



SERBIAN POLITICAL THOUGHT

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ПОЛИТИЧКА
СРПСКА



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New Regionalisms, Border Problems and Neighbouring Policy: A Comparison Between Southeast Europe and East Asia

Abstract

Since the end of Cold War, what we call ‘new regionalisms’ has flourished in the world. In Europe, the process of EU enlargement has advanced to include former socialist countries of Eastern Europe. In East Asia there have emerged significant region-wide organizations: ASEAN expanded to include ten member states. In addition, the post-Cold War period witnessed the emergence of Asia Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC), the ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF), ASEAN+3, and EAS (East Asia Summit) and so forth. However, it is often said that the institutionalization of political cooperation in East Asia has been much slower compared with that of Western Europe. This paper examines some main features of regionalism in Southeast Europe and East Asia from comparative perspective, referring to the meaning of the border problems in both regions and the neighbouring policy of Serbia and Japan.

Keywords: Japan, Serbia, borders, neighbouring policy.

I. Changes in the Meaning of “Border” After the Cold War Period

1. Changes in Border Implications

As D. Newman states, we live in a world of lines, above all border lines. We may not necessarily see the lines, but they order our daily life practices, strengthening our belonging to, and identity with, places and

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groups in a society, while – at the same time – perpetuating and perpetuating notions of difference and othering (Newman 2006: 143). We are all cognisant of the fact that borders create (or reflect) difference and constitute the separation line not only between states and geographical spaces, but also between the ‘us’ and ‘them’, the ‘here’ and ‘there’, and the ‘insiders’ and ‘outsiders’. In this sense, borders retain their essential sense of sharp dislocation and separation, a sharp cut-off point between two polarities (Newman 2006: 148).

It has been proposed that borders have generally become more porous, weaker, and vulnerable since the acceleration of economic globalization and the collapse of socialist regimes in the early 1990s. Along with this line, one should point out that border studies have flourished since then. On this point, J. Anderson states that there exist three reasons for the academic development on the border studies; sudden proliferation of new borders with the fragmentation of the ‘Soviet bloc’ and Yugoslavia (which also produced some of the ‘collapsed’ or ‘pre-modern’ states); the differentiating effects of the EU’s ‘deepening and widening’ on internal and external borders; and the more general and fundamental transformations of existing borders with globalization (Anderson 2001).

First, it is important to note that the rise of nationalism and ethnic conflicts occurring in the process of transition from socialist and authoritarian regimes have rekindled our interests in the meanings of boundaries. In contemporary discussions, ethnic identity and the advent of the right of national self-determination as such have become the central agenda for the political constitution of the nation-state (Newman, Paasi 1998: 187). In relation to the second reason, I. Likanen points out that the process of EU integration and enlargement has deeply affected how borders and boundaries have been perceived, both in the realms of social sciences and public life. Furthermore Likanen goes on to contend that state borders, at least in Europe, are now getting consolidated into a new relative permanence, but their traditional barrier function appears to be diminishing remarkably, thanks in great measure to European integration and enlargement. This has opened up considerable room for diverse interpretations and research perspectives on borders (Likanen 2010: 21).²

2 A. Paasi notes that in Europe, states are reducing the significance of international borders, with clear benefits. Yet for most of the world they remain one of the defining elements of the polity. See also Ratner 1996: 606.

Regarding the third reason described above, E. Soja examines the meaning of boundaries in this period of globalization which in its manifold forms has loosened up older territorial boundaries of political power and cultural identity, and stimulated the emergence of new and different forms of bounding political economies and cultures at every geographical scale. Among the most useful and interesting ways to describe this loosening up and selective reconfiguration is through the terms “deterritorialization” and “reterritorialization” (Soja 2005: 35).

2. Advent of Border Studies After the Cold War Era

According to T. Tamminen, recently the spatial scope of analysis has become increasingly diversified, with the primary interests shifting from the level of nation-building or interstate relations to the global and the local level as well. Border-drawing that takes place at supra-national or sub-national level is seen to be as important an identity-producing practice as the border-drawing and maintaining actions involved in nation-building processes. Therefore, the borders studied are not merely physical but also mental: divisions between ‘us’ and ‘others’, enemies and friends, difference and sameness (Tamminen 2004: 404).

Referring to the recent characteristics of border studies, Tamminen points out that today the actual, concrete frontiers are no longer forming the centre of research interest: the focus is now on the geopolitical action that produces and reproduces them. Boundaries are no longer seen as ‘neutral’ territorial dividing lines or as simple political constructs. Their creation is considered to play an important role in the discursive construction of spatial and political identities (Tamminen 2004: 404).

Furthermore V. Kolossov states that traditional approaches explain the phenomenon of state borders first of all by political factors, interpreting them as a mirror of neighbouring states’ military, economic and political power. The essence of states, their policy and their hierarchical relations at the global and macro-regional levels were seldom taken into account. States were considered as given realities or ‘natural’ regions, acting as an integral entity (Kolossov 2005: 612).

We have traditionally understood borders (or boundaries) as constituting physical and highly visible lines of separation between political, social and economic spaces. Only more recently have we begun to understand that it is the bordering process, rather than the border per

se, which affects our lives on a daily basis, from the global to the national and, most significantly, at the local and micro scales of sociospatial activity (Newman 2006: 144). New approaches to border research suggest that political boundaries—as well as territories and their inherent symbolisms and institutions—are social constructs and processes rather than stable entities. A historical perspective is therefore inevitable in any account on the meanings of political boundaries (Paasi 2005: 18).

In this academic environment, A. Paasi refers to the important themes of border studies such as the implications of the existing (competing) boundary narratives for the ideas of identity, citizenship, political and territorial loyalties and territorialization of memory and the power relations that these narratives may reveal (Paasi 2005a: 670).

3. Postmodern Constructivist Approach to Border Problems

Recent studies include analyses of the postmodern ideas of territoriality and the 'disappearance' of borders, the construction of sociospatial identities, and socialization narratives in which boundaries are responsible for creating the 'us' and the 'other' (Newman and Paasi 1998: 186). New postmodern approaches successfully complement traditional methods of border study, considering boundaries and cross-boundary interactions at different levels (from the global to the local) and as a single system. For this reason, recent publications show that the scale of analysis is not naturally determined, but represents a social construct and can be used to define the object and the scope of a conflict.³

Newman refers to the common features of various border studies in the academic research. For political scientists, borders reflect the nature of power relations and the ability of one group to determine, superimpose and perpetuate lines of separation, or to remove them, contingent upon the political environment at any given time. For sociologists and anthropologists, borders are indicative of the binary distinctions (us/them; here/there; inside/outside) between groups at a variety of scales, from the national down to the personal spaces and territories of the individual.

3 See Kolossov 2005: 628. Postmodern approaches help us to understand how a political discourse can define the position and role of particular boundaries and borders in foreign and domestic politics and thus enable critical thinking about political choices; *Ibid.*

For international lawyers, borders reflect the changing nature of sovereignty and the rights of States to intervene in the affairs of neighbouring politico-legal entities. For all disciplines, borders determine the nature of group (in some cases defined territorially) belonging, affiliation and membership, and the way in which the processes of inclusion and exclusion are institutionalized (Newman 2006: 147).

Borders are no longer being understood merely in terms of boundary lines and institutional practices. Instead, the focus has shifted to social, political and cultural processes that construct both borders and our conception of the world (Likanen 2010: 21). In other words, boundaries should not therefore be taken for granted, as if they were elements with one essence, function and trajectory. Neither should boundaries be understood as having some universal, independent causal power. Here it is important to note that boundaries are social and political constructs that are established by human beings for human—and clearly at times for very non-human—purposes and whose establishment is a manifestation of power relations and social division of labour (Paasi 2005: 27).

Here one needs to pay attention to the significance of the postmodern or constructivist approach to border studies. Namely, the construction of identity narratives is itself a political action and part of the distribution of social power in society. Newman and Paasi emphasize that in the study of state boundaries, it is important to know whose 'plots' or 'turfs' dominate these identity narratives, what is excluded or included by them and how the representations of 'us' and 'them' are produced and reproduced in various social practices such as the media, education and so forth (Newman and Paasi 1998: 195-196).

One can safely state that our understanding of territories and borders is less rigid and less deterministic than in the past. Territory and borders have their own internal dynamics, causing the change in their own right as much as they are simply the physical outcome of decision-making. They are as much perceived in our mental maps and images as they are visible manifestations of concrete walls and barbed-wire fences. But the latter has not disappeared altogether and, in the existing ethno-territorial and political conflicts, borders are being constructed or moved – as a means of consolidating physical separation and barriers (Newman 2006: 146).

II. Characteristics of Regionalism in Southeast Europe

According to D. Bechev, from the constructivist perspective, regions are invented by political actors as a political programme; they are not simply waiting to be discovered. Regional identity, therefore, is what people, politicians and states make out of it; it is what meaning they inject into history and culture. What we learn from constructivists, therefore, is that geopolitical identities change over time and that defining others and drawing borders between 'us' and 'them' is a key step in the articulation of identities, be they national or regional. The Balkans has proved to be a fertile ground for those arguing about the critical role of imagination and 'othering' (Bechev 2004: 84).

There is no generally agreed definition of Southeast Europe. Moreover, numerous alternative names have been given to various parts of Southeast Europe; the Near East, the Balkans, and Turkish Europe and so forth. According to Bechev, the Southeast European project has been an attempt to overcome the area's marginalization vis-à-vis the West, but the emergence of a coherent regional identity was inhibited by the impossibility to draw clear-cut borders in order to demarcate Southeast Europe (Bechev 2004: 84).

M. Todorova examines the terminology of the Balkans in her book entitled *Imagining the Balkans*. As in the case of the Orient, the Balkans have served as a repository of negative characteristics against which a positive and self-congratulatory image of the "European" and the "West" has been constructed. With the reemergence of East and orientalism as independent semantic values, the Balkans are left in Europe's thrall, anticivilization, alter ego, the dark side within (Todorova 1997: 188).

In the wake of the resolution of the Kosovo crisis of 1999, the Stability Pact served as a turning-point in terms of defining and naming the region, rendering the use of the term 'South East Europe' central to its operations (Solioz and Stubb 2009: 6). Although SEE (Southeast Europe) was only at 'arms length' from the member and the candidate states of the EU from east-central Europe, the EU had hastened to fix its external border with SEE as early as the early 1990s, in order to insulate itself from the zone of 'disorder, war and backward area'. From the EU perspective, sub-regional cooperation in SEE must be understood in a new geographical environment. It should be acknowledged that the EU has started to focus in a new way on what happens beyond its borders (Solioz and Stubb 2009: 10).

Difficulties concerning regional cooperation in Southeast Europe are in general linked to conflicting definitions of such concepts as region and regionalism. Institutionalizing regional cooperation is a process of region-building. How to define Southeast Europe or the Balkans is a complicated issue. Moreover, the major dilemma associated with regional cooperation is the conflicting or contradictory understanding of the goals or significance of such a project. On one hand, regional cooperation can be understood as part of a larger European integration process; on the other, fears have been raised that the magnitude of regional integration thus brought about might even hamper the plans of those countries in the region wishing for a relatively quick integration into the Euro-Atlantic structures and which could lead to increasing isolation of the Balkan region (Tamminen 2004: 405-406).

III. Characteristics of regionalism in East Asia

Viewing the advancement of regionalism and integration processes, one of the most notable differences between Europe and East Asia is that the institutionalization of political cooperation (or regionalism) in East Asia has been much slower than in Western Europe. Undoubtedly, the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN), which was established in 1967, now stands as the most durable forum that has ever emerged in the 'developing world', and has proved to be an important vehicle with which the countries of Southeast Asia can manage and promote specific interests. However, the development of a wider East Asian regional grouping which, in addition to Southeast Asians, would include the major economies of Northeast Asia – China, Japan, and South Korea – had not gained any meaningful momentum until the late 1990s (Beeson 2005: 978).

Here one needs to point out some features of East Asian regionalism in comparison with the European one. Europeans have tended to seek political union based on collective sovereignty, whereas East Asians have rejected that goal. The desire to create a single market has been a major driving force leading to European integration, whereas most Asian governments see the complete elimination of economic barriers as more of a threat than an opportunity. Furthermore, national resistance to shifting sovereignty to a regional level is stronger in East Asia than in Europe. "This may partly explain why in East Asia the building of a security cooperation structure has so far been less than

productive. The sensitive concerns with national sovereignty, the state monopoly on foreign policy, and popular nationalism in East Asia have long impeded the formation of transnational linkages that could facilitate the development of a regional identity transcending national borders” (Frost 2008: 11).

According to B. He, the key to understanding Asian regionalism lies in nation-states. The core element of Asian regionalism is the centrality of the nation-states. While regionalism is an application instrument to national building, nationalism is always of the essence (He 2004: 120). In contrast to the projects for building nation-states and national economies after the Second World War, the project for region building lacks a clear objective, a shared vision, and strong political support. Political leaders in East Asia express an awareness of regional developments and frequently float proposals for various kinds of joint projects and regional institutions. But they extend very little energy persuading domestic constituencies about the importance of these ideas and devote very few resources to their implementation (Evans 2005: 196).

In addition to this, unlike the earlier European experience, American power has primarily had a constraining rather than an enabling impact on the process of regionalism in East Asia. Not only did the American policy effectively fracture the putative region along ideological lines for approximately fifty years (Beeson 2005: 979). In Europe, the exigencies of war-time reconstruction and the emerging bi-polar confrontation with the Soviet Union gave a critical spur to regional cooperation. In these political and economic situations, the American material assistance accompanying political leverage played a key role in directing the course of regionalism in Western Europe.

Things could hardly have been more different in East Asia. Not only was the Cold War a powerfully centrifugal rather than centripetal force in East Asia, but even when the region was eventually freed from its paralyzing influence, East Asian regionalism has accelerated pace despite American wishes. American power in such circumstances facilitated and encouraged European regional initiatives. In East Asia, however, American power has either made regionalism difficult because of the essentially bilateral strategic architecture it has created or actively opposed regional initiatives that threatened to undercut its influence (Beeson 2005: 982).

U.S. foreign policy in East Asia for the past half-century has been based on the concept of the so-called “hub and spokes,” with the United

States as the hub projecting its power into the region by means of bilateral alliances and arrangements with such countries such as Japan, South Korea, the Philippines, and so forth (Curtis 2004: 206). Since the end of the Cold War, however, U.S. strategy in East Asia has been rooted in three new assumptions. The first is that retaining bilateral alliances with Japan and South Korea will be of critical importance not only to contain any nation but to prevent the creation of a power vacuum and to facilitate the rapid deployment of U.S. military forces to meet contingencies as needed. The second is that East Asian regionalism, like Western European regionalism, is not necessarily inimical to U.S. national interests. The United States needs to avoid a kind of knee-jerk reaction to proposals for regional institutions of which it would not be a part. East Asian nations have vital interests in having the United States maintain a political, economic, and security presence in the region. The third assumption underwriting U.S. policy in East Asia should be that U.S. interests are to be served well by the birth of multilateral approaches to regional security (Curtis 2004: 207).

IV. Changes in the boundary of East Asia

‘East Asia’ is more a functional concept than a geographical one. The expansion of economic, political, and security interdependence has been constantly changing the scope of East Asia. If we follow this definition of the region, its geographical scope could be expanded or narrowed, depending upon the intensity of interactions in a specific issue area. In this functionalist approach, therefore, the boundary of East Asia varies with the issue areas.

Recently, scholars have turned towards a constructivist understanding of region as constant definition and redefinition. Regions are not longer being understood merely in terms of boundary lines and institutional practices. Instead, the focus has shifted to the political, economic, and military processes that construct the region. Regions are neither static nor permanent structures. As human constructs, they emerge, exist for some time and disappear.

From this constructivist perspective, it may be said that Japan’s mapping of East Asia has changed and fluctuated since the end of the Second World War; the Far East, the Northeast Asia, the Pacific Rim, Asia Pacific, and East Asia. In this sense, the boundary of East Asia has

been modified since then. However, in the constructivist approach, it is important to ask who invented these regions, and for what purposes and interests. Beyond the functional approach to regionalism, we must ask who needed these regional frameworks and whose interests they served.

In 1950s and 60s, 'the Far East' was in general use in security issues. Article 6 of the US- Japan security treaty says as follows: for the purpose of contributing to the security of Japan and the maintenance of international peace and security in the Far East, the United States can operate its land, air and naval forces out of facilities in Japan. In 1970s, 'North-east Asia' was widely used in the context of US military strategy, then in 1980s 'the Pacific Basin' or 'the Pacific Rim' in the development of economic interdependence between ASEAN and developed countries in this region, including the United States, Canada, Japan, South Korea and Australia. After the end of Cold War, the Asia Pacific, as in APEC (Asia Pacific Economic Cooperation), and East Asia, as in East Asia Summit, became commonplace expressions. As mentioned above, the boundary and range of East Asia has been changed and invented.

Regarding the member states or the boundary of East Asia Summit, there is no satisfactory consensus among member states (Terada 2006: 8-9). China insisted that ASEAN+3 should be the official members of East Asia Summit, but Japan pressed that India, Australia, and New Zealand should be invited besides ASEAN+3, accepting the proposal from the United States to counterbalance the influence of China in this region. After all, in the first East Asian Summit, ASEAN+3 and India, Australia, and New Zealand (ASEAN+3+3) participated in the Summit. In the 6th East Asia Summit held in Indonesia in 2011, Russia and the United States became the official members of the Summit (ASEAN+3+3+2). The United States is concerned about the rising Chinese power and how this will affect the developing East Asian regional framework.

V. Neighboring Policy in the Age of New Regionalism: Serbia and Japan

From a historical point of view, neither Northeast Asia nor the Balkans developed regional cooperation and regional identity in the modern age, because almost all countries in both regions got involved in

the great power rivalries and confronted one another. In the Cold War period, both regions were divided into two blocs. After the end of the Cold War many frameworks of regional cooperation were developed in the world, but both regions were faced with their own problems and could not construct regional cooperation schemes on their own initiative. In the Balkans, multilateral regional cooperation mechanisms such as Stability Pact for Southeastern Europe (SP) and South East European Initiative (SEEI) were founded after the settlement of the Yugoslav conflict. However, these cooperation processes have been mainly initiated by external actors such as NATO, the EU, and International Financial Institutions (IFIs), not by regional ownerships (Sadakata 2009: 109).

On the other hand, Northeast Asian countries could not even establish such a multilateral cooperation scheme. In the Cold War era, though three countries of Japan, China, and South Korea joined ASEAN (Association of South-East Asian Nations) scheme as members of ARF (ASEAN Regional Forum) and ASEAN+3, they could not develop a Northeast Asian regional cooperation framework on their own initiative. In order to substantiate regional cooperation, the good neighboring policy is indispensable based on a mutual understanding of the specifications of the regional geopolitical environment (Frost 2008: 11-14). From this perspective, I would like to examine and compare the neighboring policy of Serbia in the Balkans with that of Japan in Northeast Asia.

1. Serbia and its Neighboring Policy

In the 1960s and 1970s the main point of Yugoslav diplomacy was to pursue a non-aligned foreign policy with Asian-African countries. However, in the post-Tito era, Yugoslavia began to emphasize the importance of cooperation with the Balkan countries for ensuring its own security. In the 1980s the intra-Balkan cooperation got new impetus as there were issues to be resolved, such as problems of surrounding regional economic cooperation, advancement of transportation systems, and the international recognition of national minorities. Yugoslavia took the initiative to convene a Balkan ministerial conference in the latter half of the 1980s.

In the 1990s Serbia acquired new neighbors in the process of the disintegration of Yugoslavia, (the former Yugoslav republics: Croatia,

Bosnia-Herzegovina, Macedonia, and Montenegro). Due to the ethnic conflicts and the UN sanctions, not only the neighboring countries but also the Western powers and the international community in general regarded Serbia with hostility. In this political situation, the Yugoslav neighboring policy was interrupted for almost a decade.

The geostrategic position of Serbia has drastically changed in the past 20 years. The Yugoslav conflicts brought Serbia a new geopolitical environment along with new neighbors. Serbia began to focus on neighboring countries once again. At present, good neighboring policy is indispensable for the stability and cooperation in the Balkans, and it is among the most important policies for the Serbia's post conflict nation-building process.

After the democratic change of 2000, the international political and geostrategic importance of Yugoslavia considerably diminished within the overall context of European and world politics. First, the then foreign minister G. Svilanović asserted that Yugoslavia should behave as a small and impoverished country, without great pretensions. The first priority was an urgent regulation of its membership and integration in numerous important international organizations. Second, in the field of bilateral relations, priority was given to the normalization and promotion of cooperation with neighboring countries, especially the new neighbors, the so-called independent former Yugoslav republics (Svilanović 2001).

According to the official statement, multilateral regional cooperation is among the highest priorities of the Serbian foreign policy. Serbia has participated in many multilateral regional processes and initiatives. After the conflicts were over, in the process of peace-building, various schemes of the Balkan cooperation have been launched. Nonetheless, there is a lack of positive regional identity shared among the countries in the region.

More recently, in a new geopolitical environment after the so-called UDI (Unilateral Declared Independence) of Kosovo, Serbian political reaction was strikingly prudent and responsible. Foreign minister V. Jeremić stated as follows: "Serbia's decision to contest the Kosovo issue at the International Court of Justice constituted a paradigm shift in favor of peace in the Western Balkans. Our democracy responded with maximum restraint. We ruled out the use of force and the imposition of economic sanctions against the breakaway province. Serbia decided to

defend its sovereignty and territorial integrity through diplomacy and international law” (Jeremić 2009).

Thus presently Serbia has adopted more refined diplomatic policies and activities. I may refer to this as “reasonable diplomacy.” From these diplomatic behaviors, it may be said that Serbia has been reborn as a stable and pivotal state in the Balkans. In other words, Serbia is now an indispensable anchor of the Western Balkans.

2. Japan and its Neighboring Policy

Here, I would like to discuss Japanese neighboring policy and geopolitical position in contemporary Northeast Asia.

As to the relations of Japan with South Korea and China, emotional and political estrangement separated these three neighboring countries for the last several decades. There are many controversial issues between Japan and its neighboring countries. Among these there are so-called “historical issues” such as Japan’s war responsibility in relation to the issues of comfort women, the Nanking Massacre of 1937, and the Japanese history textbooks. In addition, there exist other critical issues including the abduction of Japanese citizens (Avery 2008) by North Korea, Japan-Korea and Japan-China territorial disputes, and so forth. In a word, the history between Japan and its neighboring countries has been an unfortunate one. In these circumstances, it is often said that Japan and its relations with its neighbors is “near and far”: geographically “near” but politically and psychologically “far”.

Japan focused overwhelmingly on its relations with the United States rather than on those with its neighboring Asian countries. The Japan-US alliance was very much strengthened through the US strategy toward Northeast Asia in the Cold War era. Even after the end of the Cold War, in June 2008 Foreign Minister Mr. Komura stated that the Japan-US alliance had not only ensured the security of Japan but also served the “public good” in Asia, providing a basis for stability and prosperity in the region. One of the main goals of Japanese diplomacy was to establish a virtuous circle of strengthening the Japan-US alliance and engaging in a proactive diplomacy toward Asia by creating a synergy between the two (Koumura 2008).

In contrast with this, the Japanese government led by the Democratic Party of Japan (DPJ) emphasized the importance of Japan-Asian

relations with the aim of building the East Asian Community and making the greatest possible effort to develop mutual trust with China, South Korea, and other Asian countries. However, at present Japanese diplomacy towards Asia has not necessarily produced good results because of its backlog of problems with neighboring countries. In short, we can say that the Japanese government has continuously regarded the US, over the Pacific Ocean, as its neighboring country since the end of the Second World War.

3. Two Neighboring Policies: Serbia and Japan

In the post-Cold War era, the Balkan countries were swallowed up by the wave of the EU/NATO enlargement. Furthermore, in the wake of so-called new regionalism and through the response to the UDI of Kosovo, Serbia was reborn from a “difficult” neighbor to a “reasonable” and “stabilizing” power in the Balkans. On the other hand, Japan has been locked in the stalemate of Northeast Asian international politics.

Japan cannot find a brighter future with the US, but also cannot strengthen its foothold in Northeast and East Asia. Faced with ever developing China, Japan, as if it were a drifting nation, can think of nothing but balancing between the US and China (Smith 2009: 232-237). Additionally, in North Korea’s nuclear impasse, Japan still cannot play a leadership role in the Six Party Talks. P. Ness states that Japan, potentially a major player remains hesitantly deferential to American leadership, but most of the other countries in the region want to engage with both the United States and China (Ness 2005: 232; 242-243).

In the regional politics, while Serbia grew from being a “difficult” neighbor to a stable and pivotal country in the Balkans, Japan doesn’t seem to be able to grow out of the “difficult” neighbor role, and cannot be a pivotal country in Northeast Asia. In this sense, Japan has many things to learn from Serbia’s experience in its neighboring diplomacy. Located in critical regions of international politics and faced with strained situations, it is imperative for both countries to contribute to the stability and prosperity of the respective regions ever more ardently.

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Christian Think-Tanks in Europe and North America

Abstract

In contemporary literature, think-tanks are often considered political, strategic, security, foreign policy and international relations. Unfortunately, the concern for religious think-tanks is missing from scientific analysis.

The most appropriate classification of think-tanks entails specific religious defining them. Thus, we will consider: religious analysis think-tanks, Christian think-tanks (with their categories: Catholic, Orthodox, Protestant and Evangelical), ecumenical and inter-religious think-tanks, Islamic think-tanks, Jewish think-tanks; Buddhist think-tanks, New Age think-tanks, atheist think-tanks.

Among these, Christian think-tanks present a common organizational and functional theme, which makes them suitable for a separate approach – which constitutes the object of the following research.

Keywords: Think-tank, Religion, theological research, Catholicism, Orthodoxy, religious policies.

Introduction

The genesis of public policies in contemporary times is closely linked to the activity of think-tanks - formal research groups consist of experts in various fields who work together in programs and projects in order to present policy makers with solutions (McGann, Weaver 2000; Abelson 2002).

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Political, strategic, security, foreign policy and international relations think-tanks are known and frequently analyzed. Religious think-tanks, on the other hand, are virtually unaddressed as far as analysis is concerned although their numbers are growing and the analysis performance of which closely follows that of classic think-tanks. This happens as a result of the fact that they do not direct the object of their research towards national and international policymakers – hence they benefit from a limited material support and understanding. Their research serves policymakers pertaining to the cults and religious organizations they represent and their active members.

Under these circumstances, we have to resort to an adaptation of the classical definition of think-tanks as it phrased by the researchers of the “Notre Europe” think-tank (Boucher 2004: 4).

Classic think-tanks	Religious think-tanks
permanent organizations	permanent organizations
specialized in the production of solutions for public policies	specialized in production of solutions for public policies
due to its dedicated research staff it	due to its dedicated research staff it
provides an original production from reflection, analysis and counseling	provides an original production from reflection, analysis and counseling
in order to be communicated to the government and public sector	in order to be communicated to religious decision makers and the interested public sector
are not required to perform governmental functions	are not required to perform governmental functions
strive, in general, to maintain freedom of research and not related to specific interests	proclaim and respect subordination to the religion or religious cult
their main task is not academic or awarding of degrees	their main task is not academic or awarding of degrees
they serve no commercial or patrimonial purpose	they serve no commercial or patrimonial purpose

Consequently, seven of the nine essential characteristics of traditional think-tanks are kept strictly within the definition of the religious ones. There are two minor differences:

- The recipient of the research does not usually consist of state officials in the case of religious research (except for the cases in which religious researchers propose legislative action, but this is not the main objective of religious reflection). On the other hand, public opinion is the beneficiary of think-tanks' products in both cases, but a more specialized one appears in the case of religious think-tanks.
- Regarding the claim of autonomy of classic think-tank reflection, one must state that this is more of an ideal than a reality –the one who commissions or finances the research is always favored as his interest serves a different purpose than research. In this respect, an additional dose of honesty is obvious in the explicit statement of the bias of religious reflection.

The most appropriate classification of religious think-tanks is the one that invokes the specifics of their (self) definition. Thus, we will consider: religious analysis think-tanks, Christian think-tanks (with their categories: Catholic, Orthodox, Protestant and Evangelical), ecumenical and inter-religious think-tanks, Islamic think-tanks, Jewish think-tanks; Buddhist think-tanks, New Age think-tanks and atheist think-tanks.

Religious Analysis Think Tanks

It is a category that claims – and mostly succeeds - an independence from religious cults, even if their researchers are active members of one or the other. Their fundamental objective is to analyze the religious phenomenon, status and major trends in the contemporary world, the relations between religions. Most times, they are undeclared Christian think-tanks. Representative may be considered “The Hartford Institute for Religion Research”² from the United States of America, which has a history of 35 years of “rigorous registration, policy relevant research, anticipation and generation issues, and commitment to disseminate teachings”. The Institute states three main objectives: 1) Dissemination of research results in the sociology of religion, 2) Presentation of research findings online for the benefit of pastors, religious leaders, journalists and the public domain, 3) Technical assistance to those

2 <http://www.hartfordinstitute.org/>.

interested in using statistical data and the technology of constructing religious sites. Major research directions are: Megachurches, Women and Religion, Religion and Family, Religion and the Internet, Pentecostalism, Orthodox Churches in the United States, Homosexuality and Religion. The books and articles are published in full or in summary on the official site.

Since 1951, in the United States also operates "The Religious Research Association"³ which defines itself as a group of "academics and religious experts operating at the intersection of research with practical religious activities". Over 600 members from universities, colleges and seminaries are religious leaders, organizational consultants, legal specialists. Association offers networking opportunities, promotes the circulation, interpretation and use of one's own research in the religious organizations and other stakeholders, and provides a forum for publications. The two periodicals are entitled "Review of Religious Research" and "Context of Religious Research".

In the same category the prestigious British think-tank "Ekklesia"⁴ must be mentioned (founded in 2001 and ranked every year since by the British "The Independent Newspaper" among the top 20 think-tanks), which assumes the Christian perspective as an "independent nonprofit think-tank that examines the role of faith, values and religion in public life." In this respect, the research aims at: Community and Family, Crime and Justice, Ecology and Environment, Economy and Politics, Education and Culture, Globalization and Development, Life and Death, Peace and War, People and Power; Race and Identity, Religion and Society, Sex and Gender. The official website publishes books, liturgical texts, and offers a media center that publishes news and press releases.

The UK (London) also hosts the religious analysis think-tank "Theos"⁵, which "organizes research, publishes reports and conducts debates, seminars and lectures at the intersection of religion, politics and society in the contemporary world." Areas of analysis refer to Multiculturalism, Christian Education, Religious Freedom, and Parliamentary Representation of Religions. For the future, the organization announced the launching of Research Areas related to Religion and Law,

3 Established as „Religious Research Fellowship”, see <http://rra.hartsem.edu/>

4 <http://www.ekkleisia.co.uk/>

5 <http://www.theosthinktank.co.uk/>

Political Economy, The role of Religion in International Affairs. They materialize through seminars, conferences, debates and readings, research and publishing, reviews, analysis and information for the media, politicians and policy makers, newsletters via e-mail.

Christian Think-Tanks

Quite naturally, Christian think-tanks vigorously dominate numerically and qualitatively the religious think-tanks landscape. They are based mostly in the West, where the think-tank phenomenon is the oldest and most well-defined, best perceived in intellectual circles and public opinion - and best supported in financial terms. Inside the Christian world there is significant a numeric difference between Catholic, Protestant and Evangelical think-tanks- on the one hand, and Orthodox - on the other. The advantage of the first category is explained by the continuous democratic tradition of Western Europe and North America, whereas freedom of thought and institutional organization of intellectual reflection is a reality for only around two decades in Eastern Europe. It is impossible to prove, at this time, a greater receptiveness to Western Christian religions compared to the Eastern ones towards the think-tank type of organization.

Catholic Think-Tanks

The intellectual core of Catholic religious thought is “Pontificia Academia Scientiarum”⁶ (“Pontifical Academy of Sciences”), founded 1603 and re-founded 1936 at the Vatican. The founding manifesto launched by Pope Pius XI defines the main objective “science, if it is true knowledge, never comes in contradiction with the Christian faith. Indeed, as is well known by those who study the history of science, one must admit on one hand that the Roman Pontiffs and the Catholic Church have always supported experimental research, on the other hand, this research has paved the way for the defense of supernatural truths embedded in the Church (...)”.

Nowadays, the Academy focuses its research efforts on six main areas: Basic Sciences, Science and Technology of Global Issues, Science

6 <http://www.casinapioiv.va/>

in the service of the Third World, Ethics and Science Policies, Bioethics, Epistemology. Its publications, in periodical or book form, are grouped into collections "Acta", "Extra Series", "Scripta Varia", "Documenta" and "Varii".

The number of academy members totals 80 (in certain historical epochs it was set at 70), among them appearing the Academy Chancellor, the Library Prefect, the Apostolic Prefect of the Vatican's Secret Archives. The president of the academy is elected by majority of academicians and approved by the Pope.

Recognizing the primacy and authority of the Academy, the main Catholic religious orders established their own centers of reflection.

The Jesuits open research and education institutes in many countries: United States, United Kingdom, South Africa, Philippines, etc. The "Jesuit Social Research Institute"⁷ sponsored by the Jesuit Society and the University of New Orleans can be viewed as representative, as it proclaims four core values: Faith leads to justice, Prophetic vision leads to transformation; the love for thy neighbor leads to solidarity, Doctrine leads to action.

Founded in 2007, the Institute examines four areas in which faith influences society: Catholic Social Thought, Migration, Poverty, Racism, and Interconnection (in terms of building institutional networking). All these contribute to the quarterly "JustSouth E-News" and "JustSouth Quarterly", as well as book collections.⁸

The Dominicans organized an international network of think-tanks based on the Jesuit model. We can point out one of the most active, operating in Limerick - Ireland, as "Dominican Biblical Institute"⁹, the objectives of which are formally summarized as follows: The Advance of Biblical Research, The Promotion of Global Dialogue (especially between the Bible and Science In relation to other disciplines), The Use of the Bible in everyday life. To this end, the following categories of reflection are promoted: Bible and Science, Bible and Dialogue, Bible and History, Synoptic Issues, Divine Lessons, Transfiguration.

These research gains constitute the foundation of the classes that result in the receiving of a diploma in "Biblical and Theological Studies".

7 <http://www.loyno.edu/jsri/>

8 Under status of Research center such think tanks operating in all American countries, but also in Jordan and Zambia-Malawi.

9 <http://www.dbclimerick.ie/>

There are Dominican think-tanks focusing on pastoral training, such as that of Michigan - United States of America, entitled "Dominican Center for Religious Development".¹⁰ It was founded in 1980 based on three spiritual assumptions that today proclaim: God communicates to all men; this communication was made obvious through contemplation and personal reflection; the Articulation and clarification of this experience through dialogue with a spiritual director is significant for anyone. The internship programs promise a development as a spiritual evolution, a thorough understanding of theological and psychological bases of spirituality and spiritual communication skills.

Meanwhile, academia remains the preferred host for most Catholic think-tanks, which thus may rely on the academic and research experience and on the energy of generations of students.

Also, in this regard the United States includes more examples. To be noted here "The Institute for Advanced Catholic Studies"¹¹ at the University of Southern California. Here one can study the Catholic tradition based on a long line of brilliant works by Catholic authors in the fields of theology, philosophy, science, history, literature, art, architecture and music.

Interdisciplinarity appears necessary in the logic of research methodology for programs entitled: The true wealth of nations, Catholic Education, Catholic Tradition, Generations in dialogue, Interreligious and ecumenical issues. Resulting publications are published by Oxford University and Fordham University.

Protestant / Neo Protestant Think-Tanks

The geographic concentration of Protestant think-tanks is remarkable in Western Europe and the United States - where the landscape is still vigorously dominated by neo-Protestant analytical reflection. In other parts of the world it is an insignificant presence.

Amongst Lutheran research centers, the "Protestant Academy of Bad Boll"¹² (German state of Baden Württemberg) is rather notable as it organizes about 200 annual events per (meetings, roundtables, sym-

¹⁰ <http://www.dominicancenter.org/>

¹¹ <http://www.ifacs.com/>

¹² <http://www.ev-akademie-boll.de/>

posia, conferences, lectures, study trips, themed holidays). Research directions are called: Economy; Globalization; Sustainable Development; Society, politics, State; Culture, Constitution, Religion. An impressive exhibition center hosts literary salons, exhibitions, publication launches.

From the plethora of Protestant thought in the US, a good example is "Discovery Institute"¹³ – associate of the Calvinist cult, based in Washington DC. Mission statement aims at "advancing a culture of creativity and innovation" that employs an interdisciplinary group of academics and specialists in public policy research teams grouped around the following areas: Science and Culture, Economics and Business; Human Exceptionalism Center, International Affairs; Local Government and Community; Religion and Public Life.

More active, more present in the public consciousness and better connected with political life are neo Protestant think-tanks, who claim to perpetuate the foundations of the American national spirit. They exert a serious lobbying function, influencing American political leadership in the adoption of legislation and their implementation.

"Baptist Joint Committee for Religious Liberty" based in Washington, aims "to defend and extend divine religious freedom for everyone continuing the Baptist mission that promotes the principle that religion should be practiced freely without being promoted or inhibited by the government"¹⁴. Essential Baptist debate themes are: Free exercise of religion; Church electoral systems; Religious manifestos; Civil religion. The Committee publishes in a collection of books the results of research focused on the themes above, as well as documents and testimonies.

Seventh-day Adventists are represented by "The Biblical Research Institute of the General Conference of Seventh-day Adventist"¹⁵, which aims to generate doctrinal and theological materials required for pastors and interested members of the confession, to encourage personal Bible study, to promote dedication the personal message of Christ, to disseminate reliable information about Adventist thought in Christian and non-Christian circles. The main publication is entitled "Reflections" but the Institute publishes collections of books and pamphlets as well.

¹³ <http://www.discovery.org/>

¹⁴ <http://www.bjcpa.org/>

¹⁵ <http://biblicalresearch.gc.adventist.org/>

Evangelical Christians have put together an “Institute for Biblical Research”¹⁶, consisting mainly of specialists in the Old and New Testament and related disciplines. It has been in existence for nearly 30 years. They organize an annual conference, seminars and workshops, and sponsors biblical publications. Annually it releases the volume entitled “Bulletin for Biblical Research”, which has been ongoing since 1991.

It is remarkable the operation of the organization “The Flow of Times”¹⁷ from Romania, which is self-described as a “Romanian evangelical think-tank.” Its activity focuses around the official website that promotes debates and research on the topics: the Christian and the city; the Christian and culture; Uncomfortable discussions. Editorials and kaleidoscope-type of news are published to serve the members of the Evangelical community.

Evangelical think-tanks are best shaped and best consolidated nucleus in the neo Protestant research institutions in North America. A list of maximum concentration mandatory hyper-selective, one must note:

- “The Ethics & Religious Liberty Commission”¹⁸ maintains a research institute which aims: to provide a professional organization in which conservative, evangelical theorists discuss American cultural trends, apply biblical truth in public policy and religious freedom with the purpose of transforming American culture, to develop a comprehensive biblical model with which to endow biblical Christians in order to assess family issues, and modern culture.
- “The Ministry of Chalcedon”¹⁹ has been active since 1965 as a Christian educational organization devoted to research, publishing and promoting Christian reconstruction in all areas of life. Research is reflected in the “Topical Index”, “Scripture Index”, “Position Papers”, collection of books and online articles database. Major themes include: Biblical Law, Christian Reconstruction, Theology, Philosophy, Education, Family, Christianity and State, Apologetics, Economics, Science, Psychology, Justice, Charity, American History, Conspiracies.

16 <http://www.ibr-bbr.org/>

17 <http://www.mersulvremurilor.ro/>

18 http://erlc.com/research_institute/

19 <http://chalcedon.edu/>

- “The Pascal Centre for Advanced Studies in Faith and Science”²⁰, founded in 1988 by Redeemer College in Ontario - Canada, is remarkable in its research of the border between religion and cyberspace, but also the significance of nature in biblical writings. It organized a Conference Centre of Science and Faith, which hosts the majority of their events.

Orthodox Think-Tanks

Christian orthodoxy is less present in the specialized media and public opinion through its work relationship with political and economic lives. Indeed, its think-tanks are proportionately less, and are more heavily oriented towards analyzing theological foundations than to the role of the Church in the terrestrial world. Religious reflection occurs more inside educational institutions than outside, and support for private think-tanks initiatives is almost missing. In these circumstances, America is again the place where Orthodox think-tanks are more active – as they were forced to respond to local trends and competition between cults taking place (and) in this field.

Under these conditions, the think-tank type of activity of Orthodox intellectuals is found almost exclusively in research centers attached to the Faculty of Orthodox Theology.

By way of example, “The Interreligious and Interdisciplinary Studies Center”²¹ of the Orthodox Theological Faculty in Bucharest, having completed research projects “On the security implications of religion in the context of EU enlargement” and “Blessed are the peacemakers. Christianity and security: the Sermon on the Mount from September 11, 2011”. The Center is currently developing the project “The dynamics of intellectual life in Byzantium Palaeologan (1261-1453) under the influence of polemics”.

As a private Romanian initiative, we point out “The Hesychasm Association”²², which aims its research goals (embodied in the magazine “The Commandment of Love” and the series of books published in its own publishing house “Agaton”, but also in audiovisual productions about spirituality and Christian anthropology) advocacy goals (“guid-

20 <http://pascalcentre.org/>

21 <http://www.ftoub.ro/>

22 <http://www.rugulaprins.go.ro/>

ing the people by the Church, towards a life in Christ”) and lobbying goals (“initiating local and national action - bills projects, statement of a fund for Christian mission - and supporting them through lobbying locally and parliamentary”).

Crossing the Atlantic, among the most famous American appearances include “Patriarch Athenagoras Orthodox Institute”²³ in Berkeley - California, which “exists to educate, communicate, promote and support the traditions, values, teachings and culture of Orthodox Christianity.” It constitutes an intellectual umbrella for Albanians, Antiochians, Bulgarians, Carpatho-Russians, Greeks, Romanians, Serbians and Ukrainians. Its scientific arsenal consists of research, academic lectures, symposia, rare book library and museum. It also hosts the only Orthodox educational center in North America.

The private initiative of the priest Hans Jacobse belonging to Antiochian Orthodox Christian Archdiocese of North America is also quite remarkable which runs the “American Orthodox Institute”²⁴ in Naples - Florida. The research projects of the Institute are entitled: Church and Society, Orthodox Unity, Sanctity of Life, Canon 28. All these can be found in articles published in the “Clarion” magazine, which has its own website.²⁵

Inter-Religious / Ecumenical Think-Tanks

The dialogue between religions cults, Christian or other origins, as well as the institutionalized dialogue between Christian denominations (ecumenism) has found an ideal form of expression in the work of think-tanks - which, as research claim to scientific objectivity, not binding formal leadership concerned cults directly, but identifying common or the like solutions, or even to establish common institutions. In this matter, Europe is the center of gravity of ecumenical and inter-religious dialogue, followed by the United States at a considerable distance.

Amongs interreligious think-tanks, one can name the “Interreligiöser Think-Tank”²⁶ (“Interreligious Think-Tank”), in Basel - Swit-

23 <http://www.findtofund.com/patriarch-athenagoras-orthodox-institute-159.html>

24 <http://www.aoiusa.org/>

25 <http://www.clarionreview.org/>

26 <http://www.interrelthinktank.ch/>

zerland, which operates as an “independent institutional gathering of the representatives of interreligious dialogue from Switzerland, reflecting together through dialogue on social issues, religious and political openness to mutual acquired know-how”. The Board consists of one representative of the Christian, Muslim and Jewish denominations. The directions of reflection: The positive and constructive role of religions in consolidating societal unity, security and peace; the potential of religion to establish social justice in all social areas; the preservation and enforcement of religious freedom; Religious women’s voice in society; Work exchanges for women of different religions; Contacts with religiously and politically relevant institutions.

Very active and showing great quality of members and its activity appears to be the Romanian think-tank „INTER. Institutul Român de Studii Inter-ortodoxe, Inter-confesionale i Inter-religioase”²⁷ (“INTER. Romanian Institute of Inter-Orthodox Studies, Inter-confessional and Inter-religious”), in Cluj-Napoca founded in 2005 as an “academic and civic non-governmental and apolitical initiative with legal the status of an association and reuniting laity and clergy, theologians and specialists from various fields, Romanian and foreign.” The main goal is to encourage, through research, exchange of opinions and debates, articulating a culture of informed dialogue. The research projects are called “Moldova between Romania and Russia. A controversial example of orthodox geopolitics”, “The Theological Sources of Orthodox Social Ethic”, “History of the Sermon in Balkan Orthodox churches”, etc. Representative publications are “INTER Magazine” and the series “Theologia Socialis”, which has produced 17 titles between 2008 and 2012.

As an ecumenic research institution representative for the American society, the “Institute on Religion & Democracy” is noteworthy, which proclaims itself as the “ecumenic alliance of American Christians that work together to reform their churches, for social participation, in accordance with biblical and historical Christian teachings and contribute to the renewal of society both nationally and abroad”. To support this, their research fields are shaped as follows: Marriage; Human Trafficking; The Sanctity of Life; Immigration; Religious Freedom; The Environment; War and Peace; The Middle East; The Belief in the public market. The results of the research are presented in their periodicals “Faith and Freedom” and “UM Action”.

²⁷ <http://www.inter-institute.ro/>

Buddhist thinking intertwines with the Catholic one in the „Institute for World Religions” hosted by the Buddhist Monastery in Berkley – USA. The organization states it is a „result of ecumenic inspiration” and compiles its mission as it follows: „Dedicated to the creation of a sanctuary which encourages conversation about theological principles, religious beliefs and spiritual practices, the Institute creates the interface of the search for universal values in an atmosphere of cooperation and mutual respect. Its goal is to challenge the borders in our minds and prevent the attachment to sectary differences”. To serve this purpose, the Institute hosts and supports research activity and organizes classes.

Ecumenism is a highly productive research direction attached to the Orthodox Theological Faculties in Romania. „Centrul de Cercetare Ecumenică Sibiu”²⁸ („Ecumenical Research Center Sibiu”) distinguishes itself as a research institution at the Lucian Blaga University, founded by the Faculty of Orthodox Theology „Andrei Șaguna” and Protestant Theology Department, which organizes four research areas: Ecumenical Dialogue (centered on the Orthodox-evangelical reality); Church history; Religion and Society; Interreligious dialogue. Research projects undertaken on these directions is called „Churches in Dialogue”, „DOSAR - Human dignity and poverty”, „NELCEE - Network for Ecumenical Learning in Central and Eastern Europe”, „InfoEcum”.

Conclusions

The category of religious think-tanks - mainly represented by the Christian ones- has not been addressed by analytical research so far, which undoubtedly places the first approaches (such as the present research) in the close proximity of work instruments. Even the most advanced catalogs of think-tanks accidentally contain individual cases of religious think-tanks, which places them in the other categories (general, civil society, political etc.) (McGann 2013).

We are at the stage of identifying, classifying, establishing common traits and significant differences. Qualitative analysis will follow. We note, however, those characteristics which confer an individual and unmistakable identity to the category of Christian think-tanks:

- The object of research is represented both by the transcendental and the society; methodology is different (but complementary) to address the two major issues;

28 <http://www.ecum.ro/>

- The training of personnel and specialists is limited by the constraints of the transcendental approach. Training, but also the entire instrumental arsenal of activities must be selective in terms of inclusion / acceptance participants initiated into Christian doctrine and rituals;
- There is a balance between the “lobby” function (influencing policy makers) and “advocacy” (influencing public opinion), Christian think-tanks showing a strong orientation towards consolidating the Christian faith;
- The most important beneficiary is governing bodies of the associated Christian denominations. They receive religious policy proposals to interact with object of pressure: national or local policymakers.

Within the landscape of Christian denominations a large numerical preponderance of the Catholic, Protestant and Evangelical is quite visible. Orthodox think-tanks are fewer and more rooted in doctrinal research. An obvious explanation is the general nature and level of pre-occupation for research in the West compared to Eastern Europe. If theological explanations exist, they will be the subject of an extremely complicated analysis.

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External links

- <http://www.aoiusa.org/> (American Orthodox Institute)
- <http://biblicalresearch.gc.adventist.org/> (Biblical Research Institute of the General Conference of Seventh-day Adventist)
- <http://www.bjcpa.org/> (Baptist Joint Committee for Religious Liberty)
- <http://www.casinapioiv.va/> (Pontificia Academia Scientiarum)
- <http://chalcedon.edu/> (The Ministry of Chalcedon)
- <http://www.clarionreview.org/> (Clarion Magazine)
- <http://www.dbclimerick.ie/> (Dominican Biblical Institute)
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- <http://www.findtofund.com/patriarch-athenagoras-orthodox-institute-159.html> (Patriarch Athenagoras Orthodox Institute)
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- <http://www.ibr-bbr.org/> (Institute for Biblical Research)
- <http://www.ifacs.com/> (The Institute for Advanced Catholic Studies)
- <http://www.inter-institute.ro/> (INTER. Romanian Institute of Inter-Orthodox Studies, Inter-confessional and Inter-religious)
- <http://www.interrelthinktank.ch/> (Interreligiöser Think-Tank)
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- <http://www.loyno.edu/jsri/> (Jesuit Social Research Institute)
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Constitutional Court in the Process of Building of a Rechtsstaat

Abstract

In this paper the author examines the role the constitutional court plays in the democratization process. The constitutionalization of the polity is one of the core elements of the democratic transformation in which the institutional framework for the coupling of the law and the politics is set, and the boundaries of the state's intervention in the individual freedoms and liberties are defined. Yet the constitution as a legal text is not sufficient for the establishment of a substantive constitutionalism, but it can serve as a façade for a pseudo-democratic order. In order to underpin the rule of law, to prevent the concentration of (political) power, and to protect human rights, most states that have undergone the democratization process have established a constitutional court. Subject to the condition that the constitutional court enjoys sufficient guaranties for institutional stability, legitimacy, and political neutrality, it can be a progressive and stabilizing player in the democratization process. Yet the court must attain a balance with respect to the political effects of its decisions, and not to intervene in the discretionary areas of policy-making. Ultimately the implementation of the constitutional court's decisions depends on the political elite for a rationale for why court acts strategically and with self-restraint. In Serbia the power of the constitutional court to influence the democratization process is burdened with some difficulties. There have been constant blocks and delays in the appointment of the court's judges, with the court becoming fully operational not until 2010. Given the low degree of legitimacy and authority of the Serbian constitution, it is very difficult for the constitutional court to impose the authority of the constitution to the political players. Yet the constitutional court occasionally delivers decisions that influence the transformation process. Nevertheless, the implementation of the court's decisions is selective.

Keywords: constitution, democratization, constitutional court, Serbian Constitutional Court.

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Introduction

The breakup of an autocratic regime provides an opportunity for a comprehensive democratization process with the aim of establishing a Rechtsstaat in which the political actors accept the democratic rules of the game. Since democratization should lead to the institutionalization of political power and to the setting of institutional links between a legal order and a political process, a constitution is a key legal framework and a guideline for the democratic transformation. Because of the importance of the constitution and of the need to create additional safeguards for protection of a democratic order, most states that have engaged in the democratization process have established a constitutional court. By resolving constitutional disputes a constitutional court (usually) acts as a guardian of the constitution, maintaining democratic legal and political order and protecting individual human rights, which are essential for a democratic Rechtsstaat.

Since a constitution is the decisive parameter for the constitutional court's activity, the first part of the paper deals with the general position of the constitution in the democratization process. In every phase of this process the impacts of the constitution on the political process and vice versa are different, and thus the circumstances for the court's activity also differ. The second part of the paper deals with the role of a constitutional court in the democratization process. This role is two-fold. On the one hand, the constitutional court goes through the institutional build-up and is itself an object of the democratization. On the other hand, the constitutional court reviews the activity of other actors with regard to the constitution and, thus, can influence the democratization process. In this respect, the paper deals with the instruments the constitutional court has at its disposal to influence the democratization process. The third and final part of the paper outlines some of the central aspects of the position of the Serbian constitutional court in the democratization process.

Constitution in the Democratization Process

The term "democratization" refers to the transformation of a totalitarian or an authoritarian regime into a democratic political order

(Merkel and Puhle 1999: 13). The transformative processes that have taken place in south Europe (Spain, Portugal, and Greece), in the former communist countries in Central and Eastern Europe, as well as in Latin America, indicate that democratization has two main phases: the democratic transition and the democratic consolidation. The transitional phase begins with the breakup of the totalitarian or the authoritarian regime followed by the institutionalization of a democratic order. This is followed by the second phase, democratic consolidation, which aims to ensure the long-lasting functionality and the sustainability of institutions and rules established in the democratic transition. Consequently, democratic processes should be irreversible and the restoration of the authoritarian system less probable (see Merkel and Puhle 1999: 13; Merkel, Sandschneider and Segert 1996: 13; Rüb 1996: 47f.; Pridham 1996: 2).

The breakup of the authoritarian regime is the first step in the democratization process. This can occur because of an agreement (bargain) between the government and the opposition by which they arrange both the tempo and the outreach of the change (Sandschneider 2003: 28). This was often the case in the former communist states because at least a part of the communistic elite was involved in the regime change (Merkel and Puhle 1999: 95). The breakup of the regime can also occur as a chaotic, uncoordinated process in which the authoritarian regime simply collapses and the opposition takes political responsibility (Sandschneider 2003: 28). The way the old regime breaks up can be of importance for the constitutionalization of the emerging democratic order. If the breakup is a result of a bargain between the old and the new structures, the future legal arrangements of the polity will take into the account the interest of the authoritarian elites. The people are in such cases rarely the *pouvoir constituant* but the constitution as an act of the consensus reflects the arrangements with the old elites. The more revolutionary breakup is more likely to lead to a legal (constitutional) framework for the new democratic polity *ab novo*, with the possibility to use the new constitution plausibly as an act of discontinuity. The breakup of the *ancien régime* opens the gate for political and social liberalization, but the level of democratic institutionalization will remain low (Merkel and Puhle 1999: 106; Rüb 1996: 47). The legal regulation in this phase focuses on the issues of elections, political parties, approach to the media and the guaranties of equal opportunities in the electoral campaign (Rüb, *ibidem*).

It is during the institutionalization of democracy that the basis and the institutional framework for a new democratic order will be set. The founding elections and the adoption of a new constitution are the milestones of this phase of the democratization process. The breakup of the old regime opens “the window of constitutional opportunity” and the possibility to set the constitutional framework for the new democratic order. The constitutionalization of the new polity can go through the reinforcing of the old constitution, or its extensive amending, or through adoption of an entirely new constitution (Merkel, Sandschneider and Segert 1996: 13). As mentioned above, the nature of the breakup of the old regime will affect the constitutional change that can emerge either in line with the rules of the old order or fully ignoring the previous legal order. The constitutional continuity is not per se an obstacle for the transition from an authoritarian to a democratic order. The ratio of such continuity lies in the will to perform a radical transformation in line with the legal procedures of the breaking legal order. It mirrors the principle of the rule of law: a society that aims to build a polity on this principle cannot break the binding law despite its defects. However, constitutional continuity does not imply the maintenance of the old system. The necessary changes to the old system will be implemented within the scope of the legal norms of this system. Even though the transformation in this case is evolutionary, its outreach should be revolutionary. Constitutional continuity should be short and dynamic, and the delegitimation and annulment of the old order needs to be followed by the immediate creation of a qualitatively better system. It is only in this manner that constitutional continuity can lead to the fast and in-depth change of the old constitutional order (Dimitrijević 2004: 61f.)

The new constitution sets legal grounds for the institutionalization of a new democratic order. It should reflect the deepest values of the society and the basic grounds for the democratic process (Schwartz 2004: 13). It sets the legal framework for human rights protection and the model for organization and legitimation of political power. Furthermore, the new constitution should communicate with the society and offer effective mechanisms for peaceful conflict resolution. The enforcement capacity of the new constitution depends not only on legal instruments set to ensure its implementation, but also on its legitimacy. The phase of the adoption of a new constitution can underpin its legitimacy threefold: through the procedures in which the constitution is adopted, the perception of the constitution as an act of a consensus, and the wide acceptance of values and rules enacted in it. The new constitu-

tion sets a legal framework in which the democratic structure gradually becomes routine, and the political elites become accustomed to adjusting their behavior to the democratic principles (Pridham 2000: 3). It is with the establishment of new essential institutions or the adjustment of old institutions to democratic principles that the democratic order becomes institutionalized (Rüb 1996: 47).

The phase of democratic consolidation brings strengthening, legitimization, and stabilization of the democratic structures, and leads all politically relevant groups to perceive political institutions of the regime as legitimate and to respect the democratic rules of the game (Merkel and Puhle 1999: 135, 136). A result of a democratic consolidation is “a political regime in which democracy as a complex system of institutions, rules, and patterned incentives and disincentives has become, in a phrase, ‘the only game in town’ (Linz and Stepan 1996b: 15). The democratic consolidation does not address just the political institutions, but it presupposes the consolidation of diverse social segments: economic stability and development, political parties, civil society, deeper national integration (inclusion of national minorities and of regions), and a diffuse support for democracy (Merkel and Puhle 1999: 138). According to the theory of Juan J. Linz and Alfred Stepan, consolidated democracy must have five interconnected and mutually reinforcing arenas. These arenas are civil society that functions on the principle of freedom of association and communication; political society that is based on free and inclusive electoral contestation; the rule of law based on the constitutionalism; the state apparatus that is organized on rational-legal bureaucratic norms, and the economic society which rests on an institutionalized market (Linz and Stepan 1996a: 7-15). As a special precondition for democratic consolidation, but also the entire democratization process, these authors emphasize the existence of a functional state. According to Linz and Stepan, all significant actors, especially the democratic government and the state, must respect and uphold the rule of law (Linz and Stepan 1996a: 10). As they note, a spirit of constitutionalism “entails a relatively strong consensus over the constitution and especially a commitment to ‘self-binding’ procedures of governance that require exceptional majorities to change” (*ibid.*). Further, constitutionalism requires “a clear hierarchy of laws, interpreted by an independent judicial system and supported by a strong legal culture in civil society” (*ibid.*).

The goal of the democratization process is the establishment of a Rechtsstaat in which political power is limited and accounted for by ob-

jective legal (constitutional) rules. Political power is set in democratic institutions wherein there is an institutional connection between a legal order and a political process. Law sets legal rules for democratic governance and constitutes a political process, yet lawmaking is politicized and interconnected with political action. It is in such an arrangement that a constitution gains significance for the submission of politics to law. However, a constitution is a necessary precondition for the establishment of constitutionalism², but rarely is it a sufficient condition. It is not always the case that constitutions are taken seriously or that constitutional norms always prevail in cases of conflict with political interventions (Grimm 2010: 3). Some constitutions lack serious intention to limit the rulers powers, or in some cases constitutional rules do not enjoy full primacy over the acts of government, but are legally superseded by political decisions (*ibid.* 11, cp. Jovičić 1995: 168). The quality of a democratization process in respect to the successful constitutionalization of the political order can be measured by whether a constitution has effective power to frame the political process. The democratization process can lead to the establishment of a liberal democratic order or it can be stuck in some form of semi-democracy or façade democracy. The rule of law supported by an independent judiciary and other institutions of accountability that check the abuse of power and protect civil and political freedoms is immanent to a liberal democracy (Diamond 2002: 7). Façade democracies show some aspects of a democratic political order: a political space for opposition parties and civil society, regular elections, and democratic constitutions (Carothers 2002: 9). However, “they suffer from serious democratic deficits, often including poor representation of citizens’ interests, low levels of political participation beyond voting, frequent abuse of the law by government officials, elections of uncertain legitimacy, very low levels of public confidence in state institutions, and persistently poor institutional performance by the state” (*ibid.* 9f.). The central weakness within a façade democracy is the politicization and inefficiency of key institutions of a “horizontal accountability” (judiciary, the audit agency, and even the electoral commission). This often results from the lack of political will by political leaders to build and maintain institutions that constrain their own power, whereby a civil society is too weak, or too divided to compel them to do so (Diamond 2002: 9). Within a liberal democracy, then, a constitution adopted in the phase of democratic transition is a base for

2 There are exceptions to this rule, e.g. United Kingdom, Israel and New Zealand are constitutional democracies with established *Rechtsstaat* but lack a constitution.

development of constitutionalism in the phase of democratic consolidation. However, in a façade democracy, a constitution has no power to produce constitutionalism. Constitution as such is a façade and the stakeholders are not inclined to submit themselves to legal norms but pretend to be exercising their power within the constitutional framework (Grimm 2010: 3).

Constitutional Court as a Guardian of a Constitution in a Democratizing Polity

Democratization processes in the world indicate a specific position of a constitutional court in democratization and establishing of a Rechtsstaat following a breakup of authoritarian or totalitarian regimes. Interesting enough, Samuel P. Huntington's theory of three waves of democratization (Huntington 2004: 22) leads to some parallels in the development of the institution of the constitutional court. The first wave of democratization led to the first ever constitutional court being established in Austria, the second wave brought about the constitutional courts of Germany and Italy, and the third wave resulted in the constitutional courts of Spain and Portugal and in the flourish of constitutional courts in the democratization processes in the 1990s³. The establishment of constitutional courts was to a large extent the result of the "trauma" of totalitarianism/authoritarianism that shaped the need to create additional safeguards for the protection of democratic order. Since the legal system of autocratic regimes is subordinated to the political system and more or less abrogated in favor of it (Hein 2011: 7f), a constitutional court's primary function is to protect constitutionally set legal boundaries of politics. The establishment of a constitutional court in newly formed democracies reflects a worry that the principle of majoritarian rule may (as their autocratic past shows) lead to a tyranny. The principles set out in the constitution should be protected from the arbitrary intrusion, and eventually violation, from the parliamentary majority. All new democracies have rejected the Westminster model of complete parliamentary sovereignty, and provided checks against the power of the dominant legislative coalition (Issacharoff 2010: 6). This general course shapes the main tasks of the constitutional court in the

3 All post-communist Central and East European states, except for Estonia, have established a constitutional court. Constitutional courts were also established in South Africa, and numerous Latin American and Asian states.

democratization process, i.e., to prevent the concentration of (political) power and to protect human rights. A constitutional court's institutional position and legal competences are crucial for it to successfully perform these tasks, which in turn support the democratization process.

The constitutional court is a part of the institutional framework of a new democratic order set in the phase of the democratic transition. As such, the constitutional court goes through a build-up process and is itself an object of democratization. However, in most new democracies the constitutional court is a newly established institution, one not burdened with the authoritarian past⁴. Consequently, the institutional build-up of a constitutional court did not emerge as a reform but as a new beginning. In the initial phase of democratization the institutional position and the identity of a constitutional court is set. A constitutional court can effectively support the democratic Rechtsstaat only if institutional arrangements guarantee its independence and neutrality. The formal level of the court's independence depends on a diverse group of legally set instruments: sufficient financial and organizational resources, appointment procedures, professional requirements and age-limits for the judges, terms of office, limited impeachment possibilities (Grabenwarter 2011: 3, para. 13; Hein 2011: 18; Sadurski 2009: 4-8). Formal safeguards are essential but eventually not sufficient to prevent the influence on constitutional court and judges that can occur at the informal level⁵. Informal influence depends on the political and constitutional culture of a state and can occur through subtle mechanisms of influencing or even pressing judges. The position of a constitutional court in the democratization process is not static or separated from the democratization developments in other state institutions. For example, if the appointment of constitutional court's judges is entrusted to the president and the parliament, the bad collaboration between the president and the parliamentary majority can lead to a standstill in the process of appointing new judges and eventually block the work of a court. Similar results can occur if a state body does not exercise the right to appoint a judge in cases where the power of appointment is divided between a few bodies that act independently from one another (cp. Sadurski 2009: 4f). The main challenge for a constitutional court lays in

4 In the initial phases of the democratic process full with euphoria this circumstance to some extent put an aureole of nobility and "democratic purity" to constitutional courts in contrast to parliaments and ordinary courts.

5 Yet a high degree of formal independence does not suppress but paradoxically encourages a certain degree of politicization at an informal level (Hein 2011: 4, 18).

the danger of its politicization. The politicization degrades a constitutional court as an institution and jeopardizes its role in the democratization process. If the constitutional court's adjudication reflects the party sympathies and it is incapable to act as a neutral player, then the whole idea of the constitutional review is perverted. The politicization of a constitutional court indicates weakness in the democratization process and states with a highly politicized constitutional court usually get stuck in the democratic transition. The safeguards against politicization of the constitutional court address the parliamentary majority and the executive branch, but also require the constitutional court to strict obedience of rules of conduct and to use the legal methods when interpreting the constitution.

The extent of the influence of the constitutional court on the democratization process depends on the court's competences laid down in the constitution. The constitution regulates the scope of the constitutional dispute and which (political) players can bring it to the court, and thus it sets field and also the limits for the constitutional control over politics. The main goal of the establishment of a constitutional court is the safeguarding of the democratic legal and political order and protecting individual freedoms and liberties (Schulz 2010: 1). Reflecting the violations of some basic values and perverting the majoritarian principle in the period of authoritarian past the constitutional law makers set the constitutional court as an impartial guardian of the constitution and its values. If in the earlier phase of the democratic transition the established political players (in the post-communist countries these were the socialist government and the opposition) face the uncertainty about their political future after the first democratic (founding) elections, they both advocate for a (strong) constitutional court as one of the institutional guaranties that would protect them if the other side win a decisive victory (Boulanger 2006: 270f.) Both sides have had the interest that for the case they lose the founding elections they have an option to correct the governmental policy or even block the reforms using the constitutional court. Parties are forever uncertain as to who will rule and seek to limit the ability of the other to exploit momentary political favor (Issacharoff 2010: 26). Thus, it is not surprising that numerous new democracies have established a powerful constitutional court.

The very core of the constitutional court's activity is to settle constitutional disputes by giving the "final word" on the interpretation of the

constitution. Since the constitutional norms are often vague programmatic clauses on basic values of the polity, the content of the constitution depends on its interpretation and cultural, social, and political environment in which the constitution lives and is applied (Maruste 2007: 11). In new democracies where no stable consensus is reached on diverse issues, the way the different political actors read the constitutional text can vary and, thus, produce constitutional disputes. In situations of “triadic dispute resolution”, when two parties in the political arena cannot solve their conflict over the interpretation of the constitution, a constitutional court acts as a “neutral third” party, an arbiter. Involvement of the constitutional court can stabilize the situation, yet an overly extensive constitutionalization can produce the opposite effects. If the competences of the constitutional court are too widely set, it can lead to an over-juridification of political processes and call into question the ability of the political system to function properly (Möllers 2012: 2).

The central instrument for the constitutional court to legally channel the democratization process is the abstract, usually ex-post, review of legislation adopted by the parliament. In line with the principle of the separation of powers the parliament is entrusted with the competence to enact legislation and set the legal framework for governmental policy. The democratic legislator is not only bound by the constitution, but is the first interpreter of the constitution (Kirchof 1997: § 221, para. 77). By adopting laws that shape the constitutional order and practice itself, the parliamentary majority determinates its vision of the “real meaning” of the constitution (Boulanger 2006: 269). Yet by involving the constitutional court into the institutional framework, the constitution limits the parliamentary sovereignty with regard to the interpretation of the constitution. The extent of the leverage the constitutional court has on the democratization process via abstract review depends generally on two issues: the number of subjects empowered to bring the case before the constitutional court, and the scope of and boundaries for the court’s intervention.

The abstract review is initiated by political actors. It is an instrument against the parliamentary majority and can be used by the opposition when there is a disagreement about what law or policy is best for the society under general and indeterminate constitutional provisions (Sadurski 1999: 22). The president is often empowered to initiate the abstract review and in cases of cohabitation the president can use this power to eventually block the decisions of the parliamentary majority.

The constitution can entrust some other actors, such as courts, government, units of federal or local government, etc. with the right to call the constitutional court for an abstract review. Some constitutions provide a mechanism for individuals to initiate an abstract review of statutes. Some constitutions allow for the constitutional court to initiate an abstract review *ex officio*⁶. For an abstract review to be effective it is important that the constitution finds a right balance when regulating the circle of subjects empowered to initiate the abstract review. If the right to initiate an abstract review is restricted to only a few actors, there is a danger that the possibility of abstract review is severely reduced or even eliminated (Marković 2008: 551). On the other hand, if the circle of the empowered subjects is too widely set then almost every dispute can be brought before the constitutional court, thereby perverting the abstract review process.

The other central issue determining the effects of the abstract review is the degree to which a constitutional court is engaged in activism and, hence, the extent of its intervention. This highly controversial issue is the result of the blurred boundary between law and politics in constitutional disputes. Since the constitutional court model does not accept the political question doctrine⁷, the constitutional court can deal with diverse highly politicized cases. Yet the fact that the constitutional court faces politics at every turn does not mean that its decisions are necessarily political (Maruste 2007: 10). The parameter for a constitutional control is a constitution as a legal act; the constitutional court is driven by legal logic, argumentation, and methodology; and its due process is legal. Furthermore, the abstract review is limited to the legality (constitutionality) of the statute whereas the legislature's political margin of discretion remains except from the control (cp. Nikolić 1995: 181). However, a problem arises because the constitutional norms are often vague and the decision if the attacked legal provision is constitutional-conform relies on the interpretation of the court. Although this interpretation primarily rests on legal argumentation (cp. Vučić and Stojanović 2009: 98ff.), the constitutional court takes general and abstract legal theories as well as a wider social context into account. In

6 This is somewhat controversial because it violates the principle "*ne procedat iudex ex officio*" and questions the impartial position of the constitutional court.

7 The political question doctrine is immanent for the US Supreme Court under which it will refuse to hear cases dealing with questions that are in their nature fundamentally political and not legal. Such cases are ruled as no justiciable.

such cases there is a great risk for political criteria and preferences to intrude into the court's decision (Galič 2002: 218). The constitutional court can reduce the politicization risks by following a coherent system of principles and by developing certain values that underlay the provisions of the constitution.

The role of the constitutional court in the abstract review is one of veto-player. If the court finds that the disputed statute (or statutory provision) collides with the constitution, the court will nullify it. It is for this reason that constitutional theory labels constitutional courts as "negative legislators". However, even though the competence of "positive legislation" is still reserved for the parliament, the division line between positive and negative legislation is not always strict. So when a parliament enacts legislation to comply with the constitutional court's decision, it will usually follow the court's argumentation though it is not obliged to do so. In many legal systems, constitutional courts can decide not to nullify the law in the process of the abstract review but to interpret it in a way that makes it conform to the constitution, thereby making such an interpretation a binding one. Also, constitutional courts can sometimes present guidelines for future legislation or even supplement the parliament when the needed legislation is missing (Grabenwarter 2011: 2, para. 9). Yet the principle of judicial self-restraint limits judicial activism. An overly activist constitutional court would give the impression that the court attempts to act as a political player and that its decisions rely not on legal argumentation but rather on political preferences (Galič 2002: 218).

Although abstract review is the key competence of the constitutional court, it is not the only one that influences the political processes in a democratizing society. In disputes on the horizontal separation of powers, the court can have a significant role in establishing the boundaries of power and limiting its concentration. This is especially the case in periods of cohabitation when the president and the government have different political colors. Moreover, the constitutional court can affect the democratization process through adjudicating disputes concerning vertical separation of powers, electoral disputes, ban of political parties, as well as through its involvement in the impeachment process. And when it comes to fundamental rights, some cases are initiated with the constitutional complaint in which the court not only decides about violations of rights of respective individual but also sets objective standards for the human rights protection.

The previously cited democratization processes indicate the significant role the constitutional courts have played in the democratic transition. In the first years of the post-WW II period, for example, the Italian constitutional court was a crucial actor in eliminating the old fascist legislation that was at odds with the constitution. The Spanish constitutional court was the arbiter and the leading actor in the territorial distribution of competences. Also, constitutional courts of many post-communist states in Central and East Europe have established themselves “as powerful, influential, activist players, dictating the rules of the political game” (Sadurski 2009: 3). The constitutional courts in these countries have dealt with diverse issues and nullified important aspects of laws on abortion, the death penalty, lustration, criminal prosecution of former communist officials responsible for crimes against the people during the communist period, economic austerity measures, fiscal policy, citizenship requirements, personal identification numbers for citizens, and indexation of pensions (Sadurski 1999: 2f). Frequent interventions of the constitutional court in the transitional phase of the democratization process are indicative of the unstable consensus in the polity, as well as the imperfections within the legislative process⁸. They also indicate the readiness of the political actors to settle disputes through formal (institutional) channels⁹ and that the constitutional court has gained certain level of authority to act as an impartial arbiter. Yet it is not always the case that the constitutional court is proactive in the initial stages of the transition to a constitutional democracy. If a court has to establish its own independence, legitimacy, or authority, it will be in no position to resolve basic constitutional questions effectively (Epstein, Knight and Shvetsova 2001: 156). Under such circumstances a new constitutional court will reluctantly get involved into the issues about which there is a greater disagreement, and limit its activity to reinforcement of those features of the constitutional system about which there is already substantial agreement (Epstein, Knight and Shvetsova 2001: 156). In the initial transitional phase, the court needs to

8 In new democracies the legislation is qualitatively poor both with regard to the procedure and to the content nomotechnically. The reason thereof lies in the lack of experience and the tradition. Furthermore, the parliament is overburden with adopting of a new legislation during the democratic transition, since it is a necessary instrument for democratic change. In those states that desire membership to the EU, the necessity to adjust the national norms to the *acquis communautaire* further complicates the legislative process (Galič, 2002: 218).

9 However, it should be borne in mind that political actors can address the constitutional court so as to block political processes.

find a fine balance with regard to the political power. If the court is involved in politically colored disputes, then that could compromise its neutrality and public credibility. In still fragile new democracies the constitutional court's decisions unfavorable to a ruling party can in some extreme situations provoke attempts to actually or formally limit the court's independence (Sadurski 2009: 33).

The constitutional court's position can be powerful but the court is not an omnipotent actor. Although the court's decisions are final and binding, the court has no means to enforce its decisions. In fact, the implementation of the court's rulings depends on the political players that are the object of the court's constitutional control. Consequently, the impact the constitutional court has on the democratization process depends not only on the decisions it makes, but also on the degree to which these decisions are implemented. The implementation of the court's decisions depends on the overall development of the legal and political culture in the country, on the court's authority and legitimacy, and on the willingness of the political actors to comply their political action with the legal (constitutional) norms. Since the constitutional court's decision limits the power (at least for the party that lost in the constitutional dispute), it is not surprising that the implementation of court's decisions is not always smooth but confronted with ignorance or delaying. The degree to which the court's decisions are implemented can indicate the quality of democratic transformation: in consolidated democracies the compliance with the constitutional court's judgments is normally fairly high, while it declines as far as the quality of democracy declines (Sadurski 2009: 23).

Serbian Constitutional Court and the Establishing of a Constitutional Democracy in Serbia

Unlike the situation in the post-communist states in Central and East Europe, the Serbian constitutional court was not a new institution established through democratic change, because the Serbian legal order acknowledged the institution of the constitutional court since 1963. Yet neither under the communist regime nor under Milošević's rule did the constitutional court play the role of the guardian of the constitution. Since political power was set beyond the legal order that was just a façade, the constitutional court was not a tool for establishing and promoting constitutionalism but was used for the formal legiti-

mation of the political system. It was because of this that the constitutional court in Serbia entered the democratic transition of 2000 as a weak institution. The court's ability to influence the democratization process and to push the major political players to play by the democratic "rules of the game" was to a great extent limited by the need of the court to strengthen its position in terms of its legitimacy and authority. For many years the main political actors have occasionally blocked the work of the constitutional court because they neglected to appoint the court's judges. After the regime change in 2000 it took almost two years, until mid-2002, for the court to be capable of making decisions. The problem occurred again in 2005 when the President (after a long delay) presented two candidates to fill vacancies on the bench, but the appointments were blocked because the parliamentary fractions could not agree. The adoption of the new Serbian constitution in 2006 did not bring a change in attitude towards the constitutional court that was not constituted before the end of 2007. Yet the appointment procedure was not completed until 2010 because of delays in establishing judicial bodies assigned to appoint five judges to the constitutional court. This perennial seesaw in the appointment of constitutional judges has not only hampered the court's legitimacy and authority, but also occasionally blocked its work and has led to an overburdensome caseload. Given its delicate position, the court was not able to position itself so as to have leverage (at least to the degree conform to a constitutional court's role) for the democratization process. To some extent its actions were constrained, thereby making it incapable of imposing its will as the highest constitutional arbiter and significant player in designing constitutional paths for the elites' arrangements in the transitional phase and, thus, in setting the basis for the constitutionalization of the polity.

Furthermore, the position of the constitutional court and its institutional authority have been compromised due to the low degree of legitimacy and authority of the Serbian constitution, which should serve as the central parameter for resolving constitutional disputes. One of the central barriers for the democratization process and the establishment of a Rechtsstaat in Serbia is the confusion within its legal order. The reasons lie in the authoritarian past of the state, as well as in the lack of a clear consensus among the political elites about the course and the basic values of the reforms. Serbia lacks a deep rooted tradition of the rule of law. Although in the past the regimes have changed, the relation between law and politics has remained the same. Politics has never been

functionally subjected to a legal framework; consequently, no power had ever unconditionally respected legality or the law (Belančić 2001: 2008). During the socialist era law was just one of the instruments used to achieve the goals of socialist ideology. The constitutions were adopted not for implementation, but simply to fulfill the formal condition for a state to have a constitution. The “state reason” and even “the party reason” were the primary motive for the action of all state institutions (Jovičić 1995: 174). The law was not comprehensive but it was composed of a set of norms regulating particular state activities and specific behavior of citizens. Some issues were regulated in detail, while there was a lack of minimal regulation of others. The communist party was the source of power and the law was just an instrument for ruling (cp. Dimitrijević 2002: 23ff). The negative tradition of misuse of law for the purpose of governing continued in the 1990s under the Milošević regime. Actually, there was no legal order at that time but only a set of dispersed norms that were arbitrarily and selectively implemented on demand. The breakup of the regime in 2000 neither brought a clear break with the quasi-legal legacy nor a significant change in treating the constitution as a façade. The Serbian political elite showed no willingness to depersonalize governance by channeling it into the legal framework. In so doing it preserved the elements of the legal façade of the previous systems. The way political players have treated (and still treat) the constitution suggests a lack of serious intent to constitutionalize the polity. As noted above, one of the central elements in the phase of the institutionalization of democracy is the adoption of a new constitution. In Serbia it took six years to overthrow the 1990 constitution and to adopt a new one. Although the electoral revolution in 2000 provided a window of constitutional opportunity, there was no consensus on the issue and constitutional reform was blocked. In fact, constitutional continuity preserved the ideological, political, and legal core elements of the old system (Dimitrijević 2004: 61f). Political players perceived the creation of an independent state of Serbia in 2006 as constitutional opportunity, one that led to a new constitution being adopted in November 2006. Yet the adoption of the constitution was neither a result of a comprehensive public debate nor a reflection of a consensus on basic principles and values of the democratic polity. The adoption of the constitution was to a great extent linked to the Kosovo issue so as to constitutionally safeguard the territorial integrity of the state. Unfortunately, the legitimacy of the constitution was very low

from the very start. Both the adoption procedure and the quality of the constitutional norms were perceived as highly problematic. Apart from that, the adoption of the new constitution did not result in political actors submitting all government actions to rules and institutionalizing political decision making. In short, the constitution is perceived as an interim act that does not meet the needs of the polity and the society and thus should be changed¹⁰. The continuing constitutional debate, and the failure to reach the minimum consensus over the basic values and outlines of the legal and political order capture the democratization process and hamper substantial constitutionalization of the state.

This para-constitutionality places the constitutional court in an unfavorable position: although it gives great latitude for the court's activism, it also sets limitations to it. Since the constitution is not just a text but also a set of values and principles, the constitutional court could play a decisive role in formulating them, thereby addressing the lack of consensus. Yet this could bring the constitutional court into the grey zone of positive activism and turn it into a constitutional-maker instead of a constitutional-interpreter. On the other hand, the general mistrust of institutions, the low legitimacy of the constitution, and the overall position of the constitutional court could limit the outreach of the court's decisions even if the court opts to act less constrained.

Despite these circumstances the Serbian constitutional court has delivered diverse adjudications that have affected some key issues of the democratization process. For instance, the court has played a decisive role in enforcing the principle of the free mandate of the MPs. In 2003 the court had struck down the statutory norm that linked political party exclusion to the loss of a parliamentary seat¹¹, and in 2010 the court declared the institution of undated resignations as unconstitutional¹². Additionally, the court had stroke down the authority of the presenter of a candidate list (usually a political party or a coalition) to arbitrarily assert the mandates to the candidates from the list¹³. Although these decisions have provoked turbulence and disaffection in the political

10 According to the results of one survey performed in 2012, only 10% of citizens and 5% of the members of the political elite expressed their opinion that the constitution should not be changed. The constitution was rated with the average note 2.8 (grading 1 to 5). For detailed results of the survey, see "Zašto Ustav mora biti promenjen", [online]. Available at: <http://www.fosserbia.org/projects/project.php?id=1656> [Accessed March 9, 2013].

11 „Službeni glasnik RS“, no. 57/03.

12 IY3-52/2008, „Službeni glasnik RS“, no. 34/2010.

13 *Ibid.*

arena, they initiated change and compliance with the democratic standard of the free mandate.

Judicial reform is also indicative of the constitutional court's involvement in the democratization process. The Law on Judges adopted in 2008 has stipulated a new appointment of all judges. The law was challenged before the constitutional court but it did not accept the initiative¹⁴. In 2009 a general appointment of judges was carried out with the majority of appointed judges already having held the position of judge, but some new judges were appointed, and some judges were recalled. The appointment process turned out to be extremely problematic mainly because it was not sufficiently transparent and the selection (appointment) criteria were not precisely set. The reform of the judiciary became a highly controversial political issue and it also hampered its efficiency. The question of the legal remedy arose for the judges who were not (re-)appointed, and a complaint to the constitutional court appeared to be the only way out. Addressing the complaints, the constitutional court declared that the presumption that the applicants meet the appointment requirements was not overturned, leading the court to order that all unappointed judges be appointed¹⁵. These constitutional court decisions resolved the uncertainties caused by the chaotic appointment procedure and have brought the issue back to square one. Yet the constitutional court's intervention was to some extent hesitant and one could argue that a more activist approach by the constitutional court in regards to judicial reform would have prevented these negative effects.

When it comes to the vertical separation of powers, the court's direction became clear with decision about the unconstitutionality of some norms of the Law on the Competences of the Autonomous Province of Vojvodina¹⁶. With the complex decentralization issue and the present tensions between the state government and the provincial government as a backdrop, the court's decision led to a live political debate. The decision was heavily criticized in Vojvodina as an indicator of the general intent to narrow the autonomy of the province. Yet the legal effects of the court's decision remained blurred. The court struck down the diverse norms of the law, but it did not provoke any reaction on the republican or the provincial level to adjust the legal framework to the

14 IV3-43/2009, "Službeni glasnik RS", no. 65/2009.

15 VIIIY-413/2012, "Službeni glasnik RS" no. 105/2012; VIIIY-420/2012, VIIIY-486/2012.

16 IV3-353/2009, "Službeni glasnik RS", no. 67/2012.

court's decision. The national parliament did not amend the respective law and the provincial parliament did not amend the Statute of Vojvodina. It was because of a lack of political agreement on the status of Vojvodina and on the scope of its autonomy that the issue was just set aside.

In addition to ruling on cases dealing with the protection of the democratic order the court also deals with constitutional complaints involving the protection of individual human and minority rights. Indeed, the vast majority of cases brought before the constitutional court are those initiated with a constitutional complaint. These complaints lead the court to decide on individual cases of human rights violations, as well as to develop a comprehensive system of human rights standards and principles which supports the democratization process.

Conclusion

One of the central goals of the democratization process is the establishment of the rule of law based on a clear hierarchy of laws and the supremacy of the constitution. The constitution reflects the basic values and principles of the polity, sets the institutional framework for the coupling of the law and the politics, and defines the boundaries of the state's intervention in the individual freedoms and liberties. Yet the constitution is merely a legal text and its effects depend on its implementation and authority to generate the commitment to the democratic procedures. To this regard a constitution can serve either as a façade or as a basis for the establishment of a substantive constitutionalism. Most states that have gone through a democratization process have established a constitutional court as a special safeguard of the democratic order. This meant that they opted to soften majoritarian rule, to exclude basic principles and values from arbitrary decision-making by the parliament, and to give the constitutional court the last word on the interpretation of the constitution. The impact that the constitutional court has on the democratization process depends on its institutional position, legitimacy and authority; and on the various legal instruments and competences on its disposal. For an effective constitutional court it is essential that it not become politicized and lose the position of a neutral arbiter. Institutional safeguards must be set in place to protect the court's independence from the influence of the political actors. Additionally, the court must act impartially and respect the legal

standards of procedure and the principles of the legal interpretation and argumentation. And finally, the court needs to find a balance with respect to the political effects of its decisions. The court can be a stabilizing actor only if it limits the review to constitutionality and avoids intervening in the discretionary areas of policy-making. No matter the institutional strength that a constitutional court enjoys in one legal order, it is never an all-powerful institution. The implementation of its decisions depends on the political elite complying with them instead of ignoring them or delaying their implementation. For that reason the degree to which the court's decisions are implemented can be used as an indicator for democratic development.

For the position of the constitutional court in the democratization process in Serbia a few factors are indicative. The constitutional court in Serbia was established before the breakup of the authoritarian regime and, thus, it faced some mistrust and legitimacy deficits as well as the other institutions face. There were constant obstacles and delays in the appointment of the court's judges and it was not until 2010 that the court became fully operational. One of the greatest barriers for the constitutional court's impact on democratization in Serbia has been (and still is) the low degree of legitimacy and authority of the Serbian constitution. Any serious intent to constitutionalize the polity and to limit political power by constitutional norms remains absent in Serbia, thereby making the constitution a façade. These circumstances make it difficult for the constitutional court to impose the authority of the constitution to political players. Yet the constitutional court occasionally delivers decisions that influence the transformation process. Nevertheless, the court's decisions are selectively implemented. The decisions that limit political power or change political practice are implemented only if the issues are politically prioritized, and there is sufficient international (mainly the EU) pressure to comply with the decisions.

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Global Environmental Issues and IR Theories: A Pluralist Theoretical Approach

Abstract

This article considers the English School as an underutilized research resource in the field of international relations (IR). Its defining attributes are its methodological pluralism, its historicism, and its interlinking of three main concepts: international system, international society and world society. Parallels are also drawn among the three IR traditions – international system, international society and world society – as the English School differentiates them. This paper points out that the current globalization process reinforces the transnational paradigm that focuses on non-state actors, with a new configuration emerging in which politics loses the hierarchical position implied by realism. Finally, a pluralist theoretical approach is proposed as the most appropriate for research in the area of international environmental politics.

Keywords: International relations, security, environment, realism, rationalism, revolutionism, the English School.

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Introduction

Global degradation processes now occupy a prominent position in international relations and are recognized as a legitimate concern of security studies (Marković 2002; Đorđević 2002). Various perspectives (statist, humanist, and ecological) on linking environment and security reflect different values and aspirations (Miltojević 2002). Statists, or state-centric concepts (national security, extended national security, and intra/state security), consider the implications of environmental change within the framework that implies a dominant role of a state in security.

However, it does not mean that other approaches (ecologist or humanist) should be discarded (Newman 2001). Taken all together, they express the full complexity of the relationship between environment and security. Matthew (2000: 38) describes these mutual relations in this way: “Only a few people are likely to choose the condition of the environment [emphasis added], or the condition of humankind [emphasis added], or the condition of the state [emphasis added] as the single and unconditional point for all reasoning and action. We are more complex than that, and more appreciative of the simultaneous separateness and interconnectedness of things that make up our world. To make an unconditional choice, one has to deny the immense power of the state, or the special status of the human species, or the transnational character of nature – denials that are not easy to sell or live by.”

How, then, can traditional International Relations (IR) theories explain this new reality? The complexity of environmental security presumably calls for a pluralistic theoretical approach in IR theory. In opening up the ontological basis for analyzing environmental security phenomena, we intend to complement rather than to supplement existing approaches, and to combine inductive/deductive or hermeneutical/scientific explanatory approaches.

The starting point for this reasoning may be the distinction among three main traditions. These are concepts of international system, international society, and world society, or Realism, Rationalism and Revolutionism (Wight 1991), respectively. This, so-called English School discourse codifies these 3(R) as Hobbesianism or Machiavellianism, Grotianism, and Kantianism, respectively (Cutler 1991). The main authors of the English School (Hedley Bull, Martin Wight and Adam

Watson) tended to create a third way between realism and idealism, consisting in the synthesis of the two currents (Czaputowicz 2003).

A comparative review of these three traditions is presented in Table 1. There is a general agreement that the main thrust of the English School has been to establish the Grotian/Rationalism element by developing the concept of international society. In the area of environmental affairs, the English School has been grafted to regime theory.

International regimes are “social institutions consisting of agreed-upon principles, norms, rules, and programs that govern the interactions in specific issue-areas” (Zürn 1998: 624). Defined in this way, regimes are distinct from international law in that they are more rooted in social practice than in general principles. Therefore, environmental problems are conceived of in terms of the interstate interdependence they generate, and analyzed as collective action problems. The key normative assumption of the regime approach is that the states system can respond to global environmental change, because of the premise that “there are no insuperable obstacles to cooperation under the basic anarchy of international politics” (Paterson 1999: 794).

However, a number of scholars during the 1990s questioned the assumption that the emergence of global environmental change does not involve any substantial challenge to the basic structure of international politics (Meyer *et al.* 1997). They all, hence, have criticized the regimes framework. This paper considers the three IR traditions and their ramifications on environmental security issues in some detail. It focuses especially on the transnational paradigm which points out individuals as international actors, emerging with a new structure of the world in which politics loses the hierarchical position implied by realism.

Martin Wight	<i>Realism</i>	<i>Rationalism</i>	<i>Revolutionism</i>
Hedley Bull	<i>Realism</i>	<i>Internationalism</i>	<i>Universalism</i>
Form of international relations	<i>International system</i>	<i>International society</i>	<i>The world system/society</i>
Precursors	<i>Hobbes/ Machiavelli</i>	<i>Grotius/ Locke</i>	<i>Kant/ Marx</i>

Table 1. Tripartite division of IR theories.

Realism

The state-centric theories of Classical Realism that asserts that states struggle for power (Morgenthau 1978: 29) and Neo-Realism (or Structural Realism) that asserts that states struggle for security as the highest end (Waltz 1979: 126) have been for a long time dominant IR traditions. Realist theories of international politics are based on material assumptions that define the structure of the international system in terms of the material capabilities of state actors. It assumes that the distribution of these attributes creates the basic causal framework by which the range of outcomes in the international systems are determined, including also cooperative frameworks.

The normative and ideational phenomena are left out of the structure. Morgenthau, for instance, asserts: "The actions of states are determined not by moral principles and legal commitments but by the considerations of interest and power. Moral principles and legal commitments may be invoked to justify a policy arrived at on other grounds, but they do not determine the choice among different courses of action" (Myers 1998: 320).

Since the normative and ideational factors are complex phenomena, realist "value-free" explanations of international politics rely on a strict positivist, analytically rigorous methodological model (McElroy 1992: 3). In most cases, the structure of the international system is an independent variable while the behavior of states is a dependent variable. Although Realism recognizes the possibility that actors may and do shape structures in the real world, this empirical fact is held out of theory in the interest of parsimony and the isolation of causal relationships (Keohane 1984: 78). Similarly, power is part of the independent variable, a cause but not an effect. Finally, the interests of states are either independent variables or fixed parameters in the causal equation and typically treated as constant, unitary and unproblematic (Sullivan 2001: 13). However, not all realists, including the most prominent ones such as Morgenthau, Kennan, or Lipmann are in favor of behavioralism in world politics. Morgenthau, for instance, was a consistent opponent of positivist reasoning and of the claim that moral reasoning had no role in the study of international relations (Rengger 2000: 757).

Many scholars, therefore, criticized basic assumptions of Realism (Cox 1981; Ruggie 1986; Keohane 1986; Ashley 1986; Putnam 1988;

Haas 1992; Rasmussen 1997). The main objection is that the realist approaches do not incorporate domestic political variables and do not consider the power of ideational elements on the structure of the international system. The examination of domestic politics may, for example, provide the key to understanding the different types of responses to an environmental stress, especially demands for scarce environmental resources like water, and the ways of dealing with this specific “security dilemma” (Jervis 1976: 66).

Putnam’s (1988) “two-level game model” also links domestic agencies and international negotiation process. In short, any given negotiation, following Putnam, implies a simultaneous occurrence of at least two games, one at the inter-state level and the other at the level of negotiator’s domestic constituencies. The key point is the simple observation that a negotiator has to satisfy these two interdependent imperatives simultaneously.

Norms, as the end product of international negotiation process, may also be both “products of power” and “sources of power” in the international system (Sullivan 2001). States can actually gain more from cooperation than they can from discord. This is, in fact, the ontological premise of the other structuralist, state-centric approach – Neo-Liberal Institutionalism or Neo-Liberalism. Like Neo-Realism, Neo-Liberalism operates explicitly within the rational choice theory which assumes maximizing the utility function of political actors from a fixed set of preferences. If preferences are stable and outside of the process of choice, then “we cannot inquire into how preferences are formed” (Wildavsky 1987: 5). Due to these prepositions, Simon (1985: 293) is correct when he asserts that rational choice theorizing, paraphrasing Clausewitz, is a “continuation of political realism by other means”. Nevertheless, a generic power of this theory makes it applicable to a number of political phenomena. Contemporary environmental reality tends to be explained on the basis of rational choice models as well.

Barrett (1998), for instance, argues that the “free-rider problem” is the “hearth of the ecological problem”. He observes these two main features of the problem: (1) “free-riders” get the benefits from every else’s restraints but profit from their own lack of restraint, and (2) if there are a large number of people in the group, every one is tempted to be a free-rider because the global advantages if restraint are negligible. Thus, as Barrett asserts, the environmental resources will be vastly overlooked

and any agreement will be insecure. Soroos (1994), in an interesting article on the security aspects of two international environmental negotiations (the global warming and ozone depletion problems), used another rational model – “prisoner’s dilemma”. His study showed that, in the case of global warming, the logic of the prisoner’s dilemma could be a significant factor in environmental efforts to address the problem of environmental change.

Yet, due to a high degree of uncertainty, that characterizes many contemporary global environmental problems, reasoning in this fashion may be problematic (Waltz 1999). Simon (1985: 302) argues that where the facts are clear, we have some chance, by application of the principles of reasoning, to calculate what the choice will be; however, where evidence is weak and conflicting, especially true in the case of global warming, a rationality principle has little independent predictive power. Evidently, rational choice theorists tend to simplify human motivation in order to derive, according to Green and Shapiro (1994), coherent and unified theoretical view of politics. These authors, however, do not question its power as a general explanatory tool.

The classification of ontologies presented in this section (realism, neoliberalism and culturally/based approach) is similar to that suggested by Blatter et al. (2001: 12). The new element of this systematization is the notion of culture, including also “eco-culture” (Dyer 1993), understood as a socially constructed reality. Human behavior is seen as co-determined by social interdependence and interaction (Malešević 2002). The key variables are ideas, culture, and identity, as the ideational elements in the IR theorizing. This relativist ontology is reflected in the constructivist strand in IR theory, whose proponents (Wendt 1987, 1994, 1995; Wendt and Friedhem, 1995; Katzenstein 1996; Ruggie 1998) criticize the key assumptions of Neo-Realism, especially the concept of anarchy. Wendt (1992: 391) has argued that “anarchy is what states make of it”, and that threats are constructed, rather than being natural or inevitable. His main argument is that identity and interest formation derive from the social processes of interaction leading to expectations of costs and benefits attached to different types of behavior within a system. The constructivist theory of IR is closely related to the English School.

While Neo-Liberal institutionalists or Grotian rationalists focus their attention on the causal effects of ideas on policy and normative

elements, constructivists try to capture the structural quality of ideas in the forms of “intersubjective meanings” (Yee 1996: 102). The concept of intersubjective meaning, as Neufeld (1995: 77) defines it, is “the product of the collective self-interpretations and self-definitions of human communities”. Therefore, the key constructivist assumptions are ideational elements in the behavior of political actors, problem definitions, perceptions, communication, and shared understanding. Power is based on network centrality and communicative skills.

In the environmental domain, this ontology is recognizable primarily through the environmental equity (justice), or human security literature. The emphasis is on ethical issues associated with the economic relationship between Developed and Developing World and the struggle of marginalized minorities or indigenous groups within a society for their livelihoods (Shue 1981, 1999; Shiva 2002).

Finally, it is important to note that constructivists do not reject positivist thought or causal explanation. Their disagreement with mainstream IR theories is ontological; not epistemological. The last point means, as Checkel (1998: 325) observes, that constructivism has the potential to bridge the still vast gap separating the majority of IR theorists from postmodernists and critical theorists. With the latter, constructivists share many substantive concerns (for instance, the role of identity and discourse) and a similar ontological stance; with the former, they share a largely common epistemology. Constructivists thus find themselves in the middle ground between rational choice theorists and post-modern scholars.

Rationalism

Grotianism is about the institutionalization of shared interest and identity amongst states, and Rationalism puts the creation and maintenance of shared norms, rules, and institutions at the center of IR theory. However, the notion of an international society does not mean pure altruism; states are expected to act in accordance with their own interests as well. As a result, as Sullivan (2001: 23) observes, “norms must be seen as operating on a sliding scale”, or, in Walzer’s words (2000: 253), as a “map of human crises”.

Rationalism, therefore, should not be confused with the idealistic position that assumes common interests in institutions, or so-called

“harmony of interests”. In contrast, the principle of “self-interest rightly understood”, as Tocqueville (1990: 123) named it, is much better description for the international society: “The principle of self-interest rightly understood produces no great acts of self-sacrifice, but it suggests daily small acts of self-denial. By itself it cannot suffice to make a man virtuous; but it disciplines a number of persons in habits of regularity, temperance, moderation, foresight, self-command; and if it does not lead men straight to virtue by the will, it gradually draws in that direction by their habits. If the principle of interest rightly understood were to sway the whole moral world, extraordinary virtues doubtless be more rare; but I think that gross depravity would then also be less common. The principle of interests rightly understood perhaps prevents men from rising far above the level of mankind, but a great number of other men, who were falling far below it, are caught and restrained by it.”

In order to mark a clear distinction between realist and rationalist traditions in terms of the interest concept, Watson (1992: 14) uses the terms “raison d'état” and “raison de systeme”, respectively. Sullivan (2000: 23) has considered Watson's idea of “raison de systeme” as an important one to “understanding in empirical terms how norms influence the behavior of states in the international system”.

Bull and Watson (1984: 1) defined the international society as: “A group of states (or, more generally, a group of independent political communities) which not merely form a system, in the sense that behavior of each is a necessary factor in the calculations of the others, but also have established by dialogue and consent common rules and institutions for the conduct of their relations, and recognized their common interest in maintaining these agreements.”

This classical definition includes both the Hobbesian/Realist element of the international system and the Grotian/Rationalist element of a socially constructed order of the international society. Thus the international society perspective is less utopian, more empirical, and more state-centric than the cosmopolitan view of idealism. Although the English School scholars occasionally address the possibilities of a more cosmopolitan future, Sullivan (2001: 24) asserts that “their stance remains essentially Grotian, not Kantian”. Cosmopolitanism is, according to Wight, “theoretically the least important” form of radical thinking about world politics (quoted in Linklater 2002: 12).

Revolutionism

Finally, Kantianism takes individuals, non-state organizations, and ultimately the world population as a whole as the focus of global societal identities. Its central core is a transcendence of the state system as the center of IR theory; that is, the idea of shared norms and values at the individual level. Revolutionism is mostly about forms of “universalist” cosmopolitanism (Buzan 2001: 475).

Cosmopolitanism rejects the idea of a security of states claiming that the only true international society is one of individuals (Dobson 2006). This is the most revolutionary branch of three revolutionist theories and it implies that total dissolution of international relations (Wendt 1991: 40). The other two forms are “doctrinal uniformity” and “doctrinal imperialism” (Buzan 2001: 478). The first, based on Kantian Perpetual Peace, argues that a world consisting exclusively of republican regimes would be a peaceful world. It calls for the ideological homogeneity. The second, which is attributed to Stalinism, is in favor of doctrinal unity through the efforts of a great power “to spread a creed and impose uniformity” (Linklater 2002: 323).

Although the English School has a great credit for synthesis of Realism and Rationalism, it is obliged to deal with the elements of Liberal Revolutionism. The relation between international society and world society is particularly important to English School theory. The general view is that world society (in the form of shared culture) is a prerequisite for international society. Namely, a common culture appears as a necessary condition for an international society. However, Buzan (1983) acknowledges that “a case can also be made that preceding world society is neither historically nor functionally a necessary condition for the formation of an international society”.

Cosmopolitans, however, argue that the doctrine should be more influenced now than it has been in the past, especially during the Cold War, since it is the obvious remedy for so many of the world’s problems, including environmental ones (Linklater 2001: 273). Although scattered references to harm and injury are plentiful, there is no distinguished body of literature which examines how harm to individuals has been understood, managed and controlled in different states-systems. In order to deal more analytically with the problem of harm in world politics, Linklater (2002: 327) identifies five forms which would be a sound reason for developing cosmopolitan harm conventions:

(1) deliberate harm caused in relations between independent political communities, (2) deliberate harm caused by government to their own citizens, (3) deliberate harm by non-state actors, (4) unintended harm, and (5) negligence.

The most striking example for unintended harm is environmental degradation. Linklater (2002: 329) acknowledges that environmental degradation is the “best contemporary example of how the repetition of everyday actions which are seemingly harmless in themselves can, with the passing generations, create outcome that no one desired”. On the other hand, under negligence Linklater lists examples such as “nuclear colonialism” (Diblin 1988: 205) – testing nuclear weapons in the South Pacific with seeming indifference to the health of local population – and “environmental apartheid” (Shue 1981) – the practice of exporting hazardous waste to societies where environmental safeguards are lower than in the West.

Finally, some scholars are optimists since they rely on the “environmentally benign democratic peace” (Dalby 2000: 88). The Kantian notion of “perpetual peace” through spreading of democracy (Doyle 1983; Russett 1993; Diamond 1995) has its responses in the environmental security literatures. Larry Diamond (1995), for instance, reasons: “They [democracies] are more environmentally responsible because they must answer to their own citizens, who organize to protest the destruction of their environments. They respect competition, civil liberties, property rights, and the rule of law; democracies are the only reliable foundation on which a new world of international security and prosperity can be built (cited by Newman, 2001: 248). “Neumayer (2002) empirically demonstrates that “democracies exhibit strong international environmental commitment”.

The English School Pluralist Approach

As the previous sections suggest, all the three IR traditions should be invoked in studying of a particular environmental security phenomenon. This stems from the international character of many environmental problems as well. Although each element in this 3R-triangle is conceptually and methodologically distinct, they blur or merge into each other as the boundaries. For instance, Imperialism can be placed between Realism and Revolutionism (See Table 2).

I	
(Security/Defensive) ↔ (Conservative/Pluralist)	
Hobbesianism	Grotianism
(<i>Realism</i>)	(<i>Rationalism</i>)
International system]	[International Society]
Methodology:	Methodology:
Positivism	Hermeneutics with interpretivism
II	
(Progressive/Solidarist) ↔ (Evolutionary)	
Grotianism	Kantianism
(<i>Rationalism</i>)	(<i>Revolutionism</i>)
[International Society]	[World Society]
Methodology:	Methodology:
Hermeneutics with interpretivism	Critical theory
III	
(Messianic Universalist) ↔ (Power-Maximizing/Imperial)	
Kantianism	Hobbesianism
(<i>Revolutionism</i>)	(<i>Realism</i>)
[World Society]	[International System]
Methodology:	Methodology:
Critical theory	Hermeneutics with Interpretivism

Table 2. Transformations of International Relations
According to the English School

In the English School perspective all three of these elements are in continuous coexistence and interplay. Buzan makes this clear, saying: “By assuming that all three elements always operate simultaneously (that is, methodological pluralism), it also transcends the assumption often made in the so-called inter-paradigm debate, that realist, liberal, and Marxist approaches to IR theory are incommensurable” (2001: 476). Many scholars advocate the methodological pluralism of the English School, that is combining the Hobbesian/Realist element of the international system with the Grotian/Rationalist element of a socially constructed order.

Finally, the English School is not a coherent body of literature. Within this IR theory one can distinguish two currents – pluralism and solidarism. The pluralism strand (Bull) assumes that international relations between independent states are based on interaction and coexistence, focusing, thus, on these key categories: (1) sovereignty, (2) diplomacy, and (3) international law (See Table 3.). It is important to note that only sovereign states, according to pluralism, can become members of the international society.

Form of international relations	Sovereignty of nation states	Common norms and institutions
International System	<i>Yes</i>	<i>No</i>
International Society	<i>Yes</i>	<i>Yes</i>
World Society	<i>No</i>	<i>Yes</i>

Table 3. Forms of international relations

The solidarist current of the English School (Wight) assumes solidarity of states in the introduction of international law and universal standards of behaviour. In this approach international society is rather a political society than a society of states. Solidarists claim that the subjects of international law are not only states, but also individuals. In short, states are obligated to respect the full range of human rights, including those relating on clean water, air and land. Whereas in the case of pluralism the dominant tendency was particularism, in the case of solidarism it is universalism. Thus, pluralism is closer to Realism, solidarism is closer to Revolutionism. (See Table 2).

Obviously, the English School is dominantly a state-centred and quasi-realist theory. Andrew Hurrell (2001) claims that the English School provides the adequate framework for the intellectual dialogue between law and politics. Yet, this general theory, in order to be applicable to a broader range of international issues (including environmental ones), could use the constructivist epistemology, and it should be combined with „comparative studies, governance studies and liberal theories” (Jørgensen 2000: 8-9). Some of these alternatives are analyzed in the following sections.

The Other Pluralist Approaches

Moravcsik's "new liberal theory" of international relations represents also a call for theoretical pluralism. However, his emphasis is on Liberalism. For liberals, the configuration of state preferences matters most in world politics, not as realists claim, the configuration of capabilities and not, as institutionalists argue, the configuration of influences and institutions. The priority of liberalism in multi-causal model of state behavior implies that collective state behavior should be analyzed as a two-stage process of constrained social choice. Put briefly, as Moravcsik (1997: 544) argues in his "nonidealistic, nonutopian, nonmoralist, and empirically more oriented liberal theory", states form first preferences – a stage explained by liberal theorists of state-society relations. Then they debate, bargain, or fight to particular agreement – a second stage explained by realist and institutionalist (as well as liberal) theories of strategic interaction. We would agree that contemporary international environmental policy gives proof for this statement. Thus, the American rejection to ratify the Kyoto Protocol could be explained using this two-stage process, in which American non-cooperative behaviour was driven by specific domestic preferences – a protection of corporations' interests.

All the evidence suggests that material, that is military and economic power, institutional, and cultural element, all need to be considered simultaneously in assessing an anarchical society's propensity for conflict and in designing strategies to promote change. This is a debate of compelling intellectual and practical importance. Snyder contends (2002) that assessing the future of the international system needs thinking in terms of mutual feedbacks among material, institutional, and cultural elements. Yet, he acknowledges that changing the ideas, norms, and culture of an anarchical system is not sufficient condition for the transformation of the system.

On the other hand, Wendt and Friedhem (1995: 692) believe that this debate (material versus non-material factors) is often muddled by two misunderstandings:

„First, it is not about relative explanatory power of 'power of interests' versus 'ideas' but about whether material forces can explain international politics stripped of social (and thus ideational) content. Idealists are not saying that states do not act on the basis of power and interests but rather that this is contingent on the social structure in which states

are embedded. In a conflictual system power and interests matters, but what makes a system conflictual is an underlying nature of common knowledge. Second, and relatedly, this debate is also not about how much conflict exists in the system. Material forces may cause cooperation and shared knowledge, conflict. Neorealists have confused matters by treating conflictual systems as realist worlds.“

In line with this, Grundmann has shown that the power of ideas may be of great importance for explanation of international environmental security problems. According to Grundmann (2001: 19), ideas serve as symbolic resources” (scenarios or alarm signals) or are part of world-views (norms and values of proposed solutions), and thereby pre-structure a discourse. Environmental hazards that are abstract (for instance, radiation) call for symbolic representation. Since most environmental degradation processes occur under uncertainty, it is principally symbolic resources that make a decisive difference: scientific scenarios and writings, interpretations of the situation and proposed solution.²

Undoubtedly, Revolutionism/Kantianism should be part of this theoretical pluralism. In fact, the relationship between international society and world society is particularly within the international environmental policy arena. The question is: Where should the organized but non-state components – for instance, environmental organizations, scientific communities, media, or industry – of the global civil society be placed? If transnational³ companies and international non-governmental organizations (NGOs) are part of world society, it is far from clear, as Buzan (2001: 477) observes, “how they relate to world society conceived in terms of shared identity at the individual level”. Clearly, analyzing the role of transnational networks in international governance involves similar difficulties to those of study of shared norms, ideas, and institutions amongst states within the international society.

This is especially important for the new age of globalization, or the age of “glocalization”⁴ Dyer (2001: 446) neatly observes that the local-

2 For Grundmann (2001: 17), the term ‘information’ is not a good one to describe these forms of representation. Namely, “knowledge is not just information but interpretation, judgment and understanding”.

3 Transnational relations denote regular interactions beyond national borders which include at least one non-state actor. In contrast, international relations are relations between states (Grundmann 2001: 217).

4 Glocalization, a combined notion of ‘globalization’ and ‘localization’, refers to the fact that the current explosion of interterritorial linkages and communications is not just

global characteristic of environmental stress is what presents the greatest challenge to state-centric IR theories. He explains this challenge: "Where once the great issues of world affairs could only be conceived of and addressed through the mechanisms of inter-state relations, these mechanisms now appear to be playing 'catch-up' to globalized political practices. Thus, while not everything is necessarily an 'international' issue, that in itself has little or no bearing on relative importance".

The variety of views in terms of international relations in the area of environment can be summarized and classified, as Paterson (1999) did, taking as a primarily criterion the role of a state in this process. Paterson identifies these three different scenarios: (1) international governance, (2) global governance, and (3) "resisting the global, reclaiming the commons" approach. Advocates of the first approach argue that the environmental problems should be conceived of in terms of the inter-state interdependence they generate, and thus should be analyzed as collective action problems.

On the other hand, there is an increasing number of authors arguing that the basic framework of international politics is inadequate to deal with the challenge of global environmental change and, hence, new patterns of global environmental governance are emerging. They break down the traditional dominance of states in this policy arena. Within this approach, there are three distinct senses to environmental politics: (1) global governance as primarily an interstate phenomenon (Young 1997); (2) global governance in relation to "glocalization", assuming a simultaneous shift of authority up to international/transnational institutions and down to local organizations (Rosenau 1990; Hempel 1996); and (3) global governance as essentially a transnational phenomenon (Wapner 1996; Lipschutz 1996).

The third approach to evolving forms of international environmental politics assumes that the dominant forces driving patterns of environmental governance are those tied to economic globalization (Finger and Chatterjee 1994; Karliner 1997). Karliner, for instance, coined the term "grassroots globalization" (1997, 13). Unlike Wapner and Lipschutz, who viewed environmental activism (mobilization) in terms of networks and learning, the advocates of this school conceptualize

a phenomenon of increased 'horizontal' interaction, but also has to be understood in its 'vertical' dimension, characterized by direct mergers of local and global processes. What 'glocalization' contributes is a recognition of the greater importance of the local and global levels compared with the interposed national level (Blatter et al. 2001: 6).

mobilization in terms of resistance. Namely, local groups, threatened by global forces (transnational corporations), organize precisely to preserve their traditional livelihoods.

Paterson's classification of forms of international environmental governance is in agreement with the "triangular game" (state \leftrightarrow transnational actors \leftrightarrow identity entrepreneurs) elaborated by Badie (2001: 255). Badie asserts that international relations are more and more structures by the autonomy of each of these interacting players – acting simultaneously. Their autonomy is the main source of tensions. Namely, following the logic of the triangular game, "identity entrepreneurs obviously deny the legitimacy of the social contract and jeopardize the political autonomy itself; transnational networks go against the exclusive social relationship on which is based identity mobilization and promote an inclusive conception of the social game" (Badie 2001: 255-256). Obviously, Badie's new configuration does not fit neither into realist theories nor the "dualistic theory", which distinguishes between the state-centered and the multi-centered world (Rosenau 1990). Yet, it is still appropriate for many international environmental policy issues such as involvement of transnational actors (for instance, epistemic communities).

Haas (1992) introduced a distinct explanatory approach in international relations dealing with the effect of experts and knowledge-based communities on governmental learning and the development of new state objectives. Scholars from this tradition look at policy-making process in terms of nonsystemic variables such as: ideas, knowledges, beliefs, experts and scientists. Thus, a knowledge-based group is an "epistemic community".

An epistemic community is a professional group that believes in the same „cause-and-effect" relationships, truth tests to assess them, and shares common values. However, learning process can only begin after an epistemic community has established its channels of communication to government. The outcomes of this learning process can be various, starting from the simplest to more sophisticated ones: (1) pursuing new policies (new means) in order to accomplish given objectives within the same framework of cause-and-effect relationships; (2) adopting new objectives; (3) the acceptance of entirely new cause-and-effect relationships and reasoning patterns; and (4) transcendental learning.

Conclusion

In conclusion, one can say that the studying of international environmental politics, and, in particular, global and regional environmental security phenomena (conflict and cooperation), should be based on the theoretical pluralism that incorporate all three IR traditions: Realism, Rationalism, and Revolutionism. Realism and rational choice models do not consider the role of normative and ideational factors in international politics. Consequently, our suggestion is not to complement but to combine realism with other approaches.

The complexity and interdependency features of any particular environmental security problem simply have called for the multi-dimensional approach to explain the full range of observed effects. To capture the environmental realities, it is not necessary, to integrate disciplines into interdisciplinary systems analysis and other methodological frameworks. A more plausible explanation often emerges from a number of theories, each of which delves deeply into the aspects of problem using the analytical tools best designed to examine the specific problem.

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The Value of Patriotism for Students in Russia and Serbia

Abstract

Results of the survey regarding the relation of students with reference to the values of patriotism in Moscow, Belgrade and partly in Kosovska Mitrovica are comparatively presented in the paper. The technique of questionnaire was applied in the survey, in Moscow on random and in Belgrade on two-stage, quota sample, while the instrument was the same. The survey on student population was also performed in Kosovska Mitrovica, but by another instrument application, so that conclusions on students' patriotism might be indirect. The results of the survey in both countries show that more than the half of students declare themselves as patriots, while this percentage grows with Serbian students when the patriotism is concretized (e.g. the relation regarding Kosovo). It is noticeable that Russian students in the first place show patriotic pride regarding the heroic history of their country, while Serbian students put in the first place deideologized values – natural beauties.

Keywords: patriotism, Russian students, Serbian students, survey.

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“Patriotism deserves a special attention as one of the feelings that should inspire a man of science. For him, it has completely positive connotation: he is eager to improve the prestige of his country, but without destroying the reputation of his contemporaries”

(Santiago Ramón y Cajal, 2007)

“Patriotism means to stand by the country. It does not mean to stand by the President or any other public official save exactly to the degree in which he himself stands by the country. It is patriotic to support him insofar as he efficiently serves the country. It is unpatriotic not to oppose him to the exact extent that by inefficiency or otherwise he fails in his duty to stand by the country”

(Theodore Roosevelt, 1918)

On the one hand, the meaning of the word ‘patriotism’ is absolutely clear as fixed in numerous dictionaries – “love for one’s country, one’s motherland”, thus ‘patriot’ is “a lover of the fatherland, the adherent of its good and welfare” (Даль 1978: 24). On the other hand, the concept ‘patriotism’ allows many different and ambiguous interpretations considering the current and historical political situation and ideological grounds of the authors that appeal to it: patriotism can be seen as an absolute good or, on the contrary, as a source of national strife and social disintegration – the famous Russian writer Leo Tolstoy once wrote about patriotism: “it’s a shameful feeling because it turns a man not only into a slave, but a game-cock, a bull, a gladiator, who is ruining his life not for himself but for his government” (Шаповалов 2008). Probably every Russian public and literary figure spoke about patriotism although the thematic contexts and assessments of this social phenomenon differ greatly focusing for the most part on the so called ‘national question’ (the relationship of patriotism and nationalism is one of the most complex and challenging issues in the Russian society throughout its history) or, let us say, on the geopolitical consequences of the dominant interpretation of the word ‘patriotism’. For each case we can find quite opposite quotations in the Russian scientific, fiction and non-fiction literature that has always produced fierce debates. For instance, such a ‘globalist’ interpretation: “alive and active patriotism by definition excludes any international strife, thus a patriot is ready to work for the good of the whole mankind, if he can be helpful. Limiting one’s activities only to the native land is the result of one’s knowledge and understanding that this is exactly the place where one can be most helpful... True patriotism as a particular manifestation of love for all humanity simply cannot coexist with a dislike for certain nationalities”

(Добролюбов 1948: 567). The great Russian scientist Dmitry Mendeleev denied such an interpretation: “some extreme individualists try to present love for the country or patriotism in a bad light saying that it is time to replace it with some kind of common love for humanity... The falsehood of such an idea, in my opinion, is quite clear due not only to important historical facts of accumulation of people in large states that caused the very rise of patriotism but because no one can imagine in any possible future that countries and continents will merge and distinguishing features of races, languages, beliefs and forms of governance will disappear for such differences are the basis and source of competition and progress...” (Менделеев 1907: 111-112).

Such a terminological confusion led to the present situation – the dictionary interpretation of patriotism given by V. Dal (broadly speaking it’s “love for the country and defense of motherland’s interests”) seems to be basic and widely acknowledged in the Russian society for one can build any further arguments on such a definition, focusing on the historical destiny of the country, pride for its achievements and criticism for shortcomings, sympathy for the sufferings and social needs of the people, respect for the heroic past and traditions, attachment to the place of birth or residence – ‘love for the graves of our fathers’, willingness to sacrifice, to struggle against the enemies of the fatherland, protection of its interests and so on (Левашов 2006). On the other hand, vagueness and ambiguity of the concept complicates the work of teachers and researchers that are to ‘teach’ and to study patriotism. For instance, most federal, regional and local programs reduce the so called ‘patriotic education’ either to some kind of military training or to different activities contributed to keeping up distinctive features of national minorities (then ‘patriotic’ in fact is replaced by ‘ethnic’) or preserving cultural autonomy.

Since 2007 the Sociological Laboratory of Peoples’ Friendship University of Russia has conducted sociological surveys on the value orientations of Russian students. These empirical studies are based on representative samples (by profiles of higher education training – technical sciences, social sciences and humanities, natural sciences) of Moscow students (typically the sample size is about 1000 respondents). The questionnaire includes several thematic groups – the needs of the young people in the educational field, their expectations of their future employment and job requirements, their family and marriage values and priorities in interpersonal communication with neighbours and wider social environment, interests in the political sphere and partici-

pation in elections, etc. One of the most interesting thematic groups of the questionnaire includes questions on whether the Russian students consider themselves to be patriots and where they see the main sources of national pride for today's young generation.

During the social transformations in the 1990's, the old Soviet system of patriotic education collapsed, destroying the very concept of patriotism: if previously this word had a very specific meaning and associations, in the early 1990's the notion of patriotism acquired a rather negative connotation with a sarcastic tone to it. The concepts of 'homeland' and 'state' drifted apart, while in the Soviet era they were practically identical. In the 1990's the word 'Homeland' evoked warm emotions, memories of childhood, of one's own home, of the nature of one's native land, pride in one's language and culture, while the word 'state' was associated with bureaucracy that used the notion of patriotism in manipulations aimed to substitute collective values in such a way that if you love your home and native land, you love your country, and the country is the state. In the individual consciousness, however, this substitution did not work, as the people could not understand why and how their warm feelings for the native land should make them, for instance, do military service and pay taxes to the heartless state machine, which did not provide any sense of social security and infringed on private life.

However, since the early 2000's, Russian public opinion polls have shown a gradual increase in the number of respondents who consider themselves patriots – this figure seemed to stabilize in the mid-2000's, and by 2010 the number of those who considered themselves patriots reached 84% – most of them live in Moscow and Saint Petersburg and mostly are elderly people (88%) (New Russian Patriotism ...).

Would you identify yourself as a patriot? (closed question, one answer), %				
	2005	2006	2008	2010
Yes, of course	47	42	48	41
Rather yes	37	42	40	43
Rather no	8	10	6	9
Absolutely not	2	2	2	1
Hard to say	6	5	5	6

Table 1.

The new patriotic consciousness is a subject of great interest for sociologists, historians, political scientists, exploring, in particular, the so-called 'patriotic spirit' of young Russian citizens, whose adulthood fell on the era of perestroika – a situation quite different from that of previous generations in terms of the role of Russia in the world and its prospects for development. In the majority of studies patriotism is described as respect of the citizens towards society and the state, the country's history and traditions – in other words, as the fundamental unifying idea of the people. The main components of patriotism as a socio-cultural phenomenon include spiritual and ideological values, as well as individual values that ensure readiness for a patriotic act in the interests of society, manifesting themselves at three levels – the national, group and interpersonal level.

The subject of patriotism does not only have a 'diagnostic', but also a practical potential in that it develops the state's national ideology to fill up the 'content' of patriotism in the face of the declining authority of the state bodies, strong separatist and nationalist movements and increasing globalization. The first five-year state program "Patriotic Education of Citizens of the Russian Federation", adopted in 2001, aimed to revive patriotism as the person's spiritual heritage and the foundation of social and national system necessary to maintain social and political stability in the country. The program focused on the development of patriotic education aimed to enhance the citizens' patriotic consciousness, loyalty to the Motherland, readiness to do one's civic and constitutional duty of protecting the interests of the country, and implied providing military and patriotic education through film and video production, publishing and other creative activities.

In 2006, the first state program of patriotic education of citizens of the Russian Federation was followed by the second one (Program... 2006) that focused on further developing patriotic consciousness as the most significant foundation of the spiritual and moral integrity at the national level. The second program took it for granted that the first one had created an institutional system of patriotic education based on the unified public policy at the federal and regional levels and focused primarily on the younger generations in order to improve the evolving system of patriotic education, particularly through the establishment of coordinating councils and centres for patriotic education.

The latest state program of patriotic education, adopted in 2010, focuses on eliminating extremism and increasing political stability in the country (Правительство Российской Федерации 2010). Asserting

that 'the system of patriotic education of citizens has mainly been created' and 'patriotic consciousness of citizens is increasing' (coordinating councils and centres for patriotic education, regional programs of patriotic education are implemented, festivals, exhibitions and competitions devoted to patriotism take place etc.), the program is to improve legislation in the field of patriotic education, develop 'professional patriotic education' and encourage the people to use the Internet more actively for social and educational purposes.

We did not plan to evaluate the overall results of the two national programs of patriotic education (to 'measure' the levels of patriotism before and after the development and implementation of the programs) – our goal was to assess the general patriotic mood of Russian students (on the example of the Peoples' Friendship University of Russia). According to our survey in 2011 (we designed a questionnaire thematically focused on patriotic issues), the notion that provokes the warmest feelings in the Russian youth is 'my country' (Russia) (29%), followed by 'the whole world' (19%), 'my city, town, village' (17%), 'my territory, republic, region' (12%) and 'Eurasia' (9%). Approximately half of the respondents replied to the question 'For you Motherland is...' 'Russia as a whole' (46%), one in four answered 'family and friends' (23%), 16% of the respondents marked the location (city, town, village), in which they were born, and only 12% believe that their Motherland is the territory, region, district in which they live.

Despite the fact that the vast majority of the respondents (89%) agree with the statement that the national symbols are quite important for every country to distinguish it from any other (90%), although they carry no special meaning (87%), and serve to unite the country (66%), only one in three knows the origin, meaning and transformation of state symbols (36%), and one in five (21%) 'is not interested in the state symbols and believes that this topic is obsolete and not interesting.' However, almost half of the respondents (44%) feel excitement and pride for the country, when they hear the national anthem of Russia, and a quarter of the respondents 'simply like it' (23%).

According to the survey results (78%), Russia is a country with a great potential for development, which should not depend on other countries, especially the U.S. and the West (62%), and all its troubles come from the inability of the elites to rule the state, their self-interests (62%) and the lack of 'normal' laws (70%), so in the next 10-15 years Russia will turn into a moderately developed country (58%). The majority of respondents (71%) believe that the citizens of Russia do have

reasons both for pride and for extremely negative emotions. Answering the question 'As a citizen of the country I am proud of ...' the respondents were able to choose more than one answer. The undisputed leader of our conditional rating of pride is the heroic past of the country (77%), in the second place – the art (52%), in the third – sport successes, cultural, scientific and technological achievements; every fourth respondent believes that he/she should be proud of the spirituality of the Russian people. Very rarely the respondents mention that, as citizens of Russia, they can be proud of the 'economic development of the country', 'Russia's domestic policy', 'power structures', 'protection of the rights and freedoms of the citizens' and the 'social security system'.

As a citizen of the country I am proud of ...	%	«Places»
Heroic past of the country	77,4	1
Art	52,1	2
Sport successes	42,8	3
Culture of the country	41,8	
Scientific and technical achievements	40,4	
Spirituality of the Russian people	24,8	4
Educational system	17	5
Russia's foreign policy	13,6	6
Russian army	8,8	7
Economic development of the country	5,8	8
Russia's domestic policy	4,6	9
Power structures	4,1	
Protection of the rights and freedoms of citizens	4,1	
Social security system	3,4	10
Other	1,7	

Table 2.

Such a distribution of the answers seems to be predetermined by the respondents' perception of the overall situation in the country (we used a set of dichotomous scales, which increases response rates compared with other types of questions): nearly two-thirds of the respondents believe that there is a threat of social unrest (73%), every second – a threat of mass unemployment (51%), environmental disaster (53%), failure of

the economic policy (58%), collapse of science and education (53%), loss of national culture (50%), to a greater extent (66%) – a threat of religious conflicts; nevertheless, all that would not lead to the country's disintegration (78% of the respondents rejected this possibility) or a military dictatorship (83%).

Every fourth respondent (26%) found it difficult to identify themselves in terms of patriotism, 60% do consider themselves patriots, while 14% do not. The main reason for hesitation is the difficulty to name one's attitude to the country using an unambiguous notion of patriotism (37% of those who did not identify themselves in terms of patriotism), some consider the term too ideological, which makes them reluctant to deal with it (19%), or out of date (17%), others believe that this term is artificial, invented for manipulative purposes (14%). However, all the respondents seem to be quite consolidated naming the basis of the concept of patriotism – love for the country and pride in the achievements of the country and its people. This consolidation is manifested in the obvious overlapping of the concepts of Motherland and the state: 65% of the respondents believe that their peers will take part in military operations to repel the aggression of other countries – just as many are convinced that their peers will not take part in military operations to suppress an attempted coup.

This interpretation of patriotism (love of the country) is confirmed by the beliefs of the respondents that the level of patriotism grows during war periods, revolutions, radical political upheavals (74%), but not in situations of extreme social conflicts (23%). The individual patriotic spirit intensifies in consequence of the national team's victory at international sport events (59%), when citizens or nationals of Russia are awarded important international prizes for scientific, cultural, athletic and other achievements (42%), when one goes abroad (39%) and at the time of national holidays (38%). The most patriotic holiday for Russian students is Victory Day (85%).

In the open question asking to name 'a true patriot' among one's contemporaries, one in ten respondents indicated V.V. Putin (11%), far behind him go D.A. Medvedev and V.V. Zhirinovsky (3%). When the same question is referred to Russian history, the respondents name Peter the Great (13%), who is followed by Stalin (4%) and Suvorov (3%), i.e. all 'true patriots' are 'statesmen'. Moreover, when choosing options to complete the expression 'A true patriot of the country is a person who ...', the respondents also stressed the 'presentational' component

of true patriotism: first of all, he respects the history and traditions of the people (72%), after that comes doing military service in the armed forces (31%) and the desire to maintain the most positive image of the homeland and intolerance towards any manifestations of disrespect for the country and its citizens (36%); the third set of patriotic behavioural practices includes the non-political social activities and one's personal life position – a good family man, father and friend – 21%, who is diligent and successful in his work or study – 17%, is actively involved in patriotic events and activities – 19% and in unpaid community work (volunteer, voluntary work, donations, etc.) – 16%. Only 12% of the respondents consider membership in any political and social organizations as the main criterion of patriotism.

Almost half of the respondents (44%) believe that patriotism should be purposefully taught to the youth, 27% of the respondents believe that patriotism should emerge spontaneously rather than act as a pseudo-imposed force, 29% – that patriotic feelings should be formed spontaneously and purposefully. However, half of the respondents think that the Russian government and the president only speak about patriotism instead of taking practical steps to strengthen the patriotic mood of the population, one in five is sure that the authorities do absolutely nothing in this direction.

In addition to the thematic questionnaire aimed to measure patriotic values, we included some relevant questions in a comprehensive questionnaire designed to study the Russian students' value orientations. The patriotic cluster here is very small and duplicates the basic questions on patriotism presented above, but with the second questionnaire we are interested not only in patriotism itself, but in how it 'behaves' in the context of other values of young people. The results of the 2011 survey show that every second Moscow student (the sample size was 1000 respondents representing students by training profiles) considers himself a patriot; the request to identify oneself in terms of patriotism causes difficulties for every third respondent, because it is hard for them to define their feeling towards the country as 'patriotism' (in fact, it is a rather trite word, especially in the Russian public discourse). Every third student who had difficulties answering this question uses the proposed response option – an appeal to the concept of a globalizing world (Table 3). Taking a look at the dynamics of answers to this question we can speak of the increasing erosion of the term 'patriot' in the Russian everyday discourse (despite its active and politically sensitive use in the media and public discourse), because the number

of those who found it difficult to identify themselves as patriots, refusing to name their attitude to the country as patriotism, has grown by 14% since 2007, when for the first time we used our questionnaire in a representative survey of Moscow students.

Moreover, since 2007 the number of young people confidently naming themselves patriots (despite the ambiguity of their assessments of the political processes in the country and the world detected by the responses to other questions), has not decreased and remains stable at about half of the answers, while the number of negative answers to this question has dropped by almost a half – from 18% to 11% (Table 4).

If you did not answer the previous question (‘Do you consider yourself a patriot?’), explain why:	2007	2011
I do not understand the meaning of the term ‘patriotism’	14%	8%
It is difficult for me to clearly define my attitude to the country as patriotism	51%	65%
In the modern era of globalization the concept of patriotism has lost its meaning and is no longer relevant	29%	24%
Other	6%	3%

Table 3.

Do you consider yourself a patriot?	2007	2011
Yes	51%	51%
No	18%	11%
It is difficult for me to clearly answer this question	32%	38%

Table 4.

Regardless of their self-assessment in terms of patriotism, Moscow students are proud of the historical past of the country (Table 5), its natural resources (Table 6), cultural heritage (Table 7) and sports achievements (Table 8) (we used a set of dichotomous scales in the questionnaire).

The position of Russia in the international arena is a source of pride for every fourth Moscow student, scientific achievements and the educational system – for every second, and the Russian army – for every fifth student. According to the table below, the objects of national pride and anti-pride are quite stable, as there are no significant fluctuations in the corresponding figures. We should only mention an almost two-fold increase in the number of respondents who do not consider the cultural heritage a cause for personal pride (from 7% to 13%). This is probably due to the fact that in recent years the mass media have been discrediting and often denying the cultural achievements of the Soviet period, formerly seen as clearly positive. On the other hand, there is a significantly evident political rhetoric ‘it’s enough, we should no longer live falling back on past achievements, if there is nothing to be proud of in the present’, which could also determine a slight decrease of this indicator.

As a citizen of the country are you proud of its history?	2007	2011
Yes	87%	89%
No	13%	11%

Table 5.

As a citizen of the country are you proud of its natural resources?	2007	2011
Yes	87%	88%
No	13%	12%

Table 6.

As a citizen of the country are you proud of its cultural heritage?	2007	2011
Yes	91%	87%
No	7%	13%

Table 7.

As a citizen of the country are you proud of its sports achievements?	2007	2011
Yes	78%	73%
No	22%	27%

Table 8.

It is important to emphasize that, unfortunately, there is a clear trend in the responses of Moscow students: the pride in the cultural heritage in the broadest sense of the word (achievements of the previous generations) has remained on a high level since the mid-2000's, while the dissatisfaction with life in Russia has been gradually growing (although within the limits of statistical error) in all the indicators considered. The common areas of students' dissatisfaction (anti-pride figures are close to the mark of 90%) are: the development of the economic and social spheres (13% of the respondents find grounds for pride here), the rights and freedoms of individuals (17%), the activity of state bodies (15%) and in general – the standards of living of the population (10%). Such a high social discontent lowers the level of trust in the basic social institutions of the Russian society. Thus, only one-third of Moscow students trust the government, the Russian and international NGOs working in Russia, the courts and the media, and every fourth – the Council of the Federation and the Public Chamber (probably a relatively high degree of confidence in the last institution can be explained by the fact that the respondents do not fully understand its mission and functions), one in five trusts the State Duma (68% do not trust). An absolute leader of the students' trust rating was the President of the country (58%, although a third of the respondents refuse to trust him), followed by the church (50% trust it), banks (47%) and big business (40%). The 'anti-leaders' of the social trust rating are political parties (72% of the respondents do not trust them), the police and law enforcement agencies (77%), and the army (65%).

In the light of all said above, the five key problem areas in Russian society that the students indicate seem quite predictable: drug and alcohol addiction (less often smoking, but all together leading to health problems), followed by the moral degradation of society, and crime (emphasis is made on the behavioural characteristics of Russian society), then comes the cluster of 'objective' factors apparently determining the problems mentioned previously – unemployment and, as a consequence – lack of financial resources, corruption, no access to education, and at the same time – as a result of the above said reasons – the economic, civil and legal situation, and understanding of problems created by the generation gap (Table 9).

In your opinion, what are the most acute problems of today's Russian youth?	%	«Places»
Drug addiction	76%	1
Alcoholism	60%	2
Moral degradation of society	48%	3
Smoking	38%	4
Crime	31%	5
Health problems	28%	
Unemployment	25%	6
Lack of financial resources	25%	
Lack of support from the state	24%	
Corruption	19%	7
Inaccessibility of education	16%	8
Economic situation in the country	14%	9
Violation of civil rights and liberties	13%	
Limited opportunities for leisure, boring life	12%	
Lack of mutual understanding with parents	12%	
Political situation in the country and in the world	4%	10

Table 9.

Given that only one in ten students (Table 10) is confident that the situation in the country (described above in dark colours) has nothing to do with his/her life plans (the number of those who hold this position has reduced by 6%), one would expect a very pessimistic assessment of the future by the students (Table 11), but young people look into the future with hope and optimism (every second respondent) or are not worried about it, or without much hope and illusions (about 40%). Perhaps, such optimism about life in the light of the above given data can be explained by two factors: on the one hand, by the so-called 'youth maximalism' and the inherent youth confidence that everything will be just fine; on the other hand, by the above-mentioned areas of national pride – the cultural heritage in the broad sense, which provides confidence in one's potential and forms the role models to follow. One third of the respondents consider themselves optimists, a third – realistic, and a third – situational opportunists (whose choice of behavioural strategies depends on the situation); nearly half of the respondents plan their life in the short term, every third respondent has a long-term plan.

In your opinion, how much can the situation in the country affect your life plans?	2007	2011
The situation in the country has nothing to do with my life plans	16%	10%
It may affect my plans, but insignificantly	32%	34%
It will have a significant impact on my plans	25%	34%
Realization of my life plans fully depends on the situation in the country	7%	6%
Hard to say	20%	16%

Table 10.

You look into the future...	2007	2011
with hope and optimism	46%	49%
without much hope and illusions, unaffected	43%	43%
With anxiety and uncertainty	8%	7%
With fear and despair	3%	1%

Table 11.

In 2009, with the help of the same questionnaire, we conducted a survey on a representative sample of university students in Maikop (Adygeya) to evaluate the stability of the identified value orientations of Russian students in a regional context. As the survey shows, quite predictably the 'traditionalism' of the Circassian society predetermines a higher level of social trust (by about 10%-13%) of Maikop students to the basic social institutions: the federal government (46% vs 33% in Moscow), the State Duma (33% vs 21%), the Council of the Federation (37% vs 26%), the media (39% vs 30%). And the picture is the same when the objects of distrust are considered – the social distrust level is lower in the regional centre concerning the police and law enforcement agencies (do not trust 77% of Moscow and 69% of Maikop students), the army (65% vs 51%) and political parties (72% vs 63%). However, a number of fundamental indicators in the diagnosis of the social wellbeing of young people in Moscow and Maikop 'behave' almost identically – identification in terms of patriotism, objects of national pride and anti-pride, assessment of one's future prospects, the main institutional actors of trust and confidence, the key problems of young people etc. Thus, we can confidently say that the

younger generations in Russia do possess stable collective evaluations of the country's cultural heritage and today's social institutions which shape up their quite optimistic social mood.

Regarding the patriotism in Serbia, we have researched the relation directly to it as the value on population of Belgrade students in 2010³, but also indirectly several times through the relation of students in Kosovska Mitrovica to the protection of integrity and sovereignty of their state. Before we expose the results of the researches conducted in Serbia, it is necessary to mention that after the political changes in Serbia and Yugoslavia in the year 2000, the new authorities actively worked on presenting to the citizens the values of patriotism as "anti-value" (see Avramović 2009, 2012; Radojčić 2009), as something on behalf of which "crimes" were conducted in the wars on the territory of the former Yugoslavia, or great malversations and misuses were conducted regarding the spending of state assets⁴. The ideas of the "Patriotism" and the "Patriot" have been derided and mocked during the first decade of the 21st century. "New elite turn their back to the homeland and the nation to which they belong, to the domicile state, tradition and patriotism. International connections, market, piling of money, glamour are becoming the essence of life for them. On this basis has appeared the parole that patriotism is the last asylum for rascals" (Smiljković 2011: 132). It even should not be mentioned that during the whole last decade the socialization of the youth in Serbia through the schooling system was not performed according the idea of patriotic, but of mundialistic education. Considering that patriotism as the value is accepted in the childhood, through the process of primary socialization in the family, but also through the national education (Marković 2010: 33; Šuvaković 2010: 130-145) that is expressed in the schooling system and through

3 This survey was set wider, it included also the survey of the values of patriotism, and it was conducted on the instrument made by RUDN that was adopted to Serbian population. Such the survey was simultaneously conducted in Russia, China, Serbia, Czech Republic and Kazakhstan. The bearer of the survey for Serbia was the Serbian Academy of Education, the Head of the survey was Prof. Dr. Danilo Ž. Marković, and the survey was conducted by the Department of Sociology of the Faculty of Philosophy of the University in Pristina with contemporary Head office in Kosovska Mitrovica that has performed empiric sociological surveys for years.

4 Television "B92" within their broadcast "Insider" during 2012 broadcasted a series named "Patriotic Pillage" referred to the events in Kosovo and Metohija, in which they presented the data of Albanian separatistic authorities as legitimate, with an attempt to present the Serbs that live and work in the north of Kosovo and Metohija and their representatives as "criminal structures".

political socialization that leads to interiorization of a certain pattern of political culture (Podunavac 1993: 1091-1097), then it is clear that it cannot be reduced only to the “constitutional patriotism”, as Habermas tried to do, but it is necessary to include it also in the idea of patriotism. Unfortunately, Serbian schooling system even today has not institutionalized the process of patriotic education of pupils and students, but on the contrary it favors a mundialistic model through so-called “Bologna process”, although it is quite clear that even from logistic point of view mundialism as attitude is – unviable. This is because the general in individual exists only through the special, or as academic Mihailo Marković concretized: “In order to belong to the humankind, one must belong to a concrete society. An individual who does not belong to any society, even not to the one for which he is connected with his language and culture from which he arised – is and remains a narcissist who loves only himself and misrepresent himself in public as a humankind lover” (Marković 1994: 398). While in other states, including both Serbia and the Russia, patriotism as the value is questioned, “in America so-called patriot act (The Patriot Act) has been adopted, the act that limits many human rights and freedoms just refering to the value that has been questioned in other parts of the world in many ways – to the patriotism” (Nadić, Šuvaković 2010: 863).

The survey was conducted in May 2010 by quota and two-stage cluster sampling of 500 Belgrade students, by applying the technique of the questionnaire in the field. The two-stage cluster sampling was necessary in order to comprise all four groups of Belgrade University, while the choise of faculties within the groups was free (never only one faculty within the group), and the selection of students that entered the sample was random.

To direct question if they considered themselves as a patriot, 64.1% answered with “Yes”, 11.1% with “No”, while 24.8% stated that it was “difficult for them to give a specific answer”. If we sum up those with decided answers of “No” with those who had difficulties to give answer, it comes out that a little more than 1/3 of Belgrade students at least have problem to qualify themselves as patriots. The distribution of answers to the requested explanation why they refused to qualify themselves as patriots (this question was answered only by those who did not qualify themselves as such) was as follows:

If it was difficult for you to answer the previous question, please explain why?	2010 (in %)
I do not understand the meaning of the idea of patriotism	9,80
It is difficult for me to define my attitude to the country as patriotism	45,10
In the modern era of globalization the concept of patriotism has completely lost its meaning and is no longer relevant	33,20
Something else	10,90

Table 12.

The solid domination of the second offered answer clearly indicates the lack of socialization, especially the secondary – institutionalized, in the patriotic spirit. It should be kept in mind that the surveyed population had vague memory of the wars in the former Yugoslav territories, that they were not able to judge their causes on basis of their own insight, and they were socialized in the direction that Serbia is responsible for them and that the proof of „Europeanship“ of each Serbian was to be as less patriot as possible. However, encouragement was that even in spite of such propaganda that lasted for a decade, even 2/3 of respondents declared themselves as patriots, at the greatest university in the country, in its capital town, where the influence of the ideology of globalization was the greatest.

In order to establish with which sphere of life the Belgrade students were the proudest of, and which of them excited the feeling of patriotism, we put the question „Are you proud of“, offering 13 spheres of life and leaving the possibility for dichotomous answer.

Are you proud of:	Yes (%)	No (%)	Rank
History of the country	85,6	14,3	4
Natural resources	91,7	8,3	1
Cultural heritage	87,6	11,9	3
Work of state authorities	11,0	89,0	9
Position of the country in the world scene	8,4	91,6	10
Economy in the country	3,7	96,3	12
Situation in the social sphere	5,3	94,7	11
Respecting human rights and freedoms	29,1	70,9	8

Are you proud of:	Yes (%)	No (%)	Rank
Educational system	34,8	65,2	5
Standard of living of citizens	3,3	96,7	13
Army	31,3	68,7	6
Development of science and technique	29,5	70,5	7
Sport achievements	88,4	11,6	2

Table 13.

It is visible from the table that Belgrade students are the proudest of what have neutral value in the contemporary social-political context and yet represent the source of patriotic feelings with them: natural resources, sports achievements, cultural heritage, history of the country (each of these areas with more then 85% of Yes answers), far behind on the 5th place is educational system (approximately 35% of Yes answers), while on the other hand one might say that they are almost ashamed of the citizens' standard of living (96.7% encircled No), economy, situation in the social sphere and position of the country in the world scene (more than 90% of respondents had negative reaction to these answers).

Considering that respondents were students, it was necessary to ask them also what were, according to their opinion, the greatest problems with which the youth is faced. Vices hold two places among the first four: even 80% of respondents identified drug addiction as the greatest problem of the youth, while alcoholism is in the fourth place (46.8%). Problems that society must solve were on the second and the third place: crime (58.3%) and unemployment (57.8%). It was interesting that only every tenth respondent identified lack of state support as problem, which might be interpreted by getting used of students to that fact.

What are the greatest problems that jeopardize the youth today (respondents could encircle 5 at the most)	Yes (%)	Rank
Drug addiction	80,0	1
Crime	58,3	2
Unemployment	57,8	3
Alcoholism	46,8	4
Moral degradation of society	36,5	5
Economic situation in the country	35,3	6

Corruption of the authorities	31,9	7
Lack of financial resources	28,9	8
Smoking	23,7	9
Lack of mutual understanding with parents	13,1	10
Political situation in the country and in the world	12,4	11
Lack of support from the state	10,8	12
Inaccessibility of education	10,8	12
Limited opportunities for leisure, boring life	10,6	13
Health problems	8,0	14
Violation of civil rights and liberties	6,9	15
Others	1,6	16

Table 14.

Although political situation in the country and in the world was only at the 11th place (12.4%) of the list of problems that mostly jeopardized the youth at the moment, nearly 57% of respondents considered that actual political situation in the country influenced accomplishment of their life plans. Such a comprehension of the youth was understandable considering that it was the period of implementation of the toughest principles of party state (see Šuvaković 2011).

In your opinion, how much can current situation situation in the country affect realization of your life plans?	(%)
The situation in the country has nothing to do with my life plans	8,8
It may affect my plans, but insignificantly	25,1
It will have a significant impact on my plans	47,4
Realization of my life plans fully depends on the situation in the country	9,5
Hard to say	9,1

Table 15.

However, regarding the look into the future, Belgrade students were rather realistically determined: 43.7% of them were looking into the future with hope and optimism, 30.3% calmly and without special hopes and illusions, while concern and uncertainty showed only 1/5 of respondents, and fear and desperation every tenth Belgrade student. Yet, the

greatest number of respondents was making plans only for the near future (44.5%), a little less than 1/3 was planning even the furthest perspective (30.1%), while 16.1% mainly was not planning their own future, and 9.3% never thought about it. "These data are in accordance with the recorded trend in the states with transitional experience where difficult economic crisis produced the feeling that everyday life is actually a struggle for existential survival in the life of the majority of the population. The phenomenon of "shortening perspective" dominates in such a social atmosphere, which is manifested by redefinition of long-term goals, interests and strategies for making plans in always shorter terms" (Petrović 2011: 892).

However, it should be noticed that declaring oneself as patriot is one thing and being patriot in reality is quite another thing. Unfortunately, Serbs, and also Serbian students, are in the phase of permanent testing of patriotism through the relation regarding Kosovo and Metohija, the territory of Serbia where separatists have proclaimed "independence" and which great Western powers are trying now to realize *de facto* and *de iure*. Therefore, we are giving here a comparative review of the attitudes of students of the University in Belgrade and the University in Pristina with contemporary head office in Kosovska Mitrovica regarding this question, on basis of the survey conducted in Belgrade in 2010 and in Kosovska Mitrovica in 2012 by quota sampling of 400 respondents by the technique of the questionnaire in the field.⁵ It was offered to students to opt for answers regarding the recognition of so-called independence of Kosovo.

Serbia should not recognize independence of Kosovo	Completely disagree (%)	Irresolute (%)	Completely agree (%)
Students of the University in Belgrade in 2010	7,9	11,2	71,1
Students of the University in Kosovska Mitrovica in 2012	2,8	6,1	87,1

Table 16.

- 5 This survey, as well as the same kind conducted in 2009 among students' population in Kosovska Mitrovica, was managed by prof. Uros Šuvaković, Ph.D. and doc. Jasmina Petrović, Ph.D. and was conducted by the Department of Sociology of the Faculty of Philosophy of the University in Pristina with contemporary Head office in Kosovska Mitrovica within the project III 47023 "Kosovo and Metohija between national identity and Euro-integrations".

Although a five-degree scale was offered, the number of those who partially agree, i.e. partially disagree was negligible. Actually, such opinions are comprised in the attitude of irresoluteness. Therefore, regarding this distinct direct relation to the own state, students expressed clearly a patriotic attitude, which is considerably more expressed with Belgrade students⁶ comparing to the situation when they were asked to declare whether they were patriots or not. Higher percentage of determined regarding this attitude of the students in Kosovska Mitrovica is understandable, considering that the city is divided and local students have direct experience with terror performed daily by Albanian extremists over members of Serbian nationality. Therefore, their attitude that Serbia should not recognize independency of Kosovo is actually the attitude that they should survive and live in that area, since otherwise it should not be possible. On the other hand, high percentage of Belgrade students declaring the attitude on non-recognition of so-called independency of Kosovo shows patriotic orientation of Serbian students and contradicts the analysts pleading for the thesis on students as extremely globally oriented population, obviously without empirical foundation. Maybe it was the goal of various creators of public opinion in Serbia, but regarding the results – it was not accomplished.

Conclusions

Comparing Belgrade and Moscow students regarding the relation to the patriotism, it is certain that this population of young people feels like patriots. Even 51% of respondents declare as such in Moscow, while in Serbia 64.1% of respondents feel like that. The number of students not feeling like patriots is the same in Moscow and in Belgrade – 11%, while there are respondents who find it difficult to answer clearly to this question – 38% in Moscow and 24.8% in Belgrade. It is obvious that the systematic anti-patriotic campaign that global organizations and media lead against the idea of patriotism, and especially against such an idea with Slovene people, has given results. However, one may notice that the campaign in Serbia has not accomplished the goal completely. Actually, the real indicator of patriotism with all Serbs, including also the students' population, is the relation regarding the issue of preserving Kosovo and Metohija as integral part of Serbia, which practically represents a concretization of the idea of patriotism in the

6 Students in Kosovska Mitrovica were not asked direct question on patriotism.

case of Serbia. Even 71.1% of respondents are against recognition of the “independency of Kosovo”. Indeed, that percentage reached 87.1% in Kosovska Mitrovica in 2012, but the fact that surveyed population live in an area of frozen conflict must be considered. Therefore, it is clear that the solid majority of students in Serbia is absolutely against recognition of “independency of Kosovo”, which is the best indicator of their patriotic determination.

The minority – both of Russian and of Serbian students – that responded that it was difficult for them to define themselves as patriots was asked why they declared like that. The answer that it was difficult for them to define their own relation to the country as ‘patriotism’ dominates in both cases, which clearly indicates the lack of institutional socialization in the patriotic spirit, which the Russian authorities have valued well by starting realization of programs in that direction. The second most common answer in both groups of respondents was that patriotism “have lost its sense” in the world of globalization. This answer, which is more present with Belgrade than with Moscow students, actually indicates the popularity of globalization ideology among the students’ population, which is surely the problem with which both Russia and Serbia must confront.

However, the differences between Moscow and Belgrade students regarding what are they proud of in their countries are interesting. The first places among Moscow students took the heroic past of the country (ranked on the 1st place, 77.4%), the art (2nd place, 52.1%), sport successes, culture of the country, scientific and technical achievements (3rd place – 42.8%, 41.8% and 40.4%). However, Belgrade students were less “political”, so they are mostly proud of natural resources (1st place, 91.7%), sport successes (2nd place, 88.4%), cultural heritage (3rd place, 87.6%) and then the history of the country (4th place, 85.6%) and educational system (34.8%). Therefore, the mutual things among the leading ranks of both Russian and Serbian students are proud of the history of the country, sport successes and cultural heritage, where the number of those with positive determination regarding the offered elements is higher with Serbian students. On the other hand, the fact is that they are mostly proud of something that has nothing common with politics, and educational system is best ranked regarding the current institutions. However, Moscow students in the first place put the proud of the history of the country, which is par excellence political respond, but if tables are compared – both groups express rather great discontent with e.g. economic situation, social security system, etc.

Regarding the problems that distress students in Russia and Serbia, the common problems among the five most important are drug addiction (in the 1st place in both cases), alcoholism, crime and moral degradation of the society. Among the first five, Serbian students also rank unemployment (the 3rd place – 57.8%) and Russian smoking (the 4th place – 38%). It is obvious from this that the problems of the youth in transitional countries are almost the same, and differences might be explained both by considerably lower rate of unemployment in Russia (6.1% of active citizens in 2011) in comparison to Serbia (22.2% of active citizens in 2011) and by cultural reasons regarding the problem of nicotine mania with Serbian students. In fact, even today in Serbia – although a great campaign against smoking is going on – it is not considered as a great vice, which is the consequence of a tradition that lasts for several centuries.

Russian students in lower extent consider that the situation in their country might influence their life plans, while such an influence is emphasized by an absolute majority of Serbian students' population. This might be considered as a serious indicator of the stability of the Russian and instability of the Serbian society. In general, Russian students look into the future with more hope and optimism than Serbian students (49% of Russian and 43.7% of Serbian), while a realistic position regarding the future hopes "without special hopes and illusions" again take more Russian than Serbian students (43% of Russian and 30.3% of Serbian). The feeling of anxiety is considerably higher with Serbian students: even every fifth expresses concern and uneasiness, and every tenth fear and desperation, while regarding Russian students the situation is significantly different: only 7% of them express concern and uneasiness and only 1% fear and desperation. Such the result probably might be explained by the feeling of belonging to a great and powerful nation, regardless if it is consciously expressed as patriotism or not.

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
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Institutional Design of Local Self-Government in The Function of Strengthening The Political Subjectivity of Citizens

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Redesigning local self-government: Theoretical and comparative framework for modernisation of the local self-government in Serbia (Redizajniranje lokalne samouprave: Teorijski i uporedni okvir za modernizaciju lokalne samouprave u Srbiji), Institute for Political Studies, Belgrade, 2012, 168 p.



As the modern time has shown, through practical experience as well as through numerous studies, institutional design in the field of local self-government has significant, both direct and indirect, developmental implications for the political system, as a very important sub-system of the global social system, and for the society as a whole. Therefore, it is not surprising that reactualisation and revitalisation of these issues is in the focus of attention of contemporary politicological and related studies, as well as the wider public discourses. By paraphrasing a part of John Keane's work, we may even

say that, in our contemporaneity, not only has the term itself been revitalised, but also the language of the local self-government,¹ in particular the striking and manifesting being the revitalisation of the talk of related decentralisation. This, among other things, is also the consequence of decentralisation in that area of vertical division of power being treated nowadays as the European and, in general, as the democratic standard par excellence, so its implementation is inevitably being taken as a test of democraticity. We are witnessing that, within the global revitalisation of the decentralisation subject, the talk of regionalisation, as one of its specific form, has particularly become popular in the Serbian society. Namely, we can notice that lately, frequently and from different sides – be it political, civil and social, and even scientific, various projects, i.e. regionalisation models are being presented, some of them less and the others more interesting, realistic and applicable, some even have potentially dangerous implications considering already existing social cleavages in the Serbian society, and, at the same time, some of them are also completely opposed and often

only in the function of political marketing.

All of this more than clearly shows that the academic monograph we have in our hands thematically fits the current moment, and that the author, Petar Matić, has thus found himself on the line of one of the crucial politicological trends of our time. In addition to these compliments for the actuality, or the shown keen sense for the selection of what is now called the timing for dealing with a certain thematic, the author's style deserves special compliments and it provides him, in literary terminology, with positive criticism only. The simplicity of his academic expression and more specifically his skillfulness to set out a large quantity of empirical details and information belonging to often complicated comparative, political, legal and normative practice, offered in this book, not only makes it a clear and understandable reading material for the wider audience, but also makes its reading simply flow.

In respect of the metodological and theoretical matrix underpinning this research undertaking, we can conclude that a combined approach has been used within neo-institutionalism, which today is an almost unavoidable, very modern and dominant course in the modern political science. It is

1 Keane speaks of „reviving the language of civil society“. See: Džon Kin (2003) *Civilno društvo: Stare slike, nove vizije*, Beograd: Filip Višnjić. p. 11.

a combination of constructivist on the one side, and sociological i.e. normative, and historical neo-institutionalism on the other. We particularly wish to emphasize that we share this metodological and theoretical position with Matić, and that it is therefore easier for us to understand and properly interpret the author's metodological standpoint and academic goals he pursues by this reasearch. Namely, it is our common belief that constructivism in itself, and institutional design as such – in terms of some artificial creation of institutions, according to an institutional construction project given or set in advance – cannot meet the criteria of functionality and effectiveness in a specific society (societas). As without taking into consideration the existing system of social values, or those areas from which it is generated, such as: tradition, historical legacy and rooted social patterns, institutionalisation comes down to mere inoculation of institutional solutions, with little or no chance of success. It is important, however, to point out in here what is often overlooked, and to some extent it seems overlooked in this monograph as well, at least in its explicit level – that, in addition to acknowledging already existing social values, there is a basic need (especially in the societies going through the process of democrat-

isation or even democratic consolidation) to incorporate, in the process of institutional designing, a designed system of values as well, therefore those preferred but still unfounded or insufficiently developed social norms that should be the subject of socialisation and individual interiorisation. It means that the prospective role of the process of institutional designing is needed as well, if the aim is that it has not only evolutionary and innovative sign, but the effect too. Usually, under institutional design we understand the process of modelling, designing, testing and creating institutions which, in the most general sense and by a certain working definition used in this study, represent „established 'game rules, formal and/or informal, through which different stakeholders, individual or collective, act in a system“²

In any case, however, the author's orientation to the sociological approach towards the new institutionalism and giving the key role to that normative i.e. the value dimension is clear. It is witnessed by the fact that a special section in the book is dedicated to that approach, its significance and contribution to the research and building of institutions, both those

2 Petar Matić (2012) *Redizajniranje lokalne samouprave*, Beograd: Institut za političke studije. p. 39.

at the general level and those at the level of local self-government.³ In the case of institutional building of the local self-government, Matic finds that particular importance of sociological discourse within neo-institutionalism is reflected in that the local institutions, closest to the citizens, can most easily respond to their needs. In order to fulfill their purpose, the local institutions, however have to be harmonised with the system of values in the local communities. This, in our opinion, highly important part of a monographic study, gives us also a very useful determination and differentiation of the process of institutionalisation which, as the author notices himself, is in the centre of sociological institutionalism. Starting from Huntington's determination of the institutionalisation process as a general process of the evolution of institutions, the process by which „the old institutions change and disappear, and the new institutions replace them“,⁴ Matic formulates his own, much more precise and useful definition ac-

cording to which „institutionalisation is the process through which relevant rules and norms within a society blend into the system of institutions and become universally valid principles“. ⁵ Further on, due attention has been paid to distinguishing the concept of institutionalisation from the concept of modernisation which, as we can notice, becomes similar and related to the former exactly in the context of the above-mentioned Huntington's determination. Relying on Schmucl Eisenstadt's differentiation, it is pointed out that, unlike modernisation characterised by evolvability, institutionalisation is just a certain form of political development, which is not necessarily evolutionary nor exclusively a part of the wider modernisation processes.

Finally, there is another moment indicating the author's preference of normative and historical institutionalism. It is the fact that the author, in his comparative analyses of different institutional models from the empirical field of important political systems existing today, systematically always leaving the space to examine the possibilities of their application in Serbia (which also shows a very good structuring of the study itself), is trying to filter some of their important aspects and in-

3 See: *Ibid.*, chapter: „New theoretical models in studying local institutions“, pp. 29-43; in particular see section: „Sociological and historical institutionalism“, pp. 38-40.

4 Samuel Huntington (1986) "Political Development and Political Decay ". In: Kabashima, Ikuo and White, Lynn (eds.) *Political System and Change*. Princeton: Princeton University Press; cited in: Petar Matic, *op. cit.*, p. 39.

5 *Ibid.*

stitutional solutions through cultural, normative and historical context of the Serbian society, meaning that he considers them from the perspective of the Serbian particularity. For instance, one of such research findings states that the British system of local self-government is hardly applicable in its comprehensive form to domestic practice, primarily due to its specific and very long (centuries long) island tradition, and continued development of the system in relatively stable political conditions; also because it is such an institutional system that is largely not even based on legal norms, but on the local tradition and political practice of the local character.

At the metodological level, there is another specificity of this study, which also represents the common denominator of Matić's and some of our own research studies. It is the analytical combination of political theory and of what is called comparative politics. Although there are different opinions of some members of local professional community as well, it is important to say that it is quite a legitimate approach – very widely accepted, and by that, it would seem, acknowledged in the global dimensions – which, in certain research fields, particularly those that are directed towards

the area of political work, such as is the area of public governance itself, is the only one that ensures a good and comprehensive analyses. Besides, when it comes to such type of research subject, it is exactly this approach that potentially enables that the research gets the applicative function in theoretical and analytical as well as practical and political field. We think that this monograph offers exactly such twofold contribution. However, when it comes to the political field (policy) itself, it particularly contributes to the part of it that covers building of institutions, public policies and political mobilisation of citizens.

Following detailed reading and deep analyses of Matić's monograph, we can conclude, with great certainty, that in the basis of templates offered herein, theoretically and comparatively grounded, is in fact the author's recognition of the necessity of strategic development, cultural and normative adaptation and constant innovation of the institutional (re) designing process within the local self-government, mainly in order to strengthen the political subjectivity of citizens. This goes both for the general level of observation, and as much, and even more, for transitional societies, so-called young democracies, whose political and economic systems are in

the process of reforms, systems that are burdened with different political deviations and economic and social problems, where a general (spiritual and material) and mass pauperisation of population took hold, such as is the Serbian society to which has been dedicated a separate case study in this research. Namely, public self-government, with direct political action or participation of the general public, in modern conditions of complex systems of representative democracies domination at the central level of power, is actually the only or mostly possible self-government in such local frameworks.

Strengthening of political power of citizens, the power of their political action and influence, reinforcing their political and working capacities means at the same time strengthening of democratic capacities of the reference society, therefore the social capital of the state in question. The actual and essential inclusion of citizens (and not only as a formal and legal possibility) in the political decision-making process (so-called policy-making process), through the local level of vertical organisation of power, is the only way to truly create and implement what is modernly called public policies. Behind this is a very important project of reviving the civil, or as some may

prefer to say, national sovereignty. In other words, it means giving the sovereignty back to its original subjectivity, and it is the citizens themselves. In our opinion, it may be the biggest contribution of this academic monograph, in addition to as important diagnosing the status of the local self-government in Serbia and detecting its systemic weaknesses, its causes and consequences. Along with this, a tremendous effort which the author made should also be acknowledged of course, engaging in a venture of making a functional and systematic overview of the selected comparative practices, covering six different European systems (British, French, Swiss, German, Scandinavian and Polish), every one of which has been, as already emphasised, observed through the prism of its applicability for „domestic“ needs of remodelling the local self-government in Serbia. With regards to the very significance of all the presented, particular systemic and institutional solutions, they are perhaps more or less efficient and adaptable to a certain social and cultural and value context, which should be subjected to additional and concrete testing, however they are indeed inspiring in analytical sense, and we can hope that they will be inspiring where they are most needed – in the field of practical and political action.

Citing and Referencing

We welcome articles reporting research on substantive topic, concepts, and/or methodologies in all fields of political science. Authors of single country cases are strongly advised to consider the theoretical and comparative implications of the case. All articles are refereed by domestic and international experts in the field. Deadlines for sending the manuscripts are: **March 15** (for Issue 1) and **September 15** (for Issue 2).

Serbian Political Thought is using a modified version of Harvard referencing system.

Intext References

Any intext reference should include the authorship and the year of the work.

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Example: (Przeworski 1991: 28)

Books

Use the title page, not the book cover, for the reference details. Only include the edition where it is not the first. A book with no edition statement is most commonly a first edition. The required elements for a book reference are:

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For journal articles the required elements for a reference are:

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Intext reference: (Parekh 1996: 505).

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