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TRANSPARENCY AND SECURITY CULTURE IN THE SECURITY SECTOR REFORM²⁾

Summary

The main topic of this work is the relationship between transparency and security, as well as their cultures within the Security Sector Reform (SSR). The paper will first address the impact of transparency on security. Increased transparency is one important segment of the SSR representing a central component of democratic transition, and democracy in general. More transparency could mean that security secrets are more available to individuals and groups (in)directly taking part in decision-making and others. Too much transparency could remove the element of surprise, and thus could create security risks. As legal, habitual, moral and other norms and standards could not be sufficient in all cases, a culture and education of transparency of security are needed. There is the open question who is supposed to provide transparency and control those who control security actors?

As the impact of the activities of security actors could also be harmful for transparency, the second key question is how much transparency can and should be enabled by various interests. The assumption is that interests and needs of SSR actors should be 'filtered' by transparency, contents of security culture, education, norms, interests and needs. In conjunction with the first observed relationship, one should

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determine the extent of the impact of security on transparency. The contents of culture, education, and habits should not be shaped exclusively by security actors and their educational institutions, but also by civilian actors and institutions.

The conclusion is that relations between security and transparency in SSR could be compared with the relations between fire and water. The main success of SSR efforts could be directed towards harmonizing security and transparency by establishing a future common culture based on general culture, education, the norms defining by the common public interests and needs and their main actors.

Key words: Transparency, security, culture, Security Sector Reform

The main topic of this scholarly attempt is to explore the relationship between transparency and security (existence of threats of rather low intensity or lack of threats), as well as their cultures (ways of living of a human beings' community or group transmitted from one generation to the next³⁾) within the Security Sector Reform (SSR). The SSR includes in the first place the transformation of security actors and oversight mechanisms utilized for democratic civilian control and a practical and proceeding by argument or reasoning (rather than intuition) shift in policy-making.⁴⁾ This is particularly significant for post-conflict and/or

3) „The military's professional culture rests on the military system's differentiation from the other branches of the state" (Frederik Rosén, "Third Generation Civil-Military Relations and the 'New Revolution in Military Affairs'", DIIS Working Paper, No 3, 2009, p. 33, <http://www.diis.dk/sw74373.asp>, internet, 26/04/09).

4) Democracy could be defined as a rule of majority and a procedure used for the non-violent elimination of political, economic, ethnic, and other conflicts and discrepancies in interests, i.e. positions in society. Since the end of the Cold War the interest of scholars has been focused on the security aspects of the ethnic conflicts, and on political aspects of the development of democracy or transition toward democracy (i.e. its general pattern).

Conflict in general could be defined in the meaning of manifest and dynamic conflict process consisting of certain phases. In this case, the term conflict is utilized in a more specific meaning: a political process (dynamic situation) in which engaged parties have incompatible attitudes and behaviors. Conflict has three inter-related components: First, conflict situation, manifested in expressing various political aims or conflict of interest (see: Johan Galtung, "A Structural Theory of Imperialism", in *Classics of International Relations*, 2nd edition, ed. Johan A. Vasquez, Prentice Hall, Englewood Cliffs, N.J., 1990, p. 247), which cannot be simultaneously achieved and for that reason could be qualified as mutually exclusive. Second, conflict behavior (at the first place aimed to achieve the mentioned political aims). One should stay away from the notion that conflict behavior should always be something that is to be stopped. Moreover, it should not be assumed that conflict in a wider sense of the term is something that should be necessarily avoided (Håkan Wiberg, "Identifying Conflicts and Solutions", *Review of International Affairs*, Vol. XLIX, No. 1070-71, 1998, p. 176). Third, conflicting attitudes and perceptions having emotional dimension (feeling of anger, mistrust, fear, scorn, hatred, etc.) as well as cognitive dimension (maintenance of certain stereotypes and beliefs regarding the opposite side). Compare: C. R. Michell, *The Structure of International Conflict*, St. Martin's Press, New York, 1981, 29. More details: Zlatko Isakovic, "Measurement and Distribution of Political Power in Balkan and other States", *Review of International*

post-authoritarian states seeking to become elements of Euro-Atlantic integration processes.⁵⁾ It should be stressed that the countries that participate in the Euro-Atlantic integration processes are themselves in the transitions. Respect and implementation civilian control norms over the security sector have been a key condition for the post-Communist states integration.

Having in mind the situations in numerous transitional countries, it could be noted that the culture of conflict behaviour means that actors on all levels usually have different not just political, security, religious, and economic, but also cultural and some other interests. One of the methods utilized for conflict resolution purposes is reformulating a conflict apparently over power, justice or identity in terms of the mentioned interests.⁶⁾ It should be learned to deal with conflicts peacefully, primarily through the equalization and balancing of the diverging interests calling all parties (but without winners and losers) for certain sacrifices by and compromises.⁷⁾

As the relationships observed in this work have multidimensional nature, this research project has a complex methodology composed of combined groups of methods that are usually used in political sciences, sociology, anthropology, ethnology, social psychology, philosophy, linguistic studies, economy, (modern) history, theory of international relations, theory of law, certain law disciplines and some other more or less related disciplines. This methodological conglomeration is used to define possible concrete answers for the questions related to societal security.

Affairs, Vol. LIX, No. 1129, January – March 2008; Zlatko Isakovic, „Democracy, Human Rights and Ethnic Conflicts in Eastern Europe and Asia and in the Processes of European Integration and Globalization“, Journal of East European and Asian Studies, No. 1, p. 85-107.

- 5) See: Zlatko Isakovic, “Measurement and Distribution of Political Power in Balkan and other States”.
- 6) See more details on identity and other security threats in the Second Yugoslavia and its successor states: Zlatko Isakovic, *Identity and Security in former Yugoslavia* (Aldershot: Ashgate, 2000).
- 7) See more details: Dieter Senghaas, *Zivilisierung wider Willen. Der Konflikt der Kulturen mit sich selbst*, Suhrkamp, Frankfurt am Main, 1998, ; Zlatko Isaković, *Osnovi teorije političke moći u međunarodnim odnosima*, Institut za međunarodnu politiku i privredu, Beograd, 1998), 36-47; Zlatko Isakovic, “Democratization, Democracy and Ethnic Conflicts in the Balkans”, *COPRI Working Papers*, No 9, 2000; Zlatko Isakovic, “The Role of the University in Ethnic Conflict Transformation, Democratization, and Developing Human Rights in the Balkans”, *COPRI Working Papers*, No. 14, 2002; Zlatko Isakovic, “The Role of the University in Ethnic Conflict Transformation, Democratization, and Developing Human Rights in the Balkans“, Islam and Human Rights, <http://www.law.emory.edu/IHR/>, 22/05/06.

THE IMPACT OF TRANSPARENCY ON SECURITY

Increased transparency is observed and considered as one important segment of the SSR representing a central component of democratic transition, as well as democracy in general. The reason the actors and their activities are supposed to become increasingly transparent during their transformation process is quite understandable: how to provide democratic civilian control without transparency?

However, more transparency could mean that security secrets are more available to individuals and groups directly or indirectly taking part in decision-making and implementing decisions on and in war and peace, the arms race, terrorism, terror, organized and other criminal activities. The secrets could also be more available to their family members, voters, members of their political parties, political rivals, allies, rivals and even enemies, and other concerned parties. Too much transparency could remove the element of *surprise*, which represents a crucial security tool. In other words, *too much transparency could create security risks or it could be perceived and presented in that way*. As legal, habitual, moral and other norms and standards could not be sufficient in all cases, a culture and education of transparency of security are needed.

Oversight mechanisms and activities utilized for democratic civilian control over the security sector should be transparent too having also at least some of the mentioned and other possible results, i.e. risks. Finally, people in the transitional and some other countries – at civilian and military cultural, educational, research, and other institutions, and places – should learn how to assume a transparent, individual and group attitude toward security and civilian control actors and their activities and conflicts within and in relations with other societies.

THE IMPACT OF SECURITY ON TRANSPARENCY

As the impact of the security actors' activities could also be harmful for transparency, the second key question is how much transparency can and should be enabled and implemented by operational, tactical, bureaucratic, group, and/or even private interests. The assumption is that needs and interests of SSR actors should be 'filtered' by transparency, contents of security culture, education, social habits, legal, moral and other norms, interests and needs.

In conjunction with the first observed relationship, one should determine the extent of the impact of security on transparency. However, the contents of culture, education, and habits should not be shaped exclusively by security actors and their educational institutions, but

also by civilian actors and institutions. While the security actors are traditionally in pursuit of national, i.e. more precisely state security (and population is one of the constitutive elements of state with territory and government), the civilian actors and institutions seem to aim increasingly human security, i.e. security of human beings and their communities (including families, friends, neighbors, colleagues from workplaces, states, nations, humankind, etc.). It is well known that all security concepts could be misused at least to some extent.

One should also pay attention on the profound changes in the US (and to the very notion of) military.⁸⁾ Namely, there is „the ambitious stabilization work that the US Department of Defense has commenced in Afghanistan, in which the US military is carrying out holistic civil governance reform projects. Whether such work will become a part of the US military’s standard repertoire depends on the degree of success and possible entrenchment of the current innovations“. It is concluded that, „however, ... this expansion of the functions of the military organization into civil governance is historical, and it might bring about profound changes to the US military, perhaps even transforming the notion of military more generally“.⁹⁾

The Europeans would doubtlessly be more inclined to join the FDD if their values with regard to planning, *transparency* and evaluation were more explicitly represented by the FDD in practice. „This turns the question of a European FDD buy in into a Catch 22: the Europeans would probably buy in to the FDD if it expressed European values more strongly, yet the EU has to join the FDD in order to embed its values in the project.“¹⁰⁾

The issue of academic freedoms (in security and civilian academic institutions, programs and *culture* in general) seems to be interesting in transitional as well as in numerous other countries (particularly after the September 11, 2001, and the beginning of the world as well as local economic crisis). Within this field there are, for example, the following open questions related to civilian as well as security actors’ institutions:

- Is it possible that a teacher could be evaluated, promoted or dismissed on irrelevant grounds (for instance, thanks to a vague definition of “scientific journal” and/or other kinds of scientific works)?

8) The idea of the military and the function of the military organization can easily change, third-generation civil-military being a good example of this”. There is the American military’s police reform program, the Focused District Development (FDD), “representing a major engine in Afghanistan for the development of third-generation civil-military relations” (Rosén, op. cit., p. 33).

9) Ibid., 8.

10) Ibid., 24.

- Could and does a government control the appointment and firing of deans, professors and university boards and close faculties?
- Could it be expected that grounds for discipline and dismissal include religious or other differences within the university administration or the outside social establishment?
- Are professors allowed and enabled to refuse signing a new labor contract required by a law, as they perceived it as a humiliation or as a declaration of loyalty to the ruling party?
- Does a law reduce the autonomy of academia (for instance, limiting the influence of professors on the curricula)?
- Do professors seem to be self-censored from time to time?
- Can it be expected that a teacher might be mauled on account on his or her political conviction?
- Do some intellectuals mostly keep themselves quiet and do not express too often their views in public trying to reduce the danger of being threatened for one's political opinions?
- Can it be expected that a teacher's language might weight against him or her?
- Can it be expected that a teacher's country of birth might weight against him or her?
- Can it be expected that a teacher's national or ethnic affiliation might weight against him or her?
- Can one expect that a teacher's sex might weight against him or her (discrimination by university and/or by wider environment)?
- Can it be expected that a teacher's disloyalty (real or imagined) could be a reason for scant funding of universities?
- Can it be expected that the university administration should be asked or even pressed to release, make transparent and accessible certain protected information about students, professors and other employees without proper legal grounds?
- Can it be expected that teachers, students, employed in the university administration, and/or other above-mentioned people could be harmed or punished in some of the mentioned or other ways on the national or even human security grounds?

- Which institutions (if any) would be important agents in the fight for academic freedoms in transitional and other countries?¹¹⁾

Academic freedoms that exist in transitional and other countries should not be taken for granted forever, as some of them, which exist today, could disappear or be limited in the future. This could be particularly applied to the countries in escalated ethnic or other conflicts as it is often hard to distinguish at least some of those elements of politics that are determined by conflicts and their escalations from those that are regular features of authoritarian politics (both often rich in threats).

Johan Galtung pointed to the Germany's behavior after the end of the Second World War, which could serve as a conflict transformation pattern. The most significant were changes within schoolbooks, university textbooks, etc. The changes included presenting atrocities and other horrible things that 'we' did sharing them in that way with our children and other descendants and the rest of the world. In addition to this self-critical method, exchange of people and their cultural values could be suggested too. Both these methods in good parts have been in hands of the universities (in the first place its managers, faculty and students) and those who take part, finance and in other way enable its activities.¹²⁾

The university is the place for dialog and global education whose purpose is to make transparent and understand how other people think, and learn to respect other cultures. The conflict transformation method includes adult education too.¹³⁾ One could utilize at least some of the experiences with the evening and summer courses, workshops and other programs.¹⁴⁾

In purpose to take its part in the transitional democratization process, the university, research and other cultural institutions previously

11) This role could be played by universities themselves, other academic institutions and weak, scared and opportunistic intellectual milieus, independent or 'independent' nongovernmental organizations (NGOs) and media, trade unions, civil society organizations, etc. See an effort aimed to explore the mentioned issue, i.e. questions in the Balkans: Isakovic, "The Role of the University in Ethnic Conflict...", 19-23.

12) Johan Galtung, "Peacebuilding, Conflict Transformation and World Order in the 21st Century", lecture held at Carleton University, Ottawa, October 11, 2001.

13) Johan Galtung, "40 Years, 40 Conflicts", eds. Johan Galtung, and Carl G. Jacobsen with Kai Frithjof Brand-Jacobsen and Finn Tschudi, *Searching for Peace; the Road to TRANSCEND*, Pluto Press, London and Sterling, VA, 2000, p. 112.

14) More details: Vladislav A. Tomovic, "Knowledge for What? – How Canadian and American Universities Prepare Their Students to Adjust to the Roles in the Industry i.e. Economy", paper prepared for the Group of Experts for Prosperity of Serbia, Belgrade, June 14 – 18, 2001, p. 3.

should be democratized themselves. They should be places for civil discourse and free speech¹⁵⁾ paying attention to security issues too. The institutional autonomy of the university should be given “as soon as democracy fortifies itself”.¹⁶⁾ At conflict escalation time, the university should strive to preserve the scholars and students’ academic freedoms and “to pursue ideas that conflict with what we believe or what we would like to believe, and to explore deep problems whose solutions have no apparent applications”.¹⁷⁾

As challenges and uncertainties lie ahead at that time, there is the open question what is the proper role of the education, research and culture in general within the conflict escalation process and simultaneous intensive and often dramatic national debate; how can the education, research and culture in general contribute to deescalation? This dilemma opens the question “culture for what?”, i.e. for what purpose observed society needs security, transparency and many other segments of culture during the conflict escalation process? This question mean primarily how one can reach the empowerment of the parties to handle themselves the security, transparency and conflict by peaceful and democratic political means having also in mind that democracy is not a perfect system?

The conflict between state sovereignty and ethnicity will remain one of the important features of the transitional and some other political landscapes. “Within such a context, the primary task for every state is to be *learning to live with ethnic conflict and to deal with it without any kind of violence*”. The conflict resolution processes will most likely be long-lasting ones. “Reaching for swift and definite solutions in this case could mean only one thing: establishing a non-democratic rule with the aim of maintaining the state sovereignty (and security - Rem. by the author of this paper) by all costs”.¹⁸⁾

After the September 11, 2001, events it is considered “freedom of inquiry, which is one of our most cherished organizing principles, is not just a moral imperative, it is a practical necessity.” It is in times of conflict escalation (called by this author “national crisis”) that “true commitment to freedom of speech and thought is tested”. Participants in the discussion often disagree about broadness of the shared blame,

15) See: Shirley M. Tilghman, Installation Address at Princeton University, Princeton, NJ, September 28, 2001, WF-EUROPE Digest, No. 169, October 1-2, 2001.

16) See: Tomovic, op. cit., p. 5.

17) Tilghman, op. cit.

18) More details: Biljana Vankovska-Cvetkovska, “Sovereignty Principle and Ethnic Pluralism – A Challenge to Macedonian State”, *Međunarodni problemi*, Vol. XLIX, No. 4, 1997, p. 88.

“about the ways in which nationalism and religion can be perverted into fanaticism”, “about whether a just retribution can be achieved if it leads to the deaths of more innocent victims”, “about the political and tactical decisions that our government will make, both in achieving retribution and in seeking to protect against similar attacks in the future”, “about how and when to wage war and how best to achieve a real and lasting peace”. Just as the cultural insitutions have an obligation to search for knowledge world-wide, so they also have an obligation to insure wide dissemination of the scholarly works of the academy and ther creators of cultural works, so that others can build on it, or correct it when necessary, or use it to make better decisions, products or plans.¹⁹⁾

In the times of conflict escalation (often bringing numerous security problems), educational and other cultural insitutions in transitional and other countries have the duty to offer to country’s decision makers in political, security and other fields and to the rest of the world – the knowledge residing in works created by philosophers, historians, economists, engineers, scholars in peace and conflict studies, political sciences and many other fields that can help make transparent and understand the *goals, attitudes, interests, identities, and/or behaviors* of the other and our conflict side as well as of the mediators, arbitrators, etc.²⁰⁾

CONCLUSIONS

Democracy has the potential to help mitigate and eliminate ethnic tensions, but transition toward democracy creates a fertile climate for hatred, biases and thus conflicts. There is an open question what could the concerned countries and the international community do in order to promote democracy (including control over security actors and those who are supposed to control them) without exacerbating ethnic and other social conflicts within the present world crisis?

An answer to the mentioned question what could the concerned countries and the international community do in order to promote democracy (along with transparent control over transparent security actors and their activities) – without exacerbating ethnic and other social conflicts within the present world crisis – is rather complex. One should keep in mind that human rights development and democratization could dampen, even transform ethnic conflicts or prevent their escalation under certain conditions. First, it is necessary that the forces pushing for genuine democratization recognize and acknowledge the ethnic diversi-

19) See: Tilghman, op. cit.

20) Compare: Ibid.

ty existing within the state along with the fact that nobody is perfect beginning with us ourselves. Second, they also have to find a way, which would be commonly perceived to be fair, to accommodate the goals and interests of different groups. On the one hand, the democratization and human rights development processes provide a propitious setting for allaying ethnic and other problems and preventing their transformation to conflicts and their escalation, and on the other hand – successful democratization needs national unity as the basic precondition. Another precondition both for democratization and for preventing or transforming ethnic and other conflicts is at least some economic prosperity, which could be also harder reached and/or maintained particularly in conflict escalation situations and the existing world economic crisis. The control over security actors as well as their activities has their economic and other costs.²¹⁾

Transparent security and control over it could be provided for all or nobody. Majority nations in transitional and many other countries will not be secure unless the human rights of the minorities would not be protected to a necessary and feasible degree. In these conditions, minorities should be deprived only of the unconditional right to self-determination including a 'right to secession' (as that right is usually interpreted on the Balkans²²⁾). In addition, as one author has stressed, "as soon as minorities become majorities, new minorities appear. If the present number of nation-states is doubled, the number of minority problems may also be (roughly) doubled".²³⁾

Robin Alison Remington stressed the question: "How can political parties, attempting to bridge ethnic cleavages, find a common denominator of national security that will satisfy the Bulgarian majority and Turkish minority in Bulgaria; Romanians and the Hungarians minority in Transylvania; Serbs, Croats, Muslims, and Albanians in the former Yugoslavia?"²⁴⁾ For this reason, the observed countries need

21) More details: Zlatko Isakovic, *Introduction to a Theory of Political Power in International Relations*, Ashgate, Aldershot, 2000, pp. 36-50; Zlatko Isaković, *Osnovi teorije političke moći u međunarodnim odnosima*, op.cit., pp. 36-47.

22) Glennly suggested that maybe a solution could be within the scope of the principle "all rights to minorities, excluding the right to secession" (see Misha Glennly, "The Yugoslav Nightmare", *The New York Review of Books*, Vol. XLII, No. 5, March 23, 1995, p. 57).

23) Thomas Hylland Eriksen, "Ethnicity and Nationalism: Definitions and Critical Reflections", *Bulletin of Peace Proposals*, Vol. 23, No. 2, 1992, p. 221.

24) Robin Alison Remington, "Security Dilemmas in the Post-Communist Balkans – Party-Army Dynamics", *Eurobalkans*, No. 17, Winter 94/95, p. 71; see also: Zlatko Isaković, "Ljudska prava vezana za ispovedanje vere i etnički odnosi u Makedoniji i na Balkanu", *Ohraniti sanje: Prispevki z druge mednarodne conference/okrogle mize "Vloga verskih skupnosti v mirovnem procesu in pri odpravi posledic vojne na področju nekdanje Jugoslavije"*, Rogaška Slatina, 1997, ed. Silvo Devetak, ISCOMET and ECERS, Maribor, 1998.

developed economies and stable democracies and systems of human rights, which are protected by law along with traditional and other habits.²⁵⁾

The more a minority is far from being loyal to state in which it has been living, presumably the more the state will use its repression; looking from the other side, the more the repression is used by the state the less is the minority likely to be(come) loyal and to perceive the state power (authority) as legitimate, but perceiving it as "plain domination".²⁶⁾

Although democracy is not a perfect system, as long as it exists it creates potentials and possibilities for peaceful transformation of ethnic and other conflicts. Before one made any proposal for conflict transformation or other form of conflict resolution, one should understand and learn how to cope with conflicts with peaceful political means. However, the more conflicts, the harder it is to achieve democracy and human rights protection and even more so to experience them.²⁷⁾ If existing system cannot be qualified as democratic one, appears the complex dilemma what could and should come first: *developing democracy (including transparency of security actors and those who should control them) or preventing escalation, deescalating or/and eliminating ethnic and other conflicts.*

It seems that the more security (especially if it is based on its national, i.e. state concept) the less transparency and *vice versa*. However, the first predicted conclusion could be that the need for security and transparency in SSR exists despite the fact that their relations could be compared with the relations between *fire and water*.

Second, where is the place of transparency "in the process of 'learning counterinsurgency'" within the US military expanding the functions of the military into civil governance? If the military replaces civil authorities, who is going to execute democratic civilian control over military and other security actors and provide the transparency?

25) See more details: Zlatko Isaković, "Položaj Makedonije u balkanskom okruženju" (Macedonia on the Balkans), *Međunarodna politika*, No. 1024, 1994, str. 35.

26) See: Maurice Duverger, *The Study of Politics*, Thomas Y. Crowell Company, New York, 1972, p. 18.

27) Compare: Renee de Nevers, "Democratization and Ethnic Conflict", *Survival*, Vol. 35, No. 2, Summer, 1993, pp. 31-48. For a provocative and multi-faceted discussion of some of the major points discussed in this paper see one issue of the *Slavic Review*, Vol. 55, issue 4, Winter, 1996. The discussion was initiated by the article by Robert M. Hayden ("Schindler's Fate: Genocide, Ethnic Cleansing, and Population Transfers", pp. 727-748). The authors who disputed his thesis in the same issue were Carol S. Lilly ("Amoral Realism or Immoral Obfuscation?", pp. 749-754); Susan L. Woodward ("Genocide or Partition: Two Faces of the Same Coin?", pp. 755-761); Paul Wallace ("The Costs of Partition in Europe: A South Asian Perspective", pp. 762-766). Finally, Hayden replied to these articles ("Reply", pp. 767-778).

Event less is clear who is going to make transparent and control those hypothetic ones who are supposed to control this controllers' controllers? Finally, is there a space for human security at all and if the answer could be positive – what are its relations with national, i.e. state security?

Third, the main success of SSR efforts could be directed towards harmonizing the relationships between security and transparency by establishing a common security and transparency culture based on common culture, education, social habits, legal, moral and other norms defining the common public interests and needs.

Златко Исаковић

ТРАНСПАРЕНТНОСТ И БЕЗБЕДНОСНА КУЛТУРА У БЕЗБЕДНОСНОМ СЕКТОРУ РЕФОРМЕ

Сажетак

Главна тема овог рада је веза између транспарентности и безбедности, као и њихова култура унутар Безбедносног сектора реформи (БСР). Рад се прво бави утицајем транспарентности на безбедност. Повећање транспарентности је важан сектор БСР и представља главну компоненту демократске транзиције и демократије уопште. Више транспарентности може да значи да су безбедносне тајне више доступне појединцима и групама (ин) директно утичући на процес одлучивања. Закони, обичаји, морал, друге норме и стандарди не могу бити довољни у свим случајевима тако да су култура и образовање транспарентне безбедности неопходни. Поставља се питање ко би требало да обезбеди транспарентност и контролу оних који контролишу безбедносне учеснике?

Пошто утицај активности безбедносних чиниоца може, такође, бити и штетан поставља се друго кључно питање о томе колико транспарентности треба омогућити различитим интересима. Претпоставка је да интереси и потребе учесника БСР треба да буду филтрирани помоћу транспарентности, садржаја безбедносне културе, образовања, норми, интереса и потреба. У вези са првим посматраним односом требало би да се одреди обим утицаја безбедности на транспарентност. Садржаји културе, образовања и обичаја не би требало да буду обликовани само помоћу безбедносних чиниоца и њиховим образовним институцијама, већ и помоћу грађанских чиниоца и инситуција.

Закључак је да се веза између безбедности и транспарентности у БСР може поредити као веза између ватре и воде. Главни успех напора БСР може бити усмерен према хармонизацији безбедности и транспарентности успостављањем будуће заједничке културе базиране на општој култури, образовању, нормама одређеним заједничким јавним интересима и потребама и њиховим главним учесницима.

Кључне речи: транспарентност, безбедност, култура, Безбедносни сектор реформи.

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