav idea, Serbo-Croatian relations, problems of democracy and parlamentarism, the role of political and intellectual elite, the history of the Balkans in the 20th century, social, diplomatic and cultural history, makes it possible for the reader to find the original and scientifically founded interpretetion of the past of the First World War. At the same time, by the way they approached the subject, enlightened all aspects of the war and presented many details, the authors motivate the reader to re-examine the past over again. The book Srbija u Velikom ratu (1914–1918) isn't just a collection of historical knowledge, however,

by its existence, it is a permanent contribution to the development of culture of remembrance in the Serbian society. Knowledge and understanding of the events related to the First World War, created on the basis of a methodologically established approach to historical sources and literature, are a necessary part of the social memory of Serbs at the beginning of the new millenium, in which the Serbian people are facing the new challenges.

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