



DISKURS I POLITIKA

DISCOURSE AND POLITICS

Priredili/Edited by

Dejana Vukasović

Petar Matić

International Thematic Collection of Papers

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Dejana M. Vukasović, Petar Matić, editors

I

**POLITICAL PHILOSOPHY AND
UNDERSTANDING OF DISCOURSE**

Alpar Lošonc*

**DISCURSIVE DEPENDENCE
OF POLITICS WITH THE
CONFRONTATION BETWEEN
REPUBLICANISM AND
NEOLIBERALISM**

Abstract

The article consists in two parts. In the first part, the relationship between structural determination of modernity and the discursive determination of politics is thematised. The dyad between meta-structure and structure is explored in order to elucidate the status of politics with regard to modern social relations. It is argued that the discursive determination of politics can be understood in the sense that discourse mediates the structural determinations of modernity. In the second part of the article, neoliberalism and constructivism are confronted, in particular taking into account the previous indications regarding the relationship between structure and discourse. The point is made in relation to the discursive dimensions of neoliberalism and republicanism, with special emphasis on the diametrically opposed stances of these two orientations concerning the position of politics. Based on the lessons learned with regard to republicanism, it is arrived

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at an understanding of politicization of the (republican) discourse as an antithesis to neoliberalism.

Keywords: discourse, structure, structural determinations, metastructure, neoliberalism, republicanism.

1. INTRODUCTION

Politics is interpreted as a triad: “metastructure”, structure and discourse. The modern understanding of the beginning is discursive but in a counterfactual way. This paper is primarily focused on Foucault’s concept of discourse and on the identification of those aspects of his work that can be useful in understanding the relationship between discourse and politics. There are different reasons why the discourse theory lends more possibilities than other similar theories. The hypothesis on the autonomous and heteronomous understanding of politics is particularly highlighted and, in that case, the selected theory is analyzed in the light of heteronomous understanding. The discourse analysis interpreted in this way offers assumptions about the confrontation between two dominant orientations, that is, between neoliberalism and republicanism.

Political philosophy has always been related to the interpretation of the beginning. The modes of explanations are different: sometimes mythology is mentioned, sometimes it is banned to do research into the origins of community; many theoreticians evoke the original and conflict human “nature” in order to find more rational explanation for the existence of community. Some theoreticians believe that the source of political power is in the “hidden truths” that we cannot discover, and other theoreticians (such as Hobbes) locate the same source in the explicit manifestation of the sovereign will (Zarka 2001: 130). Some theoreticians state that the beginning can be related to the forms of state functioning, but some deny this. However, regardless of different explanations, *mutatis mutandis*, political philosophy always observes it in the perspective of the beginning, that is, “inscenation of beginning” (Lefort).

It is most important that the modern constellation of the beginning is determined by discursive relations, that is, that the modern politics has always been characterized by a *discursive horizon*. The fiction projected at the beginning is structured *discursively*. It is here that the already mentioned Hobbes can give us a starting point and material for thinking about the *discursive beginning*. This way we can read: “this is more than consent, or concord; it is a real unity of them all in one and the same person, made by covenant of every man with every man, in such manner as if every man should say to every man... This done, the multitude so united in one person is called a COMMONWEALTH; in Latin, CIVITAS” (Hobbes 1660, XVII, here, we follow the text to a certain point, (Bidet 2008). In this sentence, the most significant is the term suggesting the *initial discursive unity* in the form of a *counterfactual* claim: “as if every man should say to every man” (underlined by A. L.)

Logos implies the possibility of mutual agreement. We know that, in Hobbes’ work, there is a similarity between the establishment based on mutual agreement and establishment based on the force of acquisition, that is, between “Common-wealth by institution” and “Common-wealth by acquisition” (Foisneau 2004). Therefore, the formulated sentence is actually part of the declarative approach, *declaration as an initial discursive act*, which stipulates civil freedom and equality as well as the community of those who are able to use words to organize a community. Just like in Aristotle’s *Politics* in which a man can pronounce words, here, a man can also use the words based on his/her anthropological background, which means that the declaration about the triad of liberty, equality and community can be made based on the fact that there is *logos* at the beginning. *Logos* has *declarative power*, as we already know it from tradition (what is a “declarative sentence” and “apophansis” (Cassin 2005). Declaration is a configuration of words and it has performative value because it arranges “civil reality”, or structures political reality overall. In that case, we can say that the aforementioned declaration is an expression of a certain form of “constituent power”, or “collective” political “selfhood” (Jaume 2018; Loughlin 2014) which is present in the reflection about modernity/revolution: forming of the community always involves the performative act of “promise” (Honnig 1981).

Bidet (2008) contended that there was a special relationship between immediacy and mediatedness: words as discursive starting points are mediated entities that enable “central contract”. He calls that a *meta-structural declaration*: people place themselves in a modern context by declaratively affirming themselves as free and equal in a community. However, there is a difference between meta-structurality and structure. *Meta-structurality* expresses the aforementioned discursive situation of declaration and *structurality* is a polar construction of modern society that forms classes: they are different, if we use Hobbes’ expressions, based on the socially affirmed differences in the process of “acquisition”. However, we would like to emphasize that *structurality* is, at the same time, an indication of the *logic of dependence*, especially with regard to the forms of subjectivity. Structure is always the context of *dependence* for the subjects; in this analysis, the starting point is not the constitutive subjectivity or intentions of subjects but it is the fact that structure has these intentions and modes of subjectivity. This way, in a certain understanding of the structure, we got the term of “constituted subjectivity” that still defines some modern orientations (Balibar 2005). From the perspective of political philosophy, we can thus deepen the general contradiction between “constitutive” and “constituted” subjectivities – the well-known dilemma, that is, the tension between “constitutive” and “constituted people” is just part of the same problem (Pasquino 2015).

Bidet says that we should think about the relationship between meta-structurality and structure (Bidet 2006). According to meta-structurality, modernity cannot be otherwise understood but in a *declarative-discursive* perspective of liberty/equality/community.¹ In other words, regardless of the conflict, the dominance/exploitation among social groups, structural determinations are present in modernity only if meta-structurality, which always represents an appellative instance, is present. *Structurality*², on the other hand, shows the configuration of power, polarity between social groups, conflicts in *metapersonal* social processes. There is

1 We depart from Bidet to some extent who speaks about the triad of freedom/equality/rationality, while we speak about freedom/equality/community.

2 *Structurality* implies not only the relation between structure and agency, that is, distance of structure from agency, but *structurality* as a „topological domain in the stratified ontology“ (Fletchart). The relationship between metastructure and structure represents the relationship between modernity and capitalism.

no temporal distance between meta-structurality and structurality; actually, structurality in the indicated context puts meta-structurality “as its own presumption” (Bidet).

It is up to us to recognize the crucial relationship between structure and discourse. However, so far presented argumentation has helped us to recognize just one aspect of the relationship in question and it is the relationship between declarative discourse and structure. We would like to reflect upon it a bit more.

2. DISCOURSE AND STRUCTURE

The insistence on “structure” and the non-personal “structured totality” sheds light on *socially* conditioned politics. In this regard, politics always takes place within the framework of certain social *determinations* that diachronically and synchronically condition political trends. The “effect of social” (Althusser) is produced, and politics takes place in pre-defined frameworks in which subjects have their conflict-based positions: this type of politics can be called “heteronomous”, but we should bear in mind that it raises the inevitable question regarding the relationship between political subjectivity and the aforementioned heteronomy (cf. Balibar 1997: 33).

Here, we find the controversy that has been haunting a great deal of political thought in the last decades. The “autonomy” concept has been developed in contrast to the heteronomy of politics. While the “transformation of social conditions” paradigm is emerging from the perspective of heteronomy, we have a totally different intention from the perspective of “autonomy” and it is the politics that is *independent* of these social determinations. Politics is not *infrasocial*: this is a statement made by supporters of autonomy. Here, politics is “rare” and focuses on the disruptions of the continuous streams of social order; it insists on the fact that politics cannot be reduced to the subsystem of social order. Politics is intervening in relation to the existing position of social subjects; it acts as a self-affirmative practice, it is incommensurable, deeply dissimilar to economics and even power (it could not be articulated in the light of power, or “politics is not made up of power relationships”, Rancière). Its idiosyncratic being transcends the well-known knowledge-power couple, it represents the “name of

nothing” (Rancière) that “dis-identifies” the subjects of society and the social beings at large. Politics cannot be linked with socially formed objects, or the mediation mechanisms (Badiou).

Bearing in mind the politics understood in this way, we could say that every social order is contingent; this is the reason why we abandon the dialectic of necessity and contingency. Instead of confirming the existing social relationships or evoking the affirmation of communities in the decreasing commonality of late capitalism, “*déliasion*” or “unlinking” is suggested in relation to the socio-economic determinations. Finally, there is a genuine indeterminacy of politics, we cannot know a priori what type of activity will be characterized as “political”: it depends on the “intensity” of the particular form of activity, on the “intensity” of articulation-based practice. Since politics is characterized by indeterminacy, it can always be transformed into “depoliticization” but it represents its fall. *To sum up: according to our exposition, politics here is on the other side of structure.*

Our hypothesis predicts that the problem of discourse can be articulated satisfactorily within the frameworks of heteronomy. This is the reason why we should re-analyze the relationship between structure and discourse but this time differently, by involving the theoretician of discourse, Michel Foucault, whom we tend to refer to. The reason for this is our intention to clarify how *embedded discourse is in the society*, its situation within the frameworks of structure. Let’s say now: should we take into consideration the above-mentioned distinction, then the theory of the French theoretician would be linked with *heteronomous orientation of politics*. The standpoint here is the manner in which he discusses “power-relations”, deeply embedded in the “social nexus”, that is, indication about the fact that “to live in a society is to live in such a way that action upon other actions is possible”. The fact that there is an agonistic relationship between the “intransitivity of freedom” and “power relations” in “all social existence” (underlined by A. L) is a clear statement (with regard to these citations and interpretation, (Ibid: 33). Therefore, Foucault emphasizes the importance of social determinations in a special manner - although it is not the manner in which we have expected it to be: in his work, inter-individual relations are considered to be determining. He can be associated with the theoreticians of autonomous politics when it comes to

discarding the dialectic mediation in understanding politics, *but his focus on social conditions puts him into the category of those who support heteronomous orientation*. This should provide us with certain impulses for analyzing the relationship between discourse and politics.

Discourse has always been associated with certain practices of signification where the meaning is variable and subject to recomposition. This way, discourses can include meanings-sequences that are singularities. The significance of discourse analysis for politics is that it can take into account the dynamics that arises from the instability of political struggles, from transitional alliances struggling to find the meaning-entities. The affirmation of indeterminacy of meaning as well as discourse as the constituent factor in our relationship to the world is a continuous controversy concerning the ideology of meaning and its fixing as naturalization. Accordingly, theoreticians who develop a discursive perspective for explanatory purposes, show tendency toward processing and not fixed meaning-sequences: thus, they claim that petrified concepts, purified from processual meanings, easily slip into the trap of naturalization.

Louis Althusser has been trying to tackle the problem of discourse for a long time, especially the problem of the *relationship between discourse and language*. It is not surprising that there is an arc leading from linguistics (which analyzes the diachronic structures of language) to the formation of discourse as a guide for theoretical performance. Althusser has sometimes expressed equality: language is a discourse, he has sometimes claimed that language does not exist and that only discourses exist in their plural forms, and he has even made a distinction between different paradigmatic discourses. His famous analysis of interpellation actually indicates a certain synthesis between the discourse of ideology and sphere of unconscious (Montag 2015). Foucault's work offers unambiguous orientation that goes beyond discourse whose focus is on language, despite the fact that he changed the aspects of his work and even reformulated the concept of discourse later (his work reflects a problem completely opposite from Althusser's who suggests the omnipresence of ideology; in Foucault's work, this ideology disappears together with its command potential). The language appears in the context of dynamics of power, but

the discourse analysis points to *translinguistic* domains: in this way, the terms such as “game”, “strategic games of action” are used. Furthermore, Foucault also uses the important concept of “practice” here: he claimed several times that “practice” is the most important orientation of his thinking. Actually, he talks about the “discursive practice”. Language exists in the frameworks of “historical and social practice” and in the frameworks of “practices of interferences”.

Here, we are interested in Foucault’s attention to archeology that actually represents an interpretation of the *discursive dependence of politics*: speech is intended for discovering the truth but it is at the same time rule-based, which connects us with the concept of “discursive synthesis” (about the differences between the Nietzsche-inspired genealogical and archeological phase, see Visker 2008). This means that “truth-claims” are in line with the existing discursive rules that transcend subjective intentions and the power of the subject in general; there is a new figure of “decentered subjectivity” whose perceptions, forms of attention, forms of perception of any social content are conditioned by discourse. Our forms of interest, “what we usually hear”, “what we perceive”, “what addresses us”, our sensibility, are conditioned by discourse: according to Foucault, these rules, “framework context” (Hacking) form the “positive unconscious of knowledge”. At this point, it is impossible to take a position “from nowhere” that could enable us “access to our own archive” (Visker); we as political beings are always-already discursively predetermined. In the descriptions of “discursive operations” that structure the modes of emergence of subjects and objects, Foucault discovers the “correlations” between “words and things”, correspondence between “sentences” and “practices”, or “discursive assemblage”. Discourses identify the *field of possibilities* for historical subjects, they define what can and cannot be said for political subjects.

As can be noted, there no form of historicist relativism here but the *rewriting of certain forms of dependence*. Now, this is an archeological-discursive dependence. There are many misinterpretations regarding archeology: decentered subjectivities are often regarded as quasi-subjectivities or as subjective instances. However, if so, then it would be difficult to thematize the problem of politics and discourse – how can we understand the politics

if we eliminate the possibility of showing the subjectivity and intensification of subjectivity in certain situations? How could we understand politics (which, in Foucault's work, is directed at "transformation") by eliminating subjectivity? How could we align conformal subjectivity and interests of the French thinker regarding the "intransitive freedom" of any order?

However, tensions rise at different levels. Unlike the autonomous orientation, Foucault does not state that politics is "rare" (although he could sign the indication of certain representatives of autonomous orientation regarding local politics definition). On the contrary, there is a continuous form of politics in his work. Namely, in Foucault's work, there is a tendency towards "politicization of reality", understanding of reality in the context of its original political mediation. When a political thinker writes about "political truth", then he implies that "truth-claims" can be understood only in the context of "politicization": according to this, we can write about the "politicization of ontology", that is, about the fact that ontology itself has been deeply politically established and that ontological order is just the result of "different political struggles" (Oksala 2010). However, if this is the case, then Foucault arrives to the point when "everything is political" (to the fact that such tendency is immanent to politics) (Nancy 2011). Ontology and ontological objects that have been analyzed in a political perspective open door to the famous "power-knowledge nexus" in Foucault's work. However, in those frameworks, we no longer have decentered subjectivities, "decentered structure of the subject" (Visker), but radical *non-neutrality* of the rules or truth, which assumes *politicization* of truth or *hyper-politicization* which Foucault, taking the reader outside the liberal frameworks, describes using the metaphor of war (liberal criticism of the mentioned metaphor "politics as war" (Vatter 2002)). We can think in such a way that archeology of discourses continues and is completed in a genealogical analysis of struggles in political fields (Badiou 2004). However, the price that has to be paid for the transition from the epistemological framework of archeology to the conquering subject of genealogy, which reveals the truth of *de-neutralization*, is the loss of the symbolic dimensions of politics for the purpose of promoting transcendental position of power with effects of causality (Flynn demonstrates this on the well-known

example of the meaning of the royal body, 1987). The category of truth falls into the configuration of power and this is evidently in line with the view that discourses realize “violence against things” based on Foucault’s genealogical orientations.

Therefore, it is not easy to keep the balance between orientation that emphasizes political preformation of ontology and the one that insists on the constituency of discourse, between the views of politically predetermined ontological entities and “order of discourse” as a “formative” horizon. We find it important to understand Foucault in such a way that he tries to avoid discursive absolutism³: each theory of discourse predicts the formative importance of discourse for the dynamics and political objects, but some theories neglect the purpose of articulating the relationship between discursive and non-discursive (see the difference in theories of Laclau-Mouffe and Foucault in that regard, (Torning 1999:91)). Foucault, who we keep in mind, broadens the view about the relationship between the discursive and the non-discursive.

The theories of discourse are criticised because they hypostasize the meaning and meaning-mediated activities (by contrast to the “reality structures”) (Fletcher 2015). They deny the existence of ontological autonomy of “extra-discursive” objects, and they do not take into account irreducible materiality of certain objects. It is claimed that approaches referring to discursive articulation insist on “performativity”, on the actual effectiveness of discourse, that is, on “discursive performativity” (Butler). However, the complexity of reality implies extra dimensions in comparison to performativity: not all the elements of reality are traces of performativity.

This is the reason why Foucault is criticized because he could be accused of dissolving social objects into the frame of knowledge and is unable to report on the objects that are independent of knowledge. However, we believe it important that Foucault can lead us to examine *both* the discursive *and* the non-discursive, that is, examine their relationship. There are non-discursive moments in his work too, but without risking of finding the thought in a hum-

3 “Foucault acknowledged... that he used the notion of discourse in at least three different ways: (1) as a general domain of all statements, (2) as an individualizable group of statements, (3) as a regulated practice that accounts for a certain number of statements”, Oksala 2005: 35. Discourse is, in another formulation, “different ways of structuring areas of knowledge and social practice”, Fairclough 1992: 3.

drum of naive assumption on pre-discursivity. He is more interested in liminal phenomena regarding meaning and non-discursive zones (Veyne 1997). Discourses are positioned really *materially* which implies that they do not depend on mental activities of subjects; however, materiality or extramentality of discourses does not mean that there are no other material objects apart from the discursive ones. With Foucault, it is possible for us to think about “limits of discourse” (Glynos 2000) and about criticism against the overexpansion of discourses - even though we do not want to claim that Foucault has provided unambiguous answers to the problem of relationship between the discursive and non-discursive moments.

We should be satisfied with the fact that there is no pure binary relation between the “extra-discursive” and discursive moments: if we accept this, then we could say that Foucault’s work does not lead us to the discursive creationism (which would mean that discourses create their objects). *Discourses focus on referential systems of politics, the manners in which decentralized subjects of politics react to world phenomena.* They enable the process of identification of objects, that is, the processes of “making conceptually intelligible” (Ophir 2018) objects. However, the question that has already been raised still remains (Ricoeur 1967) but originally it has been related to language only: is the language performative *per se* or in the indications of social structure? What is the political capacity of language? Here, the following question is raised: is the discourse performative *per se* or within the framework of social determinations? Foucault, with his genealogical approach, could vote for *inherent performativity* of the discourse (and for everything performativity implies: commandment etc.), but the theoretician of archeology may be would dismiss this argumentation. The theoretician who supports genealogical approach could say that discourse is always, unconditionally, a political stake: it brings power so this is the reason why political subjects fight for it in order to affirm their power.

Let us draw the conclusion: *conditionality and embeddedness* of (political) subjects are represented by discursive determinations. The phenomenon of subject disappearance would necessarily mean that we are not interested in Foucault’s work regarding heteronomous articulation of politics. Therefore, discourses do not represent that much the immersion into de-subjectivity as the position of

“in-between” (Rancière) for subjects, that is, the position between *desubjectivity* and sovereign subjects. The disappearance of subjects would result in depoliticization. In our opinion, the discursive analysis should show nothing more than the fact that at the same time, political subjectivity must be understood as a conditioned discursive formation that is, in a certain sense, distinctive in comparison to other equivalent formations. Therefore, the following should always be analyzed: do the existing political discourses enable or disable political subjectivities? Do the existing discourses lead to politicization or depoliticization? This is a battlefield between neoliberalism and republicanism.

3. REPUBLICANISM VERSUS NEOLIBERALISM: IMPOSSIBLE DEBATE?

The conflict between republicanism and neoliberalism is very rare; at first, it seems as if they cannot be compared. How can we compare the political theory with evocation of neo-Roman form of freedom, that is, the theory that has achieved considerable success over the last decades and the “orientation” whose identity seems suspicious for certain researchers (as a merely “necessary illusion”, (Castree 2006)? In addition, isn’t this the case of incommensurability *tout court*: republicanism is a theory about the post-liberal rehabilitation of politics and “neoliberalism” relates to economization of non-economic spheres, or the affirmation of the economization as the ultimate imperative of rationality? How can such heterogeneous movements like republicanism and neoliberalism be brought up for discussion? The former is focused on the field of freedom in order to reform “political association” of those subjects that are no longer subjects of domination, and the latter, however, develops different mutually intertwined forms of deregulation and reregulation. How can we compare (modern) republicanism that is focused on the rearticulation of the “non-domination” phenomenon with neoliberalism which, by moralizing freedom, insists on the fact that self-control should be developed for the purpose of realization of the self as the special field of entrepreneurship? How is it even possible to compare republicanism which attempts to solve classical theological-political issue (“balance” between freedom and order, Spencer 2011; tension between “power of people“ and

“rule of law“, (Vatter 2005) and neoliberalism which claims that the market is “the last bastion of the truth”?

We have not exhausted the list of possible divergences between republicanism and neoliberalism, but we have said enough. One of the few researchers who found it appropriate to embark on the creation of a parallel is Vatter: it is of particular importance for him to contrast the neoliberal and republican constitutionalism, that is, the divergent understanding of the *nomos* (Vatter 2018). For us, it may be interesting that Foucault, once again, plays the main role in all this: it is precisely his own pioneering analysis of neoliberalism, which insists on the economization of rights and the affirmation of economic dimensions of law, that throws light on the conflict between republicanism and neoliberalism regarding the rule of law.⁴

However, we are more interested in the preceding issue: *the status of politics, the constellation of politicization and depoliticization*.

First, we must consider neoliberalism and republicanism based on their reference to something we have called metastructural, level of modernity: accordingly, these modern orientations are always in relation to the initial discursive-declarative complex of freedom/equality/community. Furthermore, the above-mentioned movements abound in interpretations of liberalism: we can determine their discursive positions as *internal-external* in relation to liberalism. They, in fact, accept liberalism as an immanent part of modernity, but they do not want to conserve it. Newer republicanism, of course, develops different relations with liberalism, some movements tend to discover “liberty before liberalism”, while others realize their determination as the founding of the republic in liberal terms - in that respect, with the republican principles, liberalism reaches its end. Nevertheless, regardless of the differences, there is a clear dissatisfaction of republicanism with liberalism, and it is because of the perception of freedom. This entails a change in relation to the liberal treatment of the state that is only positioned there “externally”. In republicanism, the state is not defined negatively; the focus is more on its confirmation for the purpose of realization of the arrangement regarding non-domination as the

⁴ At least with occasional skepticism about the vague relationship of the Frenchman and neoliberalism (Zamora 2014).

“world without interference by arbitrary powers” (Pettit). Modern republicanism is also a critical philosophy of power: it pledges for a *politically shaped freedom* that should criticize and fix unpleasant consequences of the current stable oligarchic power structure.

So, today’s most influential orientation evokes a premodern term of domination and contrasts it with the liberal articulation of freedom (Pettit 2002): only by subordinating the forms of domination can we speak about freedom. The notion of domination reminds us of Hobbes: his *dominium* is primarily a power over things that are executed by the owner, and what is of even greater importance is that it is power by force. As researchers have already noticed, Hobbes equates *dominium* and *potestas* by showing the “right of command” of the winner over the “defeated” (Foisneau 1992: 93). Most importantly, the liberal insistence on non-interference as a condition of freedom is insufficient: there could be situations where there is no interference, but the freedom loses. So, for a liberal like Hobbes, fear does not yet collide with the possibility of practicing “external” freedom, because fear remains in the internal sphere (Zarka 2007: 19). For republicanism, fear is a powerful brake because it prevents the situation of non-domination. In other words, fear prevents free action because it creates the domination of man over man. In neorepublicanism, non-domination is firmly bound to the notion of arbitrariness, so that arbitrarily mediated power always produces a situation of domination.

The mentioned *internal-external relationship* regarding liberalism characterizes neo-liberalism, too. It was created with the idea that republicanism was familiar with: classical liberalism cannot effectively defend freedom alone (Losonc 2013); it falls behind the multidimensional forms of freedom endangerment in the 20th century. The “nature” shining in old liberalism has been lost. We can show this on the basis of classic dichotomy of the political philosophy of “natural/artificial”. As Foucault discovers, neoliberalism does not content itself with the referential structure of liberalism that directs us to “nature”: even the transition to a state of civility keeps the traces of “natural liberty”, that is, the meanings of freedom that tie us to the natural order. In neoliberal terms, there is also a confrontation with the forms of coexistence between freedom and order, as in the case of Republicanism (Hayek 1966) we have already mentioned the issue of *nomos*), but from

a neoliberal perspective, it is tragically inadequate to rely on the natural order and human nature as the horizons for freedom development. Thus, *artificial* creation of freedom is proposed, with its privileged bearer being the universalized figure of creative entrepreneurship. We could also observe this from a more critical standpoint and see artificiality as something leading to “naturalization” of certain meanings, which means that entrepreneurial freedom is considered as “naturalized” - and it is here that we see the possible political-critical effect of the discourse. Namely, the neoliberal perception of a particular form of freedom can be understood only *within the scope of phenomena that are discursively structured*. As Foucault might say, only in certain discourses can the hypostasis of entrepreneurship be the “candidate for truth and falsity”. Before criticizing neoliberal orientation as an ideological scheme, we should first recognize those discursive determinations that cause elements of neoliberalism to appear as “nominees” for the “truth and falsity”. A Foucault’s follower could probably also analyze the numerous links between discursive manifestations, political knowledge in relation to “strategies and behaviors” and bodies. Even the critical outburst of discursive articulation appears in continuous *denaturalization* of those political concepts.

We are already looking here for the help of the theory of discourse. We should consider possible *discursive consideration of both republicanism and neoliberalism*. Our hypothesis is that Foucault’s process is not oriented towards the unification of its subjects: for a theoretician who defers conceptualization from *one* meaning/concept, liberalism does not appear as a homogenized doctrine as much as *a set of discourse practices*. To quote: “the unity of discourses would be the interplay of the rules that define the transformations of these different objects, their non-identity through time, the break produced in them, the internal discontinuity that suspends their permanence ... to define a group of statements in terms of its individuality would be to define the dispersion of these objects” (Foucault 1989: 37). Thus, liberalism was once characterized as a “play” (Foucault 2004: 53). French theoretician is not interested in a transcendently set individual as the last guarantee of freedom, a connection between autonomy/subjectivity, but in liberalism as the practice of “control” and “governmentality”. Liberalism can certainly not be verified by “true/false” question;

instead, we ask if something is “pure, radical, consistent, or mixed” (Foucault 2008: 93). There is a self-referentialism of liberalism that sets its own rules, and measures its own criteria. Liberalism is a station on a historical path where certain relationship between truth and discourse is developed.

Anyhow, we must also understand neoliberalism as a disseminated “group of statements” with the “interplay of rules”, that is, as discursive statements on the “play” between freedom and non-freedom, individualism, the relationship between freedom and governmentality. The liberalism discourses treat various forms of security and freedom, tackling even the contradictory aspects relating to the interference between security and freedom, or liberalism-based autonomy. The discourse theory is engaged in research into the dissemination of various discourses that are self-understood as liberal: discursive pluralism assumes that unification of liberalism is not necessary; on the contrary, it is important to observe (neo) liberalism as a set of mobile discourses that *simultaneously* hypertrophy the elements of security, emphasize entrepreneurial freedom and economize legal relations. *This is what the theory of discourse can offer us: the articulation of the split of its own discursive subject.* While those researchers seeking coherence in neoliberalism often lament over dispersion (Venugopal 2015), discursive analysis is happily moving around the multiplied worlds of neoliberalism and even sees the affirmation of its hypotheses. Thus, discourse analysis shows how the very concept of (constructed) market is subject to discursive transformations, and that it should be separated from naturalistic meanings.

We should remember that the theory of discourse gladly uses process terms, and therefore we can speak of “neoliberalization”. These are multiple discourses naming different entities, assigning them differential identifiers, imposing their reasons for existence, disseminating different meanings in terms of perception of objects. Or, as it was once said “half silent murmur of ... discourses”. These discourses are, undoubtedly, *formational*; they represent the conditions for the possibilities of beings that are capable of speech. As we have seen, Foucault emphasized subjectivity that is embedded in the structure of dependence: thus, every political theory relying on a discursive horizon must be sensitive to criticism arising from such a position of the subject. More precisely, we can develop a

criticism of neoliberal perception of subjectivity; it relies on the projection of the subject as a locus of “self-sufficiency”. *Homines neoliberales* are projected as “self-made men” who find support in themselves, and they are surely the authors of their works (London 2015), so they represent entrepreneurship-based subjectivity. Even though discourses do not dissolve subjectivity, that is, they do not derogate it to the level of epiphenomenon, such neo-liberal imagination of political subjectivity requires criticism: it parasites on the assumption of unambiguous sovereign subjectivity.

The political use of discursive practices to describe neoliberalism transforms neoliberalism into a discursive production, too. More precisely, *neoliberalism is the process of forming different discourses* that are imposed by the imperative of urgency and the only possible reality. Neo-liberalization is also a constant production of discursive practices on “strategies”, “behaviors”, “bodies”, on financial therapeutics of those countries that are stuck in the burden of debt, on deregulation as an insurance of freedom, on the necessity of guardianship over those countries that have not reached adulthood yet, on “monadic happiness” (London), on special status of “resilience” (Read 2012) as the reformulated anthropological relations to the “danger”, or on “undoing of demos” (Brown). Neoliberalization imposes ways of existence, doing, thinking, it creates reality based on a network of different norms. The discourse analysis will, at the same time, proudly state that it has strong critical potentials, and that it does not go into endless descriptions but introduces a whole series of subversive aspects into its subject, as well as in the neoliberal machinery of discourse that ties international institutions like the IMF or the World Bank, or different articulations posited by neoliberal discourse-making subjects. Where hegemonic subjects see stability, uniformity, and the link between knowledge and rationality, the proponents of critical discursive analysis identify destability, breaches, divergences between knowledge and rationality. Consequently, the discourse with critical ambitions “affirms that any social text, whether spoken or written, contains implicit hierarchies, through which an order is imposed on ‘reality’ exercising a subtle repression, as these hierarchies exclude, subordinate, and hide various other potential meanings” (Springer 2012: 140). It is the *political* effect of discursive analysis; it presents power where others mask it.

It protests against political systems being understood as strong identity because it is suspicious about one whole giving way to all parts. Finally, it develops criticism of the dominant forms of expert discourse in today's world that call for neutrality and suggest that they operate in the fields free of politics: in this sense, critical discourse analysis reveals the ideological ambitions of "expertise" as a substitute for politics. Discourse analysis suggests that reality is determined by social constructivism: discourses are "framing" practices that allow for certain "categorization", "classification", "ordering" of objects and people in a positive order. Without it, there is no politics. So, one of the rare Foucault's followers in the field of analytical philosophy, Ian Hacking, developed a series of analyses that clarify the "making of people" (Hacking 1999), the structuring of the human being through various discourses such as the discourse of statistics, the discourse of market indeterminism that must be under control. It is precisely this type of social constructivism that must be taken into account for any consideration of policy conditions within the framework of neoliberalism: we can see here how discourses develop conditions, what can and what cannot be said or perceived. Foucault would gladly accept this: discourses are self-referential as they "have their own control" due to classifying, ordering and distribution of meanings, and they recompose the mentioned "interface between worlds and things". Whoever fights for discourse wants to "master" both the "contingencies" and "events". *This is the point of discourse as the field of power.*

However, in spite of the dispersive logic, the theoreticians of discourse arrive at a transitional point that we can refer to as a perspective of *unified discourses on a given subject*. This is precisely what happens to Foucault who, after developing different discourses formulates a unified definition: neoliberalism strives for global *political power* with a certain kind of "transfer". Namely, there is a transfer of formal principles of governmentality of the market to governmentality in general (Foucault 2008: 131). Interestingly, one of the first researchers of neoliberalism, Carl Friedrich, did a similar thing, that is, he put politics in the limelight (Friedrich 1955). It is a specific position of *politics*, discourses are developed in such a way that they gravitate towards the articulation of this specific position: this is where we can observe the role of the theory

of discourse, *which is to re-highlight politics as a specific field.*

Once again, we can refer to the relationship between republicanism and neoliberalism. If we look for help from a modern theoretician (Esposito 2005: 11) he could say that neoliberalism, paradoxically, reaches a “hyper-politicization”. Anti-politics is promoted by developing the autonomy and immanence of the market in relation to human existence, that is, politics should be consubstantial with the “formal criteria” of the market governmentality. However, Esposito claims that depoliticization in the name of the market is a “form of politics”, it is a form of *hyper-politicization*. In contrast, we are leaving the Italian theoretician here, republicanism is revolving around the status of politics, but aims not at hyper-politicization but rather at *re-politicization*. Republicanism considers freedom in relation to the market (Pettit 2006), but without the mentioned hyper-politicization. Republicanism is an *anti-thesis* to neo-liberalism; it develops a polemical discursive field against neoliberalism.

Republicanism is not just an argumentation about the relationship between liberty and order; it is not just thinking about “freedom as antipower”, *but also a set of discourses about the forms of non-freedom in today’s world.* For it, invocation of political freedom is as important as describing the discourse on non-freedom. After all, isn’t republicanism at the same time a set of different discourses about *common good*? Isn’t it so that it continually circulates around the discursive structures of common goods in the constellation of heterogeneous patterns of value?

Finally, there is an intentionally derived discourse component of republicanism. It was not accidental that Pettit decisively pleaded for republicanism in the perspective of “discourse-theory”. Political beings are posited in the discourse with others, discourse is the manifestation of the other-relatedness of these beings (Pettit 2002). Moreover, the search for freedom is finalized as “discursive control” (Pettit 2005).

Yet, the discourse here is treated *à la* Habermas, therefore, from the aspect of teleology of consensus. This differs from the Foucauldian, agonistic understanding of discourse, which assumes the deconstruction of the assumption of the mentioned teleology: the existence of a common discursive framework transforms sub-

jects of conflict into pre-*recognized* political entities and pacifies the politics. For the representatives of the agonistic understanding of discourse, the logic of predetermined recognition inevitably introduces depoliticization. That represents constant danger that lurks politics, which is to dissolve itself in its own depoliticization. *Still, the political role of discourse analysis is to oppose such depoliticization.* Its political abilities enable the clarification of demands that are not heard because they are not recognized as political subjects. Dominant discourses distribute bodies and functions of people in the system of labor division with the aim of depoliticization.

“Every man should say to every man” – the earlier statement at the beginning of modernity is possible only with previous discursive homogenization. Hence the phrase “*as if*”. It is fiction, although constitutive fiction. Agonistic analysis of discourse should not forget that political discourses execute and prohibit in the sense that the demands and manifestations of certain subjects are not heard because they have been excluded from the discourse. How can we *demonstrate* (to mention this discursive construction as well) their impossible demands? In this sense, the agonistic analysis could also warn republicanism that, in the constellation of the rule of neo-liberal discourse, it is not sufficient to insist on the personal component of domination (Zarka 2007), and that it is not enough to criticize power as arbitrary (Markell 2008). Power imposes itself as non-arbitrary, too. Consideration of neoliberalization through discourses warns about the necessity to take into account forms of domination based on *non*-arbitrary power, as well as the forms of non-personal domination.

4. INSTEAD OF CONCLUSION

We have opened the discussion about the relationship between meta-structure and structure. There is now a relationship between structure (as suggested) and discourses to be discussed. We wish to affirm that discourses depend on metasubjective processes of structure, on structural configuration of power. In that regard, discourses are “*mediating entities*” (Fairclough) of structures.

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Lino Veljak*

FILOZOFIJA IZMEĐU DISKURSA RELIGIJE I DISKURSA ZNANOSTI

Apstrakt

Diskurs religije obilježen je argumentacijom utemeljenom na prihvaćanju nedokazivih apriornih istina svojstvenih religijskim vjerovanjima i najčešće oblikovanih posredstvom dogmi. Diskurs znanosti utemeljen je na dokazivanju aposteriornih istina ili utemeljenih vjerovanja svojstvenih empirijskim i eksperimentalnim znanostima. Metodski nečiste kombinacije ova dva tipa diskursa dovode do pseudoznanstvene argumentacije u prilog vjerskih istina ili pak do dogmatizacije znanstvenih otkrića odnosno do dogmatskog tumačenja zakonitosti prirode i ljudskog svijeta do kojih znanstvena istraživanja dopijevaju.

Zadaća je filozofije u raščišćavanju ovoga nesigurnog tla, kako bi se opovrgle pretenzije vjerskih dogmi na status apsolutne istine, kao i pretenzije znanosti na univerzalnost i apsolutno važenje dogmi koje se legitimiraju svojom navodnom znanstvenom utemeljenošću. Kritika dogmatizma čini temeljnu pretpostavku ispunjavanja te zadaće. Utemeljen na kritičkom pristupu, diskurs filozofije obilježen je preciznošću analize, opovrgavanjem pretenzija nositelja nedovoljno obrazloženih zaključaka na

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status istine (ili čak i na status vjerodostojnosti), opovrgavanjem svih pretenzija govornika na posjedovanje bezuvjetne istine, ali ujedno i opovrgavanjem pretenzija zdravog razuma na metodska i spoznajno-istosnu apsolutnost. Filozofija koja pravi kompromise s bilo kojom od spomenutih tendencija u načelu (a obično i faktički) iznevjerit će svoje poslanje te će time ona izgubiti svoju bit i lišit će se prava na filozofijski dignitet.

Ključne riječi: diskurs, filozofija, religija, znanost, dogmatizam.

1. UVOD

Prije svega treba definirati ključni pojam koji u ovom našem sklopu povezuje religiju i znanost. Pod diskursom se – kako to govori jedna standardna definicija – podrazumijeva cjelina kodificiranog korištenja jezika svojstvenoga određenoj društvenoj praksi.¹ Pojam *diskurs* u lingvistiku je 1952. godine uveo američki lingvist Zellig S. Harris (Johnstone 2008). Tim su pojmom obuhvaćeni različiti oblici teksta (ali i usmenih izričaja i drugih jezičnih praksi), a posjeduje i različita značenja: za razliku od Harrisa koji tim pojmom označava svaki vezani slijed rečenica ili izričaja, dakle, praktički, svaki jezični događaj, K. L. Pike razumije diskurs kao proizvod interaktivnog procesa u određenom sociokulturnom kontekstu, dok ga M. Coulthard definira kao konverzacijsku interakciju.²

Imamo li u vidu da navedene definicije nisu inkompatibilne, moramo postaviti pitanje: Što razlikuje diskurs religije od diskursa znanosti i gdje je tu filozofija?

1 http://www.revue-texto.net/Reperes/Glossaires/Glossaire_en.html#discourse (posjećeno 28. 6. 2018).

2 <http://www.enciklopedija.hr/natuknica.aspx?id=15415> (posjećeno 9. 7. 2018.)

2. RELIGIJA

Za razliku od M. Lemperta, koji s pravom upozorava na upitnost instrumentalnog korištenja religijskog diskursa u lingvističkim istraživanjima u svrhe unapređivanja spoznaja o semiotičkim procesima, pri čemu se zanemaruje sâm fenomen religije kao i njezin karakter socijalnohistorijske kategorije, ali redukcionistički predlaže istraživanje osebnosti diskursa religije u kontekstu njezina odnosa spram sekularnog diskursa, (Lempert 2015: 902-915) te R. McCutheona, koji s pravom osporava nepovijesno istraživanje religije koje ne vodi računa o njezinom sudjelovanju u sistemu političke dominacije obilježenom privrednim i kulturnim imperijalizmom, ali istodobno zanemaruje racionalnu srž argumenta o *sui generis* karakteru religije, (McCutcheon 2003) čini se da bi razmatranje diskursa religije trebalo zasnovati na uvidu u bit religije (preciznije, u bit organizirane i institucionalizirane religije), a tu bit moramo naći u neupitnosti prihvaćanja nedokazivih apriornih istina svojstvenih religijskim vjerovanjima koje se najčešće (ili u pravilu) oblikuju posredstvom dogmi (Von Kutschera 1990).

Što je dogma? Izvor i karakter dogme se u službenom nauku Katoličke crkve (koja u tom pogledu može služiti kao primjer za sve institucionalizirane vjerske zajednice raznorodnih vjeroispovijesti i denominacija) određuju se na sljedeći način: „Crkveno učiteljstvo koristi puninu svojega autoriteta koji je dobilo od Krista kada definira neku dogmu, tj. kada u obliku koji obvezuje kršćanski narod na neupitno prihvaćanje vjerovanja proglašava istine sadržane u božanskoj objavi ili kada u konačnom obliku proglašava istine koje su s njima nužno povezane.“³ Ovdje imamo jasan model dogme: imamo ovlaštenu instancu (u konkretnom slučaju to je „crkveno učiteljstvo“, tj. katolički biskupi na čelu s rimskim biskupom kao Petrovim nasljednikom, ali istovjetan model ovlaštene instance nalazimo u svakoj organiziranoj vjerskoj zajednici) koja sebe proglašava i smatra nositeljicom ili posredovateljicom istine, a koja – što je posebno važno – ima i neki relevantan broj sljedbenika koji vjeruju da je ta instanca doista posjednica ili ovlaštena navjestiteljica istine; imamo i definiran sadržaj te istine; konačno, imamo i zabranu dovođenja te istine u pitanje ili čak i njezina relativiziranja. Istina je objavljena, ona nam je dana i o njoj se ne

3 http://www.vatican.va/archive/ITA0014/_PL.HTM#7P (posjećeno 13.9.2018).

može raspravljati. Konzekvencija prihvaćanja dogme jest diskurs koji je u bitnoj mjeri obilježen apriornošću.

3. DOGMATIZAM

Je li dogma svojstvena isključivo religijama?

Ako imamo u vidu da se dogma može općenito definirati kao neki univerzalan princip kojim se zasniva i opravdava neko praktičko (ne nužno religiozno) ponašanje, a oblikuje se pomoću jednog ili više iskaza (Hadot 1992), onda bi se stekli evidentni razlozi za skeptičnost u pogledu afirmativnog odgovora na to pitanje. Ako takav odgovor nije prihvatljiv, a očigledno je da nije, slijedilo bi kako bi pored vjerskih ili religijskih dogmi pažnju valjalo obratiti i na druge vrste dogmi. Dok su religijske dogme po svojoj naravi vječne i nepromjenljive, socijalne i političke dogme (koje se ne odnose na pitanja o transcenciji, nego na ovozemaljska pitanja, a obilježavaju autoritarne i totalitarne poretke) mijenjaju se s protokom vremena: ako je Vođa (bio on Duce, Führer ili Staljin) izvor istine, on sebi smije dopustiti i stvaranje međusobno isključujućih istina, čija nekonzistentnost i nekoherentnost neće rezultirati njihovim odbacivanjem ili problematiziranjem među sljedbenicima ili podanicima, sve dok ovi vjeruju – ili su prisiljeni da vjeruju – u to da je On neupitan izvor istine i sve dok je represivni aparat u stanju da suzbija bilo kakav oblik kritičkog preispitivanja tih privremenih sekularnih dogmi. Ovdje dakle nije više riječ o nepromjenljivosti sadržaja dogme nego tek o neupitnosti ovlaštene instance. Ove sekularne dogme u organskoj su vezi s pogonom proizvodnje ideologije u autoritarnim i totalitarnim ambijentima.

Dogmatska je tu prije svega metoda: ovlaštena instanca proglašava neki stav obavezujućom istinom. Dogmatizam je po svom opsegu i dosegu širi od dogme (jer upitno je smije li se neka privremena istina koju je proglasio Vođa smatrati baš dogmom u strogom smislu, ako je vjerojatno da će sutra ona biti nadomještena nekom novom - možda posve drugačijom i njoj suprotnom – istinom). Pod dogmatizmom se podrazumijeva s jedne strane stanje duha u kojem se sve što je ovlaštena instanca proglasila istinom prihvaća bez pitanja, a s druge pak strane tvrdoglavo ustrajavanje na očuvanju nekih istina koje su u suprotnosti s aktualnim uvidima, takvih istina koje su – ponekad i očigledno – opovrgnute novi-

jim i suvremenim uvidima (Slenczka 1991). Valja napomenuti, za život dogmatizma nije nužna ovlaštena instanca, iako se bez nje teže može doći do društvene relevantnosti nositelja dogmatskog pristupa koji se ne mogu osloniti na neki neupitan izvor istinitosti svojih iskaza.

4. ZNANOST

Znanost bi, tako se to na prvi pogled čini, trebala biti slobodna od dogmatskih sadržaja i općenito od dogmatizma. Naime, diskurs znanosti utemeljen je na dokazivanju aposteriornih istina ili utemeljenih vjerovanja svojstvenih empirijskim i eksperimentalnim znanostima, te se stoga u znanosti ništa ne bi trebalo uzimati kao istinito ako izostaje valjana, vjerodostojna i uvjerljiva argumentacija. Ako bi se znanstveni aksiomi ili postulati htjeli proglasiti dogmama, previdjela bi se bitna razlika između vjerskih (i po uzoru na ove oblikovanih sekularnih političkih i socijalnih) dogmina jednoj te aksioma i postulata na drugoj strani: vjerske su dogme apsolutne istine koje se prihvaćaju na temelju vjerovanja (analogija: istine koje je proklamirao Vođa prihvaćaju se na temelju vjerovanja u Njega), dok su „znanstvene dogme“ tek sredstva za utemeljenje neke teorije. Aksiome i postulate proglašavaju oni koji posredstvom hipoteza pokušavaju doći do znanstvenih otkrića, a ne neka ovlaštena instanca; oni su tek polazište za izgradnju neke korisne (po mogućnosti primjenljive) i koherentne (dakle kontradikcija lišene) teorije, te nemaju nikakvu pretenziju na status apsolutne i neupitne istine (Veljak 2004). To najbolje dolazi do izražaja pri nadomještanju aksioma, čak i onih posve samorazumljivih, novim i drugačijim aksiomima u svrhu očivanja konzistentnosti samoga aksiomatskog sistema. Klasičan primjer takvoga modificiranja aksiomatskog sistema (odakle jasno slijedi zaključak kako aksiomi nipošto nisu istovjetni dogmama) predstavlja stvaranje neeuclidskih geometrija, koje se oblikuju na temelju modifikacije petoga Euklidovog aksioma te proizvode nove teorije (a te teorije ne dovode u pitanje valjanost starih teorija) (Faber 1983).

Znanstvena istina (ili istina u znanosti) trebala bi stoga biti slobodna od dogme i dogmatizma. U skladu s time dolazi u današnjem akademskom javnom mnijenju dopraktičkog izjednačavanja pojmova znanosti i istine, ili, preciznije, kako to suvremeni njemač-

ki filozof Oswald Schwenmer formulira, „istina i znanost su u našem razumijevanju toliko usko povezane, da se dospijeva dotle da se o istini smije govoriti isključivo u znanosti. Jer gdje se drugdje može naći jasne i jednoznačne kriterije razlikovanja istine od laži i znanstvenosti od neznanstvenosti, usporedive postupke provjeravanja istinitosti ili čak vjerojatnosti iskaza te konačno usporedive jasnoće i jednoznačnosti tvrdnji koje pretendiraju na istinitost?“⁴ Diskurs znanosti obilježen je korištenjem stručne terminologije, koja se oslanja na uređene eksperimentalne i općenito empirijske prakse, pri čemu se svaki iskaz nalazi u logički i matematički normiranoj povezanosti s drugim iskazima u dotičnoj znanosti. S obzirom na taj odnos s empirijskom praksom i s logičkim i matematičkim relacijama znanstveni se iskazi naposljetku svode na matematičke jednadžbe i empirijska promatranja, čija se istinitost može ustanoviti eksperimentalnim putem. Sporovi o istinitosti reduciraju se tako na sporove o valjanosti procedure i, eventualno, pitanja jesu li iscrpljena sva moguća tumačenja ustanovljenih činjenica.⁵ U skladu s time važi i (navodno nesvjesna odnosno neosvjestena) trojaka zabrana: u diskursu znanosti nije dopušteno govoriti u prvom licu, nije dopušteno pripovijedati niti je dopušteno korištenje metafora (Beneš 1981). Strogim se provođenjem tih zabrana potvrđuju pretenzije znanstvenog diskursa na objektivnost i impersonalnu istinitost, gdje se od znanstvenika očekuje da apstrahiraju od svojih osobnih stajališta i mnijenja.

Tom se nepristrasnošću i objektivnošću dospijeva, ukoliko se striktno pridržavamo verificiranih metodologija, do mogućnosti odgovora na sva smislena pitanja, vjeruju zastupnici scijentizma (Sorell 1991). Neophodno je, međutim, jasno razlikovanje i razdvajanje scijentizma od znanstvenog pristupa. Znanstveni pristup je metoda, dok je scijentizam ideologija: „Prirodoznanstveni pristup preobražava se u ideologiju kad se uzima kao jedini način spoznavanja egzistencije“ (Herrera 2011). Redukcionistička metodologija prema kojoj se svaki predmet spoznavanja mora moći kvantificirati svojom se pretenzijom na univerzalnost i vjerovanjem njezinih zastupnika da se njome i samo njome može dospjeti do neospornih istina tako ispostavlja kao dokaz da je dogmatizam prodro i u samu znanost. Bolje rečeno, ni znanost nije unaprijed oslobođena

4 <https://www.philosophie.hu-berlin.de/de/.../vorlesungstext4> (posjećeno 10. 7. 2018).

5 <https://www.philosophie.hu-berlin.de/de/.../vorlesungstext4> (posjećeno 10. 7. 2018).

od dogmatskih iskušenja, koja se mogu očitovati u dogmatizaciji znanstvenih otkrića ili pak u dogmatskom tumačenju zakonitosti prirode i ljudskog svijeta koja se evidentiraju na temelju znanstvenih istraživanja.

Međutim, tu treba razlikovati znanstvena istraživanja od interpretacije karaktera znanosti i rezultata znanstvenih istraživanja. Sama znanstvena istraživanja nisu obilježena dogmatizmom, osim eventualno na razini metodologije, ukoliko se naime propisuju takve procedure koje svojim redukcionizmom ili rigidnošću onemogućuju valjano i primjereno istraživanje. Kao primjer takvog metodološkog i metodskog dogmatizma može se navesti mrzovolja u odnosu na metode kvalitativnog istraživanja koja vlada u dobrom dijelu socijalnih znanosti (Halmi 1996). Dogmatizam ipak ponajprije valja tražiti u scijentističkim apsolutizacijama znanosti kao jedinog valjanog načina suočavanja sa svijetom.

5. ZNANOST I RELIGIJA

Vidjeli smo, kako je religija (bar institucionalizirana religija) po definiciji zasnovana na dogmama, ali vidjeli smo također i to da ni znanost nije oslobođena od mogućnosti robovanja dogmama i dogmatizmu, što posebice važi na razini interpretacije. Kakav je odnos - nužno dogmatske - religije i - potencijalno (ne)dogmatske - znanosti? Prema sugestiji američkog religiologa, inače zastupnika *kritičkog realizma*, Iana Barboura (Barbour 1966) mogu se identificirati četiri osnovna modela interakcije religije i znanosti.

Prvi, najpoznatiji, model imenuje se kao *sukob*: to je u osnovi sukob između dvije čiste varijante dogmatizma, koji se može sažeti u alternativu između religije i znanosti. Samo je jedna od njih nositeljica istine, prvima je to religija (valja dodati, ne religija kao takva nego samo ona pravovjerna, ona koja je jedina istinita), dok je scijentistima znanost ekskluzivna nositeljica istine. Barbour je istražio taj sukob kroz pet različitih polja rasprave (astronomija i stvaranje, implikacije kvantne fizike, evolucija i stalno stvaranje, genetika, neuroznanost i ljudska priroda, te odnos Boga i prirode), pokazavši intransigentnost dviju dogmatskih pozicija. Poteškoća Barbourova tumačenja jest da izjednačava obje pozicije i u situacijama u kojima to nije primjereno: ne mogu se na jednak način vrednovati fundamentalistički zastupnici kreacionizma i njihovi

kritičari iz redova biologa koji brane teoriju evolucije (ako netko afirmira teoriju evolucije, to još uvijek ne znači da on dogmatski zastupa scijentističku poziciju, pa da bi načelno mogao biti izjednačen s kreacionistima) (Monsma 1986).

Drugi model je *neovisnost*: i religija i znanost mogu govoriti istinu, ali samo dok se drže svojih domena te poštuju vlastite granice (znanost bi nam prema toj sugestiji davala odgovore na pitanje *kako* a religija na pitanje *zašto*). Niti znanost smije pitati o smislu, niti religija pokušavati objasniti zašto nešto jest takvo a ne drugačije. I tu se može naći jedna poteškoća, koja bi se mogla formulirati pitanjem: Slijedi li odatle da su i znanstvenici i svi drugi ljudi nužno upućeni na to da sva pitanja o smislu postavljaju isključivo unutar granica religije?

Treći model jest model *dijaloga*. Tu su znanost i religija partneri, one raspravljaju o navedenim problemskim područjima, te mogu doprinijeti širenju spoznaje o dotičnim pitanjima. Temeljna pretpostavka uspješnog dijaloga je uzajamno uvažavanje teologa i znanstvenika. No, Barbour je svjestan teškoća takvog dijaloga, posebno u pogledu pronalaženja zajedničkog temelja: Kako će se oni naći na pola puta i što to znači s obzirom na pitanje o istini?

Četvrti model što ga Barbour predlaže jest *integracija*. Istina znanosti i istina religije tu se integriraju u istinu o cjelini, a kao primjer takvog pristupa navodi se Pierre Teilhard de Chardin. Barbour preferira takav pristup, ali se istodobno boji učinaka zahtjeva religije i znanosti na apsolutnost istine, što bi moglo dovesti do gorkog razvoda između znanstvenika i teologa. No, čini se da su uspješniji oblici integracije oni koji se označavaju kao religijski naturalizam, što bi značilo kombinaciju naturalističkog pogleda na svijet s predodžbama i vrednotama koje se obično povezuju s religijama (Hogue2010). Nadalje, integrativan pristup može po svojim dometima biti skromniji ukoliko se naprosto ograniči na modernizaciju religioznih društava, gdje se uz očuvanje religijske vjere istodobno prihvaća i afirmira suvremena znanost.⁶

6 <https://crcs.ugm.ac.id/news/4750/recent-discourse-of-religion-and-science.html> (posjećeno 10. 7. 2018).

6. ZNANSTVENO DOKAZIVANJE DOGME

Pažnju, međutim, moraju privući neki zloćudniji oblici integracije znanstvenog i religijskog diskursa, posebno onih u kojima se afirmiraju fundamentalističke varijante religijskih vjerovanja. Kao paradigma mogu poslužiti pokušaji znanstvenog dokazivanja istinitosti doslovce shvaćenoga biblijskog učenja o stvaranju svijeta u šest dana. Pored sofisticiranih varijanti mirenja teorije evolucije i dogme o božanskom stvaranju svijeta (Haught 2010), možemo danas sresti niz pokušaja da se znanstvenom argumentacijom u poljima biologije, geologije, paleontologije, astronomije i drugih disciplina potkrijepi istina zapisana u Knjizi postanja prema kojoj je Bog zaista stvorio svijet u šest dana. Tako se pomoću znanstvenog (ili pseudoznanstvenog) prikaza biologijskih otkrića o karakteristikama žirafa na nekoj opskurnoj internetskoj stranici dokazuje kako i biologija potvrđuje istinitost biblijskog izvještaja o stvaranju svijeta.⁷ No, takvi dokazi ne moraju imati formu popularizacijsko-(pseudo) znanstvenog diskursa, oni se nerijetko oblikuju na razini koja formalno slijedi kriterije i procedure strogo znanstvenoga rada. Primjerice, američki geolozi Davis Young i Ralph Stearley detaljno analiziraju pokušaje da seposredstvom geologijskih otkrića dokaže istinitost biblijskog učenja, posebno u pogledu starosti našeg planeta, kako bi to proizašlo iz doslovnog tumačenja biblijskog teksta (Young, Stearley 2011). Izrazit primjer te metodski bastardne kombinacije religijskog i znanstvenog diskursa nudi nam izraelski fizičar Gerald Schroeder, inače sljedbenik ortodoksnog judaizma i predavač na jednoj vjerskoj školi, koji pomoću novijih otkrića u polju fizike dokazuje istinitost dogmi fundamentalističkog judaizma, te se među ostalime služi Einsteinovom teorijom relativnosti, kako bi argumentirao u prilog vjerodostojnosti vjerovanja u to da je svijet stvoren u šest dana (Schroeder 2009).

Ukratko, metodski nečiste kombinacije znanstvenog i religijskog tipa diskursa dovode do pseudoznanstvene argumentacije u prilog vjerskih istina, kako ih već pojedina fundamentalistička varijanta ove ili one religije postavlja. Moguće je i obrnuto: dolazi i do dogmatizacije znanstvenih otkrića odnosno do dogmatskog tumačenja zakonitosti prirode i ljudskog svijeta do kojih znanstvena

7 http://www.creationism.org/english/giraffes_en.htm (posjećeno 16. 9. 2018).

istraživanja dospijevaju. Kao primjer može poslužiti poznato djelo Richarda Dawkinsa *Zabluda o Bogu* (Dawkins 2008) u kojoj ovaj biolog, svjetski znamenit autor *Sebičnog gena*, argumentacijom koja bi se mogla označiti kao zdravorazumska instrumentalizacija rezultata znanstvenih istraživanja suprotstavlja dogmama religije ne manje dogmatične dogme znanosti (koja ovom instrumentalizacijom opasno klizi u smjeru nazoviznanosti). Pri tom nije problematična sâma Dawkinsova kritike religije nego dogmatsko suzbijanje dogmatizma i uvjerenje da se sva mjerodavna pitanja života i svijeta, prirode i povijesti, općenito svega što jest i što bi moglo biti, smiju i moraju rješavati jedino i isključivo na temelju znanosti i zdravog razuma.

U tom pogledu možda je najindikativniji primjer onaj što ga nudi socijaldarvinizam: pretvarajući znanstvena otkrića u polju biologije u paradigmu društvenih znanosti, gdje se dogme o rasnoj nadmoći pojedinih dijelova čovječanstva na drugima prikazuju kao znanstveno neopovrgljive istine (Bannister 1979). Pri tom ne treba izgubiti iz vida kobne praktičko-historijske učinke socijaldarvinizma, od njegova ideologijskog utemeljenja nacionalsocijalizma (Weikart 2016) pa da niza i danas vidljivih (ili još uvijek nedovoljno vidljivih) učinaka te vrste dogmatizma u profiliranju aktualne zbilje svijeta u kojemu živimo (Verlag 2014).

I na taj način se oblikuje jedan teren na kojemu cvatu i proizvodnost i dogmatizmi, teren koji otvara prostor za „alternativne istine“ itako započinje neveseo sumrak uma u razdoblju *post-istine* (Keyes 2004).

7. A GDJE JE TU FILOZOFIJA?

Zadaća je filozofije u raščišćavanju ovoga nesigurnog i dugoročno (pa i kratkoročno) opasnog tla. Konkretno, ta se zadaća sastoji u opovrgavanju pretenzija vjerskih dogmi na status apsolutne istine (dogma je istina samo za one koji ju prihvaćaju i ne može obavezivati nikoga drugoga, a pogotovo ne može pretendirati na status apsolutne istine), kao i pretenzija zastupnika znanosti na univerzalnost i apsolutno važenje dogmi koje su oblikovane transformacijom rezultata znanstvenih istraživanja u neupitne istine te se legitimiraju svojom navodnom znanstvenom utemeljenošću. Kritika dogmatizma čini temeljnu pretpostavku ispunjavanja te

zadaće. Pri tom valja imati na umu da nijedna ideja, koncepcija, nijedna teorija nije unaprijed oslobođena od dogmatizacije, čak i ako je ona opskrbljena dobrom – pa i najboljom - zaštitom od mogućih zloupotreba. Samo trajnim suzbijanjem dogmatskih iskušenja moguće je krčiti teren od korova dogmatizma. Travu valja zalijevati – inače će u sušnim prilikama ona uvenuti. Vinograd valja čistiti od korova – inače će korov prevladati i postupno uništiti lozu. Tako stvari stoje i s idejama i teorijama! A upravo je na filozofiji da njeguje to duhovno tlo!

Utemeljen na kritičkom pristupu, diskurs filozofije obilježen je preciznošću analize, opovrgavanjem pretenzija nositelja nedovoljno obrazloženih zaključaka na status istine (ili čak i na status vjerodostojnosti), opovrgavanjem svih pretenzija govornika na posjedovanje bezuvjetne istine, ali ujedno i opovrgavanjem pretenzija zdravog razuma na metodska i spoznajno-istinosna apsolutnost (Veljak 2002). Filozofija koja pravi kompromise s bilo kojom od spomenutih tendencija u načelu će iznevjeriti svoje poslanje (a obično će se to dogoditi i faktički) te će time ona izgubiti i svoj smisao i svoju bit: i zbog toga će lišiti svoje nositelje (sve one filozofe i pseudofilozofe koji su je uvukli u trulež kompromisa i močvaru prilagođavanja) čak i najelementarnijeg prava na filozofijski dignitet.

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Lino Veljak

**PHILOSOPHY BETWEEN
DISCOURSE OF RELIGION
AND DISCOURSE OF SCIENCE**

Abstract

The discourse of religion is characterized by argumentation based on the acceptance of the unprovable a priori truths inherent in religious beliefs and most often shaped by dogmas. The discourse of science is based on proving a posteriori truths or established beliefs characteristic for empirical and experimental sciences. Methodically impure combinations of these two types of discourse lead to pseudo-scientific argumentation in favour of religious truths or to dogmatization of scientific discoveries, that is to dogmatic interpretation of the laws of nature and the human world at which scientific research arrives. The task of philosophy is to clear this uncertain ground in order to counteract the pretensions of religious dogmas to the status of absolute truth, as well as the pretensions of science to universality and the absolute validity of dogmas legitimized by their alleged scientific foundation. The critique of dogmatism makes the basic premise in fulfilling that task. Based on a critical approach, the language of philosophy is marked by the precision of analysis, by denying the pretensions of the bearers of insufficiently elaborated conclusions on the status of truth (or even on the status of credibility), by denying all the pretensions of speakers to possessing unconditional truth, but also by counteracting the pretence of common sense to the methodical and cognitive-truthful absoluteness. Philosophy that makes compromises with any of these tendencies in principle (and usually in fact)

will neglect its mission and thus lose its essence and deny itself the right to philosophical dignity.

Keywords: discourse, philosophy, religion, science, dogmatism.

Bogdana Koljević Griffith*

POLITIKA, FILOZOFIJA, DEMOKRATIJA: FUKO I RANSIJER**

Apstrakt

U prvom delu rada autor razmatra Fukoovu koncepciju politike istine kao programski osnov njegove političke filozofije. Argumentiše se kako Fuko posle politike diskursa, odnosno, kritičke genealogije moći, skicira diskurs o politici u čijem središtu su novi oblici subjektivacije i politizacije kao srž demokratskog momenta. Politika istine ispostavlja se kao strukturno specifična moć a filozofija se pojavljuje u različitim oblicima praktično-političke delatnosti u savremenom svetu. U drugom delu apostrofira se kako Ransijer nastavlja na Fukoovom tragu promišljanja znanja i moći, te kako se iz ambivalencije između insistiranja na jednakosti kao pravoj demokratiji i svesti o značaju kompetencije rađa jedinstveno stanovište egalitarnog platonizma. U oba slučaja, relacija filozofije i politike prelama se kao pitanje istine i kao pitanje moći naroda i, u tom svetlu, reč je o suprotstavljanju tzv. praksama politike konsenzusa svojstvenim neoliberalnim post-demokratskim društvima.

Ključne reči: politika istine, filozofija, prava demokratija, narod, moć.

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1. FUKOOVA POLITIKA ISTINE

„Zadatak danas nije da otkrijemo ko smo nego da odbijemo ko smo. Moramo da zamislimo i izmislimo ono što bismo mogli da budemo...da promovišemo nove oblike subjektivnosti, odbijajući oblik individualnosti koji nam je nametnut...“

Mišel Fuko, *Subjektivnost i moć*

Uprkos činjenici da je Fukoovo delo u celini u protekle tri decenije naišlo na izuzetno relevantnu intelektualnu recepciju – usled čega se i pozicionirao kao jedan od najvećih filozofa 20.veka – interpretacije su bile orijentisane na genealogiju moći, kao i arheologiju znanja, dok su pozniji, posebno „politički“ zapisi, analizirani u manjoj meri. Tek u skorije vreme kursevi sa *Collège de France 1977-1979* tj. *Naissance de la biopolitique* (Foucault, Macmillian 2004; Koljević 2010) i *Sécurité, Territoire, Population* dobijaju veću pažnju stručne javnosti dok su pojmovi poput politike istine još uvek predmet tek pojedinačnih osvrtâ (Lotringer 2007; Gordon 2013). Stoga su neki od potencijalno najdalekosežnijih Fukoovih uvida u programskom smislu i dalje nerasvetljeni što je delom posledica značaja njegovog kritičkog angažmana, a delom je rezultat činjenice da je njegov oevre - baš kako je i želeo – ostao nedovršen tj. relevantno nepotpun i to upravo u finalnoj fazi iscrtavanja šta je zapravo politička filozofija. Ili, preciznije, pitanje je kako, u refleksivno-normativnom ključu, izgleda odnos znanja i moći, politike i diskursa i filozofije i praktičnog delovanja nakon kompletirane genealogije moći tj. posle kritičkog strukturiranja zapadnih diskurzivno-političkih praksi kroz mikrofiziku moći. Jer, naime, nakon što smo saznali kako operišu politike diskursa preostalo je da se vidi kako se programski konstituiše novi diskurs o politici.

U tom svetlu, reč je, najpre, o procesima koje Fuko naziva novim oblicima subjektivacije kao i novim oblicima politizacije i na koje apeluje tj. ističe kako su ovi procesi najpoželjniji obzirom da se pojavljuju sa one strane moći - i to je primarni razlog

zbog čega izranjaju kao oblici delanja koji se moći opiru, koji joj izmiču ili su joj, pak, strukturalno suprotstavljeni. U osnovi, to je Fukoov odgovor na biopolitiku koji zahteva maštu i invenciju tj. imaginaciju i kreativnost koje se pojavljuju kao sine qua non uslovi političko-refleksivnog odbijanja postojećeg poretka. Tek tako odbijanje nije puka negacija status quo-a bez prethodećeg *raison d'être* već se može ispostaviti kao egzemplarni politički i egzistencijalni čin kroz koji imaginacija u sledećoj fazi sopstvenog delovanja otvara celokupno polje mogućnosti i ljudskog stvaralaštva. U krajnjoj instanci, ovaj proces usmeren je prema stvaralačkoj invenciji kao političkoj invenciji koja se pojavljuje kao specifično delanje koje paralelno uspostavlja nove oblike subjektivnosti. Za Fukoa, ovde se radi o političkom, etičkom, društvenom i filozofskom zadatku *par excellence* tj. o oblicima aktivnosti koje padaju ujedno ili, preciznije, reč je o promišljanju novog rođenja politike, etike i filozofije u novom diskursu i relacijama prema pojedincu, državi, zakonima i institucijama. Naime – i u razlici spram Habermasa (Kelly 1994) - Fuko insistira da „problem ne počiva u pokušaju da se relacije moći rastoče u utopiji savršeno transparentne komunikacije, već da se iznesu pravni zakoni...kao i etika, ethos, koji bi omogućio da se igre igraju sa minimumom dominacije“ (Rabinow 1997) jer, „ako politizovati znači vratiti se na standarde izbore, onda nije vredno truda. Novim tehnikama moći moraju se suprotstaviti novi oblici politizacije“ (Foucault 1989).

Naznačeni Fukoov programski stav ni u kom pogledu ne implicira bilo kakav oblik političkog (neo)konzervativizma – u meri u kojoj ova pozicija izražava stav da suštinska promena sveta nije ni poželjna ni moguća. Jer, činjenica da se priznaje kako besprekorna komunikacija nije u potpunosti ostvariva u prostorima intersubjektivnosti ni najmanje ne znači da se u ovoj koncepciji eo ipso odustalo od stremljenja ka ostvarenju politike jednakosti niti od politike kao jednakosti. Odnosno, kroz apostrofiranje činjenice da se relacija između gospodara i roba realno ne može ukinuti na ideal-tipski način Fuko upravo otvara prostor za skicu relevantno demokratskog momenta kao nove politizacije i prostora novih subjektivnosti. Jer, ako se tehnikama moći mogu suprotstaviti nove forme politizacije koje ne znače pristajanje na postojeće izbore u zadatim okvirima, posledično se ispostavlja da se politika zapravo ne može svesti tj. strukturno redukovati na igru neograničenog

polja moći: moć nije sveobuhvatna na način da uvek već inkorporira svaki potencijalni oblik otpora a samim tim ni demokratija nije puka iluzija. U tom svetlu, upravo Fukoov eksplicitni stav o demokratiji tj. nedvosmisleni diskurs o srži pravog demokratskog momenta – iz kojeg izranjaju novi oblici subjektivacije – živo je svedočanstvo važnosti demokratije i njenog mesta u politici. Fuko, naime, ističe, da ni najmanje ne veruje kako bi se savremeno društvo moglo smatrati demokratskim društvom „ukoliko se pod demokratijom podrazumeva efektivna primena moći stanovništva koja nije ni podeljena ni hijerarhijski klasno uređena“ tj. u tom smislu, „očito je kako smo vrlo daleko od demokratije. Jasno je da živimo pod režimom klasne diktature, klasne moći koja se nameće nasiljem...“ (Fuko 2011).

Demokratija je, za Fukoa, najdirektnije suprotstavljena klasnoj podeli društva, odnosno, socijalnoj, ekonomskoj, ali i svim ostalim oblicima nejednakosti, dok se, istovremeno, ističe kako su hijerarhijski strukturirana društva izraz moći koja se nameće nasiljem tj. čija veza sa nasiljem je imanentnog karaktera. Štaviše, kroz ovakvu deskripciju savremene situacije paralelno se uspostavlja i njeno drugo tj. preciznije izranja nosilac odbijanja, otpora, imaginacije i invencije, nosilac novih oblika subjektivacije i politizacije koji nikada ne može stvoriti u potpunosti savršen svet ali ga može bitno promeniti – i to baš stoga jer izražava pravu demokratiju. Ovaj nosilac je specifična moć stanovništva, odnosno, moć naroda kao ultimativnog subjektiviteta koja oblikuje stvarnost otvarajući horizonte mogućnosti. Zato – iako reflektivno u nekoliko navrata insistira kako nije u stanju da definiše, pa čak ni da predloži idealan model za funkcionisanje društva – Fuko iscrtava obrise novog promišljanja i realizacije političkog upravo kroz koncept prave demokratije. Naime, posle, za njega prioritnog, kritičko-filozofskog angažmana koji se ticao razobličenja svih relacija političke moći koje nadziru, kontrolišu, tlače i uništavaju društvo teorija novih subjektivnosti i novih politizacija referira na razumevanje prave demokratije kao drugačije moći, kao različite moći čiji izvor je narod.

Štaviše, iz perspektive činjenice da Fuko insistira kako se klasna moć - kao politička moć - sprovodi i kroz posredovanje određenog broja institucija koje nemaju ništa zajedničko sa njom tj. deluju naizgled nezavisno od ovakve moći, proizilazi da realizacija

„efektivne moći stanovništva“, obratno, sa sobom donosi transformacije celokupnog polja društvenosti i stoga sadrži i posebnu vrstu političkog izbora.

Iz ovakvih diskurzivnih smernica potrebno je sada sagledati relaciju politike i istine, kako je apostrofira Fuko, a kroz koju se artikuliše politika istine. (Balibar, Boyman, Rajchman 2011; Defert 2014). Naime, kako primećuje Krastev, „u svom radu o govorenju istine u antičkoj Grčkoj, Fuko ukazuje da čin govorenja istine ne može da se svede na to da građani saznaju nešto što ranije nisu znali. Paradoksalno, istina u politici jeste nešto što svi znaju ali se niko ne usuđuje da je kaže...Ono što govor čini politički snažnim nije razotkrivanje neke nepoznate istine, već nečija odluka da preuzme lični rizik...do promene dovodi osoba koja ima odvažnosti da kaže istinu, a ne sama istina“ (kurziv B.K.) (Krastev 2013).

Tako se istina koja, ergo, nije nikakvo ekskluzivno pravo ili posed već, naprotiv, znanje svih - u relaciji prema polju političkog pojavljuje kao politička istina tj. kao znanje građana o političkim i javnim stvarima. Razlika političara od svih ostalih građana, u tom svetlu, proističe isključivo iz posebne vrline, odnosno njegove hrabrosti da se kocka sa tim znanjem, a to znači da deluje polazeći od tog znanja. Ovo je, istovremeno, i objašnjenje zašto je, primera radi, Fuko čitav jedan kurs posvetio tome da pokaže kako je Rusoov cilj bio upravo da pomiri pravne i konstitucionalne pojmove kao što su ugovor, opšta volja i suverenitet sa konceptom umeća, odnosno umetnosti upravljanja (art of government).

Gde je u svemu ovome mesto filozofije? Kakav je odnos političara i filozofa u savremenosti? Posebno je relevantan Fukoov uvid u kojem se kaže: „Čini mi se da filozofija danas više ne postoji, ne u smislu da je ona nestala, već da je rasuta na veliki broj različitih aktivnosti: utoliko aktivnosti aksiomatičara, lingviste, etnologa, istoričara, revolucionara, političara, mogu biti oblici filozofske aktivnosti“ (Fuko 2010).

U tom svetlu, prema Fukou, u savremenom svetu nastupila je intrinzična promena filozofije tj. umesto tradicionalnog diskurzivnog filozofija poprima mnoštvo različitih oblika. Ipak, i u ovoj transformaciji zadržana je, ili, preciznije, kao nikada do sada izražena je njena osobitost: jer prožimanje najviše teorije i divergentnih formi praktičnog delanja dostiglo je tačku sinteze

istorijske i genealoške svesti i upravo to konstituiše novu relaciju između filozofije i politike tj. uspostavlja novu političku filozofiju ali i novu politiku u kojoj se znanje pretače u radikalnu političku akciju.

Svakako, naznačeni obrasci nikako ne znače da sve razlike naučnog i političkog diskursa nestaju jer, podseća Fuko, politička praksa per se ne može imati ulogu univerzalne kritike u smislu u kojem bi se u ime ma koje političke prakse mogla presuđivati naučnost neke nauke. Ali se zato u ime neke političke prakse može dovesti u pitanje način postojanja i funkcionisanja neke nauke: „Progresistička politika je politika koja priznaje istorijske uslove i pravila neke prakse, tamo gde druge politike priznaju samo slobodnu igru individualnih inicijativa. Progresistička politika...u jednoj praksi određuje mogućnosti preobražaja i igru zavisnosti između tih preobražaja, tamo gde druge politike poklanjaju poverenje apstrakciji promene, odnosno čudotvornom prisustvu genija“ (Ibid: 55).

Progresistička politika proizilazi iz znanja i istorijske svesti građana i kao takva ispostavlja se kao prostor u kojem se postavlja pitanje „Ko ima moć?“, uz razumevanje da iako niko nije posednik moći ipak se ona uvek sprovodi u nekom pravcu tj. „sprovode je jedni s jedne i neki s druge strane, ne zna se ko je, zapravo, ima; ali se zna ko je nema...Ukoliko označiti žarišta, javno govoriti o njima, znači borbu, to nije zbog toga što ih niko do sada nije bio svestan, već zato što progovoriti o tome, probiti mrežu institucionalne informacije, imenovati...jeste prvi okret moći, to je prvi korak za druge borbe protiv moći...Diskurs o borbi ne suprotstavlja se nesvesnom, on se suprotstavlja onom tajnom...Tajna je možda teža za otkrivanje od nesvesnog“ (Ibid: 97).

To je smisao u kojem se ispostavlja bitnost relacije prave demokratije, politike kao znanja građana i političara kao nosioca vrline hrabrosti i koncepcije progresističke politike kao zaokreta moći tj. uspostavljanja drugačije koncepcije moći, moći javnosti, moći znanja i moći naroda. Imenujući sebe kao anti-strukturalistu, Fuko insistira i na bitnosti pojma događaja, kao sapripadnog mreži naznačenih pojmova, a koji posebno dobija na snazi ako se ima u vidu da je „država kodifikacija mnogostrukih odnosa moći...a revolucija uspostavlja jedan drugi tip kodifikacije tih odnosa. To implicira da postoji onoliko tipova revolucije koliko i subverzivnih

kodifikacija odnosa moći, a da se, s druge strane, savršeno mogu pojmiti revolucije koje ostavljaju netaknutim odnose moći što su državi omogućavali da funkcioniše“ (Ibid:155).

Način na koji se pitanje revolucije za Fukoa pojavljuje u kontekstu razumevanja prave demokratije ali i uloge intelektualca tj. kao pitanje relacije politike i istine možda je ponajbolje ilustrovano na primeru Tunisa: „Za njih, marksizam je bio neka vrsta moralne energije... mislio sam na raskorak između načina na koji su tuniski studenti bili marksisti i onoga što sam znao o funkcionisanju marksizma u Evropi... Eto šta je Tunis bio za mene. Morao sam da uđem u političku raspravu. To nije bilo maja 1968. u Francuskoj, već marta 1968. u jednoj zemlji trećeg sveta. Šta u današnjem svetu može kod pojedinca da izazove želju, volju i mogućnost za apsolutnom žrtvom? A da se, pri tome, ne posumnja ni na najmanju želju za moći i profitom? To je ono što sam video u Tunisu, očiglednost nužnosti mita, duhovnosti, video sam nepodnošljive situacije što ih proizvode kapitalizam, kolonijalizam i neokolonijalizam. U borbi te vrste zahtevao se neposredan, egzistencijalan, fizički rekao bih, angažman“ (kurziv B.K.) (Ibid: 221).

Svakako, ovaj biografsko-filozofski rasplet u različitim aspektima prevazilazi ravan Fukoovih životnih odluka tj. razmešta se u polje najsvetlijih levičarskih tradicija. Ili, preciznije, pored opisanog odnosa teorije i prakse – i zapisa o marksizmu u Evropi i van nje – Fuko ističe dve bitne karakteristike bez kojih ne može biti govora o progresističkoj politici. Prvo, to je nužnost mita kao utopijskog elementa koji se tiče duhovnosti i drugo, intrinzična povezanost kapitalizma, kolonijalizma i neokolonijalizma, koja znači da o političkoj levici, i ozbiljnoj politici uopšte, ne može da se raspravlja bez svesti o ovoj relaciji.

U tom svetlu, potrebno je sagledati i Fukoovu artikulaciju da „suštinski politički problem za intelektualca nije da kritikuje ideološke sadržaje...nego da sazna da li je moguće konstituisati jednu novu politiku istine. Nije problem da se izmeni svest ljudi, nego politički, ekonomski, institucionalni režim proizvodjenja istine. Nije reč o tome da se istina oslobodi svakog sistema moći – to bi bila himera, pošto je sama istina moć – već da se moć istine oslobodi hegemonih oblika (društvenih, ekonomskih, kulturnih)

unutar kojih, za sada, funkcioniše. Političko pitanje nije zabluda, iluzija, otuđena svest, ili ideologija, nego sama istina“ (Ibid:167).

Sadržaj politike za Fukoa tj. pojam političkog i prvo pitanje politike, upravo se tiče filozofije politike ili, preciznije, intelektualca kao takvog – i ne referira na kritiku. Štaviše, čak ne upućuje ni na iluziju ili marksovsku otuđenu svest, već se tiče moći istine i istine kao moći. Tako se politika pojavljuje kao politika istine a filozofiji pripada najrelevantnija uloga razmatranja potencijala za uspostavljanje nove politike istine. Jer promena sveta započinje kao promena političkog, ekonomskog i institucionalnog režima proizvođenja istine tj. moć istine potrebno je osloboditi nametnute hegemonije. Stoga, prvo pitanje političke filozofije, kao i politike, je upravo pitanje istine, i to istine kao izvorne i realne moći – one iste moći naroda kao moći novih subjektiviteta i nove politizacije tj. moći građana koji znaju. Ovo je moć koja se suprotstavlja moći hegemonije, odnosno, odbija nametnute režime istine koji su oprečni pravoj demokratiji.

Obzirom da se borba za politiku ispostavlja kao borba za politiku istine za Fukoa uobičajena opozicija između države i građanskog društva ne pokazuje se ni kao delotvorna ni kao istinita pošto se moć nejednakosti realizuje u obe sfere. Recipročno, politika istine kao prava demokratija treba da se ostvari u različitim aspektima političkog. Tako se Fukoov diskurs novih subjektiviteta i invencije ispostavlja kao diskurs koji teži da odgovori na neoliberalizam kao biopolitiku kroz politiku istine – i to je mesto preplitanja filozofije, politike i demokratije. Štaviše, kroz topografiju relacije intelektualca, političkog delanja i moći naroda Fuko iscertava put otpora politici kao beskrajnoj igri moći i insistira kako činjenica da nije precizno zapisao šta da se radi nikako ne znači da ne treba delati. I na kraju apostrofira da je uvek reč o otporu logici „gospodara i roba“ tj. saopštava: „Ništa mi nije tako strano kao ideja nekog gospodara koji vam nameće sopstveni zakon... Ukoliko ne govorim šta bi trebalo činiti, to nije stoga što verujem da ne treba činiti ništa. Naprotiv...“ (Ibid: 240).

2. ZNANJE I MOĆ - RANSIJER NA FUKOOVOM TRAGU

“Pojmovi nisu ni Platonove ideje ni puki empirijski označitelji. Oni su oruđa sa kojima možemo da ocrta-
mo novu topografiju kako bismo mogli razumeti šta nam se dešava,
i sa kojima možemo da pokušamo da sprovedemo istraživanje i delanje
koje je jednako daleko od pristajanja na stvari kakve jesu i od hiperbola
imaginarnog radikalizma”.

Žak Ransijer, *Metod jednakosti*

U ovako skiciranom kontekstu - koji upućuje na novo čitanje Fukoa koje je različito od uobičajenog - i Ransijerova teorija demokratije može se sagledati u drugačijem svetlu od standardizovanog tj. kao nastojanje da se nadoveže na skicirani diskurs ili, preciznije, kao pokušaj da se razvije i eksplicira u čemu bi se „novi oblici politizacije“ sastojali.

Štaviše, može se reći da i Badju potvrđuje da Ransijer sledi Fukoa odnosno, da nastavlja na njegovom tragu, kada saopštava sledeće: „Svakako, ako je neko bio u stanju da uspe da ovaj pojmovni odnos znanja i moći odvede dalje od Fukoa, to je bio niko drugi nego Ransijer... Ransijer i ja, i mnogi drugi, bili su suočeni sa istim pitanjem: kako ćemo odvezati postojeće konfiguracije odnosa između znanja i autoriteta, između znanja i moći?“ (kurziv B.K.) (Badiou 2010). Sam Ransijer o „Fukoovom složenom nasleđu“ zapisao je kako nema „tela“ Fukoove misli koje zasniva njegovu politiku ili etiku tj. „postoje knjige koje proizvode efekte upravo u meri u kojoj nam ne govore šta sa njima moramo učiniti“ (Rancière 2010).

Još relevantnije, Ransijer – i za razliku od većine tzv. post-modernih teoretičara - ne samo da terminološki zadržava pojam subjektivacije i ideju postajanja-subjektom već smatra da se politika dešava upravo kada je na delu ovakav proces „proizvodnje kroz seriju delovanja“, što ne samo da nas ponovo vraća relaciji

znanja i moći već predstavlja upravo nastavak puta tamo gde je Fuko stao tj. kretanje ka artikulisanju i realizaciji novih oblika politizacije suprotstavljenih „standardnim izborima“, jer samo u takvom suprotstavljanju više ima smisla govoriti o političkom.

Naime, Ransijerova ključna opozicija između politike kao zahteva za demokratijom i policije kao poništavanja političkog – proizilazi praktično iz središta Fukoovih najrelevantnijih uvida. Jer, dok se pojam „policije“ uspostavlja upravo iz Fukoovih rasprava o upravljaštvu, nadziranju i kontroli – a onda se tiče i konsenzusa – dotle se politika kao demokratija artikuliše u relaciji spram Marksovog iskaza iz 1843. gde se kaže da je „demokratija suština svih državnih oblika“, i još dalje, kao eho starogrčke isonomije („isonomy“), a zatim i kroz Fukoove refleksije da je prava demokratija uvek suprotstavljena hijerarhiji i klasnim strukturama. Ne manje bitno, upravo post-demokratsko društvo konsenzusa ispostavlja sopstveni samodestruktivni karakter - slično Fukoovom opisu „društva kontrole“ - upravo u meri u kojoj ubija demokratiju proklamujući njen trijumf.

U tom svetlu – kako je opisano, pre svega, u delima *Diss-agreement: Politics and Philosophy* i *Hatred of Democracy* – Ransijer ističe kako su praktično sve relevantne filozofije, još od Platona, implicitno ili eksplicitno zauzele poziciju „filozofa-kralja“ te tako trasira problem filozofije spram politike kao demokratije per se. Ključna ambivalentnost za Ransijera, međutim, proizilazi iz činjenice da on prihvata Platonovu kritiku demokratije (Ranciere 2014) dok, istovremeno, afirmiše antičke prakse žrebanja kao izraz prave demokratije. Naime, ovaj duplicitet Ransijerove relacije spram antičkog nasleđa iznosi na svetlo dana plodotvorne protivrečnosti koje su konstitutivne za njegovu celokupnu teoriju i, u finalnoj instanci, tiču se odnosa znanja, moći i demokratije.

Još preciznije, kompleksnost ove relacije izvire iz Ransijerovog osnovnog programskog stava tj. kako je najbolja politička vlast upravo vlast onih koji uopšte ne žele da vladaju. Apostrofiranje ovog principa konsekvantno znači ne samo da Ransijer priznaje validnost Platonove kritike demokratije već se, daleko relevantnije, njegova politička filozofija ispostavlja kao bliža Platonovoj teoriji in toto. Jer, na kraju, Ransijerova pozicija reprezentuje paradoks između koncepta primarne jednakosti, kao fundamenta

prave demokratije, i stava kako se optimalni scenario političke kao demokratske vlasti ispostavlja upravo kao vlast onih koji baš nikako ne žele vlast, a to su uvek oni koji čuvaju sopstvenu distancu spram vlasti, odnosno, uvek oni koji su u posedu znanja – i baš njima treba dati moć.

Specifičnost ove pozicije ogleda se u jednom jednom bitnom elementu: Ransijer zaključuje kako „filozof-kralj ima jednu zajedničku tačku sa narodom-kraljem“ a to je da ga „neka božanska slučajnost mora učiniti kraljem bez da je on to pozeleo. Jer, nema pravedne vlasti bez uloge slučajnosti u njoj“ (Isto: 43). U tom svetlu, ističe se relevantnost slučajnosti u smislu kontingencije, ali i u smislu ananke, koja, u relaciji spram stava da ipak treba da vladaju najumniji, znači da do toga treba da dođe na način događaja a ne prethodnog izbora da se vlada.

Tako se Ransijerova pozicija prema Platonu ispostavlja kao bliža Badjuovoj koncepciji egalitarnog platonizma – upravo u smislu u kojem je Platon pisao o retkosti čuvara („the guardians“) (Isto: 37) i Badju eksplicirao kako se ova „retkost“ poklapa sa pozicijom radikalne jednakosti. Još relevantnije, i Ransijerove i Badjuove teze proizilaze iz Fukoove politike istine u meri u kojoj reflektuju moć naroda, sa jedne strane, i uspostavljanje novog režima istine, što je zadatak u kojem filozof ima prvorazrednu ulogu. Štaviše, obzirom na uvide da je reč o primordijalnoj tenziji filozofije i politike ili, pre, o dvostrukosti koja se pojavljuje još u antičko vreme, postaje transparentno da je reč o sokratovskoj normi politike: jer kada se artikuliše da se politika rađa u elementu pravde eo ipso sledi da ona izvire iz mišljenja. Zato Ransijer – na tragu Fukoove artikulacije da se nova politizacija i subjektivacija mora desiti s onu stranu postojećih izbora – zaključuje kako je prava politika sačinjena ne od odnosa moći već od odnosa između svetova.

U meri u kojoj su savremena politička društva daleko od ovakve slike, Ransijer saopštava da se „politika događa tek sporadično ili retko“ (Ranciere 2004) – jer se tiče jednakosti a jednakost se pojavljuje kada se tradicionalni mehanizmi sistema koji se uobičajeno nazivaju politikom ozbiljno dovedu u pitanje. „Politika se dešava kada se ovi mehanizmi zaustave u njihovim šinama, kroz efekat pretpostavke koja je njima potpuno strana, ali bez koje

zapravo nijedan od njih ultimativno ne bi mogao da funkcioniše: pretpostavke jednakosti ma kog i svih“ (Isto: 17).

U tom smislu, radikalna filozofsko-politička teza da je svaka država oligarhija za Ransijera treba da služi kao jedna vrsta regulativnog imperativa, sa važnim korektivnim potencijalom - u situaciji u kojoj teorijska uloga jednog pojma postaje nezamenljiv ulog u realnoj političkoj igri. Demokratija se tako pojavljuje kao politizacija u najboljem smislu te reči tj. kao delanje čiji je cilj pospešivanje i rast političke samosvesti u najširoj građanskoj javnosti i na taj način održavanje ili, pre, permanentno proizvođenje i događanje političkog.

Štaviše, Ransijerova kritika postmodernizma usmerena je upravo na činjenicu kako se tu nastoji obnoviti jednakost, ali ona iščezava u tzv. beskonačnim razlikama koje sebični pojedinac upotrebljava u demokratskoj formi. Suprotno tome, Ransijer pita: „Zar permanencija demokratije, ne počiva, znatno više, u njenoj mobilnosti, u kapacitetu da pomeri horizonte i oblike učestvovanja?...Autentična participacija je invencija neproračunljivog subjekta...invencija pokreta rođenog ni iz čega drugog nego iz same demokratije. Garant permanentne demokratije nije popunjavanje svih mrtvih vremena i praznih prostora oblicima participacije kontra moći; to je stalna obnova učesnika i oblika delovanja. Test demokratije mora uvek biti u njenoj sopstvenoj slici: svestrana, sporadična – i zasnovana na poverenju“ (Isto: 61). Suprotno, dakle, demokratskom individualizmu i konzumerizmu - i suprotno kvazi-jednakosti koja se iz toga proizašla - slika prave demokratije je, u jednom bitnom aspektu u isti mah i slika uvek pomalo prisutne transcendencije ili, preciznije, transcendencije unutar „stvarnog“ („the real“) i „imaginarnog“ („the imaginary“).

U tom svetlu, Ransijer ističe kako je politika uvek stvaranje pozornice tj. kako politika zapravo uvek uzima oblik ustanovljena pozorišta jer izranja kao stvaranje teatarske i umetničke sfere (Ranciere 2004). Ali potrebno je razumeti specifični smisao Ransijerovog govora o pozorištu i političkom, kao i u kojoj meri taj smisao sadrži i odraz prvobitnog natpisa na šekspirovskom pozorištu „The Globe“: Totus mundus agit histrionem. Naime, u delu *Staging the People: The Proletarian and his Double* zapisano je sledeće: „Fabrika, ulica i pozorište su oblici podele, u kojoj ekon-

omsko, političko i ideološko konstantno menjaju uloge, određujući na ovaj način izvesni konfliktni odnos prostora i vremena, načina bivanja i načina delanja...Pozorište naroda...je priča o projektu koji se svodi na arheologiju sadašnjosti: san pozorišta koje bi bilo mesto ponovno otkrivene komunikacije između umetnosti i naroda... Pozorište naroda, kao narodna revolucija, uvek je uključivalo različite „narode“, jednako nesvodive na jednostavnost marksističkog proleterijata, na sindikate ili na plebs koji je intelektualna moda prethodno slavila. „Narod“ ove vrste je polemički oblik subjektivacije koja se povlači po posebnim linijama podele, gde se odlučuje o distribuciji na vođe i vođene, učene i učenike, posjednike i one koji posed nemaju“ (Ranciere 2012).

Tako se politika rađa kao stvaranje disenzusa tj. kao odbijanje da se da priznanje postojećem poretku stvari i to u ime jednakosti. To je smisao u kojem se, kako primećuje Tomas Matijen, relacija između „interpretacije sveta“ i njegove „promene“ pojavljuje kao višestruko bitna (Mathien 2010: 371). Razume se, delovati iz pretpostavke jednakosti – u ime razumevanja i promene sveta - upućuje, u isti mah, na dvostruki odnos tj. uvek se tiče i odnosa prema drugima i odnosa prema sebi – jednakost se pojavljuje kao samo-relacija i relacija-pre-svih-relacija prema drugima, kao specifično „podležće“ (hipokeimenon, subiectum) iz kojeg postaje svet i delanje u njemu.

3. POST SCRIPTUM: FILOZOF KAO POLITIČAR SAVREMENOG SVETA

Relacija između filozofije i politike – i to u svetlu promišljanja izvorno demokratskog momenta – na tragu Fukoovih, a zatim i Ransijerovih razmatranja - ispostavila se kao relevantna tema za niz različitih autora. Tako se npr. u Kričlijevoj interpretaciji, politika kao demokratija prepoznaje kao „sada“ i „mnoštvo“ tj. pojavljuje se kao „subjektivna praksa u situaciji“ (Critchley 2009: 272–306). Svakako, ovaj oblik „subjektivne prakse“ čuva intrinzičnu vezu sa Badjuovim opisom istinski prosvetiteljskog impulsa kao lokalne politike koja se bavi uspostavljanjem kolektiviteta na osnovu težnje za univerzalnošću.

Politika in toto, stoga, upućuje na stvaranje novih oblika asocijacije na različitim ravnima. Ili, preciznije, zamisao o pravoj demokratiji kao delanju na prostoru u kojem živimo upućuje na delanje prema događaju same demokratije i na njeno stvaranje – jer misliti politiku u oblicima novih političkih subjektivnosti, novih političkih asocijacija, kao i u lokalnim specifičnostima i u novim političkim sekvencama znači invenciju prave demokratije per se. U tom smislu, Kričli saopštava da politika znači „okupirati i kontrolisati teren na kojem stojimo, radimo, delamo i mislimo...politika počinje lokalno, praktično i specifično“ (Critchley 2012: 3-8).

U svetlu savremene političke i teorijske krize Evropske unije (Critchley 2012) koja je, sa turbulencijama 21.veka postala permanentna - ponajviše usled monopolizacije evropskog projekta od strane političkih elita (Habermas 2011) - pitanje filozofije i politike kao pitanje moći istine ponovo izranja kao pitanje moći naroda, kao i onih koji su u posedu znanja. Miler eksplicira kako je tzv. „evropska integracija“ zapravo bila „nerazdvojan deo novog ustavnog etosa – duboko nepoverljivog prema narodnoj suverenosti – i delegiranja birokratskih zadataka...Zemlje članice svesno su dale moć institucijama koje nisu bile predmet izbora na domaćem terenu...a sve to sa ciljem da stave pod ključ liberalno-demokratske dogovore...“ (Miler 2013: 174).

Razmatrajući političko-istorijsku genezu ovih procesa – koje označava kao „eutanziju politike“ – Miler ističe kako se već za pedesete i šezdesete godine često vezuje pojam „politike konsenzusa“ kao i da je ovo, u najkraćem, u velikoj meri zapravo ispravna ocena tadašnjeg stanja stvari jer se centar širio, „ekstremnu desnicu je diskreditovao fašizam, a posleratna levica je odbacila gotovo sve ostatke marksističke teorije i postajala je sve umerenija“ (Ibid: 167). Tako je, uslovno govoreći, u posleratnoj Zapadnoj Evropi u najvećem opsegu trijumfovala tzv. umerena veberovska politika ili, još preciznije, politiku su počeli da praktikuju i vode izvršiooci i pragmatičari i, na taj način, politika sve manje teži proizvođenju smisla i sve više se pretvara u puki tehne.

Štaviše, upravo ovakvoj slici savremenog sveta suprotstavlja se i Fukoova politika istine i Ransijerova refleksija o politici kao jednakosti, jer obe na strukturno sličan način ustaju protiv tzv. praksi konsenzusa svojstvenim savremenim post-demokratskim

društvima. Preciznije, i Fuko i Ransijer iscrtavaju obrise programsko-kritičke filozofije koju bi sproveli specifični intelektualci u politici kroz uspostavljanje nove relacije znanja i moći. Naime, u oba slučaja reč je o novim oblicima subjektivizacije i politizacije, o invenciji, imaginaciji i stvaralaštvu, ali i o moći naroda i moći istine tj. o procesu promene sveta u kojem filozof ima jedinstvenu ulogu: pre svega kroz iscrtavanje alternativa, ali i kao Fukoov „revolucionar u politici“ ili Ransijerov „filozof-kralj“ - ako ga božanska slučajnost takvim učini. U najmanju ruku, isprepletenost znanja i politike pitanje je dvosmerne relacije ili, pre, nerazdvojive jedinstvene delatnosti stvaranja svetova.

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Bogdana Koljević Griffith

**POLITICS, PHILOSOPHY, DEMOCRACY:
FOUCAULT AND RANCIERE**

Abstract

In the first part of the article, the author examines Foucault's conception of politics of truth as a programmatic basis of his political philosophy. More precisely, it is argued that after the politics of discourse elaborated as a critical genealogy of power, Foucault traces out a discourse on politics, with new forms of subjectivization and politicization at its centre, as the very core of the democratic moment. The politics of truth emerges as a structurally specific form of power and philosophy appears in different forms of practical and political activity in the contemporary world. In the second part of the article, the emphasis is on Ranciere's work as a continuation of Foucault's writings, i.e., it is analyzed how Ranciere walks down Foucault's path in rethinking the relation between knowledge and power. Ranciere remains ambivalent between his insistence on equality as true democracy, on the one hand, and awareness of the relevance of competence, on the other – for it is precisely lack of competence that characterizes quasi-democratic societies. From the contradiction, however, between the insight that everyone is equally capable to govern and the conclusion that those who should govern are those who have no wish to do so a unique theory of egalitarian Platonism is reborn. Both Foucault and Ranciere, therefore, demonstrate how the relation between politics and philosophy unveils itself as the question of truth and as the question of the power of the people. In this light, in both cases, we are dealing with fundamental theoretical and practical opposition

to the practices of the politics of consensus which characterize neo-liberal post-democratic societies.

Keywords: politics of truth, philosophy, true democracy, the people, power.

Vesna Stanković Pejnović*

MOĆ DISKURSA IZ FUKOOVE PERSPEKTIVE*

Apstrakt

Članak se bavi Fukoovom definicijom diskursa kao „načinima konstituiranja znanja”, tj. diskurs je neopipljiva zbirka autoritativnih glasova, kulturno razumljiva istina i pretpostavljenih priča o istoriji i drugim područjima znanja, u tom stepenu taj diskurs arbitrira sa znanjem. Zbog toga je diskurs intrinzičan moći, davanju autoritativnih glasova s mogućnošću da nadvladaju privatni život pojedinca i načina na koji misle i shvatanjem što mogu učiniti i tko mogu biti, u skladu sa onim što im se kaže da je istina. Unutar društvenih konteksta, teorija diskursa bavi se pitanjima moći i dominacije. Cilj rada je pokazati Fukoovu perspektivu da moć nije u nadležnosti države, već je metod na koji ljudi deluju na svakom nivou. Diskurs je moć koju treba zadobiti. Problem moći je od ključne važnosti za Fukoovo razmišljanje o odnosima društva, pojedinaca, skupina i institucija. Diskurs prenosi i proizvodi moć, ali i sam diskurs je rezultat i dejstvo moći.

Ključne reči: diskurs, moć, znanje, Fuko.

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1. UVOD

Diskurs, iako osporavan termin, ključan je pojam za razumevanje društvenih i političkih praksi. Mi kontroliramo i ograničavamo diskurse, ali isto tako oni oblikuju i ograničavaju nas. Diskurs je nematerijalna zbirka autoritativnih glasova, kulturno razumljivih istina i pretpostavljenih narativa istorije i drugih oblasti znanja, u toj meri da diskurs arbitrira ono što je znanje (Weedon 1987: 108). Zbog ovoga, diskurs je svojstven moći koja može mogućnošću da utiče na privatni život pojedinca i način razmišljanja i shvatanja šta mogu da rade i ko mogu biti, u skladu sa onim što se predstavlja kao istina. Autoritativni glasovi mogu biti institucije, vlade, pojedinci ili ostaci društvenih konstrukcija koje održavaju oni koji ih se pridržavaju i poštuju. Diskurzivno proizvedeno znanje je subjektivno, a diskurs „može biti deo strategije dominacije, ali i otpora“ (Diamond, Quinby 1988: 185).

Cilj rada je prikazati, u Fukoovoj perspektivi, teoriju diskursa kroz pitanja moći i dominacije. Proces stvaranja diskursa je istovremeno kontrolisan, organizovan i redistribuisan. Diskurs je mesto gde se prepliću želja za znanjem i želja za moći. U radu se razmatra i uloga jezika, ne samo instrumenta komunikacije ili čak znanja, već i kao instrumenta moći.

Svako društvo ima vrstu diskursa koji prihvata i čini funkciju istinitim. Društvo je područje borbe uspostavljanja i prenošenja režima istine i razvijanja tehnike i procedura. Moć sama je inherentna društvenim praksama. Diskurs prenosi i proizvodi moć, ali i sam diskurs je rezultat i dejstvo moći.

2. POJAM DISKURSA

Mišel Fuko se smatra za jednog od utemeljivača savremene analize diskursa. Njegova teorija diskursa ima mesto komparativne stabilnosti, posebno u poređenju sa drugim postmodernim teoretičarima kao što su Deridova o „dekonstrukciji“, ili Bodrijarova o „hiperrealnosti“. Fukoovu teoriju diskursa su proučavali i Agamben, Antoni Gidens, Džudit Batler i Kai Alhanen koji su kombinovali Fukoovu misao sa shvatanjima Valtera Benjamina i Karla Šmita. Među savremenim pristupima i teorijama diskursa, značajna su shvatanja Ernesta Lakloa i Šantal Muf koji istražuju

društveno formiranje „krugova kulture“, odnose znanja i moći, ali i političke borbe za hegemoniju (Keller 2012: 51).

Prema Fukou, istiniti diskurs je u VI veku pre nove ere izazivao poštovanje i strah kome se moralo potčiniti jer je bio vladajući i bio izgovaran uz posebna prava i prema određenom ritualu, zagovarajući pravdu i svakom dodeljujući njegov deo. Ipak, već vek kasnije, najveća istina više nije bila u onom što je diskurs bio ili u onom što je činio, već se oblikovala u onome što je govorio: istina se pomerila od ritualizovanog, delotvornog i pravednog čina iskazivanja u sam iskaz, ka njegovom smislu, formi, njegovom objektu, njegovom odnosu prema svom referentu. Ako od vremena Grka diskurs nije više diskurs koji odgovara na zahteve želje ili nije diskurs koji vrši moć, šta je onda u pitanju oko volje za istinom, u volji da se kazuje ovaj istiniti diskurs, ako ne želja i moć? (Fuko 2007: 14)

U svom filozofskom opusu diskurs je pojam kojim se povezuju mišljenje, govor, jezik i društvene prakse u smislen kontekst. Diskurs je jedva više od odsjaja istine koja se odvija pred nama, postepeno se stvarajući i oblikujući našu stvarnost. Diskurs je uvek samo igra: igra pisanja, čitanja i razmene (Fuko 2007: 37).

Koncept „diskurs“ je višedimenzionalan, široko shvaćen, različitih definicija. U diskursu su sakupljeni najsitniji i najsakriveniji elementi stvarnosti kao norme koje oblikuju javni govor i način mišljenja u društvu. Te tajne norme diskursa ili diskurs sam, ključan je predmet za formiranje zajednice. Diskurs nije jednostavno ono što želja izražava ili sakriva; on je takođe objekat želje (Fuko 2007:8) ali nije prosto ono što sukobe ili sisteme dominacije prevodi u jezik, nego je on ono za šta se i čime se bori. Diskus je moć koju treba zadobiti (Fuko 2007:9).

Diskursi su više od načina razmišljanja i stvaranja značenja. Oni čine „prirodu“ tela, nesvesnog i svesnog uma i emocionalnog života subjekata kojima žele da upravljaju (Veeton 1987: 108). Oni su oblik vlasti koji cirkuliše u socijalnoj oblasti i mogu se odnositi na strategije dominacije i otpora (Diamond, Quinby 1988: 185).

Diskurs je razgovor ili informacija. Putem diskursa (kroz znanje) čovek se kreira, stvara, oblikuje; i taj diskurs objedinjava moć i znanje, a njegova moć sledi iz našeg svakodnevnog i nep-

rimetnog prihvatanja „stvarnosti koja nam je prikazana“ (Foucault 1977: 34). Diskurs, kao društveni konstrukt, stvara i održava onaj koji ima moć i sredstva komunikacije. Prema Fukou, istina, moral i smisao se oblikuju kroz diskurs. U svakom društvu stvaranje diskursa je istovremeno kontrolisano, odabrano, organizovano i redistribuisano prema određenom broju procedura, čija je uloga „da izbegne svoje moći i opasnosti, da se nosi sa slučajnim događajima, kako bi izbegao svoju tešku, sjajanu materijalnost“. U Fukoovom shvatanju diskursi predstavljaju načine konstituisanja znanja, zajedno sa društvenim delovanjem, oblicima subjektiviteta i odnosa moći. Diskurs prenosi i proizvodi moć; ona ga podriva i otkriva, čini ga krhkim i omogućava njegovo slabljenje (Weedon 1997: 107).

Prema Fukou, diskurs je kulturološko konstruisana reprezentacija realnosti, a ne njegova tačna kopija. Diskurs konstruiše znanje i time upravlja putem produkcije kategorija znanja i sklopova tekstova, ali istovremeno proizvodi snagu i znanje. Diskurs definiše okvire predmete i pozicioniranja nečega što je moguće biti i šta je moguće učiniti (Kendall, Wickham 1999).

Sam Fuko preferira da govori o diskursu koji oblikuje govor o istini, ne prema predmetu, nego prema neiskazanim potrebama. Zato diskurs kod Fukoa „ne treba analizirati u okviru govora, već prema uslovima pod kojima će takvi iskazi imati određenu istinosnu vrednost, kao mogućnosti da budu izgovorene“ (Heking 2005: 133).

Diskurs nije interpretativna osnova zajednice svih fenomena jedne kulture. Diskurs i figura imaju svaki svoj način bivanja; ali oni održavaju složene i zamršene odnose. Njihovo recipročno funkcionisanje je ono što bi se trebalo opisati (Fuko 1971).

Diskurs se odnosi na uopštene procese stvaranja značenja, na simboličku interakciju, procese stvaranja reprezentacija kao predstavâ o objektima i odnosima, ali i procese u kojima posreduje moć. Značaj diskursa za Fukoa je upravo u povezivanju heterogenih društvenih praksi. Diskurs je mesto gde se prepliću želja za znanjem i želja za moći, pretenzija na objektivnost i idiosinkrazija, pristrasnost i želja za rezultatom koji nije u interesu svih nego samo u interesu onoga ko diskurs vodi.

Fuko ukazuje da nemamo znanje koje se kumulativno razvija gomilajući sve više činjenica, nego imamo režime diskursa znanja koji se u velikoj meri arbitrarno pojavljuju, uvek na novi način izražavajući neke odnose moći, noseći veo oslobađajuće istine ili uspostavljanja reda, zaštite od opasnosti odnosno bilo čega drugog čemu odgovara neka temeljna ljudska potreba. Ideologiji i diskursu koji je izražava svejedno koja će biti vodeća parola koji oni koriste za postizanje svojih ciljeve. Ideologija je oblik racionalnog diskursa o društvenoj stvarnosti i svoju manifestaciju ostvaruje u diskurzivnim društvenim praksama.

Najjednostavnije i opšte „polazišno“ određenje diskursa je njegovo predstavljanje kao „skupa iskaza koji spada u isti sistem formulacije“ (Foucault 1998: 117). Pojam diskursa se odnosi na totalitet ili celinu iskaza-događaja (kao sistemâ društvenih praksi) koji se mogu definisati s obzirom na različite kriterijume koji se istražuju kao institucionalno stabilizovani obrasci strukturâ, praksi, pravila i resursâ za stvaranje značenjâ (Foucault 2013: 72).

Pojam diskursa se odnosi na mnogobrojna delovanja, ukazujući na to da je pojmove delanja, znanja, vrednosti, ideologije i druge važne sociološke pojmove neophodno istraživati u njihovim konkretnim, empirijskim manifestacijama.

Diskurs se mora shvatiti i kao nasilje koje činimo nad stvarima; u svakom slučaju kao praksu koju im namećemo. U ovoj praksi događaji diskursa nalaze princip njihove regularnosti (Fuko 2007: 37).

Metodološki, Fuko diskurs određuje kroz četiri pravila, kao regulatorni principi: događaj, serije, regularnost i uslov mogućnosti. Svaki od njih se suprotstavlja jednom drugom: događaj stvaranju, serija jedinstvu, regularnost izvornosti i uslov mogućnosti značenju. Ova poslednja četiri pojma (značenje, izvornost, jedinstvo, stvaranje) dominirali su tradicionalnom istorijom ideja kojom se opštom saglasnošću tražio momenat stvaranja, jedinstvo dela, epohe ili misli, pečat individualne originalnosti i beskrajno blago sakrivenog značenja. (Fuko 2007: 37)

U principu preokretanja potrebno je prepoznati negativnu igru „lomova“ i proređivanja diskursa. Nije potrebno ići od diskursa ka njegovom unutrašnjem i skrivenom jezgru, ka srcu misli ili

značenja, koji bi se u njemu manifestovali, nego od samog diskursa, od njegove pojave i regularnosti, odnosno prema njegovim spoljnim uslovima mogućnosti i onome što daje prostor slučajnom nizu ovih događaja i učvršćuje im granice.

Diskursi nemaju privilegovanu ontološku poziciju, već status društvene činjenice (Dirkem 2012) koja može vršiti pritisak na pojedince koji će onda delovati nezavisno od njihovog htenja i volje. S obzirom na to, Iver Nojman smatra da su glavna obeležja diskursa normativnost, materijalnost i moć (Nojman 2009).

3. METAFORA PANOPTIKONA

Panoptikon u sebi sadrži obeležja diskursa i moći kao najvidljivija arhitektonska tehnologija koja koristi međusobnu povezanost vidljivosti i nevidljivosti za stvaranje unutrašnjeg upravljanja.

Fuko Panoptikon koristi kao metaforu za pokazivanje rada moći i nadzora u savremenom društvu i kao modela funkcionisanja vlasti koji je najšire primenljiv. Panoptikon je stvarao moćnu i novu sofisticovanu internu prisilu kroz stalno posmatranje zatvorenika međusobno potpuno odvojenih i bez dozvoljene interakcije. Nadzor i posmatranje, sigurnost i znanje, individualizacija i totalizacija, izolacija i preglednost bili su mogući iz jednog središta. Prema ideji njegovog tvorca Bentama, Panoptikon je nacrt savršene disciplinske ustanove, dok za Fukoa ima znatno dublje značenje; „pokazati kako se može dokinuti zatvorenost disciplina i postići da one na rasprostranjen, mnogostruk, polivalentan način funkcionišu u celom društvenom telu“ (Bentam, Fuko 2014).

Iako zatvorenog tipa, panoptički objekat ne isključuje stalno spoljašnje prisustvo. Panoptikon je tako daleko više od tehničkog, arhitektonskog rešenja problema; on ocrta društvo u celini i nudi se kao rešenje društvu kroz uobličavanje disciplinskog društva, odnosno društva nadzora, u kojem se pojedinac brižljivo proizvodi, u kojem smo svi mi subjekti u Panoptičkom redu stvari.

Panoptikon ima funkciju jačanja vlasti, čini je ekonomičnijom i efikasnijom radi jačanja društvenih snaga, povećanja proizvodnje, razvijanja ekonomije, širenja obrazovanja, podizanja nivoa javnog morala jer njegov zadatak je da „povećava, umnožava i ojačava“ tako što će vlast Panoptikona neprekidno funkcionisati i

što njen sistem neće biti ugrožen ni u iznenadnim, diskontinuiranim situacijama.

Fuko uočava dva modela sprovođenja vlasti nad ljudima, od kojih je jedan „san o čistoj zajednici“ na primeru vlasti jednog utvrđenog grada kog krajem XVII veka napada kuga i drugog „sna o savršeno disciplinovanom društvu“ na primeru označavanja i izoštvavanja gubavca iz društva. Jasno je da su u pitanju dva različita načina sprovođenja vlasti, koja su se vremenom približila.

Sadašnja liberalna društva su podeljena između dva alternativna okvira; suverena birokratska kontrola koja dominira nad slobodom pojedinca i potencijalnom anarhijom individualnih stremjenja te autonomni suvereni subjekti koji su pod kontrolom birokratskih mehanizama rasute moći. U tom modelu autonoman pojedinac je u potrazi za slobodom iz „čvstog stiska“ tehnologija dominacija na način da teži samoovladavanju i samousavršavanju, kreirajući nove oblike života. Dodatni pritisak na pojedinca je nedostatak intersubjektivnosti, solidarnosti i kolektivnog delovanja, ali i pojave novih oblika doiminacije.

U gradovima nadziranje rutine čini upotrebu moći jačom što je njena nevidljivost neprimetnija; ljudi se kontrolišu, kategorizuju, disciplinuju i normalizuju bez posebnog poznatog razloga. Nadzor povezuje znanje, moć, prostor. Iz takve perspektive Panoptikon se može posmatrati kao „laboratorija moći“. Postoje kritičari koji smatraju da Panoptikon nije najbolja metafora savremenog nadzora jer Panoptikon reprezentuje moderne ideje nadzora i vezan uz etos discipline dok u postmodernom društvu moć, kontrola i poredak postaju disperzivniji i fleksibilniji (Bentam, Fuko 2014).

Na slučaju Panoptikona je očito da je najopasnije, a ujedno i najlakše delovati na pojedinca u kolektivu. Ipak, i kolektiv sam može delovati na pojedinca nizom psiholoških manipulacija. Panoptikon funkcioniše kao određena „laboratorija vlasti“ jer omogućuje eksperimentisanje ljudima, modifikovanje ponašanja, usmeravanje i preusmeravanje pojedinca, međutim, istovremeno je i aparat nadzora vlastitih mehanizama i službenika kojima se onda može suditi i nametati slične metode. To je moguće zato jer se u zatvorenikovoj svesti vremenom produkuje stalan pogled čuvara na njega, čak i ako čuvar nije fizički prisutan u kuli, a dejstvo posmatranja je isprekidano. Panoptokon funkcioniše efi-

kasno u društvenom okruženju (Fukoovim nazivom „dijagram“, a Deleze i Gatarri „apstraktna mašina“) „discipline“ kao režima koji nastoji da individualizuje i omasovljuje društvene grupe kako bi se uspostavila „poslušnost-korist“. Sličnost Panoptikona (koji je ostao neizgrađen) sa stvarnim zatvorima, školama, bolnicama, nije u detalju njihovih fizičkih oblika kao takvih, već u načinu na koji se pojedinac i gomila udružuju ili formiraju u sličnom smislu u svakom prostoru. Panoptikonov dijagram discipline je imanentan svakom prostoru, iako u različitim skalama i stepenima intenziteta. Na taj način fizička tehnologija ne određuje praksu, već tehnologija služi da učvrsti društvenu praksu. Delezovim rečima, mašine su pre svega društvene pre nego što postaju tehničke, odnosno postoji ljudska tehnologija koja postoji pre materijalne tehnologije. (Deleuze 1988) Tehnologija Panoptikona je sjajna efikasnost, ali samo u onoj meri u kojoj se manifestuje dijagram discipline. Dakle, stepen na kojem „suverena“ društava postoje pre disciplinskih i kad se disciplina možda razbija u „kontrolnim“ društvima kroz konkretnu tehnologiju iz zatvora ovisi o stepenu do kojeg se disciplinski dijagram ili apstraktna mašina primenjuje (Deleuze 1988: 41-2). Ono što je za Fukoa dijagram i Deleza apstraktna mašina, za Marksa je „specifičan kapitalistički način proizvodnje“ ili „realno podređivanje“ u kome su rad i sam društveni život upleteni ili „podređeni“, a time i transformisani, u složenim procesima mašinerije u velikoj industriji (Marx 1978).

4. DISKURS I STRUKTURA JEZIKA

Diskursi govore o tome šta se može reći i misliti, ali i o tome ko može da govori, kada i sa kojim autoritetom. (Foucault 1972) Oni predstavljaju smisao i društvene odnose, oni odražavaju subjektivnost i odnose moći; i „prakse koje sistematski oblikuju predmete o kojima govore. Osim toga, diskursi nisu u objektima; oni ne identifikuju predmete, oni ih oblikuju, ali u praksi to prikrivaju kao sopstveni izum“ (Foucault 1972: 49). Diskursi postoje u pisanoj i usmenoj formi i u društvenoj praksi svakodnevnog života (Weedon 1997: 108), i inherenti su samom fizičkom izgledu naših institucija kao što su škole, crkve, sudovi i domovi. Kao što i Fuko ukazuje, jezik igra moćnu ulogu u reprodukciji i transformaciji odnosa moći u mnogim različitim dimenzijama (klase, kulture, pola, seksualnosti, invalidnosti i uzrasta itd.).

Strukture jezika daju svoju formu poretku stvari; elementi diskursa se održavaju kao teme – kroz tekstove, prepisivane rukopise, prevedena dela, komentare, imitacije; ali se otelovljuju kroz plastične motive koji opstaju kroz promene. Diskurs i forma se kreću jedno u odnosu na drugo, ali nisu nezavisne tačke.

Diskurs nije interpretativna osnova zajednice svih fenomena jedne kulture. Diskurs i figura imaju svaki svoj način bivanja; ali oni održavaju složene i zamršene odnose. Njihovo recipročno funkcionisanje je ono što bi se trebalo opisati (Fuko 1971).

Fuko sugeriše da svako društvo ima svoj režim istine, svoju „opštu politiku“ istine, odnosno vrste diskursa koje prihvata i čini funkciju istinitim; mehanizme i instance koje omogućuju da se uoči razlika između istinitih i lažnih izjava. Diskursi su konstituisani isključivanjem, ali i inkluzijama. Ovi izuzeci i uključivanja su u antagonističkom odnosu sa drugim diskursima, drugim mogućim značenjima, drugim tvrdnjama, pravima i pozicijama. Na ovaj način Fuko ukazuje na načelo diskontinuiteta budući da je potrebno napraviti dopuštenje za složene i nestabilne sile, pri čemu diskurs može biti i instrument i efekat moći, ali i prepreka, kamen spoticanja, tačka otpora i polazna tačka za suprotnu strategiju (Foucault 1978: 101).

Jezik nije samo instrument komunikacije ili čak znanje, već i instrument moći. (Bourdieu 1977) U jednoj perspektivi moć se lako može shvatiti kao prisilna sila ili ograničenje (Ball Goodson 2007: 176), a u drugoj ideja moći se ostvaruje kroz pristanak, na način kako je to shvatao Antonio Gramsci kroz „ideološku hegemoniju“. Društveni diskurs posreduje svojim snagama i kontrolama preko institucija i elita „koji se prisiljeni da prikazati pojavost koja se smatra istinitom“ (Talbot 1996: 67).

U svakom društvu se produkcija diskursa istovremeno selektuje, kontroliše, organizuje, raspodeljuje, postupcima koji imaju ulogu da uhvate moć i opasnosti diskursa, da ovladaju njegovim nepredvidljivim događajima, da izbegnu tešku i opasnu materijalnost.

Džejms Gi, na čiji rad utiče Fukoovo promišljanje, sagledava jezik u upotrebi ili načinu na koji se jezik koristi u društvenom kontekstu „usvajajući“ aktivnosti i identitete (Gee 1990). Prema

njegovom mišljenju, tekstove treba posmatrati u okviru onoga što uključuju, ali i onoga što izostavljaju. Zbog toga analitičari kritičkog diskursa ne bi trebali jednostavno tumačiti političke i društvene ideologije samo na temelju teksta, već moraju razmatrati načine na koji je tekst mogao biti napisan, njihove alternative, ali i načine predstavljanja sveta i društvenih akcija koje su određene ovim načinima razmišljanja i bića. Osim što se fokusira na značenje datog diskursa, bitna karakteristika ovog pristupa je njegov odnos prema moći izražen kroz jezik i ponašanje, ali i odnos između jezika i moći. Metod analizira kako društveni svet, izražen kroz jezik utiče na različite izvore moći. Ovaj pristup je blizak socijalnom konstruktivizmu pokušavajući shvatiti kako se društvo oblikuje (ili konstruiše) jezikom i što zauzvrat reflektuje postojeće odnose moći. Analiza pokušava da shvati kako pojedinci gledaju na svet, i istražuju kategorizaciju, lične i institucionalne odnose, ideologiju i politiku.

5. DISKURS KAO FUNKCIJA ISTINE

Svako društvo, prema Fukou, ima svoj režim istine, i opštu politiku istine, odnosno vrstu diskursa koji prihvata i čini funkciju istinitim. Po njemu je društvo arena za borbu uspostavljanja i prenošenja režima istine i razvijanja tehnike i procedura za uvođenje i prenošenja kulturnih vrednosti koje se smatraju istinitim. Diskurs kroz komunikaciju postaje govor o društvenoj stvarnosti, odnosno pretpostavka da diskursi „daju egzistenciju onome što iskazuju“ (Bourdieu 1992: 19).

Diskurzivna polja, poput zakona ili porodice, sadrže niz konkurentnih i kontradiktornih diskursa različitih stepena moći koji daju značenje i organizuju društvene institucije i procese. Takođe „nude“ niz modaliteta subjektiviteta (Weedon 1987: 35). Iz toga sledi da, ako su odnosi moći raspršeni i fragmentisani u čitavom društvenom polju, takav mora biti i otpor moći (Diamond & Quinby 1988: 185). Interni postupci kojima diskursi vrše vlastitu kontrolu su postupci koji funkcionišu kao principi klasifikacije uređivanja i raspodele. Na taj način se ovladava drugom dimenzijom diskursa: dimenzijom događaja i slučajnosti (Fuko 2007: 16-17).

„Volja za istinom“ je glavni sistem isključenja koji falsifikuje diskurs i koji „teži da vrši neku vrstu pritiska i nešto kao moć ograničenja na druge diskursa“ i nastavlja dalje da postavlja pitanje „šta je u pitanju, volja za istinom, u volji da izgovori ovaj „pravi“ diskurs, ako ne i želja i moći?“ (Fuko 2007: 18).

Postoje dva diskursa koja ograničavaju proizvodnju znanja, neslaganja i razlike, i oni koji omogućuju „nova“ znanja i razlike. Pitanja koja se javljaju odnose se na to kako neki diskursi zadržavaju vlast, kako se čuju neki glasovi, a drugi ne, ko i kako koristi vlast, odnosno pitanja koja se bave pitanjima moći. Prema takvoj perspektivi, diskurs može biti instrument moći ili efekta moći, ali i tačka otpora i polazna tačka za suprotnu strategiju.

Neke diskurse poznajemo iz našeg vlastitog kulturnog sistema: religiozni pravne tekstove, ali i književne; do izvesne mere su to i naučni tekstovi. (Fuko 2007: 19-20) Naučni diskurs, koji oblikuje perspektivu o istini i istinitom, uglavnom zbog autoriteta nauke, u stanju je da svaki drugi diskurs preokrene u svoju ili nečiju drugu korist bez značajnijih posledica po svoj privilegovani položaj. Kako se u nenarušenom statusu očitava t(r)ajna moć nauke, ovakvo poverenje istovremeno povećava i usložnjava odgovornost naučnika; dodamo li tome potisnuto pitanje autonomnosti i/ili objektivnosti u društvenim i humanističkim naukama, konstatacija da one nisu nezavisne od politike nije dovoljna za izgovor nijednog istraživača koje može da služi kao opravdanje i izvinjenje. Na slične zaključke navode istraživanja Majkla Biliga koji ukazuje na praznine u teorijskom diskursu, intelektualnim navikama i analitičkim tekstovima kojima se „maše kao zastavama“ (Bilig 2009: 282). Režim koristi političke, ekonomske i socijalne aparate za kontrolu i dominaciju (Talbani 1996). Pored toga, istina se uspostavlja putem diskursa moći koji se prenosi, unapred služi i legitimiše uključujući političke debate i društvene sukobe - ideološke borbe (Talbani 1996).

Koncepti diskursa, moći, kulture i jezika su dijalektički međusobno povezani jer se dopunjuju. Diskursi, zauzvrat, oblikuju stvarnost i propagiraju je u praksi. Religiozni, pravni, terapijski i, politički diskursi koriste rituale koji za subjekte određuje posebna svojstva i opšte prihvaćene uloge (Fuko 2007: 30).

U većini društava, sistem obrazovanja kontroliše država, delujući na održavanju odnosa moći u čitavom društvu u celini. Stoga, zvanični diskursi države koji se odnose na obrazovne politike su očigledni primeri u kojima diskurs postaje instrument i predmet moći (Ball, Goodson 2007: 177). Svaki obrazovni sistem je politički način da se održava ili menja prisvajanje diskursa, zajedno sa znanjima i moćima koji ga podržavaju jer je sam obrazovni sistem ritualizovanje reči, kvalifikovanje i učvršćivanje uloga za govorne subjekte, konstituisanje jedne, barem difuzne, doktrinarne grupe, ako ne raspodela i prisvajanje diskursa sa njegovim moćima i znanjima (Fuko 2007: 34).

Ispod ovog sveprisutnog uvažavanja diskursa ispod ove očigledne logofilije, postoji sakrivena vrsta straha; kao da su zabrane, barijere, pragovi i ograničenja bili postavljeni da bi umanjili barem delimično, veliko umnožavanje diskursa, da bi uklonili sa njegovog bogatstva velike opasnosti i da svoj nered tako organizuju da ono što se najmanje može kontrolisati bude izbegnuto. Postupci koji dopuštaju kontrolu diskursa odnose se na nametanje izvesnog broja pravila za pojedince (Fuko 2007: 28). U društvu kao naše, postupci isključivanja su dobro poznati. Najočigledniji i najpoznatiji je zabrana. U današnje vreme postoje oblasti u kojima je okvir najuži i gde su zabrane sve brojnije: to su oblasti politike i seksualnosti. Očigledno je diskurs, daleko od toga da je transparentan ili neutralan elemenat u kom je politika pacifikovana, zapravo bio jedno od privilegovanih mesta gde politika vrši neke od svojih najopasnijih moći (Fuko 2007: 8).

U „našoj“ stvarnosti se pojavljuje istina koja se shvata kao bogatstvo, obilje, blaga i prepredena univerzalna sila. Pritom previdamo volju za istinom, tu čudovišnu mašineriju namenjenu za isključivanje. Postoje i mnogi drugi postupci kontrolisanja i ograničavanja diskursa koji u izvesnom smislu deluju spolja kao sistemi isključivanja pa se i odnose na onaj deo diskursa koji se odnosi na želju i moć.

6. DISKURS I MOĆ

Diskursi se mogu razlikovati na temelju toga u kojoj meri su prožeti moći. Zahvaljujući Fukoovim istraživačkim zaokretima, moć se u analizi diskursa ne posmatra kao nešto što neko poseduje,

već kao nešto inherentno društvenim praksama. Za Fukoa moć u supstantivnom smislu (*le pouvoir*), ne postoji. Pogrešno je zamišljati da je moć locirana na nekom mestu ili da proizilazi iz njega. U stvarnosti moć znači odnose, više ili manje organizovanu, hijerarhičnu, koordinisanu grupa odnosâ (Foucault 1980: 198).

Fuko tvrdi da diskurs može prenositi, proizvoditi i ojačati moć, ali istovremeno i diskurs može umanjiti i narušavati moć, čineći je nestabilnom, ali i posedovati mogućnost da spreči njeno delovanje (Foucault 1978).

Diskurs nije samo sredstvo dominacije, već je instrument, rezultat i dejstvo moći (Hutcheon 1991). Prema široko prihvaćenom mišljenju, moć je sredstvo za socijalnu izgradnju realnosti, odnosno instrument moći i ideološke kontrole, ali i prepreka. Moć je moguće naći u svakoj poziciji ili nema pozicije u kojoj ne postoji moć. Moć nije homogena već se može objasniti kroz određene tačke kroz koje prolazi (Deleuze 1988: 25). Moć je relacija koja se stvara i dešava između entiteta. Moć je aktivnost, dostignuće. Svaka relacija između delovanja je relacija moći (Fuko 1978: 92-102). Kako su odnosi snaga fluidni, moć je delovanje, a ne posedovanje i efekat tih relacija različitih delovanja koji su materijalizovani u mikrofizici moći. Odnosi moći tvore „lanac ili sistem“, tvoreći opštu liniju snage i glavne dominacije, obuhvatajući hegemonistički efekat odnosa snaga (Fuko 1978: 94).

Moć ne postoji samo kao obaveza ili zabrana „onih koji je nemaju“ (Foucault 1977: 27). I pored toga što nemaju moć, oni su konstitutivni deo odnosa moći jer ona u njih ulaže, menja se od njih i kroz njih, pa zbog toga oni nisu samo pasivni objekti moći. Krucijalna originalna perspektiva Fukoovog promišljanja je činjenica da nema pasivnog pola u odnosima moći. Relacije moći su spoj mnogobrojnih fluidnih i cirkulirajućih elemenata, prožetih nejednakošću, asimetrijom, neravnotežom.

Iako su društvene prakse prožete odnosima moći, one nisu samo odnosi moći. Moć je jedan od dinamičkih elemenata društvenih praksi. Dakle, sociološko-diskurzivna analiza, istražujući društvene pojave treba da identifikuje različite vrste moći, njene efekte i tehnologije, odnosno načine na koje se moć ispoljava u diskurzivnim društvenim praksama (Dolar 2012: 109).

Diskurs i delovanje stupaju u odnose moći. Jedan nema više ili manje moći od druge, ali svaki jednako oblikuje i drugi (Foucault 1977). Diskurs nije samo činjenica već i delovanje. Diskurs nije zauvek podređen moći ili njoj suprotstavljen. Potrebno je stvoriti dopuštanja za složen i nestabilan proces, pri čemu diskurs može biti i instrument i efekat moći, ali i prepreka otporu i polazna tačka za suprotnu strategiju. Diskurse prenosi i proizvodi moć; ona ga podstiče, ali i podriiva i otkriva, čini ga krhkim i umanjuje je (Foucault 1998: 100).

Za razliku od Altisera koji je opisao moć kao „hijerarhijsko” posedovanje koje pripada državi koja je koristi za potčinjavanje, Fuko smatra da je čovek aktivan sudionik u odnosima moći, a ne večna žrtva institucionalne moći. Po njemu je sistem moći mrežni sistem isprepleten svojim međusobnim odnosima. Fukoova moć se može opisati kao mnogo složeniji sistem interakcije od jednostavnog sredstva ugnjetavanja, kao delovanje ljudske interakcije, u kojem je moć uvek očigledna (Foucault 1980: 98). Dok Hana Arent razmeva političku moć kao zajedničko delovanje, kolektivnu praksu, Fukoova teorija je apolitična jer on izbegava intersubjektivnost i solidarnost, i bazirana na drugačijem razumevanju autoriteta. Moć je virtualna sve dok nije aktualizovana, ali je isto tako neodeljiva od toka svoje aktualizacije (Deleuze 1991: 42).

Istina o moći, kao i svaka druga istina, uvek je rezultanta konkretnih borbi, eliminacija i ratnih strategija. Fuko ne želi istraživati alternativni, nehistorijski ili opšti koncept moći. Njegova konceptualizacija moći se može shvatiti kao predstavljanje sukoba sa različitim predstavama o moći, ali više kao teorijski pristup moći nego kao teorija o moći koja je primenjiva u političkoj praksi. Svoje polazište shvatanja moći Fuko pronalazi kod Ničea u tumačenju da je svaka istina samo trenutna prevlast, rezultat određenih odnosa moći. Svaki osećaj, svaki mir, svaki zakon i svaki oblik dominantne racionalnosti samo su ekspresije određenog trijumfa posebnog oblika moći. To je određenje nestabilnosti relacija moćikoje određuju strateško ili nestratificirano okruženje (Deleuze 1988: 74).

Fukoov pojam moći je psihoanalitički po svojoj prirodi, pokušavajući da objasni zašto i kako pojedinci vrše dominaciju na bilo kom nivou, analizujući kako aktivni akteri moći reaguju

na dolazne moći izvršavajući svoje. Fuko moć ne vidi kao pojam sa velikim M, koja nameće svoju racionalnost društvenom telu. Odnosi moći imaju različite višestuke forme, različitih oblika, mogu biti u igri porodičnih odnosa, unutar institucije ili uprave.

Osvajanje moći kao strategije, a ne kao posedovanje znači izvršenje ili delovanje, jer moć nije nešto što se jednostavno može steći i nije lokalizovano isključivo u određenim institucijama ili pojedincima. Moć je skupo dnosa raspršen diljem društva (Foucault 1980). Ipak, u moći mora postojati otporjer on uključuje moć, kao i potčinjavanje. Ako vlast ne čini ništa drugo nego samo govori „ne”, onda verovatno nećemo to poštovati (Balan 2006: 3). Otpor u sebi sadržava uslov postojanja odnosa moći. Ideja o superirnoj moći evocira na Ničeovu poznatu dihotomiju o snagama i njihovoj volji ka moćima (superironija naspram inferirnoj, aktivnoj prema pasivnoj). Odnosi moći menjaju se otporom (Foucault 1978: 95-96). Fuko ne želi da objasni što je moć po sebi, što je njena suština; on tumači metodološka oruđa, praksu tretiranja moći, odnosno perspektive borbi sa moći unutar diskursa.

Za Fukoa znanje nije moć, niti je moć ekvivalent znanju, ali je moć suština znanja i obrnuto. U kritici moderne i humanizma, Fuko tvrdi da su moderni oblici moći i znanja podloga za stvaranje novih oblika dominacije. Takva perspektiva je jedna od glavnih polazišta postmoderne zato jer zapadna civilizacija ograničava želju za moći i isključuje mogućnost uzimanja moći

Otkrivajući promenljivu prirodu dinamike moći, Fuko pokazuje da svaka analiza moći mora biti spremna da odgovara promenljivim sistemima ovih odnosa i njegovih glavnih arbitara. Suprotno monarhističkoj i demokratskoj moći, Fuko tvrdi da demokratija ne zasniva svoj legitimitet i silu u *de facto* snazi monarhije već „predpostavlja tesno pletenu mrežu materijalnih prinuda“. Zbog toga demokratska sila mora biti prikrivena, budući da ona zahteva od subjekta da u jednoj instanci podrži ono što njima upravlja, ali i čemu se pojedinac odupire (Foucault 1980: 104).

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Vesna Stanković Pejnović

**THE POWER OF DISCOURSE FROM
FOUCAULT'S PERSPECTIVE**

Abstract

The article addresses the Foucauldian definition of discourse as the 'ways of constituting knowledge'. Discourse is the intangible collection of the authoritative voices, culturally understood truths and assumed narratives of history and other areas of knowledge, to that extent that discourse arbitrates what knowledge is. Discourse is intrinsic to power, betrothing authoritative voices with the ability to trespass upon an individual's private life and the way they think and conceive of what they can do and who they can be, in accordance with what they are told is the truth. Within social contexts, discourse theory is concerned with issues of power and domination.

The aim of the paper is to show Foucauldian perspective that power is not the possession of the state, but the method through which humans interact on every level. Discourse is power that needs to be gained. The power problem is central to Foucault thinking regarding the relations between society, individuals, groups and institutions. Discourse transmits and produces power, but at the same time discourse itself is the result and the effect of the power.

Keywords: discourse, power, knowledge, Foucault.

Valerio Fabbrizi*

POLITICAL DISCOURSE AND REASONABLE DISAGREEMENT - WHAT CONSTITUTIONALISM SUGGESTS

Abstract

Reasonable disagreement is one of the most critical issues in contemporary political philosophy, especially within liberal-democratic constitutionalism. In emphasising the role of disagreement in the relationship between discourse and politics, many scholars such as Jeremy Waldron and Richard Bellamy – against the background of the Rawlsian idea of “reasonable pluralism” – defend the thesis of moral disagreement as the core of political deliberation. By refusing the idea of neutrality, these authors maintain that political discourse cannot be established by simply removing our moral disagreement on political values. This essay engages the issue of “discourse and politics” by focusing on some relevant topics: the deliberative conception of democracy; the Rawlsian idea of public reason as a forum for deliberation and discourse; the fact of disagreement and its influence on the deliberative process.

In order to investigate such issues, the paper follows three ways. First, it aims at examining John Rawls’ idea of public reason, by presenting it as a tool to

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resolve reasonable disagreement in the context of constitutional essentials. The second section deals with reasonable disagreement from a liberal point of view, by trying to focus on some critical remarks which Bellamy raises against Rawlsian political liberalism. The third section briefly analyses Waldron's arguments in defence of reasonable disagreement, as a critique of the deliberative model of democracy. From this perspective, Waldron presents deliberative democracy's failure in considering political dissent and moral disagreement as two problematic aspects of democracy.

Keywords: discourse and politics, reasonable disagreement, public reason, neutrality, consensus.

1. INTRODUCTION

Reasonable disagreement is one of the most debated issues in contemporary political philosophy. Generally speaking, reasonable disagreement is an *intersubjective* matter, as Samantha Besson correctly remarks, it opposes two or more people in a context of deliberation and intellectual exchange. Hence, Besson elucidates that “disagreement results from real differences of judgment or the “diversity of opinions” among members of a political community” (Besson 2005: 20).

Additionally, disagreement primarily concerns general principles, different conceptions of justice and, also, the constitutional essentials and not personal or group interests. Finally, reasonable disagreement opposes different opinions and views about justice and rights, openly and sincerely expressed in a public political discourse. On this line, Besson adds that such opinions “ought to be distinguished from *mere moral differences* (...) and differences in holding conflicting values” (Besson 2005: 21).

Citizens frequently disagree on many issues of social and political life, confronting themselves on different and sometimes irreconcilable moral and political grounds. Disagreement can concern different conceptions of justice, different views about funda-

mental values and the ways in which these values and rights should be protected. In this respect, Besson remarks the importance of distinguishing among “moral” disagreement (which affects value judgements) and “political” disagreement, which takes such values into account when meeting political matters. Nevertheless, a further definition of disagreement should be traced: disagreement about the *law* emerges as the main sort of political and moral disagreement. This depends on the fact that “it is a type of political disagreement since law may be regarded as an “offspring of politics” (Besson 2005: 46).

In the lights of the moral disagreement, people can reasonably defend a “political” variety of constitutional democracy, according to which fundamental rights and principles are supposed to be better protected by parliaments and majority rule; others can instead reasonably defend a “legal” account of constitutionalism, by considering courts as necessary institutions to protect fundamental rights from the risks of a constitutional majoritarianism.¹

More generally, reasonable disagreement involves a debate concerning its role within constitutional democracy and two different approaches can be identified: on the one hand, many commentators (Jeremy Waldron and Richard Bellamy, at first) consider as simply impossible to set aside or trivialize disagreement, by remarking its fundamental role for the democratic process. On the other hand, liberal theorists such as John Rawls and Charles Larmore defend a model of democracy which adopts the principle of neutrality as the only way to make fair and equal decisions about justice and political issues.

2. PUBLIC REASON AND DISAGREEMENT IN JOHN RAWLS’ POLITICAL LIBERALISM

The core question in John Rawls’ *Political Liberalism* asks “how is it possible that there may exist over time a stable and just

¹ This difference concerns, in a broader sense, the debate between legal and political models of constitutionalism. The first one – proposing a dualist idea of democracy – distinguishes the level of constitutional politics from the level of normal politics, in order to defend the democratic role of constitutional courts and the legitimacy of *judicial review*. Political constitutionalists, by rejecting the idea of a judicial control over legislative power by courts, defend a majoritarian form of monist constitutional democracy in which there is no separation between normal and constitutional politics. On this point see B. Ackerman (1991), R. Bellamy (2007).

society of free and equal citizens profoundly divided by reasonable though incompatible religious, philosophical and moral doctrines?" (Rawls 1993: XVIII).

The Rawlsian response focuses on the idea that disagreement arises from the so-called "circumstances of justice", which are the combination between the principle of "moderate scarcity" and "moderate self-interest". At the same time, Rawls stresses that political liberalism proposes the idea according to which a well-ordered society is commonly characterized by a reasonable pluralism which implies to reject any form of liberal perfectionism.

In Rawls' words, the cornerstone of political liberalism lies on the liberal principle of legitimacy, which states that "our exercise of political power is fully proper only when it is exercised in accordance with a constitution the essentials of which all citizens as free and equal may reasonably be expected to endorse in the light of principles and ideals acceptable to their common human reason" (Rawls 1993: 137).

The key point of the liberal principle of legitimacy affirms that the constitutional essentials on which the political power is grounded can be considered as legitimate only when they are accepted by all citizens, independently of their individual comprehensive doctrines. In the lights of such a principle, political liberalism assumes two key theses: the first points out that the constitutional essentials and the legitimacy of the political power depend on specifically "political" values; the second thesis involves the idea of an overlapping consensus, which entails that the political power and the constitutional essentials should be articulated independently from any particular comprehensive doctrine. This is what Rawls defines as a "political conception of justice".

The Rawlsian idea of a well-ordered society is based on the idea of "reciprocity", that can be distinguished into two versions: a weak reading and a strong reading. Under a weak reading, reciprocity requires that a person should be prepared to publicly justify only those principles according to which one acts in terms "others might reasonably accept" by sharing a common moral point of view from within the common human reason (Reidy 2006: 24).

The weak reciprocity means that citizens admit to reasonably disagree over moral or ethical issues when they *reasonably* defend their opinions about such issues, whilst they seek a common and shared point of view, but disagreement persists. Conversely, strong reciprocity demands “more than that we act toward our fellow citizens in political life in accord with and from principles they could reasonably accept” (Reidy 2006: 26). In this sense, strong reciprocity presupposes that, in our political life, we act in accordance with principles that the others could reasonably affirm and not reasonably reject.

The main difficulty with reciprocity lies in shifting from the weak to the strong version since, as Reidy concedes, “while the counterfactual aspect of “could” renders the *weak could reasonably affirm* formulation of reciprocity virtually toothless (since so many things “could” reasonably be affirmed) it renders the strong reading virtually ruthless” (Reidy 2006: 27). By contrast, the strong version – the so-called “*could not reasonably reject* thesis” – contains an idea of reciprocity which demands that “no citizen could reasonably reject those terms now or at any future point in time” (Reidy 2006: 27).

We cannot explore political discourse in Rawlsian terms without distinguishing between reasonable and rational actors. Reasonable persons are those who are willing to accept fair terms of cooperation and, at the same time, to propose such terms and principles to create a system of social and political equality in a context of reciprocity. Reasonable persons are not inclined to pursue general good as such, but they aim to follow the principle of fair cooperation on terms that all can accept. Conversely, rational individuals accept to participate into social cooperation only on the basis of their personal advantage or benefit; as Rawls highlights, “they are ready to violate such terms as suits their interests when circumstances allow” (Rawls 1993: 50).

Rationality and reasonableness are two complementary characteristics of human being, though they are two distinct ideas: the reasonable has the disposition and the willingness to cooperate with others for the common good, while the rational pursues only his/her own personal aspirations and goals. Nonetheless, Rawls remarks that, on the one hand, rational agents are not merely self-in-

interested individuals, since rationality does not imply interests in benefits to themselves but it can be interested in defending many kinds of affections or passions, such as love in a broader sense; thus, rational actors are ready to make everything to protect and defend such feelings.

Similarly, reasonable agents cannot be defined as merely “altruistic”, if it means to exclusively act for the interest of the others, since everybody holds rational ends and life scopes which cannot be set aside, though being disposed to fairly cooperate with all the others. This means that, as Rawls claims, “reasonable and the rational are taken as two distinct and independent basic ideas. They are distinct in that there is no thought of deriving one from the other; in particular, there is no thought of deriving the reasonable from the rational” (Rawls 1993: 51).

Nevertheless, rationality and reasonableness are complementary; it implies that both the rational and the reasonable cannot stand without the other: merely reasonable individuals would not have personal ends and scopes to promote though social cooperation; conversely, purely rational agents would lack of a sense of justice, by promoting only their personal ends and ignoring the spirit of cooperation.

Additionally, reasonable is “public” in the way the rational is not; reasonableness allows political actors to participate into the public sphere in a condition of cooperation with others, by promoting fair terms of the cooperation itself and by accepting the terms proposed by others. Thus, being reasonable imposes to think about our fellow citizens with respect, in the lights of the reasonable disagreement, but having the purpose to find a common ground when moral and political issues are at stake.

However, the peculiar aspect of reasonable agents is that they are inclined to recognize and respect the so-called “burdens of judgment” which are the sources or the causes of reasonable disagreement between reasonable persons, by accepting their effects on the legitimate exercise of public reason; Rawls identifies six stages of the burdens of judgment, by listing them as it follows:

1. The evidence – empirical and scientific – bearing on the cases is conflicting and complex, and thus hardtop assess and evaluate;

2. Even where we agree fully about the kinds of considerations that are relevant, we may disagree about their weight, and so arrive at different judgments;
3. To some extent all our concepts, and not only moral and political concepts, are vague and subject to hard cases; and this indeterminacy means that we must rely on judgment and interpretation (and on judgment about interpretations) within some range (...) where reasonable persons may differ;
4. To some extent the way we assess evidence and weigh moral and political values is shaped by our total experience, our whole course of life up to now; and our total experiences must always differ;
5. Often there are different kinds of normative considerations of different force on both sides of an issue and it is difficult to make an overall assessment;
6. Any system of social institutions is limited in the values it can admit so that some selection must be made from the full range of moral and political values that might be realized (...) In being forced to select among cherished values, or when we hold to several and must restrict each in view of the requirements of the others, we face great difficulties in setting priorities and making adjustments. Many hard decisions may seem to have no clear answer (Rawls 1993: 56-57).

Reasonable agents know that the burdens of judgment impose limits and constraints on what can be reasonably justifiable in front of the others; consequently, reasonable persons accept to disagree with their fellow citizens, by considering as unreasonable to use the political power to overcome moral disagreement by restraining non-unreasonable comprehensive doctrines.

The burdens of judgment thus represent the constraints over the collective exercise of the common human reason and their task is to motivate the existence of a deep reasonable disagreement among citizens; in this sense, the burdens of judgment are the pillars on which a fair and open political discourse can be settled within democratic regimes.

Many authors (Cohen 2003; Ferrara 2014) have described Rawls as a theorist of deliberative democracy and, to some extent, they seem to be right. Deliberative democracy, as Rawls conceives it, focuses on the idea that the public political debate, which aims at enabling the exercise of collective power, is an expression of the exercise of citizens' common reason, a form of moral argument deriving from reason and shaped on the idea of a democratic society of free and equals.

Under a deliberative banner, democratic politics— to be legitimate — needs to be structured on moments of public debate, in which citizens can exchange their reasons and ideas in a condition of equality and free speech. As Alessandro Ferrara underlines, “without this moment of *discourse* — broadly understood as a dialogical exchange under conditions of good faith, equality and reciprocity — politics would just be based on arbitrary force, the contingencies of power or the oscillation of popular sentiment” (Ferrara 2014: 32).

Deliberative democracy, properly understood, holds three key points: 1. An “object of deliberation” as its core issue; 2. The idea of the existence of this “object” leads us to assume the existence of a “deliberative body”, namely a subject of deliberation within which a collective discussion takes place; 3. The third point poses the existence of a “deliberative process”, within which a free and open exchange of reasons among the participants in the deliberative process takes place.

The Rawlsian deliberative account of democracy proposed adopts the idea of public reason as its pillar; in Rawls' view, public reason is a deliberative forum in which citizens can confront their positions and participate into the political discourse from a position of equality. In Larmore's words, “we honor public reason when we bring our own reason into accord with the reason of others, espousing a common point of view for settling the terms of our political life” (Larmore 2003: 368).

The idea of public reason is deeply connected with the so-called ideal of *publicity*, a tool of representation which entails the idea according to which we tend to adopt the principles of justice by the fact that we believe that our fellow citizens will do the same. The core of the ideal of publicity lies on the idea that the

social contract, on which our society is based, is built on a shared system of justice.

Publicity consists of three stages. The first one states that a democratic society should be governed in accordance with the principles of justice. In this first step, citizens accept such principles and believe that the others will do the same and this mutual trust is publicly recognized. The second one implies, in Rawls' terms, "the general beliefs in the light of which principles of justice can be accepted" (Rawls 1993: 66). These beliefs mainly concern the human nature and the way in which our socio-political institutions work; in the second stage, citizens share their beliefs and views, by participating into political discourse and a process of public reasoning to present their own views and eventually support those of others. The third step relates to the idea of a full justification of the political conception of justice. As Rawls points out, "this justification includes everything that we would say when we set up justice as fairness and reflect why we proceed in one way rather than another". (Rawls 1993: 67)

When, in a well-ordered society, all these three stages of publicity are fulfilled, the so-called *full publicity condition* is finally satisfied. This condition occurs only when all the characteristics of a well-ordered society are publicly disclosed and subjected to a fair and public political discourse. Indeed, the *full publicity condition* does not depend only on its public acceptance, but also when it is justified in a way that everybody might embrace and share such a condition.

Public reason is the basic element of any constitutional democracy; its form and content represent the main arguments of the Rawlsian conception of democracy. As Rawls claims, any democratic society is characterized by the so-called fact of pluralism, which consists in the existence of various facing reasonable comprehensive doctrines. Within public reason, citizens well know the impossibility to reach an agreement on the basis of their conflicting comprehensive doctrines; thus, in a condition of reasonable pluralism, public reason aims to facilitate the political discourse by accepting all the comprehensive doctrines, as long as they do not conflict with the constitutional essentials and with the idea of public reason itself. The application of public reason within our

analysis of “discourse and politics” leads us to distinguish five fundamental features of such a tool:

1. Public reason should always focus only on premises which are shared and accepted by all citizens;
2. Public reason only concerns issues of basic justice and only refers to the constitutional essentials;
3. Besides public reason, Rawls postulates the existence of other forms of political discourse, different from public reason but equally legitimate: declaration, conjecture, and-witnessing. In the case of the declaration, we are called to declare our own comprehensive doctrine, by presenting them to our counterparts. Conjecture, instead, calls us to “argue from what we believe (...) are other people’s basic doctrines (...) and try to show them that (...) they can still endorse a reasonable political conception that can provide a basis for public reason” (Rawls 1993: 465-466).
4. An argument stemming from issues of basic justice, by respecting the constitutional essentials and does not relate to these three kinds of discourse, fits within the public reason only if it takes place within the so-called *public political forum*, which is different from the so-called *background culture*.

A public forum is a context of argumentation in which a decision eventually must be made. This distinction is not the same as the distinction between the sphere of political decision making and the public sphere in Habermas. For the public forum includes not only the arguments taking place among office holders in legislative, executive, and judicial institutions when deliberation about the relevant matters is at stake but also deliberation in the larger citizenry when voting “in elections when constitutional essentials and matters of basic justice are at stake,” arguments offered by “members of political parties” and candidates in their campaigns. In the “background culture,” instead, we find arguments exchanged on the basis of non-public reasons in churches and universities, scientific societies and professional groups (Ferrara 2008: 64-65).

A further feature of public reason distinguishes between *inclusive* and *exclusive* conceptions. According to the *inclusive*

version, citizens are able to propose within the political discourse also those political values which refer to their comprehensive doctrines, provided that these values contribute in enforcing and enhancing the ideal of public reason itself. For the *exclusive* version, citizens can never present arguments from their own comprehensive doctrines when within public discourse fundamental political issues are at stake.

Within the *public political forum*, three different kinds of discourse can be identified: the first is the discourse delivered by judges in enacting their sentences – the judges of the Supreme Court, for instance; the second one is the discourse of the elected representatives, especially when holding an office; the third is the discourse of the candidates for such institutional offices or of their mentors or their electoral campaign's managers.

Within this framework, public reason develops within the *public political forum* and it is applied to parliaments and to their elected members; to government and to any other political or elected assembly. Following the Ackermanian dualist definition of constitutional democracy², Rawls refers to the Supreme Court as the “exemplar of public reason”, since the justices should always be able to publicly justify their decisions about laws and legislative acts enacted by parliaments, in the light of the constitutional essentials and the principle enshrined by the Constitution.

Public reason states that, when a reasonable decision about the *constitutional essentials* is made, reasonable citizens are not necessarily supposed to agree with such a decision; Rawls does not believe that reasonable and rational actors agree on all the decisions concerning the *constitutional essentials* or that they share the same concerns or opinions about legislative acts. Hence, the burdens of judgments help us to recognise the persons are often in a condition of reasonable disagreement both about the reasonableness of the

2 Bruce Ackerman defines the so-called “dualist” model of democracy by distinguishing two different levels of democratic decision-making: on the one hand, there is the “higher” lawmaking, which corresponds to the level of the Constitution and which is embodied by *we, the People*; on the other hand, we have the so-called “ordinary” lawmaking, which instead corresponds to the ordinary legislation carried on by representatives in the Congress or in parliament. At the same time, dualist democracy separates between two kinds of politics: “constitutional” politics, which occurs rarely and calls the people to express their voice about the fundamental principles and “normal” politics, which instead occurs daily and that is in the hands of the electorate, represented by the legislative members. About this issue see Ackerman 1991.

outcomes of a political discourse and on what they should consider as “morally” reasonable with respect to their comprehensive doctrines.

In addition, Rawls emphasises that differently from “moral” disagreements – disagreement about politics affects the political values that individuals accept and share as free and equal members of society. Accordingly, Samuel Freeman has correctly proposed to distinguish between *political* and *moral* accounts of reasonable disagreement.

Agreement on political values of public reason is crucial for the political autonomy of free and equal citizens; it is not essential that citizens always agree on laws and the appropriate resolution of disputes within public reason. General agreement among all reasonable citizens is only to be had on a few fundamental matters. Among these are most of the political values that count as public reasons, the guidelines for public reason, and the basic requirements of a liberal political conception of justice. For much of his career, Rawls hoped that he could show how it is possible that reasonable free and equal moral persons could come to generally agree upon justice as fairness as a regulative conception of justice. But he finally gave up on this ideal of a well-ordered society, once he fully realized the implications of the burdens of judgment (Freeman 2007: 410).

To conclude, Rawls addresses the issue of reasonable disagreement and discourse in politics by presenting public reason as the natural framework within which a moment of political public deliberation can take place.

3. LIBERAL DEMOCRACY AND THE FACT OF DISAGREEMENT

David Archard has rightly noted that disagreement essentially derives from pluralism and it is deeply connected with the idea of public reason. As Archard underlines “we could contrast two views of the political condition. The first sees the problem as one of philosophical disagreement [...] The second sees the problem as a conflict of material interests that derives from a competitive struggle for self-advantage and access to goods and power” (Archard

2001: 208). Thus, social conflict and political disagreement arising from socio-economic factors can be solved through an agreement on principles of justice; by the contrary, such agreement cannot help us to solve moral disagreement.

On this line, Richard Bellamy argues that the principles of justice cannot operate as a general framework, with ordinary democratic procedures, being perfectly acceptable as long as they do not risk to violate basic liberties. As Bellamy writes, “when competing conceptions of justice and rights are in play and are themselves in competition with other goods and values, then it becomes necessary to have political procedures that enable such disputes to be resolved in a manner that takes into account the interests and ideals of those concerned” (Bellamy 1996: 13).

In *Liberalism and Pluralism*, Bellamy notes that Rawls implants the so-called “fact of pluralism” within the framework of the burdens of judgment, by being “agnostic on the issue of whether pluralism is real or simply an appearance beyond which we are unlikely to go” (Bellamy 1999: 8). Thus, for Bellamy, the burdens of judgment set in superable obstacles in achieving an agreement on the better way to lead life. Bellamy adds that these limitations are not the result of a bad logic, narrow-mindedness or mere self-interest, but they are only the result of what we can reasonably demonstrate (Bellamy 1999: 43).

Accordingly, in pluralist societies moral disagreement is a substantially unavoidable condition; the crucial point in endorsing disagreement suggests that it does not arise from a rejection of reasonable discussion, or to an unreasonable approach to fundamental issues. Theorists of disagreement contend that liberals à la Rawls, in proposing neutrality principle as the way to resolve controversies, fail in affirming that, on the one hand, disagreement originates from irrationality or mental closure and, on the other hand, that disagreement is, *tout court*, the wrong way of reasoning.

In discussing reasonable disagreement, Robert Talisse suggests distinguishing between the so-called “non-convergence thesis” and the “equal reasonableness”. The first thesis implies that the free and equal exercise of individual reason does not fall within the general convergence of all individuals on a particular comprehensive doctrine. As Talisse stresses, Rawls recognizes the

principle according to which our public debate on natural sciences can lead us to a convergence of opinion “at least in the long run”; however, Rawls denies the possibility that such convergence could be achieved on philosophical, religious or moral principles or constitutional essentials. Rawls denies that rational and free citizens will eventually come to agree upon a single comprehensive doctrine, even in the long run. Although disagreement with regard to scientific theories may be temporary, disagreement with regard to comprehensive views can be overcome only by oppression. Disagreement is, therefore, a “permanent” feature of a free society (Talisso 2003: 178).

According to the second thesis –the “equal reasonableness” –our different comprehensive doctrines – though sometimes incompatible each other – are to be generally considered as equally coherent with the exercise of our common human reason. In this vein, disagreement should not be considered as a “matter of dogmatism or unreasonableness” due to the fact that when the full and proper exercise of human reason does not identify with a specific and particular comprehensive doctrine, our disagreement on moral and philosophical matters will be considered as purely “reasonable”.

There is a plurality of fully reasonable comprehensive doctrines, such that doctrines that are logically incompatible may each be fully reasonable. In this sense, there is not simply widespread a permanent *disagreement* among people, but widespread and permanent *pluralism* with regard to philosophical, moral and religious essentials about which people might disagree (Talisso 2003: 178).

Scholars such as Waldron, Bellamy and Albert Weale identify the so-called “circumstances of politics” as a key issue. The “circumstances of politics” arises into two main aspects: the first relates to the fact that our contemporary society is characterized by a deep reasonable moral disagreement. In such a condition, we disagree on many aspects of social and political life, and we put our particular conception of justice into play. The second aspect is that – despite this wide disagreement – we need to make decisions which allow the citizens to live and cooperate together as free and equals.

As Bellamy writes, “circumstances of politics are circumstances where we disagree about both the right and the good, yet nonetheless, require a collective decision on these matters. Conse-

quently, the constitution cannot be treated as a basic law or norm” (Bellamy 2007: 5). This means that the constitution should be considered as a “political” issue which is to be subject to public political debate.

From the Rawlsian perspective, reasonable disagreement can only concern comprehensive doctrines and not the constitutional essentials, which instead fall into an overlapping consensus. For Rawls, fundamental rights and principles and the most divisive issues should be always left outside the ordinary political discussion; at the same time, the interpretation of fundamental principles and of the basic rules concerns the scope of public reason and of the Supreme Court, that Rawls defines as the “exemplar of public reason” (Rawls 1993: 231-239).

In Bellamy’s view, the circumstances of politics allow us to assume the commitment to equality of concern and respect in a way that satisfies the condition of the republican non-domination. In this vein, Bellamy argues that “a system of equal votes and majority rule complies with this criterion by offering a procedural form of public reasoning that provides a fair means for ‘hearing the other side’. Competition between political parties further reinforces this system by promoting the responsiveness of political agents to their citizen principals and of citizens to each other” (Bellamy 2007: 259). Reasonable disagreement entails that modern pluralist societies are characterized by different worldviews and competing methods and solution to cope with this disagreement. Simon Caney indicates three possible solutions to this matter: the first is a so-called “institutional” solution, according to which, a way to cope with moral disagreement is to create political institutions in order to recognize and accept moral conflict as a vital element of our contemporary society, instead of rejecting it as a negative aspect.

As Caney reiterates, the first solution aims to create political procedures in order to give citizens the opportunity to properly defend their own worldviews under the equality principle and to gain the support of their fellow citizens. Thus, finally, political institutions are designed to regulate such disagreement in an equal and legitimate way.

The second solution – the so-called *avoid anceresponse* – takes into account those considerations which citizens and their

representatives should keep in mind when deciding about political issues. By recalling Rawls, Caney writes that “those who hold political office should practice this *method of avoidance*. Clearly, the neutralist position falls into this category since it forbids citizens and politicians from drawing on their beliefs about the good when passing legislation. Certain considerations [...] should not shape or influence political measures” (Caney 1998: 20).

The third solution is the so-called *cultural response*. It concerns virtues and fundamental character traits that people hold and propose when they disagree. Thus, it means that citizens who disagree should adopt certain fundamental norms and principles of justice, treating whom they disagree with civility and respect. Disagreement can “culturally” be reduced “by avoiding contempt for others, arrogance, boorishness and insulting language” (Caney 1998: 20). By assuming the second solution as the best one, and by defending an anti-perfectionist approach on justice, neutrality seems to be better equipped in order to respond to reasonable moral disagreement. Caney presents three further issues:

1. Reasonable disagreement does not concern principles of justice as a whole; thus, it follows that there is always a basic consensus on certain political values and ideals, such as – for instance – the respect for fundamental human rights or the respect for democratic principles such as free elections or democratic representation. The real disagreement concerns specific issues of justice: in this line, people diverge, for example, in their views about distributive justice; in the forms of punishment; in the legitimacy of the death penalty; in the forms of judicial activism over constitutional matters and so on.

2. Due to reasonable disagreement, principles of justice cannot be directly enacted by the *State* and this means that the *State* is prevented to impose just policies. Caney consequently admits that there is a cost to pay in terms of State-action when we establish that principles of justice should be acceptable to all reasonable citizens.

3. The principles of justice might be reasonably questioned by people; accordingly, the principles of distributive justice may be legitimately rejected by reasonable people simply because they disagree about the aims. Caney supports the thesis for which it

should be extremely implausible to argue that the *State* should not engage in enacting just policies.

Lars Vinx highlights that disagreement can be legitimately limited in the sense that there may be a certain conception of democracy and rights which cannot be reasonably subject to contestation or disagreement. As he notes, “if there is a defensible core-conception of democratic integrity that must be satisfied before democratic procedure can legitimately arbitrate the remaining disagreements about rights, there would seem to be no conclusive reason, from a democratic point of view, not to constitutionally entrench it and to have it enforced by the courts” (Vinx 2009: 594).

Bellamy rejects this analysis, by remarking that there is no fundamental moral principle, valid for all citizens, at the base of democratic legitimacy and that cannot be subject to public discussion as matters of reasonable disagreement. In his view, the only legitimate way to choose the fundamental principles is to give voice to disagreement, enhancing it through the majority rule.

4. ON JEREMY WALDRON’S DEFENCE OF REASONABLE DISAGREEMENT

In his major work, *Law and Disagreement* (1999), Jeremy Waldron focuses on the premise according to which politics primarily concerns disagreement. His question asks how law and politics can claim authority over citizens while recognising and enhancing a widespread reasonable moral disagreement about justice and constitutional essentials.

Within this framework, Waldron shares with Ronald Dworkin that disagreement can reasonably pertain to the idea of democracy itself, to what it does require and to what it is implied in such a notion. In this perspective, citizens are supposed to disagree about basic principles and fundamental issues such as the right to vote, the idea of political participation, the issues on which a common decision is required, the consequences of such issues on each of the social groups which form part of the community, the relationship between minority and majority groups and so forth. What Waldron emphasises is that “even if they agree that democracy implicates

certain rights, citizens will surely disagree what these rights are and what in detail they commit us to” (Waldron 1999: 294).

In Waldron’s view, reasonable disagreement implies that, in a constitutional democracy, constraining majoritarian will – through *judicial review*, for instance – represents an allegedly unjustified and illegitimate procedure. On this point, David Estlund notes, Waldron claims that “majoritarian processes cannot be subordinated to any particular account of justice, or rights, or even democracy without enshrining some view that is open to reasonable objection” (Estlund 2000: 112).

Waldron then assumes that disagreement is an indisputable condition of contemporary societies: people disagree, first of all, about the nature of rights, about the possible moral foundation of rights. Such a disagreement concerns “what rights we have; what they are rights *to* and what they are based on” (Waldron 1999: 11). Moreover, Waldron points out that, though assuming a Rawlsian *overlapping consensus* as the basis of democratic theory, we will always hold a strong disagreement about the implications of such a consensus and on what such a consensus really entails.

“Does”, Waldron asks, “the US Bill of Rights imply a right to privacy which in turn generates a basis for striking down laws that restrict abortion?” Or, as Waldron insists, “does the Second Amendment of the US Constitution require legislatures to permit private individuals as well as well-regulated state militias to carry assault weapons?” (Waldron 1999: 12). The crucial point here is that these issues generate a radical and intractable disagreement about them, for their interpretation and, moreover, for the implications they might have in our lives.

In defending reasonable disagreement, Waldron assumes a critical position against deliberative democracy, by contesting the thesis according to which the real aim of democratic debate is to achieve a reasonable consensus by setting aside disagreement through neutrality principle. Waldron argues that this ideal consensus tends to “present reasons that [...] the other should accept, and for two or more people to persist in argument is for them to notice and pursue the possibility that in the end, the same considerations will convince them all” (Waldron 1999: 91).

In his opinion, deliberative democrats emphasize that disagreement is a detrimental and problematic aspect of democracy, underlying, at the same time, that disagreement is actually the failure of deliberative process which is reflected in a weak and narrow consensus. For Waldron, deliberative democrats try to delegitimise voting decision and majority rule legislation in several ways. First, the deliberative model may be confined, in its application, only to those who share a common understanding and who consider politics as the way to clarify what this shared understanding is. Secondly, the deliberative model may be confined to certain areas of politics that deliberative theorists consider as more “consensual” (constitutional essentials or the idea of justice, for instance). Thirdly, deliberative theorists may affirm that there is something wrong with the motivations and argumentations of individuals when the voting moment comes.

Waldron’s main argument in defence of reasonable disagreement relates to the what he calls as the “circumstances of politics”, an idea borrowed from Rawls’ notion of the “circumstances of justice”. The main difference between these two concepts is that the Rawlsian one concerns the fundamental aspects of justice as fairness (*moderate scarcity* and *limited altruism*), whilst Waldron’s “circumstances of politics” pays attention to the disagreement generated by such principles.

Accordingly, Waldron’s thesis of the “circumstances of politics” goes hand in hand with a radical defence of the majority rule as the most democratic way to make political decisions. Two reasons seem to make majority rule the most democratic tool. First, it respects and enhances difference of opinions about justice and the fundamental values. This means that it does not require to set aside or sacrifice our own beliefs in favor of a “fancied” consensus. Second, majority rule “embodies a principle of respect for each person in the processes by which we settle on a view to be adopted as *ours* even in the face of disagreement” (Waldron 1999: 109).

Majority-rule decision-making provides – as Waldron contends – the best argument in defence of the principles of justice, by being the fairest method for making political decisions when people disagree about them. The fact of the recurring alternation between majority and minority in the political and legislative arena

allows majoritarian forces to be in a position to determine the political agenda and to propose a fair and open discourse about all those issues they consider as relevant at some point; furthermore, a majoritarian process allows minorities to influence decision-making processes and to highly contribute to the political discourse. Finally, Waldron emphasises that majoritarianism “will often ensure that no one party or faction monopolizes all the bases of current decision-making” (Waldron 1999: 188).

Elsewhere, Waldron has stressed that majoritarian decision-making is the best way to give individual’s view the broadest and deepest attention and care, by admitting the necessity to assign to everyone an equal attention and care for their views. By upholding this thesis, Waldron emphasises how majoritarian democratic deliberation looks like the fairest method for decision-making; still, Waldron argues that that majoritarian system is “a natural interpretation of the physical aggregation of forces in the physics of consent” (Waldron 1999: 148).

Although it seems that Waldron accepts the Rawlsian thesis of reciprocity in giving an equal attention to every view on the political scene, it is to say that he fails in attributing to majoritarian decision-making process the “magic” power to resolve any kind of controversies. The idea that the majority always wins because it is “the majority” is simply misleading. Democracy is not a mere “celebration” of majoritarian strength over minorities; democracy is instead a debating process among different views and opinions and its aim is to lead towards a common decision and a shared consensus about the constitutional essentials, a decision which unifies majority and minorities instead of separating them.

5. CONCLUSION

As we have seen, within constitutional theories of democracy different approaches can be traced: down one path, liberal theorists à la Rawls believe that moral disagreement should be gradually overcome or reduced at least by accepting the burdens of judgement and applying the principle of neutrality when issues about fundamental values and the constitutional essentials are at stake. Down another path, defenders of the centrality of reasonable disagreement within deliberative and constitutional process reject

the principle of neutrality and the idea of reducing or setting aside disagreement about fundamental moral values, by emphasising that it would mean to jeopardize the real essence of democracy.

The thesis I emphasise here is that we should distinguish between two different circumstances in which disagreement takes place: down one path, disagreements which arise on moral and ethical issues; down another path, disagreements may concern purely political issues as well as the constitutional essentials. My argument underlines that disagreement on individual moral and ethical issues is a natural, unquestionable and, in some sense, desirable condition of human being, since it affects to the most personal and experiential domain of individuals (likewise the Rawlsian “background culture”).

Conversely, when dealing with purely political issues or when constitutional essentials are at stake, we should make a strong reciprocal effort to reduce our disagreement on fundamental common values and to achieve the widest possible consensus, in the vein of the Rawlsian overlapping consensus, which aims at reaching a deep, broad and stable consensus on the constitutional essentials. At the same time, such a consensus requires to resolve, as far as possible, our disagreement about how democracy works or should work and on what constitutional essentials mean for us.

I eventually suggest separating the two stages of our “discourse ethics: 1. Disagreements about the background culture, which oppose issues which do not have relevance for our public *political* sphere, but that only concern the sphere of our personal and individual relationships; 2. Disagreements that, by contrast, arise when debating on the principles of justice and on the meaning of democratic citizenship. In this case, the principle of neutrality might help us to overcome disagreements on constitutional essentials, and to reach a compromise on what unites in a body politic us as free and equal citizens, rather than pursuing a divisive approach to democratic values.

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Ivan Matic*

**THE RIGHT TO BE WRONG:
THEORETICAL AND
PRACTICAL ASPECTS OF
FREEDOM OF SPEECH IN
PUBLIC DISCOURSE****

Abstract

This paper will present an analysis of freedom of speech, both in its theoretical breadth, and in its practical application. The first part of the paper will focus on the philosophical origins of freedom of expression, examining the differing approaches of John Locke and John Stuart Mill. The second part will analyze the criticism of this doctrine, drawing in particular on the works of Herbert Marcuse. Based on the previous conclusions, a classification will be established as a means of clearly distinguishing between freedom of speech and license of speech. Finally, this ranking will be applied as a foundation of practical judgement, examining both the current and historical status of freedom of expression under different legal systems.

Keywords: freedom of speech, license of speech, John Locke, John Stuart Mill, Herbert Marcuse,

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Bill of Rights (US Constitution), ECHR (European Court of Human Rights), public discourse, censorship, tolerance.

1. INTRODUCTION

The topic of free speech comes up every so often in today's world, and whether it's modern liberals opposing the First Amendment of the Bill of Rights in the United States (Pruden 2017), right-wing groups being banned for controversial comments (Sommers 2016), or American intellectuals urging European states to relax their stringent speech codes (Dworkin 2006), the issue is always mired in controversy. But, where did all these disagreements and cross-currents arise from? To truly understand the root of the issue, we have to go back to the theoretical foundations of freedom of speech: what it is, how it came to be, and most importantly, why. This intellectual journey will take us all the way back to the social contract theory. From there on, we will follow the development of early liberalism and, finally, arrive at the Marxist¹ critique of freedom of speech.

Having examined the development of free speech from a theoretical standpoint, we will then take on its practical history, from the Bill of Rights of the United States Constitution and the French revolutionary Declaration of Rights of Man and of the Citizen, to the controversial American espionage laws and the European Convention on Human Rights. All of this will give us a better understanding of what freedom of speech actually is and how it differs from license of speech, which will, in turn, enable us to clearly distinguish between legal systems that foster open discourse and those that suppress it.

¹ Herbert Marcuse's status as a Marxist political thinker can legitimately be brought into question. However, his position on the political economy, the interrelation between workers and capitalists and the eventual triumph of socialism over capitalism clearly qualifies him as such, even if his proposed means fail to achieve the goals he sets for society. For more on this topic, see: Marcuse, H. (1964).

2. PHILOSOPHICAL ORIGINS OF FREEDOM OF SPEECH

When it comes to political ideas, freedom of speech can be described as relatively ‘young’. Though some Italian Renaissance thinkers (Gucciardini 1998: 139, 141) argued in favor of making public discourse free and open, this was exclusively in the realm of ruling bodies, such as the senate, or the councils. It wasn’t until the seventeenth century and the rise of early proto-Enlightenment thought that the idea of free general public speech actually came about. It then saw further development in the eighteenth and toward the nineteenth century, though through a notably different approach, as part of the early liberal tradition.

2.1. The Contractual Approach

Social contract theories, despite their fundamental similarities, nevertheless diverge on a number of crucial issues, from human nature, across the legitimate limits of government, to the private sphere. Developed in the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries, these theories attempted to explain the origins of human society, while using the state of nature and the human condition as criteria of government legitimacy. Depending on their view of human nature, shaped in part by political systems they were proposing, the social contract theorists’ views on government greatly varied: while Hobbes, for example, stood for absolutism, though not necessarily absolute monarchy (Hobbes 1996: 121), Locke proposed a limited representative government consistent with broadly defined individual freedoms (Locke 2003: 110), and Rousseau favored direct democracy with a minimal representative element (Rousseau 1994: 66).

Their positions on freedom of expression varied accordingly: Hobbes, for instance, advocated for strict censorship (Hobbes 1996: 118), while Rousseau identified a very broad public domain, with individual rights being limited to life and liberty, in the sense of absence of chains (Rousseau 1994: 67). However, our focus here will be mainly on Locke, who was the first author to introduce the idea of freedom of speech in public discourse as a general notion. This wasn’t done as part of his famous *Two Treatises on Govern-*

ment, though, despite his *magnum opus*' considerable dedication to individual freedom and limits to governmental power.

Rather, Locke's ideas on freedom of expression came to be formulated as part of his anonymous *Letter Concerning Toleration*, which sparked a debate with Jonas Proast, an English theologian. Proast claimed that force, 'rightly used' and 'duly proportioned' was a necessary means of religious conversion (Proast 2010: 59). Locke responded to his claims by pointing out that all punishment is immoderate where there is no fault to be punished, and further, that the opposite opinion conflates dissent with guilt (Locke 2010: 75, 94). This hearkened back to a point that Locke had made in his original letter: "I readily grant that these opinions² are false and absurd; but the business of laws is not to provide for the truth of opinions, but for the safety and security of the commonwealth" (Locke 2003: 241).

This sentence captures the essence of freedom of speech, which would come to influence the framing of the First Amendment to the United States Constitution: that regardless of the content of opinion – its consistency, coherence, or veracity, the government cannot legitimately restrain or suppress it, as its role is limited to providing for the defense of the republic, and doesn't extend to ensuring universality of opinion, whether in regard to its truthfulness, or its value-based content (Weinstein 2009: 81). Locke's response to Proast's proposition of legal punishments as a means of religious conversion naturally stems from this foundation: if the government has no legitimacy in regulating opinions, dissent, by extension, cannot be treated as a crime. What follows, then, is that so long as citizens aren't taking up arms against the republic, or aiding its enemies, they are allowed not only to hold, but to publically express any opinion, regardless of its content in terms of popularity, value, or veracity.

In this regard, Locke goes on to point out that no opinion contrary to civil society ought to be tolerated (Locke 2003: 244); this includes the right of the magistrate to ban any organization (including churches) that attempts to subvert the government. In particular, he considers the danger of Islam, whose followers at the time recognized the mufti of Constantinople, himself obedient

2 Namely, the religious doctrines of Catholics, Jews and pagans.

to the Ottoman emperor (Locke 2003: 245-246). The boundaries Locke sets, however, still implicitly contain his distinction between expression and action: that certain doctrines aren't to be tolerated means not that the opinions they espouse are to be prohibited from being expressed, but that taking action upon them (which constitutes an attack against the republic), carries with it the threat of legal punishment (as the purpose of laws is ensuring the commonwealth's security).

Locke's contractual view of freedom of speech doesn't carry much theoretical ambition with it: its goal is simple, narrowly defined and entirely practical. The purpose of freedom of expression isn't to ensure that the truth becomes public knowledge, or to pave the way for progress; merely to define a broad scope of individual liberties and limit the power of government to its necessary role, thus preventing the kind of overreach that could result in the creation of what Locke considers to be even worse than the state of nature: absolute monarchy (Locke 2003: 105).

2.2. The Liberal Approach

A prominent utilitarian philosopher and one of the most influential liberal thinkers of all time, John Stuart Mill was uniquely eloquent and imaginative in his defense of freedom of speech: in his essay, *On the Liberty of Thought and Discussion*, he begins his analysis by separating freedom of speech from freedom of the press, assuming that no argument need be made in defense of freedom of the press as a means of preventing the rise of a corrupt and tyrannical government, or against a legislature determining what arguments the people should be allowed to hear (Mill 1977: 228). He goes on to point out that while freedom of the press is instrumental as a barrier against government corruption, freedom of expression is essential as a means of ensuring that the truth becomes public knowledge; that even had it been one with the people, the state would be no more justified in suppressing dissent, since the best government has no more right to it than the worst (Mill 1977: 229).

Mill concludes the premise of his argument with what is perhaps one of his most well-known quotes: "If all mankind minus one, were of one opinion, and only one person were of the contrary

opinion, mankind would be no more justified in silencing that one person, than he, if he had the power, would be in silencing mankind” (Mill 1977: 229). He goes on to point out that the particular evil of suppressing the freedom of expressing an opinion is that it denies everyone – those who agree, as well as those who disagree with it, the present generation, as well as posterity – the possibility of learning it; that it robs those who dissent from the opinion still more than those who share it. “If the opinion is right, they are deprived of the opportunity of exchanging error for truth: if wrong, they lose, what is almost as great a benefit, the clearer perception and livelier impression of truth, produced by its collision with error” (Mill 1977: 229).

Ronald Dworkin points out that, according to Mill’s view, truth is most likely to emerge as a result of free intellectual combat (Dworkin 2009: VII). Indeed, Mill claims that we can never be sure that the opinion we are trying to stifle is a false one; that any attempt to do so is an assumption of infallibility (Mill 1977: 229). He considers that the possibility of a judgement being used erroneously should not prevent it from being used, as we always act and exercise power without full certainty, anyway (Mill 1977: 230). “There is the greatest difference”, he concludes, “between presuming an opinion to be true, because, with every opportunity for contesting it, it has not been refuted, and assuming its truth for the purposes of not permitting its refutation” (Mill 1977: 231).

Appealing to a broader sense of justice, Mill points out that even the Catholic Church, infamous for its punishing of dissent, allows for a “Devil’s advocate” to be heard before canonizing saints, and that the trials of Socrates and Jesus should be more than enough to convince those who follow in their traditions of the value of freedom of expression (Mill 1977: 232, 235-236). However, even in the face of what seems like imminent prosecution, at least to some degree, Mill expresses the hope that truth will triumph over error, naming as its main advantage that it keeps reappearing throughout history, until favorable conditions have been met for its seed to be planted firmly (Mill 1977: 238).

It’s hard not to appreciate the eloquence and clarity of Mill’s stalwart defense of freedom of speech, particularly if we compare it to Locke’s matter-of-fact approach that almost regards it as a

non-issue. Despite this, however, distinguishing between foundations that these two great thinkers develop freedom of expression upon is important, as it will later enable us to discover where it is exactly that the theoretical approach went astray, and, consequently, where its practical application resulted in censorship.

As evidenced by his impassioned writing style, Mill was a fervent believer in free speech, not only for the sake of limiting excessive government power, a point that he briefly touches upon, but mainly for its contribution to civilization – to progress. Observed from this perspective, free public expression isn't merely the domain of the people that the government cannot legitimately infringe upon, but a tool for the eventual triumph of truth over error and, implicitly, rational modernity over irrational tradition. Such a fervent hope may be regarded as admirable, however, from a realist perspective, it needs to be judged not on its undoubtedly noble intentions, but on its long-term consequences.

3. THE THEORETICAL CASE FOR CENSORSHIP

As referenced by Mill in his defense of freedom of speech, censorship has, in one way, or another, existed as long as has organized society: in plain terms, it is as old as public expression itself. Consequently, its impact throughout history and, particularly, that of philosophy and religion, has been tremendous, perhaps most notably in the cases of Socrates and Jesus (Mill 1977: 235-236). However, for most of its existence, it hasn't had to be defended, and therefore, a foundation of its intellectual apology hadn't been developed until very recently.

Before the idea of free public expression even came to be considered, censorship was regarded as a matter of fact: Thomas Hobbes, for example, saw its derivation as a consequence of the absoluteness of the sovereign (Hobbes 1996: 118). As the early modern state was in its entirety the personal domain of the absolute monarch, there was no consideration of legitimacy in its bounds: nothing was recognized as being beyond the scope of the state's authority. Censorship, therefore, needed no defense. It was only with the introduction, not only of the philosophical idea, but with the practical establishment of free public discourse, that the

concept of suppressing dissenting opinions came to need arguments made in its favor.

Some early conservative thinkers dismissed the then-radical idea of freedom of speech, calling it “the right to be wrong”, which, in essence, it really is. However, where they saw it as negative, others observed it as a given that such a right was a necessary criterion of legitimacy. As we saw earlier, Locke understood free speech as being wholly beyond right and wrong and simply within the subject’s inviolable sphere, while Mill lauded it as one of the foremost tools of progress. One has to note the irony, then, in the fact that the contemporary defense of censorship would come to be based upon the very same approach that the philosophical founder of liberalism had previously used to promote freedom of expression.

Enter the Frankfurt School: a group of unorthodox Marxist intellectuals who had to migrate from Germany to America during the Nazi regime: these philosophers and sociologists were still focused on realizing Marx’s original goal of overthrowing capitalism and replacing it with socialism on the world stage, but were simultaneously dismayed by what they saw as the Soviet Union’s indefensible regression into totalitarianism, as well as a lack of revolutionary fervor within the working class in the West. One of their most influential members, Herbert Marcuse, advocated for what he saw as the solution: a shift of the revolutionary vanguard, from the working class, to the unemployed and the unemployable, as well as the non-integrated (racial, sexual and religious minorities, etc.) (Marcuse 1964: 260-261).

Establishing the framework of this new revolution would, among other things, require a change in the intellectual foundations of culture and society, in order to adapt to the new stage of development and enable the continuation of progress. Thus, Robert Paul Wolff writes, while political tolerance has played an important historical role, it is ultimately indefensible (Wolff 1965: 4-5): this is because freedom of speech, according to him, should not be regarded as a universal principle, but as a stepping stone tied to specific stage of development – namely, early capitalism.³

³ The implication of this argument is that the original, now surpassed purpose of freedom of speech was to pave the way for liberation from Christian dogma, making a re-introduction of censorship the ‘new way forward’.

The socialization and collectivization of initially atomized labor and individual firms has rendered political tolerance obsolete, as its positive role in progress has been surpassed, making its perpetuation historically unjustifiable (Wolff 1965: 7).

Wolff further criticizes freedom of expression in the United States, stating that “Absolute tolerance ... has the same disastrous effect on the adult personality as extreme permissiveness on the growing child” (Wolff 1965: 34-35). Finally, he observes that pluralism emerges as the domesticated version of class struggle, thus condemning it as a tool with which the capitalists lead the working class astray, distracting them from realizing their allegedly authentic goals (Wolff 1965: 52).

Herbert Marcuse establishes his defense of censorship within this theoretical framework: assuming the truth of foundational Marxist suppositions about politics and economics, he sets as his goal to explain why freedom of expression has outlived its usefulness. “In the firmly established liberal society of England and the United States, freedom of expression and assembly was granted even to the radical enemies of society, provided they did not make the transition from word to deed, from speech to action” (Marcuse 1965: 85). With this quote, Marcuse demonstrates a clear understanding of what freedom of speech entails – that no opinion, regardless of its content, ought to be suppressed; as long, that is, as it remains an opinion to be discussed, and not a battle cry to be followed.

Immediately, however, Marcuse treats us to an ‘alternate reading’ of tolerance: there is an “internal connection”, he claims, between truth and liberty, “a sense in which truth is the end of liberty, and liberty must be defined and confined by truth” (Marcuse 1965: 86). This is because, as he explains, “Freedom is liberation, a specific historical process between theory and practice, and as such it has its right and wrong, its truth and falsehood” (Marcuse 1965: 87). That freedom is liberation is an unjustified supposition of identity that has the unfortunate function of being one of the main pillars of Marcuse’s argument: liberation, as he correctly defines, is, indeed, a long historical process. Freedom is merely its conclusion – a political relation between subject and sovereign,

such that the sovereign's authority over the subject has bounds, as dictated by the domain of inviolable fundamental rights.

Tolerance, Marcuse further claims, is a precondition of freedom, but it cannot be indiscriminate in regards to the content of expression or action; it cannot protect false words and wrong deeds (Marcuse 1965: 88). To be properly understood, this proposition has to be separated by the individual claims that compose it, and analyzed accordingly. Firstly, that tolerance is a precondition of freedom is undoubtedly true – the only way a subject can have liberty under a sovereign, regardless of the political system, is if the sovereign's power over him has clearly defined boundaries.

Further, the idea that tolerance cannot be indiscriminate in regards to the content of expression or action is both problematic and rather manipulative, as Marcuse himself pointed out earlier that freedom of speech comprehends that even radical enemies of society are granted the right to express their opinion, “provided they did not make the transition from word to deed, from speech to action” (Marcuse 1965: 85). This newfound conflation of expression and action is, therefore, quite dishonest. As to the notion that tolerance cannot be indiscriminate to the content of expression, one has to wonder: in what other way can tolerance be tolerance? If only opinions that we agree with are allowed to be expressed, what is it, exactly, that we are tolerating?

Finally, in regards to the point that tolerance cannot protect false words and wrong deeds, let us, for argument's sake, assume that falseness of words and wrongness of deeds are indeed always knowable: let us, then, make the astounding leap of faith in further assuming that they are knowable in the ever elusive, eternally polarizing context of politics. Even so, going forward with the assumption that the truth reigns (a required condition, in order to enable the suppression of falsehood), the question still remains: what, exactly, is the purpose of tolerance and where does it manifest itself? If truth reigns by way of suppressing (supposedly) false dissenting opinions, what is actually being tolerated?

Here, Marcuse goes on to make some exceptions: he allows, for instance, the toleration of “regressive” art and literature (naming Dostoevsky as an example), as he considers art itself to be progressive, even if its content is not (Marcuse 1965: 89). He goes on to

assume that tolerance was conceived in order to enable people to develop their own interests and rights against established authority and opinion, noting that it becomes questionable when administered to the manipulated and indoctrinated who parrot the opinions of their masters. He concludes that the “telos (purpose) of tolerance is truth” (Marcuse 1965: 90). Even if were to go along with this assumption, we still have to ask ourselves: how are the manipulated and the indoctrinated ever to stand a chance of eventual emancipation if all sources going against the current of established authority are suppressed?⁴

Marcuse further correctly recognizes that tolerance is first and foremost for the sake of heretics, those targeted for prosecution by the powers that be. However, he goes on to point out that heresy by itself is no token of truth (Marcuse 1965: 91). While neither of these is problematic, it’s interesting to note how Marcuse fails to realize that the points he just made go directly against what he claimed above. In his reading of Mill, free and equal discussion can only fulfill its role if it is also *rational* (Marcuse 1965: 93), an interesting observation that Mill himself never made, nor would he have subscribed to, if we read *On the Liberty of Thought and Discussion* in its entirety, rather than isolating its quotes and embellishing them with our own political views.

Finally, Marcuse proposes an alternative to what he regards as “repressive tolerance” – his own, “liberating tolerance”, one in which right-wing opinions are banned from being uttered and any perceived “regressive” elements are viciously suppressed, while left-wing ideas are promoted and revolutionary violence is excused (Marcuse 1965: 100-103). “Liberating tolerance, then, would mean intolerance against movements from the Right, and tolerance of movements from the Left ... (it) requires the withdrawal of tolerance before the deed, at the stage of communication in word, print, and picture” (Marcuse 1965: 109). As we read these lines, let us remember with unparalleled irony, that their author was a Marxist thinker who was allegedly appalled by totalitarianism in the Soviet Union.

4 The irony that Marcuse and Wolff fail to see is that their case for censorship could just as well have been made in earlier times, namely, that ‘tolerance has no value when administered to those indoctrinated by the Church’.

4. FREEDOM OF SPEECH VS LICENCE OF SPEECH

While it can be argued that Marcuse ended up creating amore vicious monster than the one he tried to slay in his case for censorship, the concerns that underlay his ideas cannot easily be dismissed. As today's society maintains a relatively high nominal level of freedom, suppressive elements constantly creep in through the gaps: the abstract impartiality of the media serves to minimize their false objectivity, people suffer under established policies they have no real power over, and decisions between opposing opinions are often made before any debate has taken place, as Marcuse describes, not by any dictatorship, but by the "normal course of events" (Marcuse 1965: 92, 97, 98).

All of this is true and it would be very difficult indeed to argue that such covert manipulation doesn't exist in contemporary societies, particularly in highly developed Western countries. However, by the same token, it's easy to get carried away and assume that a problem is so pressing, that it needs to be solved immediately, by any means necessary: what such a fervent approach tends to disregard, is that an issue can be made worse by the application of an improper solution – that our attempt to fix it, if misguided, can actually render it worse. I will argue that such is inevitably the case with censorship, the policy whereby public expression is well within the domain of the government, such that for this allegedly noble goal or another, the state has the final say regarding what is allowed to be expressed (Marcuse 1965: 109).

Interestingly, throughout his essay, Marcuse uses the word "tolerance", proposing a new kind of it to replace the old. However, the ideas that John Locke and John Stuart Mill stood for, also constitute tolerance. Their content, however, was very different from that of the ones expressed by Robert Paul Wolff and Herbert Marcuse. All of this seemingly entangles us in a web of confusion that revolves around one central question: what is tolerance? If the notions that the laws ought to have no power over what is being expressed, their sole purpose being the preservation of the commonwealth's security; that freedom of speech is necessarily absolute regardless of the content of opinions, but is especially important for its contribution to the eventual triumph of truth; and that certain opinions should be banned by way of their political

affiliation, even before being discussed, all somehow constitute tolerance, can there even be a unifying element to tolerance?

I would like to draw a distinction here, which will become especially important when dealing with the historical and legal development of freedom of speech in practical terms. Namely, since the ideas of Locke and Mill on the one hand, and those of Marcuse on the other, confusingly both bear the name of tolerance, identifying the subtle divergence of approach that led to this development is of paramount importance here. The first step to solving the puzzle, then, is a change of perspective: the distinction I would propose here is between freedom of speech and license of speech, the former being defined as the right to express any opinion, regardless of its content, and the latter being defined as any principle that nominally allows freedom of expression, but adds the caveat 'except for X', where the variable X represents any idea or opinion perceived by the government as false, absurd, unpopular, or as holding any other quality, whereby its expression would hurt those otherwise capable of suppressing it.

The purpose of this distinction is twofold: its main goal is to help us differentiate between actual and purported freedom of speech; however, it also helps us distinguish between varying levels of censorship. This is important because, in the contemporary world, very few states and yet fewer people would consider introducing absolute censorship, whereby the government would have limitless power over what is being said, as the sole judge of public expression. With the idea that each and every document, speech and book ought to pass a censor's judgement before being published becoming increasingly unpopular and unworkable in the information age, censorship has to adapt, mold, and evolve, taking on a seemingly more legitimate and reasonable domain, while maintain its original goal: silencing dissenting opinions (however noble and justified this endeavor is presented as being).

License of speech, therefore, exists in the seemingly nebulous space between liberty and restriction, treading a blurry line that separates freedom of speech from boundless censorship. However, it clearly leans toward the latter, as its fundamental character remains unchanged with the transition to an appearance of liberty: for while the domain of opinions that cannot be expressed is

drastically reduced in its scope, the essential nature of the policy of censorship stays the same – there are still opinions that are forbidden from being expressed, the government has the final word on what these opinions are, and, by extension, who the people to be silenced are, allowing those in power to direct public discourse according to their will.

A clear advantage of license of speech over true censorship is that it can be ‘sold’ as freedom of speech: when a theory in line with this idea is proposed, or legislation based on it introduced, the apparent guarantee of the right to freedom of expression is noted, while the caveat outlining its ‘reasonable’ restriction is overlooked. Such restrictions typically impact fringe ideas and tiny minorities who have no real chance of opposing them, while the vast majority sees them as irrelevant, or even detestable, and, therefore, disregards their legal status.

Such an attitude is understandable, especially if the ideas in question have been historically shown to be dangerous, or are themselves opposed to freedom and equality before the law. However, it underestimates the danger that license of speech, just like any form of censorship, poses for public discourse in its entirety: while prohibiting radical or extreme ideas may seem prudent in principle, imbuing the government with the power to forbid public expression of ideas can have dangerous consequences in practice. For, while it might be tempting to entrust a government we support with such authority, we have to ask ourselves whether we’d also be ready to see that same power in the hands of a government we distrust and fear. The inevitable consequence of the former holding a monopoly over public discourse, is that the latter will eventually possess it as well.

The fundamental question, then, remains what freedom and license of speech are rooted in, and where the rift between them emerges from. As we saw earlier, Locke takes the stance that the government has no business in regulating opinions, the only purpose of laws being ensuring the safety of the commonwealth (Locke 2003: 241), an approach that Mill slightly twists, accentuating, instead, the importance of freedom of expression for the eventual triumph of truth over error, and the civilizational progress rooted in it (Mill 1977: 238). The problem with the early liberal approach

is that, while it firmly recognizes legitimate boundaries of government, it simultaneously sets a precedent for the circumvention of this criteria, namely, by introducing the contribution of freedom of speech to truth and progress.

The currents that ultimately spur the introduction of license of speech fundamentally start here: at their core are two conflicting principles, seemingly defending freedom of expression hand-in-hand. Fundamental rights, on the one hand, and truth and progress, on the other. On the surface, there is no reason why these should come into conflict, which is likely what inspired Mill to use them both. And, while his own commitment to tolerance is sincere and unrelenting, he may have unwittingly created a criterion for the defense of freedom of speech that would, ironically, ultimately be used in the attempt to tear it down.

Nowhere is this more apparent than in Marcuse's attack on freedom of expression: in his twisted understanding of tolerance, gone were all the principles that actually prevented governments from controlling public discourse utterly; in their place was the author's call for his own opinions and those of his allies to be recognized as true and progressive, enshrined under the glass bell of "liberating tolerance", while the ideas of dissidents were to be 'unmasked' as false and regressive, to be prohibited from being expressed in "word, print, and picture" (Marcuse 1965: 109). The irony here, as it relates to anti-Soviet Marxists' support for censorship, is that they fail to make the crucial connection between the Orwellian policies they are proposing and the ones they saw as facilitating the fall of the USSR to what they call 'Stalinism'.

Namely, the problem is that the state, once unleashed from constitutional constraints and given boundless authority, will never yield such power, and will use it to its full extent, regardless of who the people in government are and what goals they choose to pursue. To give a concrete example, take the kind of censorship that Marcuse proposes: he focuses on the ends that he deems worth sacrificing constitutionality for, but fails to realize that the means dictate political life more than the ends do. A government authorized with suppressing dissent for the purpose of ensuring progress might very well do so, for a time. However, change the people in power, or, indeed, change the goals of the people already

in power, and you're left with a government authorized to suppress dissent, and no incentive for pursuing progress, as, at that point, staying in power through, among other things, eliminating political opposition, takes precedent.

Even so, there is no denying that truth, given equal legal footing with error in the form of free speech and open public discourse, will eventually triumph. However, great danger lies in positing this as the criterion and source of legitimacy for freedom of expression. The only 'safe' option, philosophically and legally, is to clearly define the domain of fundamental individual rights that the government can't abridge for any reason whatsoever, as they have no impact on the security of the commonwealth, which is what Locke's proposal amounted to. Any attempt to expand the scope of the purpose of free speech carries with it the danger that those wholly convinced of their righteousness will, as Mill puts it, assume the truth of their opinion "for the purposes of not permitting its refutation" (Mill 1977: 231).

5. PRACTICAL HISTORY OF FREEDOM OF EXPRESSION

We've gone all the way back to the philosophical foundations of free speech and traced the divergence of its theoretical development. We've seen how one approach (Locke's and, to an extent, Mill's) identifies freedom of expression as an end, while the other (originally Mill's, later Marcuse's and Wolff's) sees it as a means to an end. We will now take a look at the gradual historical development of this conception in practical, legal terms, and observe how these fundamentally different views manifest themselves in political systems.

As is its case in philosophy, freedom of speech is also a 'young' idea in the political and legal domain: the famous English Bill of Rights of 1689, for example, mentions it in the context of petitions and parliamentary discussions (English Bill of Rights), but makes no attempt of ensuring it in the broader public discourse. In fact, the very first, and, to this day, firmest guarantee of free speech came a whole century later, as part of the US Bill of Rights, the first ten amendments to the US Constitution of 1787. In the

exact wording of the First Amendment, “Congress shall make no law respecting an establishment of religion, or prohibiting the free exercise thereof; or abridging the freedom of speech, or of the press; or the right of the people peaceably to assemble, and to petition the Government for a redress of grievances” (US Bill of Rights). John Locke’s influence on America’s founding document needs no elaboration. However, despite its clarity, First Amendment rights, freedom of speech in particular, have been the subject of cases before the US Supreme Court a number of times. These ‘trials of tolerance’ will later be analyzed and discussed.

With its principal focus on individual liberty, the US Bill of Rights represents an excellent historical example of treating freedom of expression as an end, rather than as a means to an end. The other, progressivist approach, is, perhaps, nowhere more apparent than in the Declaration of Rights of Man and of the Citizen, the defining pre-constitutional legal document of the revolutionary French Republic. Its Eleventh Article states that: “The free communication of ideas and opinions is one of the most precious of the rights of man. Every citizen may, accordingly, speak, write, and print with freedom, but shall be responsible for such abuses of this freedom as shall be defined by law” (Declaration of Rights of Man and of the Citizen)

Immediately, we see the consequences of divergence in the theoretical approach, and with them, the ever elusive license of speech: freedom of speech is guaranteed, ‘except for X’ (in this case, the ‘X’ remains unspecified, further blurring an already vague concept). The untold thousands of neither aristocrats, nor priests, but revolutionaries of different factions who perished under the guillotine perfectly demonstrate the inevitable consequences of dissenting against the opinions of those with limitless power in their hands.

In legal terms, pitting the First Amendment to the US Constitution against the Eleventh Article of the Declaration of Rights of Man and of the Citizen gives us the clearest practical distinction possible between freedom and license of speech: the former guarantees that Congress shall make no law abridging freedom of speech, period; the latter is a different story entirely: while it also nominally guarantees freedom of speech, the caveat behind

the guarantee is the article's most important point – its purposeful vagueness is there to ensure the broadest possible reading of tolerance, allowing, in effect, the government to crack down on any dissenting opinion, under the guise of its supposed abusiveness.

A contemporary counterpart of the French Declaration's license of speech can be found in the European Convention on Human Rights. Defining freedom of speech, Article 10(1) states: "Everyone has the right to freedom of expression. This right shall include freedom to hold opinions and to receive and impart information without interference by public authority and regardless of frontiers. This article shall not prevent states from requiring the licensing of broadcasting, television or cinema enterprises" (Howard 2018: 10). However, 10(2) reads: "The exercise of the these freedoms, since it carries with it duties and responsibilities, may be subject to such formalities, conditions, restrictions or penalties as are prescribed by law and are necessary in a democratic society, in the interests of national security, territorial integrity or public safety, for the prevention of disorder or crime, for the protection of health and morals, for the protection of reputation or rights of others, for preventing the disclosure of information received in confidence, or for maintaining the authority and impartiality of the judiciary" (Howard 2018: 19). In other words, basically for anything.

This isn't to trivialize the Convention's attempt at clarity, but in the undoubtedly meticulous endeavor to eliminate any misunderstandings that might arise, it ends up putting up numberless barriers, which is nowhere more apparent than in the rulings of the European Court of Human Rights in a number of controversial cases. For example, a 'right not to be offended' came to be recognized in *I.A. v Turkey*, where a novelist appealed to the European Court for a conviction of blasphemy (Howard 2018: 25). In another case, *Erbakan v Turkey*, the Court established a 'duty not to foster intolerance' (Howard 2018: 32). In *Gunduz v Turkey*, the conviction of a member of an Islamic sect opposed to secularism was reinforced; in *Norwood v United Kingdom*, the appeal of an organizer of a right-wing British National Party who connected Al Qaeda's attack on the World Trade Center to Islam was rejected; in *Feret v Belgium*, it was held that the conviction of the leader of the Belgian right-wing party National Front for 'hate speech' didn't violate his freedom of speech, while in *Vajnai v Hungary*, the Court

held that the conviction of the vice president of the Worker's party for displaying 'totalitarian' symbols (he was wearing the red star, the symbol of the international workers' movement) did violate his right to freedom of expression (Howard 2018: 61, 63, 88, 95, 107).

These cases, alongside others, such as *Zana v Turkey*, *Perincek v Switzerland* and *Le Pen v France*, et al, demonstrate in no unclear terms the Court's Marcusean "liberating tolerance" – its general bend toward the left and its commitment to 'progressivism': in most cases, Islamic law is allowed to run rampant, to the point of prosecutions for blasphemy being supported and justified, while Christian communities are required to embrace pluralism. The same goes for leftist ideas, even the most historically dangerous ones, being allowed free expression, while right-wing sentiments and protests are strictly censored as intolerable.

Beyond the mere scope of the ECHR, censorship in Europe shows a tendency of regressing toward complete absurdity: for example, a German comedian was prosecuted for writing a poem against Turkey's president Recep Tayyip Erdogan, under an obscure section of criminal law that prohibits 'offending the sovereign' (Oltermann 2016), while in a case in Britain, a Football fan group was temporarily banned for holding up signs which read "Fuck ISIS", under accusations of Islamophobia (Sommers 2016). Such bizarre legal cases led Ronald Dworkin, an American philosopher and jurist strongly committed to free speech, to urge European states to soften censorship and relax their stringent speech codes, eliminating prohibitions against 'hate speech' (Dworkin 2006).

While the status of free speech in the United States may seem flawless when compared to Europe, a careful look at twentieth century history shows otherwise: despite the stalwartness and clarity of the First Amendment, America has had its own troubled history of working out issues of censorship and suppression of dissent, primarily in response to the rise of socialism and far-right extremism. Given that the US Bill of Rights guarantees freedom of speech, these issues were mainly focused on specifying what this freedom actually entails and how to legally define it. For purposes of clarity, we will start with what the US Supreme Court arrived at, which is in line with the Lockean ideas that fundamentally shaped the constitution: freedom of speech comprehends the right

to express any opinion, regardless of its content; it does not allow taking action against the state, nor aiding its enemies in any way.

The first ‘trial of tolerance’ came with the late entry of the United States into World War I: the country’s war effort was deeply divisive and unpopular, leading the administration of President Woodrow Wilson to launch criminal prosecutions against thousands of dissidents. In one such case, *Baltzer v. United States*, where the defendant had criticized the handling of conscription, Supreme Court Justice Oliver Wendell Holmes urged those with almost unlimited power in their hands to err on the side of freedom, while supporting even harsher punishments for actual obstruction of justice. Such an instance came with the trial and conviction of Charles Schneck, the General Secretary of the Socialist Party of Philadelphia, who sent over 15000 leaflets to men slated for conscription, urging them to assert their rights against the draft, which he falsely, or, at the very least, erroneously claimed to violate the Thirteenth Amendment’s provision against involuntary servitude (*Schneck v. United States* 1919).

The Thirteenth Amendment to the US Constitution was passed by Congress in 1865, following the triumph of the Federation in the Civil War: “Neither slavery nor involuntary servitude, except as a punishment for crime whereof the party shall have been duly convicted, shall exist within the United States, or any place subject to their jurisdiction”(The Thirteenth Amendment to the U.S. Constitution: Abolition of Slavery 1865). The amendment enacted the constitutional prohibition of slavery and had nothing to do with military service, which remains obligatory under the Oath of Allegiance: “...I will support and defend the Constitution and laws of the United States of America against all enemies, foreign and domestic ... I will bear arms on behalf of the United States when required by the law...”(U.S.Oath of Allegiance).

Schneck’s conviction was upheld by the Supreme Court, and came in light of the Espionage Act of 1917 that prohibited giving aid to enemies of the United States in either material goods, or information, with Justice Holmes writing the unanimous opinion: “The most stringent protection of free speech would not protect a man in falsely shouting fire in a theatre and causing a panic. It does not even protect a man from an injunction against uttering words

that may have all the effect of force ... The question in every case is whether the words used are used in such circumstances and are of such a nature as to create a clear and present danger that they will bring about the substantive evils that Congress has a right to prevent” (*Schneck v. United States* 1919). This ruling established the criterion of ‘clear and present danger’ that would remain in use until 1969.

Another landmark ‘trial of tolerance’ came in 1929, when Rosika Schwimmer, an immigrant of Hungarian descent applied for naturalization, but would not take the Oath of Allegiance on account of being a principled pacifist. The Supreme Court held in a 6–3 vote that Schwimmer’s citizenship should be denied for refusing to take the oath. Justice Pierce Butler wrote the majority decision, quoting that: “the very conception of a just government and its duty to the citizen includes the reciprocal obligation of the citizen to render military service in case of need” (*United States v. Schwimmer* 1929). Justice Holmes wrote a dissenting opinion, stating that the applicant’s readiness to bear arms is irrelevant, as she is a woman in her fifties that would not be allowed to do so even if she were willing, and concluding with the now-revered quote that the case came to be remembered by: “if there is any principle of the Constitution that more imperatively calls for attachment than any other, it is the principle of free thought - not free thought for those who agree with us, but freedom for the thought that we hate” (*United States v. Schwimmer* 1929).

The third ‘trial of tolerance’ brought about the reckoning for Communist Party USA in 1951, with *Dennis v. United States*, a case in which Eugene Dennis, the Party’s General Secretary, and his associates were found guilty of conspiring to overthrow the US government by force, based on Marxist writings, such as *The Communist Manifesto*.⁵ This was preceded by a similar case, *Whitney v. California* in 1927. The defendants claimed to be a regular political party which promotes socialism through peaceful means, as well as that the trial, being a ‘capitalist venture’, would never provide a fair outcome for proletarians. The case was decided 6–2 in favor of conviction, though Justice Hugo Black wrote a famous dissenting opinion:

5 A declaration in the final paragraph of this (in)famous document states the following: “(The Communists) openly declare that their ends can be attained only by a forcible overthrow of all existing social conditions.”

“These petitioners were not charged with an attempt to overthrow the Government. They were not charged with overt acts of any kind designed to overthrow the Government. They were not even charged with saying anything or writing anything designed to overthrow the Government. The charge was that they agreed to assemble and to talk and publish certain ideas at a later date: the indictment is that they conspired to organize the Communist Party and to use speech or newspapers and other publications in the future to teach and advocate for the forcible overthrow of the Government. No matter how it is worded, this is a virulent form of prior censorship of speech and press, which I believe the First Amendment forbids” (*Dennis v. United States* 1951).

The fourth and final ‘trial of tolerance’ that would come to put the issue of defining freedom of expression to rest, came in 1969, with the constitutionality of the State of Ohio’s criminal syndicalism statute being brought into question following the trial and conviction of Clarence Brandenburg, a leader of the Ku Klux Klan. Brandenburg had made speeches against Blacks and Jews, and announced a ‘march on Washington’ on the 4th of July. The Court struck down the verdict, declaring Ohio’s criminal syndicalism statute unconstitutional; the *per curiam* majority opinion stated: “Freedom of speech and press do not permit a State to forbid advocacy of the use of force or of law violation except where such advocacy is directed to inciting or producing imminent lawless action and is likely to incite or produce such action” (*Brandenburg v. Ohio* 1969). The ruling of *Brandenburg v. Ohio* thus also overruled *Schneck v. United States* and *Whitney v. California* in changing the criterion of ‘clear and present danger’ for judging the legality of speech to ‘imminent lawless action’.

Half a century of legal turmoil thus resulted in a foundationally Lockean, original understanding of freedom of speech: that it entails everyone’s right to express any opinion, regardless of its content, barring, of course, a direct incitement to violence, as well as taking action against the state, or aiding its enemies, such that the purpose of laws is not regulating the truth of opinion, but providing for the safety and security of the commonwealth. With that, fifty years later, organizations such as the Communist and Nazi parties, as well as the Westboro Baptist Church and NAMBLA, though small, freely exist and openly express their opinions

unimpeded, not because they're right, but because they have the right to be wrong.

6. CONCLUSION

The last few decades have seen a severe crackdown on dissenting opinions in Europe, and whether its individual instances were motivated by preventing danger, curbing racism, or suppressing religious bigotry, the broad justification for them typically referred to a 'European reading of freedom of speech', as opposed to an 'American' one. We have to wonder, how can the right to express any opinion, regardless of its content possibly be read differently depending on the continent? Are we also to expect a 'European' reading of addition, where $1+1$ doesn't have to equal 2?⁶ It is clear that such instances of censorship arise out of the current direction of public discourse, however, well-formulated constitutional restrictions exist specifically in order to counter such arbitrary variables. Recent history shows us that their enactment can be a long and arduous process, but, supposing its foundation upon correct principles, its eventual success is inevitable. With a correct understanding of what tolerance actually entails and regulation based on it in place, no governing body, national or international, could replace freedom of speech with license of speech, the most covert and dangerous form of censorship. Then, and only then could we claim without reservation that we live in a society in which opinions are considered to be true because, with every opportunity for contesting them, they have not been refuted, rather than one in which their truth is presumed for the purposes of not permitting their refutation.

6 This is a reference to a puzzle in the philosophy of mathematics, where it was claimed that $1+1=2$, but doesn't have to, because two coins might differ very slightly, whereupon their addition can be a little less or more than 2. It was Frege who pointed out that this example doesn't theoretically endanger the operation of addition, as arithmetic deals with abstract numbers, and not the imperfect material objects that we represent them with.

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II
CASE STUDIES AND DISCOURSE IN
CONTEMPORARY POLITICAL
PROCESSES

Ruth Breeze*

**APPROACHING POPULIST
DISCOURSE FROM
LINGUISTICS: GRADUATION
IN POLITICAL SPEECHES**

Abstract

This paper applies the Appraisal framework to data from four speeches by contemporary politicians (Obama, Trump, Cameron and Farage), centering on the categories that define graduation (force and focus). The populist politicians apply force to sharpen negative effects, and their speeches are characterised by strong infusion and frequent repetition. The non-populist politicians apply force in positive as well as negative contexts, and their repetitions generally reflect development rather than simple emphasis. Regarding scales of focus, the populist politicians prefer a vague focus, particularly when defining threats facing the population, while the non-populists communicate using a much sharper focus. These results contribute to discussion in the bibliography on populist communication styles.

Keywords: discourse, linguistics, populism, communication, political speeches, ideology

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1. INTRODUCTION

There is absolutely nothing new about the idea that politics and language are inextricably bound up together. When Aristotle presented the human being as “a political animal”, he went on almost immediately to associate our “political” nature with the fact that we humans are distinguished from the animals by our power of speech (*Politics* 1992, line 1253a7). Of course, there is a vast bibliography on political rhetoric extending over many centuries and encompassing a wide range of different cultures (see Perelman, Olbrechts-Tyteca 1969; Chilton 2004). Yet the workings of language in politics are still a source of interest for linguists and discourse analysts, as each generation of politicians comes up with new syntheses to build responses to changing political scenarios, appeal to different generations of voters, and convey their messages using new technological affordances.

In recent years, the focus of interest in political discourse studies has been the emergence of new communication styles in politics, perhaps in response to changes in media systems (Mudde 2004; Esser, Strömbeck 2014). The European political scene has recently been characterised by the emergence of new parties and movements often grouped together under the heading “populist” (Wodak, Khosravi, Nik, Mral 2014; van Kessel 2015; Mudde 2016). In the USA, too, the rise of Donald Trump has been interpreted as part of a “populist turn” in public life (Hawley 2017). Moreover, these changes seem to be part of a world-wide phenomenon that has been amply documented (Moffitt 2016). Studies that have emerged in this context generally focus on the definition and nature of populism, aiming to determine whether it is essentially just a communication style, or whether it entails a particular ideological dimension, or even a commitment to certain policy priorities (Mudde 2004, Stanley 2008; Moffitt 2016). One tentative conclusion from this is that the term “populism” is currently being defined in various contradictory ways. There is the strong definition of populism as implying the empowerment of the people in their struggle against political elites (de Cleen, Stavrakakis 2017), but this can be contrasted with other definitions of populism that include political projects that claim to pursue the interests of “the people” through hostility towards outgroups (migrants, foreigners, external

antagonists, supranational organisations). Although de Cleen and Stavrakakis (2017) advocate using the term “nationalist” for the second category, and this would certainly help to clarify matters, this is currently not the case in most of the bibliography available. Moreover, as Breeze (2019) has pointed out, the interest (and possibly the strength) of current nationalist movements lies in the way they seem able to operationalise aspects of anti-elitist populism in order to give power and credibility to what are essentially xenophobic or nationalistic political agendas, thereby appealing to working class or minority voters who have lost out in the processes of globalisation.

In the present paper, I follow the precedent set by previous research on the phenomenon of right-wing political movements in Europe and elsewhere (i.e. Wodak, Khosravi, Nik, Mral 2014) in taking a broad understanding of populism as a kind of political “performance” (Moffitt 2016). In my conclusions, I examine my findings concerning populist “style” in terms of the ideological content of the messages conveyed, showing how their heightened negativity and vagueness contribute to fostering what are essentially xenophobic, nationalistic political projects.

One of the key genres for populists has always been the political speech, and the current generation of politicians is uniquely placed in that their speeches can be uploaded to Youtube to reach world audiences within minutes. It is therefore surprising that more research has not centred on this genre, given the public availability of the evidence. Recent research into populist speeches within the linguistic branch of discourse studies has centred mostly on broad rhetorical aspects such as the use of metaphor (Armaviciene 2019) or the exploitation of dichotomies (Breeze 2017), populist self-presentation (Charaudeau 2011) or “performance” (Moffitt, Tormey 2013), as well as on deep-lying cognitive effects (Chilton 2017). However, van Leeuwen (2014) opened up a promising exploratory line of linguistic investigation by taking a set of less obvious style parameters to run a comparison between speeches by two Dutch politicians, one populist and the other not. He found differences in a variety of areas, such as clause length, sentence length, and whether or not assertions were presented directly or attributed. Interestingly, one of the major differences he detected lay in their different usage of adjectives and adverbs of quantity

and intensity: the non-populist politician used these for mitigating her claims, making use of hedging devices such as “sometimes”, “may”, “nearly”, while the populist generally opted for end points on the semantic scale, such as “absolutely”, or “fed up to the back teeth” (van Leeuwen 2014: 230). Building on these insights, the present paper goes more deeply into the discourse-linguistic markers of populism, asking whether the choice of linguistic resources for intensification, quantification and prototypicality sheds light on the difference between populists and non-populists. These features are usefully operationalised using the analytical categories provided by the Appraisal framework (Martin, White 2005), namely “force” and “focus”. Appraisal is a qualitative approach based on in-depth, contextualised analysis of small samples of text. This paper therefore centres on a detailed analysis of textual samples from four high-profile political speeches delivered in English: two from politicians widely regarded as populist (Donald Trump and Nigel Farage), and two from politicians who are generally not placed in this category by the media or academia (Barack Obama and David Cameron). The research questions addressed are as follows: 1. Do these “populist” politicians differ from the non-populists in their use of force and/or focus? 2. If so, how do these findings fit into the broader patterns that characterise populist performance?

2. ANALYTICAL FRAMEWORK

Political speeches have been analysed in many different ways, using methodological approaches ranging from classical rhetoric studies to corpus analysis and critical discourse analysis (Chilton 2004). Although discourse analysis obviously provides insights into political communication, there is an inherent risk of being methodologically unsystematic (see Breeze 2011). In order to conduct a more balanced analysis, along the lines of the systematic style analyses designed (by van Leeuwen 2014), I take my starting point in the Appraisal system (Martin, White 2005) which has roots in systemic functional linguistics. This system is broad enough to cover the many different linguistic and discursive aspects involved in political speeches, but also sufficiently objective and systematic to allow comparisons to be made.

Briefly, the Appraisal system divides the way speakers or writers come to express, negotiate and naturalise particular positions in terms of three principal semantic domains: attitude, engagement and graduation (Martin, White 2005). Within this overarching structure, attitude is again subdivided into three regions, judgement, affect and appreciation, and codes linguistic manifestations of these separately (Martin, White 2005). Engagement deals with positioning, namely how the speaker/author conveys stance in his/her voice with respect to the various propositions and proposals found within a conversation or text. Finally, graduation deals with two axes of scalability that are termed “force” and “focus” (Hood, Martin 2005). “Force” is materialised in two forms, known as intensification and quantification. Intensification is reflected in values on a scale from low to high intensity, either by lexical intensification (semantic infusion, as in “adore” rather than “love”, or use of metaphor), or by emphatic repetition, by comparatives and superlatives, or by qualifying the target word with adjective or adverb indicating gradability (“slightly”, “extremely”) (Martin, White 2005: 148). Quantification involves scaling with respect to amount or extent (Martin, White 2005: 149). “Focus”, on the other hand, is to do with prototypicality, reflecting the sharpening or softening of semantic focus, that is, the continuum between up-scaling (“a true friend”) to vague association (“a sort of friend”). Typically, “focus” accounts for the way qualitative differences can be conveyed where category membership is rather tightly bound: here “graduation operates to reconstrue these categories in such a way that they participate in scalable clines of prototypicality” (Martin, White 2005: 137).




Figure 1. Model of force (adapted from Martin & White 2005, p. 141).




Figure 2. Model of focus (adapted from Martin & White 2005, p. 138).

3. SAMPLE

The sample consisted of the first section of four high-profile speeches by political leaders. Two of the speeches were directly parallel, in that they were the speeches in which Barack Obama and

Donald Trump launched their respective presidential campaigns. The other two speeches were by two prominent UK politicians, David Cameron (then Conservative Prime Minister) and Nigel Farage (MEP and head of UKIP) explaining diametrically opposite stances towards the European Union. All four of these speeches could thus be expected to reach very large audiences. The full details of these four speeches are as follows:

- Barack Obama's speech announcing that he was running for president, on 10 February 2007: "Let me begin by saying thanks to all you who've traveled, from far and wide, to brave the cold today.."
- Donald Trump's speech on 16 June 2015, in which he launched his presidential campaign: "Wow. Whoa. That is some group of people. Thousands. So nice, thank you very much...."
- Nigel Farage's speech to the European Parliament on 24 November 2010: "Good morning, Mr. van Rompuy, You've been in office for one year and in that time the whole edifice is beginning to crumble..."
- David Cameron's speech defending the European Union, on 23 January 2013: "This morning I want to talk about the future of Europe..."

To ensure that the samples would be comparable in quantitative terms, the first 500 words were taken from each, and stored in text format. They were then uploaded to Sketch Engine (Kilgarriff et al. 2014) to identify and quantify parts of speech, repetitions, etc. After this, the samples were analysed manually, in order to verify the corpus data and uncover other relevant features, such as the use of similes, lexical intensification (infusion), indicators of quantification (numbers, proximity, distribution and frequency), and any upscaling or downscaling of semantic focus. The videos of the speeches were also viewed, and the multimodal analysis was used to triangulate the findings of the quantitative study, and to disambiguate the value of certain items, as will be explained below where relevant.

4. RESULTS

In what follows, I explain the results for these four speeches using the force/focus structure, pointing out which features seem to be more characteristic of the populist style.

4.1. Force: Intensification

The instances of intensification identified in the four speeches were quantified, and the results are displayed in Figure 3.




Figure 3. Force: Intensification.

As Figure 3 shows, even within this small sample, these four politicians made use of different discursive resources in order to intensify their claims. The main categories identified here (infusion, repetition, comparative and superlative) are discussed in depth below.

4.2. Infusion

Overall, the most popular resource among all four politicians was lexical infusion, that is, the use of words that can be located towards one of the extremes on the continuum of meaning. This

notion can be grasped in the following examples in which Trump intensifies by his choice of verbs and nouns:

They are killing us economically. (Trump)

The U.S. has become a dumping ground for everybody else's problems. (Trump)

In the first case, a neutral choice to express the same idea might be "competing with us effectively", but Trump chooses to use the much stronger verb "killing". Similarly, in the second case, "dumping ground" is a strong term to express the role of the United States as a land to which people migrate. Other heightened lexical choices in Trump's speech include: "beat", "laugh at", "stupidity", "eating up". These co-occur with many other terms that are not strictly instances of infusion, but that are certainly highly negative: crime, terrorism, rapists.

Farage also indulges in a considerable amount of infusion, generally of an insulting kind: it should be remembered that his speech was delivered in the European parliament, and many of those present may justifiably have considered his remarks to be a full-frontal attack ("the Greek tragedy", "the stupidity and greed of Irish politicians", "you're happy to destroy democracy"), while others were actually named ("Poor old Barroso here looks like he's seen a ghost" or "your fanaticism", aimed directly at Van Rompuy). His vocabulary in general contains a high degree of infusion, always negatively coloured: "chaos", "fear", "desperation", "bunker mentality", "dustbin of history", "obsession", "destroy", "rob".

However, it is evident from Figure 3 that the other two politicians here also make use of infusion. Obama's speech contains lexical choices such as "humbling", "skewed priorities", "ravaged by plant closings", "cherished rights", "awakened electorate". Cameron also uses a large number of words that heighten the tone of the text: "catastrophic conflict", "strong-minded", "excitement about the future", "healing those wounds of history", "passionate in defence of our sovereignty". The difference between the populists and non-populists in this case seems to lie not so much in the amount of infusion, as in the highly negative polarity of much of the populists' language, and also its simplicity when compared to the more formal, even "official", register of the non-populists. The

following lists of the adjectives used by Trump and Obama suffice to illustrate these differences:

- Trump: nice, military, last, great, common, wonderful, true, serious, right, rich, large, good, big, Islamic.
- Obama: possible, young, true, small, skewed, single, simple, powerful, perfect, long, local, lasting, great, distant, disagreeable, constitutional, cold, civil, cherished, active, Christian.

While Trump's adjectives would be high on any general word frequency list, and tend to the hyperbolic ("great", "wonderful", "large", "big"), Obama's list contains more high register words ("skewed", "disagreeable", "cherished"), and even technical words from the area of law and government ("constitutional", "civil").

4.3. Repetition

Repetition is also a key device for intensification in Trump's speech. His characteristic rhetorical style seems to consist of advancing rather slowly on the basis of complete or partial repetitions of certain rather general ideas. In the following example, an idea is stated baldly, then this first statement is elaborated (albeit quite vaguely) in the second sentence. The third statement paraphrases the second, adding little, but providing emphasis.

Our country is in serious trouble. We don't have victories anymore. We used to have victories, but we don't have them. (Trump)

This kind of threefold structure, familiar in political rhetoric in various guises (Bazzanella 2011), also appears in Trump's speech in the form of lists.

They're bringing drugs. They're bringing crime. They're rapists. (Trump)

In this case, the multimodal evidence suggests that the list is precisely that: the three items are stated baldly, without any particular emphasis, in a rather offhand manner, with the first two nouns ("drug" and "crime") marked by a beat with an opening right hand, and the third with a slight downwards glance towards

the left. In other words, the three items are not organised in terms of mounting intensification, but merely listed, possibly generating a rhetorical effect that this is normal, to be expected.

Farage, for his part, also makes use of rather simple twofold and threefold repetitions of verbal constructions to drive home his points:

We don't want that flag. We don't want that anthem. (Farage)

Just look at these faces. Look at the fear. Look at the anger. (Farage)

As well as repetitions of intensifying adverbs with adjectives:

You are very, very dangerous people indeed. (Farage)

However, Farage makes greater use of strong colloquial intensifiers:

Who the hell do you think you people are? (Farage)

Cameron and Obama also make use of threefold structures in these extracts, but their execution of them is characteristically much more polished, and significantly more complex. Obama uses the threefold structure in combination with dichotomies to create a sophisticated effect. In each case, “in the face of” is emphasised slightly, so that the rhetorical effect is built up to the last one, which is the longest and most complex:

In the face of war, you believe there can be peace. In the face of despair, you believe there can be hope. In the face of a politics that's shut you out, that's told you to settle, that's divided us for too long, you believe we can be one people, reaching for what's possible, building that more perfect union. (Obama)

Obama again combines dyads with triads a few lines later. This time, the dyads serve to illustrate “all that is America”, while the triads again have a cumulative effect leading to a climax (“all of them clamouring to be heard”):

It was here, in Springfield, where I saw all that is America converge - farmers and teachers, businessmen and laborers, all of them with a story to tell, all of them seeking a seat at the table, all of them clamoring to be heard. (Obama)

Cameron uses the threefold structure to paint an impressionistic picture of Berlin after the fall of the Wall in order to remind listeners of that moment of promise, starting with a physical description (“abandoned checkpoints”), followed by a reference to the optimistic mood (“sense of excitement”) and culminating in certainty (“knowledge”):

After the Berlin Wall came down I visited that city and I will never forget it. The abandoned checkpoints. The sense of excitement about the future. The knowledge that a great continent was coming together. (Cameron)

Unlike Trump’s triads, the constructions favoured by Obama and Cameron are not lists, but are more complex, having cumulative effect, and building up to complex, rather abstract political statements (“one people... building that more perfect union”, “all of them clamouring to be heard” and “a great continent was coming together”).

4.4. Comparative and superlative

These politicians make sparing and rather similar use of comparatives. The non-populists deploy comparatives in rather abstract terms: Cameron uses this structure once, to say that “we [British] come to the European Union with a frame of mind that is more practical than emotional”. Obama visualises the state of the nation on a gradable scale: his dream, he tells us, was that he “might play a small part in building a better America”. Moreover, Obama strives to heal divisions in American society and build “that more perfect union”, but this is not notably different from Farage’s claim that bids for European integration are “even more serious than economics”.

Both of the American politicians use superlatives more than their British counterparts. Obama classifies certain entities in absolute terms for dramatic effect, perhaps using the two superlatives in direct parallel to each other: “Chicago’s poorest neighborhoods (...) It was in these neighborhoods that I received the best education I ever had”. Notably, though, it is Trump who makes by far the greatest use of superlatives: on the basis of this sample, it seems that Trump characteristically thinks in superlative terms. For example,

he addresses his present audience as “the best” and “the finest”, setting up a dichotomic relationship with migrants from Mexico who are not “their best”:

It’s true, and these are the best and the finest. When Mexico sends its people, they’re not sending their best. (Trump)

Moreover, in Trump’s speech, superlatives are linked to absolutes, building a discourse of urgency and immediacy:

I love the military, and I want to have the strongest military that we’ve ever had, and we need it more now than ever. (Trump)

Arguably, this overuse of the superlative, particularly in contexts of urgency, fits very well with one of the key characteristics of populist performance described by Moffitt and Tormey (2013), which is the need to create and perpetuate a sense of crisis. Simply by repeated use of hyperbolic language, Trump is able to generate a sense that the situation is grave and action is urgently needed now.

4.5. Force: Quantification

Quantification involves scaling with respect to amount, proximity and extent/distribution. Figure 4 shows the main quantitative results for these samples.




Figure 4. Force: Quantification.

All the politicians make use of quantification, which in such speeches is characteristically rather imprecise. None the less, there are some differences in degree. Cameron describes the Second World War in terms of “millions of dead across Europe”, which is essentially factual, while Farage uses the same word in what is obviously a much more hyperbolic construction:

You appear to be happy for millions and millions of people to be unemployed and to be poor. Untold millions must suffer so that your Euro dream can continue. (Farage)

Farage’s “all or nothing” approach is also reflected in his way of indicating the opposite of large quantities:

They want to remove any remaining traces of democracy. (Farage)

And again in his way of conveying a sense of geographical extension:

Right across the member states of this Union. (Farage)

Trump and Farage are also both adept at building a sense of an imminent threat. Trump mainly does this by building up the feeling that something terrible is about to happen:

Because we have no protection and we have no competence, we don’t know what’s happening. And it’s got to stop and it’s got to stop fast. (Trump)

Farage also creates a dramatic sense of impending doom, listing countries where bailouts have been needed to cumulative effect, and combining proximity with emphatic (large and small) quantification:

Because it’s Portugal next, with their debt levels of 325% of GDP, they’re the next ones on the list, and after that I suspect it will be Spain. And the bailout for Spain would be seven times the size of Ireland’s and at that moment all of the bailout money has gone— there won’t be anymore. (Farage)

4.6. Focus: Sharpening and softening

As we saw above, “focus” is to do with prototypicality, that is, the sharpening or softening of semantic focus, with clear,

detailed language at one end of the scale and vague, fuzzy language at the other.




Figure 5. Focus: Sharpen and soften.

With the notable exception of Trump, there are only small differences between the four politicians in this area. However, it is interesting that both Obama and Cameron use more resources associated with sharper focus, while Trump and Farage can be seen to have a preference for softening their focus. Just what this means can be illustrated if we take a look at some examples.

First, Obama and Cameron are both keen to explain that they have understood the real essence of the matters at stake. Thus Obama declares that his experiences in the most deprived areas of Chicago enabled him to learn “the true meaning of my Christian faith”. The inspiration for his campaign is “a single, simple, powerful idea”. Along similar lines, Cameron’s reading of European integration is that “healing those wounds of our history is the central story of the European Union”. Such perceptions seem to belong to an educated, even academic discourse, in which speakers put forward an interpretation that extrapolates from reality to build a theoretical construct in which clarity and exactitude are asserted as important attributes.

One further aspect of sharpening and softening is also noticeable in this context. Cameron and Obama both make use of a rhetorical technique that could be classed as a form of enumeration, involving the listing of specific examples that are more concrete and colourful than mere generalisations. Thus Cameron paints a picture of the benefits of European unification as follows:

Today, hundreds of millions dwell in freedom, from the Baltic to the Adriatic, from the Western Approaches to the Aegean.
(Cameron)

The vague quantification in the first clause (“hundreds of millions”) is then discursively anchored in real places in the pairs of geographical locations conjured up by the second. Similarly, later on in this speech Cameron refers to the changes caused by globalisation, this time choosing a threefold structure to list people and places in parallel: “the entrepreneur in the Netherlands, the worker in Germany, the family in Britain”. Along similar lines, Obama illustrates his vague reference to “all of America” by offering listed pairs of professional groups (“farmers and teachers, businessmen and laborers”) to conjure up an image of a diverse population and, presumably, strike a chord in the minds of many of his real and virtual listeners.

Trump and Farage, on the other hand, negotiate a considerable number of vague categories in their speeches. As we have seen, Trump favours large numbers, and his numbers are conceptually vague (“lots of”, “by the millions”). Farage, too, uses “millions and millions”, as well as vague reference to social groups or entities (“the rest of us”, “the next ones on the list”).

Beyond the lexical level, Trump, in particular, also revels in abundant vague reference to suggest the presence of menace from migration. The following example illustrates his “soft focus” very effectively:

They’re sending us not the right people. It’s coming from more than Mexico. It’s coming from all over South and Latin America, and it’s coming probably— probably— from the Middle East. But we don’t know. Because we have no protection and we have no competence, we don’t know what’s happening. And it’s got to stop and it’s got to stop fast. (Trump)

The remarkable thing about this extract is that under standard language conditions, “it” should be used to refer anaphorically to some preceding lexical item. However, in this speech “it” can only inherit its referent from some implicit element, because the chain of cohesion does not present any grammatically possible referent. From the context, it is clear that Trump is talking about migration, principally from Mexico, but the substitution of a process involving human beings by the pronoun “it” produces a peculiarly threatening effect, as though the “thing” that is coming is a substance, disease or natural disaster. To compound matters, he goes on, “we don’t know what’s happening”, which means that we are defenceless in the face of this ill-defined threat.

Farage is clearly using a similar technique of fuzzy reference when he stands in front of the EuroMPs and declares:

But just look around the chamber this morning. Just look at those faces. Look at the fear. Look at the anger (...) They’re beginning to understand that the game is up, yet in their desperation to preserve their dream, they want to remove any remaining traces of democracy from the system. And it’s pretty clear that none of you have learnt anything. (Farage)

To understand this, it is necessary to situate the speech as a performance before the camera. Farage launches into his speech with the invitation “Just look around the chamber this morning.” He is not addressing the chamber of the European parliament in any normal way: he is performing to a press, TV and Internet audience, using imperatives to direct their attention. His use of the exophoric “they” (the EuroMPs are present visually, but not mentioned in the text) is a sweeping reference to everyone in the European parliament, and metonymically, to all those who support the European Union. Like Trump’s “it”, the vague and general nature of “they” is conducive to suggesting the presence of a faceless enemy, who are “desperate” and determined to “remove any remaining traces of democracy”. However, in a surprising twist at the end, Farage changes the pronoun and directs his anger at the EuroMPs frontally, addressing them as “you”. The offensive nature of this speech, and its abrupt shifts in reference and address, are probably only comprehensible if we interpret it as a Youtube performance to an audience who share his political agenda.

5. DISCUSSION

It is clear that all politicians apply a range of strategies involving force and focus to communicate with their audiences, and the four figures discussed here are no exception. All of them use strategies for upscaling, quantification, sharpening and softening. However, despite this common ground, some major differences between the two “populist” politicians and the non-populists have come to light in the extent to which they use each one, and the subcategories of force and focus that they appear to prefer.

As Martin and White (2005: 152) point out, upscaling is generally related to raised commitment to the value position being advanced, and is used as a way of strongly aligning the reader/listener into that position. Unsurprisingly, our evidence demonstrates how the populists, Trump and Farage, make generous use of several types of intensification, particularly superlatives, repetition and a preference for hyperbolic lexical choices. In the case of Trump, these findings concur with previous analyses by (Lakoff 2016), and particularly (Petrovic 2016), who explains how Trump appeals to a wide range of voters through his use of blunt expressions. By deploying simple, conversational language (Schumacher, Eskenazi 2016; Breeze 2017), Trump incites personal and collective anxieties and nationalistic sentiments, infusing affect through direct, emotive language that might normally be encountered in more intimate circles. As Petrovic states (2016): “Trump speaks in public, openly and unapologetically, the way many people whisper at home”. The same can clearly be said for Farage, whose attack on European politicians is lexically simple, forceful, repetitive, and of course, highly offensive (see Goodwin, Milazzo 2015). By contrast, the non-populists deploy discourse that is more formal, even academic in tone, applying infusion but within a more cultured register, and using more complex repetitions that embody ideational progression rather than simple emphasis. Noticeably, the non-populists in this sample make a greater use of infusion with positive valence, while the populists’ speeches have a strong negative charge.

The results concerning focus are particularly interesting. The populists’ focus tends to be vague. In Trump’s case, the strategy consists of conjuring up a sensation of some ill-defined threat that is looming over the United States, while in Farage’s speech, the

enemy is embodied in “they” and “their conspiracy” against democracy and freedom. These messages are reinforced by a rhetoric of quantification, using numbers that are massive but vague. Obama and Cameron favour a sharper focus, and their general categories are generally substantiated with concrete examples. Even their quantification is usually anchored in potentially quantifiable phenomena, in contrast to the the populists’ indefinite “millions and millions”.

Regarding the second question, about how these findings fit into the broader patterns that characterise populist performance, it is evident that these results concur with those from the large sample spanning five continents discussed by Moffitt and Tormey (2013) and Moffitt (2016), showing how certain styles of political communication create and sustain a sense of crisis. By piling up highly emphatic, negatively infused items relating to the threat to the population, “populist” politicians like Trump and Farage help to generate anger and fear in their listeners, inciting them to choose more extreme political options (Weber 2013, Wagner 2014, Breeze 2019), and thus contributing to the polarisation of the political scenario. These populists’ habitual location on the extremes of the spectrum of graduation also fits with their predilection for dichotomic thinking (Breeze 2017), and goes hand in hand with the absence of hedging and attribution in their speeches analysed by other authors (van Leeuwen 2014). In ideological terms, it is clear that the heightened negativity and vagueness of these messages, combined with their forcefulness, contribute to furthering political projects that are essentially characterised by xenophobic nationalism, bringing them close to the kind of right-wing populist discourse analysed elsewhere (Wodak, Khosravi, Nik, Mral 2014). Further studies are needed, covering larger samples of text and more politicians of different kinds, in order to explore the full potential of the Appraisal framework in disentangling further threads of the language used across the political spectrum today.

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Raluca-Mihaela Levonian*

**SELF-LEGITIMATING
STRATEGIES IN THE
DISCOURSE OF POLITICAL
LEADERS: A COMPARATIVE
ANALYSIS OF TWO
ROMANIAN POLITICIANS**

Abstract

This chapter discusses the process of political re-branding in postcommunist Romania, through an in-depth analysis of two electoral speeches delivered by two Romanian politicians. The methodological framework is based on critical discourse analysis, with a special focus on the discursive strategies of legitimation and delegitimation (Van Leeuwen 2008; Reyes 2011), which contribute to the differentiation between in-group and out-group. The analysis also draws on Laclau's (2005) conception of populism as a political logic, assuming that populist ideas can be employed either in positive or negative manner. The two cases discussed here are illustrative for a hybrid type of political leaders, who are already famous because of the important public offices they have held before, but who also attempt to position themselves as "outsiders" and thus construct a special relation of articulation between themselves and the people. The findings reveal that both politicians employ a populist logic

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in order to counterbalance the idea of authorities' alienation from the citizens, which, in the case of Romania, dates back to the communist period.

Keywords: legitimation, discourse analysis, populism, Romania, postcommunism.

1. INTRODUCTION

Definitions of populism tend to highlight the opposition between 'the people' and one or more 'others' as a characteristic of populism (e.g. Mudde, Kaltwasser 2013; Albertazzi, McDonnell 2008: 7; Panizza 2005). While such irreconcilable oppositions are frequent in contemporary political discourse, it is more difficult to describe the political actors who adopt populist approaches in their rhetoric in order to gain voters. If the opposition between 'the people' and the actors holding the power is considered characteristic of populism, this leads to the idea that outsider parties are more prone to adopt populist approaches than mainstream parties (Pelinka 2013: 9). The positioning of a political formation as an outsider "gives credibility to their promises to restore the people's sovereignty and dignity" (Mastropaolo 2008: 37). Still, an anti-political stance can be taken not only by disappointed citizens or by political newcomers, but also by "those who are inside the system, but who wish to rejuvenate grey public images and/or denigrate their rivals" (Mastropaolo 2008: 34).

Such a situation is discussed in the present study, which focuses on the discourse of the leaders of two political parties in Romania, *M10* and the *People's Movement Party*. Both parties were positioned as outsiders before the political elections in 2016, although their leaders, Monica Macovei and Traian Băsescu, had belonged to the political élites during previous governments.

The two politicians illustrate a hybrid type of political leaders, who enjoy fame and obtain media coverage due to the public offices they had held, but who have chosen to re-brand themselves in order to legitimate their current political activity. The process of re-branding may take various forms, from the creation of new

parties to a change in the programmes, objectives and/or discourse of the politicians' parties.

This study explores the discursive strategies used by the two politicians in order to position themselves as 'outsiders' on the political stage and to construct a special relation of articulation between themselves and the electors. By emphasizing their connection with 'the people' and distinguishing themselves from the current authorities, both political leaders tend to adopt a populist approach. The figure of the populist leader combines two opposing characteristics: such a politician appears as "one of the people" and, at the same time, as "endowed with the (often allegedly charismatic) qualities to lead them" (Pasquino 2008: 21). The following analysis explores the manner in which politicians may construct such an ambivalent image in their discourse, through the employment of various self-legitimizing strategies.

2. POLITICAL BACKGROUND

The first speech selected for the analysis was given by Monica Macovei in Bucharest, in March 2015, at a meeting which marked the launch of a new party, *M10*. Its transcription, totaling 1,438 words, was posted on the official website of the party. When the data were collected, the founder of M10 was also its leader, Monica Macovei. She was already a famous politician because, as a Minister of Justice between 2004 and 2007, she introduced important judicial reforms with the support of President Băsescu. She has been a Member of the European Parliament since 2009, running in the elections for the Democratic Liberal Party (*Partidul Democrat Liberal* – PDL). In 2014 she founded the Association M10, which further became the Party M10. However, the party enjoyed considerably less success than its leader, failing to enter the electoral competition for the Romanian Parliament in 2016.

The second speech belongs to Traian Băsescu, a prominent politician within diverse centre-right political formations, who held two mandates as the President of Romania (2004-2014). Before his election, Băsescu had been the leader of the Democratic Liberal Party, a political formation which gradually lost the electors' support. After the end of his second mandate, he took over the leadership of the newly-founded *The People's Movement Party*

(*Partidul Mișcarea Populară* – PMP). At present, the doctrine of the PMP combines Liberal conservatism and Christian democracy (Nordsieck 2016). The speech analyzed below was given by Băsescu at a meeting between the PMP leaders and the party members in Bucharest. This meeting marked the beginning of the campaign for the parliamentary elections in December 2016. The recording of the speech was freely available on YouTube, being uploaded by an user identified as “Partidul Mișcarea Populară”. The speech was transcribed by the author of this chapter with a resulting written text of 4,523 words. Both original texts are in Romanian language and have been translated into English for the present study.

The two cases have been selected for analysis, because they illustrate a characteristic of contemporary Romanian politics. Between 2004 and 2010, right-wing parties were stronger than the left, which led to the observation that Romania had the strongest right-wing parties among all the Central and East European countries (McAllister, White 2007: 203). However, political parties in post-communist countries have been prone to instability and ideological oscillations (e.g. van Kessel 2014: 109). In the last years, the Romanian right-wing has also shown fusions, separations, disappearances of parties and the emergence of other political formations. In contrast, the centre-left has appeared to be (relatively) more stable, with the Social-Democratic Party as the main political actor. The evolution of the parties lead by Băsescu and Macovei may therefore contribute to a better understanding of the current fragmentation of the centre-right. The discourse of the two leaders reveals how they aimed to win back the voters’ support by presenting themselves as a ‘new’ alternative to the centre-left.

3. METHODOLOGICAL FRAMEWORK

The methodology used for the present study is based on the framework developed by Stavrakakis and Katsambekis (2014), which is in turn inspired by Laclau’s conception of populism (e.g. 2005). It consists in the assessment of two criteria, whose simultaneous presence indicates the populist character of a discursive practice. The criteria are: (1) the articulation of the discourse around ‘the people’ as a nodal point and (2) the representation of an antagonist

relation between ‘the people’ and the power élites (Stavrakakis, Katsambekis 2014: 123).

The assessment of these criteria is further complemented by the analysis of discursive legitimation strategies employed by each speaker. The discursive process of legitimation is investigated by appealing to the frameworks advanced by Van Leeuwen (2008) and Reyes (2011). Van Leeuwen distinguishes between four categories of legitimation. *Authorization* regards the affirmation of the authority held by the speaker or by other sources. *Moral evaluation* regards the judgment of actors or actions according to certain values. *Rationalization* legitimates an idea in terms of objectives, causes and effects. Finally, *mythopoesis* also proposes a moral judgment, through the appeal to a narrative which enforces the ideas of ‘good’ and ‘bad’ (Van Leeuwen 2008: 105-119). The classification of legitimizing strategies suggested by Reyes (2011) focuses on political discourse exclusively. According to this perspective, legitimization can be constructed through emotions, through the appeal to a hypothetical future, through rationality, through voices of expertise and through altruism.

The presence of the legitimation categories proposed by both scholars will be investigated in the two speeches selected. The analysis starts from the assumption that, due to their similar political background as former members of the centre-right PDL, the two politicians will employ similar discursive strategies in order to legitimate themselves as valid options for the electors.

4. THE M10 LAUNCH SPEECH

M10 began its existence as a grassroots party and maintained the connection to its supporters through materials and political statements posted on the party website. The selected speech has been delivered by the leader Monica Macovei at a direct meeting between the M10 politicians and the electorate. In order to introduce the new political formation to the audience, the speaker describes briefly the party’s objectives for the future elections.

4.1. The relation with ‘the people’

As M10 is a newly-founded party, the leader tries to justify its presence on the Romanian political stage and to distinguish it from other parties. The main legitimating strategy employed throughout this text is *moral evaluation*, which is based on adherence to a set of values (Van Leeuwen 2008: 110-112). The assertion of certain values is more frequent than other strategies, such as *rationalization* or *authorization* (Van Leeuwen 2008: 110). The party leader presents the goals of M10 as enacting positive values and thus contributing to the achievement of the common good for the entire Romanian people.

From the beginning, the title chosen by Monica Macovei for her speech indicates that the bond between the party and ‘the people’ is considered to be pivotal among the M10 political objectives. M10 is presented as the only party that defends the interests of ‘the people’.

- (1) [...] and my speech has the title: We turn the page/ politics: for you, for the people. And, yes, for the individual we want to work. As I said during the campaign, I want to be the president of the people. Now I am going to say: this party must be – and it will be – the party of the people. (Macovei 2015).

Here, Macovei uses the Romanian second-person singular pronoun (*pentru tine*/ “for you”), that shows a close, even informal relation between the speaker and the addressee. More often, she employs the third person, by using the singular noun *om* (“person/ individual”). The plural *oameni* (“people”), is also repeated three times in this excerpt, being placed every time on the last position in the utterance. Through this repetition, Monica Macovei foregrounds the dedication of the party M10 to the achievement of the common good. The identification of M10 is made in relational terms (Van Leeuwen 2008: 43), through a postmodifying phrase (*partidul oamenilor*/ “the party of the people”). In this manner, the speaker attempts to shift the focus of attention from the political party to the electors, presenting the latter as the direct beneficiary of the party’s political programme.

The bond with the electors is also signalled here by a progressive shift in verbal forms. First, the speaker expresses an intention (“we want to work”) and then introduces a modal verb of high intensity, *trebuie* (“must”). She continues with a Romanian verb in the indicative mood (*va fi* “it will be”), expressing a certain action. The shift from intention to certainty serves here to further legitimate the new party and persuade the audience to support it.

The strategy of *moral evaluationis* also visible in the synthetic description of Macovei’s previous activity as a politician:

- (2) I have been fighting for a long time for democracy, for rules, for order, for law, for justice, for freedom, in the party, outside the party. (Macovei 2015).

Instead of giving precise details about her professional achievements, the M10 leader chooses to foreground the “Western values” (Reyes 2011: 802) in which she believes, through an enumeration of abstract terms with positive meanings. The first and the last terms listed, *democracy* and *freedom*, represent values that are generally sustained by all mainstream parties in the EU states. The core of this enumeration is formed by four items with a close meaning (*rules, order, law, justice*), all related to the concept of justice. Monica Macovei thus presents her professional experience in the judicial domain in an abstract and moralizing form, as a fight in order to defend the interests of ‘the people’.

Macovei distances herself from the party to which she had previously belonged, the PDL, and presents her former political decisions through the ambiguous formulation “in the party, outside the party”. In this manner, she implies that the PDL may not have shared the same values as her and claims for herself the status of an outsider in the political sphere.

Legitimation through moral evaluation is combined here with the *legitimization through altruism*, which presents an action “as beneficial for a community” (Reyes 2011: 801). According to Reyes (Ibid:802), benefits can be not only material, but also symbolic, granting people’s access to human rights or values. When M10 was launched, it lacked massive support from the citizens. Consequently, the politician attempts here to present the M10 party

as a flexible in-group, that accepts new members and only requires from them the same altruism that characterizes the party founders.

- (3) We have no offices to offer, because we are not on the wave, we haven't got money to give, we haven't got bags with money, we haven't got contracts to give. We can give to Romania our love, our power, our intelligence, our freedom. And we love Romania. We love the people. (Macovei 2015)

The enumerations employed here contribute to the differentiation between the in- and the out-group. The in-group formed by the M10 members is assigned positive characteristics, expressed through a list of abstract terms with positive meanings (*love, power, intelligence, freedom*). All these terms are placed on an object position, while the country, "Romania", appears as the beneficiary. In this manner, the M10 leader depicts the party members as willing to sacrifice themselves and their symbolic resources for the higher good of the country.

The altruism of the M10 leaders is also visible in the speaker's denial of selfish goals. The repetition of the verb *a avea* ("to have") in negative form is followed by objects representing material assets with a negative connotation: "offices", "bags with money", "contracts". These terms remind the audience of the accusations of corruption brought to politicians from other parties in the past. In this manner, the speaker represents the political opponents as lacking moral values and as acting for their own benefit instead of serving the interests of 'the people'.

A third type of legitimization employed in this speech is *the appeal to emotions*, which are viewed as "key in the legitimization process, because they condition and prepare the audience to receive proposals and courses of actions" (Reyes 2011: 790). Macovei articulates the relation between M10 and 'the people' not only in moral terms, but also in terms of positive emotions ("we love the people"). In parallel, the relation between 'the people' and the ruling class is presented through the appeal to negative emotions, as the state authorities are criticized for having mocked and deceived the citizens.

The appeal to emotions serves to justify one of the main demands of M10, for the citizens “to be treated with respect” (Macovei 2015) by the public administration. The politician claims to know the difficulties faced by ‘the common people’ in order to fulfill administrative formalities. She even narrates a personal experience to sustain this claim:

- (4) To be treated with respect. I remember that a month ago I went to the Financial Department, to take a certificate of the fiscal police record when we created the *Association M10*. So small is the opening in the window, that you have to stand with your head bowed, in order to talk to the clerk. That in itself means that he humiliates you, he makes you smaller, that the clerk is more important, because he sits straight, he speaks through the window, you don’t hear him, you bow your head once more, ask him once more. This is not possible. The clerk is not our master. (Macovei 2015)

The speaker highlights a precise aspect of the relation between the citizen and the state, the organization of the public administration offices. In the Romanian offices, public clerks are usually separated from the petitioners through a glass window. Monica Macovei emphasizes the dimension of the opening in the window, through the deictic (*atât*/“that [small]”), referencing the spatial quality of smallness. The glass window becomes a symbol of the irreconcilable frontier keeping apart the people from the ruling structures of the state and limiting their ability to express their requests.

The conclusion of this brief story suggests that the state authorities intentionally position themselves above their citizens. This interpretation is sustained by a marked appeal to the audience’s emotions, such as pride and frustration (“That in itself means that he humiliates you, he makes you smaller”). Through the formulation of this demand, a chain of equivalences is constructed between the varied categories of citizens. They are conflated into a single, generic category, forming ‘the people’ as a popular subject:

- (5) This is why for me – and for us – the administration is a very important thing that, as you will see, will change everybody’s life: of the retired people, of the young peo-

ple, of the people, of the individuals and of the companies. (Macovei 2015)

The demand for a more efficient public administration becomes equated with the more general demands for democracy and for a more prosperous life than at present. The asymmetrical relation between public clerks and the citizens is interpreted as an indicator that ‘the people’ are deprived of the power which they are entitled to.

4.2. The relation with the élites

M10 is depicted as defending the citizens’ interests against the state élites, as taking on the role of a vigilante within a chaotic society. The relation with the political élites is expressed in Macovei’s speech in antagonistic terms. She rules out any possibility of collaboration with other Romanian parties and insists, instead, on the need for a radical change of the political class.

The strategy of *moral evaluation*, which is frequently employed in regard to the party M10, is also used in order to delegitimize its political opponents. According to the party leader, the realization of the M10 objectives depends entirely on a change in the political system. The title of the speech is based on a metaphor, *a întoarcefoaia* (“to turn the page”), whose literal meaning is “to move forward,” in other words to assure the progress of the country. The syntagma is usually employed in Romanian language with a figurative meaning, which is “to change one’s attitude towards somebody, becoming more severe” (Coteanu, Mares 1998: 388). The title of Macovei’s speech thus connotes both the idea of general development and that of a consistent change in the political sphere. As the text further reveals, the implied harshness is directed against all the politicians who have deceived the Romanians during the post-communist period.

In this speech, a relation of antagonism is constructed, as M10 is distinguished from all the other political parties in Romania, due to the moral values of the party:

- (6) It [The M10 party, my note] is the only and the first party in Romania truly of the right-wing, it is the only party that goes on the right path. It is nothing of what we have

today on the political stage, [...] it has got nothing to do with the actual political class (Macovei 2015).

By insisting on the difference between M10 and the other current political actors, Macovei implies that all the other parties are unreliable. This idea is sustained by the wordplay based on the meanings of the term *drept* (“right”) in Romanian. The adjective, which refers here to the right-wing positioning on the political spectrum, may also connote positive traits such as *honesty*, *fairness*, or *correctness*. The expression *calea cea dreaptă* (“the right path”) signifies “making the right choices” or “following the correct or legal way to do things” in this context. The speaker judges the political life in Romania according to a moral framework and labels political actors and actions in terms of ‘good’ and ‘bad’, ‘right’ and ‘wrong’.

The major accusations brought against the other political actors in this speech regard their alleged corruption and, implicitly, the lack of morality. The M10 leader does not indicate certain corrupt politicians by name, but generalizes this trait through nominalizations (*corupție* / “corruption”; *hoție* / “theft”). Hence, these phenomena are presented as characteristic for the out-group, while the agents held responsible for these flaws are suppressed (Van Leeuwen 2008). While the M10 members are presented as persons, emotionally involved in their political activities (“we love the people”) the other politicians are represented as morally flawed individuals (“thieves”, “liars”) and as a threat for the common citizens.

- (7) We, on the contrary, are facing a wave, a political class of thieves, of lies, we are facing a tsunami of corruption, of theft from our money. We fight with the wave, we are not on the wave. We are in front of the wave, in front of the tsunami, that we want to destroy for you too, for the stolen money to return to you. (Macovei 2015).

The appeal to emotions and to altruism are employed in order to legitimate the M10 members and to delegitimize the political élites as their ‘enemy’. In this manner, the speaker glosses over the representative character of the political actors in a democratic state, excluding the possibility that politicians in the ruling structures have been elected in a democratic way.

Another relation of antagonism is constructed between ‘the country’ and the state administration:

- (8) It [the M10 party, my note] wants prosperity through modernization, it wants a minimal state and a great country. What does it mean? It means that it wants a reduced state, with a reduced bureaucracy, with a reduced budgetary part, with a reduced government, with a reduced parliament, with an intervention in our lives as small as possible, with the smallest intervention in the economic life of the country. And it wants a great country, a powerful country – economically powerful, a powerful country at the international level, an energetically powerful country, a relevant country. A country that matters (Macovei 2015).

The political programme of M10 is grounded in the idea that the state institutions themselves hinder the development of the country. This idea is implied here through an enumeration of terms referring to the state administration, accompanied by the repetition of the adjectival modifier “reduced”. This enumeration represents a form of association through parataxis, made by the mere act of grouping together various elements without constructing a relation of coordination (Van Leeuwen 2008: 38-39). The mere presence of such elements within this enumeration suggests that a bond exists between them. Here, a term with a negative connotation (*bureaucracy*) is associated with other terms such as *government* and *parliament* that acquire themselves a negative meaning in this context.

The M10 leader juxtaposes here the idea of a minimal intervention of the state with that of maximal results in the welfare of the country, yet she fails to construct a more solid relation of causality between the two objectives. In the excerpt above, the repetition of the term *țară* (“country”) is self-legitimizing. Moreover, this term is accompanied by diverse attributive post-modifiers, among which the adjective *puternic* (“powerful”) is preferred. The ideal objective of a “powerful country” becomes an empty signifier (Laclau 2005), as it refers to all the important domains of a state, without giving a precise description of the projected transformations.

The formulation of this objective corresponds to the tendency manifested by right-wing populist politicians to “offer straightforward, ‘common sense’ solutions to society’s complex problems” (Albertazzi, McDonnell 2008: 1-2). Simplified solutions tend to be accepted by the electors due to the existence of an anti-political climate (Albertazzi, McDonnell 2008: 1; Pasquino 2008: 21). In this case, an anti-political orientation is visible in the criticism brought against other political parties and in the inclusion of power structures like the government and the parliament in the camp of the ‘enemies’. The political message sustained here is based on the idea that “the people are always far better than their rulers”, an ideological pre-condition for the emergence of populism (Pasquino 2008: 20).

The image constructed for herself by Macovei resembles the “Robin Hood” type of populist leader, who assumes the image of a “saviour” of the common people (Wodak 2013: 28). Still, a more adequate label for Macovei’s case can be that of a *leader-paladin*. The character of Robin Hood incarnates the outlaw animated by good intentions, but who does not obey the laws. In contrast, Monica Macovei is a political leader and a law specialist, whose public image has been constructed around her activity as a Minister of Justice and an author of a legislative reform. In this launch speech, she claims to put into application this framework in order to restore justice and eliminate the antagonisms within the society.

5. THE PMP ELECTORAL CAMPAIGN SPEECH

At the moment when the speech was issued, the People’s Movement Party was already known on the Romanian political stage, especially due to the popularity of its president, Traian Băsescu. The speech was held at a general meeting with the party members in Bucharest, that marked the beginning of the campaign for the parliamentary elections in December 2016. This was the second electoral campaign of the year, following the local elections for mayor offices. At this meeting, the PMP leader acknowledges the poor results obtained by the party in the local elections and attempts to motivate the party members from different regions of the country, in order to gain more votes in the upcoming elections. In comparison to the launch speech held by Monica Macovei, this

text is characterized by a more detailed presentation of a complex political programme. At the beginning, Băseșcu states a general objective of the PMP (to control the administrative ‘system’ in the state) and a main objective for the entire Romania (the unification with the Republic of Moldova). In the second part of the speech, the politician presents a list of specific objectives to be achieved in diverse domains, such as health, education, transportation, agriculture etc.

5.1. The relation with ‘the people’

In contrast to Monica Macovei, the PMP leader does not plead for a radical change of the status quo. On the contrary, the goals stated in the political programme of the PMP depend on the preservation of the statal authority structures. The original element of the program consists in Băseșcu’s insistence on the need for a stricter control of the administrative structures. The politician does not sustain the empowerment of the citizens, which would allow them to control the authorities directly. Instead, this control is going to be exerted by the PMP in case that it wins the parliamentary elections and forms the government.

From a linguistic perspective, this envisaged role of the PMP is mirrored in the lack of references to ‘the people’ of Romania. There is only one occurrence of the term *oameni* (‘people’) referring to the Romanian citizens as a mass, as Băseșcu (2016) says: “it is the mission of this party, to make the system work for the people [...]”. This statement reveals a political objective based on a precise allocation of roles: PMP is seen as the main agent, while the role of ‘the people’ is limited to that of a beneficiary of the party’s actions.

The relation between the PMP leader and the Romanian citizens is more complex than in the speech held by Macovei. Băseșcu constructs a specific ‘common ground’ with the people, claiming that he and the citizens share a set of values. At the same time, he distinguishes himself from the mass of the citizens, by highlighting his experience as a state president and his qualities as a political leader. The legitimating strategies employed in the construction of the politician’s image will be discussed below.

From the beginning of his intervention, Traian Băsescu foregrounds a common denominator with ‘the people’: the willingness to fight against communism. He presents a general demand, to have access to information about Romania’s recent past, which serves to constitute ‘the people’ as a popular subject. Băsescu advances a specific interpretation of an important event in the recent past: the revolution of 1989, that has caused the fall of the communist regime. The politician deconstructs the official historical narrative regarding the revolution and implies that this was a *coup d’état*, instead of the manifestation of the people’s will. Even if he contradicts the official discourse on this topic, the former president presents his viewpoint as the only correct one. Băsescu thus presents himself as the main *voice of expertise* (Reyes 2011: 800-801) in regard to the past and the current situation of the Romanian state.

- (9) Romania has two great mysteries. The greatest mystery is that of the revolution or of the coup d’état in December ’89. All its artisans (applause)... all its artisans have found themselves, during the first six years [after the revolution, my note] in all the governing structures, from treacherous generals sold to Moscow to people who never believed in a capitalist Romania, and only wanted a Romania with capitalism [sic!] in a human form. [...] When we have this mystery, of the revolution, solved by the justice, then we will know why it was bad for us, why we remained on an ambiguous position, as a NATO or EU member state, or why we have remained until 2004 on an ambiguous position in regard to our direction (Băsescu 2016).

The speaker pretends to hesitate between the use of the commonly used term “revolution” and the more problematic syntagma “coup d’état”. The preference for the latter interpretation is sustained by a series of verbs in the indicative mood (*s-au aflat/* “have found themselves”, *nu credeau/* “did not believe”, *voiau/* “wanted”) indicating past actions that have certainly taken place. The truth value of this view is also indicated by the use of time adverbials like *niciodată* (“never”) or an adverbial construction referring to a precise length of time (*primii șase ani/* “the first six years”). Moreover, the use of the term *artizanii* (“the artisans”) also indicates the speaker’s preference for interpreting the people’s revolution as a violent coup d’état. In this manner, Băsescu challenges the

hegemonic discourse about Romania's recent history. He suggests that the "mystery" is only apparent, that the truth is well known, but the élites have refused to acknowledge it so far. Although he has belonged to the state authorities in the last decades, Traian Băsescu includes himself among the mass of 'people' that have been the victims of the communist and post-communist authorities. Therefore, he constructs a bond between himself, the audience and the entire Romanian 'people' through the use of verbs in the first person plural, such as *vom ști* ("we will know") and *vom avea* ("we will have").

The formulation of this specific demand, at the beginning of a campaign speech in the autumn of 2016, indicates that the 1989 revolution is still a traumatic moment for the Romanians. Narratives advanced by political actors in regard to dark moments of the past contribute to the enforcement of specific polarisations (Boukala 2014: 484). The evocation of this traumatic event allows Băsescu to reiterate the polarisation between 'the people' and the dictatorial rulers that characterized the Romanian society before 1989. The élites sustaining the communist regime are opposed to the people who longed for democracy, freedom and a capitalist economy. Interestingly, Băsescu considers that this frontier stops in the year 2004, which is actually the year when his first presidential mandate began. Thus, he implies that his presidency has put an end to the alienation between the people and the elites. He also glosses over the fact that, although Romania accessed the EU in 2007, pre-access negotiations had started earlier and that other governments had been involved in these negotiations.

The relation of articulation between the political leader and the 'people' is enforced by the goal stated by Băsescu: all of them are committed to a common duty, the salvation of the country.

- (10) Those who have made that these realities of Romania be classified, postponed, are those who have protected the system, while our mission is to fully take back Romania from the hands of the system. And I want you to know from someone who has been the President of Romania for 10 years that this is not easy (Băsescu 2016).

In excerpt (10), 'Romania' is constructed as a concrete entity. The leadership of the country is presented as an act of possession

(the country finds itself “in the hands of the system”), which in turn leads to the presentation of the electoral competition almost as a physical confrontation. The PMP leader urges the audience: *să smulgem definitiv România din mâinile sistemului* (“to fully take back Romania from the hands of the system”). The Romanian verb *a smulge* (“to grab”), that is used metaphorically, connotes the idea of taking “something violently or with great efforts” (Coteanu and Mares 1998: 998). The reification of Romania contributes to the legitimation of the entire program of the PMP. The concrete aim of winning the elections is thus moralized and presented in a positive manner, as the patriotic duty to save the country. In this manner, the politician backgrounds his previous activity as a minister and a president, in other words as a member of the post-communist authorities.

In order to enforce the bond between himself and ‘the people’, Bănescu presents himself as a true patriot, in contrast with the communist élites. This trait is sustained through the introduction of a narrative about one of his college professors. In this manner, the speaker reminds his audience of his military training as a marine captain. He also reveals that, although his training had taken place during the communist regime, he has always shared anti-communist ideals:

- (11) [...]he used to tell us: You, dear students (he was old), will sail the seas and the oceans of the world. You will raise the flag on the ship mast at every sunshine, but you should know what the flag means, what the flag covers and he used to show us the map of the Great Romania. I have this feeling due to the education in a military institute where we have also had professors who had the courage to talk to us about the realities of our history in a period when people only talked in secret about it and in a period when we were taught to stay obedient to Moscow (Bănescu 2016).

The syntagma “Great Romania” mentioned here is rich in historical significations. Its primary meaning dates back to the moment when the participants to The Great National Meeting in Alba Iulia, in December 1, 1918, decided the unification of Transylvania with the fatherland. At that time, Transylvania was the

last Romanian province under foreign occupation. Still, in excerpt (11), the politician refers to a different historical moment, the end of the Second World War, when Romania has lost another part of its territory, namely the regions of Basarabia (the current Republic of Moldova) and North Bucovina (a part of the contemporary Ukraine), this time to the U.S.S.R. The objective proposed for the entire Romanian state by the PMP is the reunification of Romania with the Republic of Moldova, presented as the desire of a symbolic wholeness of the Romanian territory.

The legitimating strategy employed in this regard is that of *mythopoesis* (Van Leeuwen 2008: 117). The speaker legitimates his political programme and himself as a politician through a narrative which is similar to a “moral tale”. Such narratives reveal that ‘good’ actors are rewarded for doing the right things or for “restoring the legitimate order” (Van Leeuwen 2008: 117) here the re-unification of the Romanian territory is seen as an act of liberation, as saving the citizens of Moldova from the Russian influence. The antagonism between the communist Eastern Europe and the capitalist West is sustained in Băscescu’s discourse through the repetition of the adjective *sovietic* (“Soviet”). Furthermore, the aim to unify the Romanian territories indicates that the ‘Romanian people’ is constructed as a homogeneous unit, based on the criterion of ethnicity. Although he does not explicitly address foreign immigration in this speech, Băscescu suggests a distinction between those who are ‘Romanians’ and those who are not. This is manifest in his disagreement with the low number of Romanian citizenships granted to the citizens of Moldova, who are considered to be ‘Romanians’ de facto:

- (12) In 2004, the Romanian state approved only 4 (4!) citizenships to citizens from the Republic of Moldova, some hundreds of times fewer than it has granted to Arabs. (Băscescu 2016).

Although this speech does not include explicit negative evaluations of foreign migrants, it still indicates a particular understanding of the concept of ‘care for the people’, as the need to defend the interests of the own ‘people’ in front of foreign threats. Such a stance is indicative of right-wing populism, as it is “directed against an ethnically and/or nationally and/or religiously defined ‘other’” (Pelinka 2013: 7).

Traian Băsescu constructs a bond with the Romanian ‘people’ in regard to events of the past and the desire to fight against communism and the Soviet Union. When he addresses the present situation and the plans for the future, he no longer presents himself as ‘one of the crowd’. Rather, he emphasizes his authority in regard to ‘the people’: an authority that has a double source. First, he legitimates himself and the political program of the party through the appeal to *personal authority* (Van Leeuwen 2008: 106), resulting from the presidential office he had held. Second, he also appeals to *expert authority* (Van Leeuwen 2008; Reyes 2011: 800-801), as he presents himself as knowing more and being more rational than the Romanian citizens and his political opponents.

Personal authority is frequently employed throughout the speech, as Traian Băsescu reminds the audience that he had held two presidential mandates of five years each. He suggests that, in this manner, he has had access to special pieces of information which are inaccessible to all the other authorities.

- (13) This is why I have uploaded a post, in which, with the experience of 10 years [as the State President – my note], I have defined the system and I want to tell you too this definition, [...] (Băsescu 2016)

The *self-legitimation through the appeal to authority* is manifest in the specific objectives proposed by Băsescu for numerous domains of internal and external affairs. Moreover, the politician mentions specific laws or political measures that have been proposed during his former presidential mandates and that have enjoyed his personal support. In the following example, the legitimation strategy is addressed to past events instead of the present situation and can therefore be named *retroactive legitimation*:

- (14) [...] I ask you to remind the Romanians that today, when they discover that the health system has almost collapsed, in 2012, in January, a president proposed them a new law for the organization of the health system. We must fight for that law [...] This is the reason they leave the country and that law found the solution for the doctors to remain in Romania. [...] (Băsescu 2016).

A particularity of Bănescu's speech is that retroactive legitimation is linked to the idea of an imminent crisis. The speaker presents the current situation of Romania as extremely difficult, through the use of terms expressing a marked negative judgment, such as "collapse" in excerpt (14). At the same time, he introduces a positive judgment when referring to the laws of the past Democratic-Liberal cabinets. Here, this is realized through the clause constructed with the term "law" as a subject ("that law found the solution").

The emphasis on the speaker's authority leads to the differentiation between 'the people' and Bănescu as a political leader. The difference between the leader and the masses arises from the visionary capacity of the leader, who knows better than the people how to solve their problems. Bănescu highlights some positive traits for himself, like long-term thinking and honesty. Above all, he presents himself as having had a close relation with 'the people' during his presidential mandates, in form of a direct dialogue with them, which bypasses democratic institutions like the government and the parliament. He advances a model of the state – president as a mentor and a 'father', offering guidance to all the structures and exerting control over them.

5.2. The relation with 'the élites'

The examples discussed in the previous section show that 'the people' is constructed as a unitary actor who is also constant in time. Their demands for unity, freedom and capitalism have not changed during the last decades. In contrast, 'the enemies' of 'the people' are seen as having evolved in time. Thus, Bănescu introduces a distinction between the former and the current 'enemies' of 'the people' and constructs two specific out-groups in this speech.

The first out-group is characterized by the commitment to the communist ideology, a trait that is equated with the lack of patriotism. From this perspective, the antagonists of 'the people' are not only the communist rulers before 1989, but also a significant part of the political élites that replaced them:

- (15) There were many generals, there were many treacherous generals who sold themselves to Moscow, there were

many generals who immediately grabbed the power together with Ion Iliescu, Brucan and the others (Băsescu 2016).

The “totalisation of the power” (Laclau 2005: 39) in the hands of a pro-communist élite after 1989 is constructed explicitly, through the mention of the name of the former state president Ion Iliescu and also through the repetition of the plural noun *generali* (“generals”) accompanied by the pre-modifier *mulți* (“many”). The depreciation is visible in the use of derogatory post-modifiers such as *trădători* (“treacherous”) and *vânduți Moscovei* (“sold to Moscow”), which connote the idea of threat. The dichotomy between ‘the people’ and ‘the élites’ is simplified, being reduced to two main terms: ‘capitalism’ and ‘communism’, but, although the term ‘communism’ is often mentioned in this speech, the particularities of the communist ideology are glossed over. The term functions as a derogatory label, due to its association with the traumatic period of the totalitarian dictatorship. By characterizing the out-group as having communist views, Băsescu delegitimizes it through the *appeal to emotions* (Reyes 2011: 788-792), as the term ‘communism’ may trigger feelings of anger, fear or frustration to the audience.

Furthermore, the negative evaluation of the post-communist élites is enforced by their alleged loyalty to Russia. In this manner, the internal frontier between the people and the élites is extended at the international level. The conflict is carried on between the ‘people’ willing to adhere to the European Union and the (West) European values and the rulers who preferred the perpetuation of the former Soviet influence over Romania. The PMP leader thus reappropriates the characteristic distinction from the Cold War period, between Western and Eastern states, implying that the decisive choice of the democratic values has not been made until his presidential mandate.

In the construction of the past ‘enemy’, Băsescu includes the names of certain public persons. In contrast, the current ‘enemy’ appears as an extended out-group that comprises the main institutions of the state. The government of the country is not held by ‘the people’ and neither by their elected representatives, but by an administration that serves its own interests, which Băsescu labels

as ‘the system’. This power bloc covers all important domains of a state, like defence, police, education, and justice, thus threatening the existence of a democratic regime. By stating that these domains do not function properly, the speaker enhances the idea of crisis and imminent danger.

- (16) First, political people are not a part of the system. Why? Because they do not have permanent offices. They come, they go. [...] The system is formed by the budget apparatus. Generals from the information services, generals from the Ministry of Defense, generals from the Ministry of Internal Affairs, university professors, high officials who maintain their functions in the ministries, judges (not all of them), prosecutors (not all of them), but they are a part of the system. They are that backbone that every state has (Bănescu 2016).

This fragment reveals how the speaker presents himself as the main *voice of expertise* (Reyes 2011) or as the most informed source in regard to the definition of ‘the enemy’. Bănescu’s expert authority (Van Leeuwen 2008: 107), grounded in his former role as a state president, is manifest through verbal process clauses that include verbs like *a defini* (“to define”) and *a spune* (“to tell”).

The enemy is constructed here through enumerations and juxtapositions, which enables the speaker to connect diverse categories under the label of a ‘dangerous Other’. (Panizza 2005: 4) The construction of the ‘other’ can be grounded on political or economic features, or combinations of such features on criteria such as ethnicity or religion. The heterogeneity of the ‘other’ is a response to and a consequence of the heterogeneous construct that is, in fact, ‘the people’. In this case, the variety of the enemies forming ‘the establishment’ increases the idea of threat and uncertainty within the Romanian society: the speaker and the party he represents become the only trustworthy actors in a chaotic state.

The delegitimation of the actual ‘enemy’ is made through the strategies of *moral evaluation* and *rationality* (Van Leeuwen 2008: 114-116; Reyes 2011: 797-799). Populist politicians may define the élites not only in economic or ideological terms, but also through their status as intellectuals (e.g. Pasquino 2008: 20; Pelinka 2013: 7; Priester 2005: 58). Wodak (2013: 28) observes

how right-wing populists may also display an image of arrogant ignorance. The PMP leader uses the example of Ph.D. titles in order to delegitimize the official institutions of the state. At the same time, he foregrounds common-sense knowledge as being more valuable than formal education. In the example below, the speaker emphasizes his skepticism in regard to official academic titles through irony (“we would have had the most instructed ministry in the world”) and an informal language:

- (17) Now we seem to find ourselves in such a situation, when the system dominates the political [sphere, my note] and works for itself and I give you examples too: 600 PhDs in the Ministry of Internal Affairs. Oh god! If we had had 600 officers with a PhD title in the Ministry of Internal Affairs, we would have had the most instructed ministry in the world (Bănescu 2016).

The rejection of expert authority held by other social or political actors is accompanied by a strong emphasis placed by Traian Bănescu on his abilities as a political leader. Bănescu attempts to accumulate various types of authority, not only that of a former state president, but also that of an expert in relation to ‘the people’. He adopts the role of a “leader-mentor”, who knows the needs of all categories forming ‘the people’, who voices their demands and also has the right solutions to these demands. Moreover, his ‘mentorship’ is visible in the description and characterization of ‘the enemy’, that contradicts the common opinion conveyed by the media and by other political actors.

6. CONCLUSIONS

The analysis has shown that both dimensions proposed by Stavrakakis and Katsambekis (2014) for the investigation of populist discourse are present in the selected speeches. In regard to the legitimation strategies employed, the texts show significant differences. This invalidates the hypothesis formulated at the beginning, about the similarities of the two speeches due to the common political background of the two leaders.

The M10 leader emphasizes the role of the ‘people’ in political life and presents them as a homogeneous group that is consid-

ered to be better than its rulers. The alienation of the élites from the people is attributed to the alleged generic corruption of the entire political class. Moral evaluation represents here a key strategy of legitimation, which distinguishes the citizens from politicians and even from the authority structures, in general.

The image of the party leader is also grounded in this quest of moral values. In her intervention, Macovei represents herself as ‘one of the people’, backgrounding her previous professional achievements as a law specialist. She constructs for herself the image of a ‘leader – paladin’, whose main characteristic is the desire to fight in order to punish those who have harmed ‘the people’.

For the PMP politician Traian Băsescu, the frontier between ‘the people’ and the élites is based on the selective access to knowledge. Giving back the power to the people is equated with sharing the truth about Romania’s recent history. The legitimating strategies of authorization and rationalization are prevalent in this speech, as the main asset of the PMP leader and of the party consists in having the necessary information. The speaker assumes both personal and expert authority and claims to know more than all the other politicians, due to his experience as the President of Romania. This trait, together with the skepticism regarding the authority of traditional experts (such as scientists) on political issues, positions him as a ‘leader – mentor’. Although he has held the highest public office in the state, Băsescu manages to position himself as an outsider, by constructing a relation of articulation with ‘the people’ and another one, of antagonism, between ‘the people’ (including himself) and the state administration.

The endorsement of a centre-right liberal ideology is visible for both politicians who position themselves in opposition to the left-wing. Macovei affirms the liberal goal “of providing a framework for individuals to pursue projects of their own choosing” (Bellamy, 1993, p.27), while the PMP associates the liberal objectives with a nationalist component. Both speeches are grounded in a populist logic as they state the existence of a critical situation within the Romanian society and the incapacity of the current authorities to satisfy the claims of ‘the people’. However, the presence of populist elements in a party’s discourse cannot be an exclusive indicator of

electoral success, as the two parties presented here have evolved differently. While M10 did not succeed in entering the electoral campaign of 2016, PMP has obtained 26 parliamentary seats. This evolution suggests that, at the discursive level, the appeal to moral evaluation needs to be accompanied by other legitimating strategies, such as authorization and rationalization, in order to construct the speaker's image as a trustworthy politician.

Lastly, both politicians attempt to construct an internal frontier within the society that is grounded not only in the present, but also in the past. The antagonism between 'the people' and 'the élites' is based on the distinction between capitalism and communism (for Băseșcu) and between the free market economy and the command economy (for Macovei). In both texts analyzed, the populist elements serve to counterbalance a widespread perception of crisis and authorities' alienation from the citizens, which, in the case of Romania, dates back to the communist period.

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Appendix 1: the texts quoted in the original language

- (1) [...]și discursul meu se numește „Întoarcem foaia/politica: pentru tine”, pentru om. Și, da, pentru om vrem să lucrăm. Așa cum am spus și în campanie, vreau să fiu președintele oamenilor. Acum o să spun: acest partid trebuie să fie – și va fi – partidul oamenilor.
- (2) Mă lupt de mult pentru democrație, pentru reguli, pentru ordine, pentru lege, pentru dreptate, pentru libertate, în partid, în afara partidului.
- (3) Nu avem funcții de oferit, pentru că nu suntem pe val, n-avem bani de dat, nu avem sacoșe cu bani, n-avem contracte de dat. Avem de dat pentru România dragostea

noastră, puterea noastră, inteligența noastră, libertatea noastră. Și iubim România. Iubim oamenii.

- (4) Să fii tratat cu respect. Îmi amintesc că am fost acum o lună la secția financiară, să iau certificat de cazier fiscal când am făcut Asociația M10. Atât este deschizătura de la geam, deci trebuie să stai cu capul aplecat, ca să poți să vorbești cu funcționarul. Asta în sine înseamnă că te umilește, te face mai mic, că funcționarul este mai important, că el stă drept, vorbește prin geam, tu nu-l auzi, îți mai apleci capul o dată, îl mai întrebi o dată. Nu se poate așa ceva. Nu este funcționarul stăpânul nostru.
- (5) De-asta pentru mine – și pentru noi – administrația este un lucru foarte important care, după cum veți vedea, va schimba viața tuturor: a pensionarilor, a tinerilor, a oamenilor, a indivizilor și a companiilor.
- (6) El este singurul și primul partid din România de dreapta cu adevărat, este singurul partid care merge pe calea dreaptă. El nu este nimic din ce avem azi pe scena politică, [...] nu are nimic de-a face cu actuala clasă politică.
- (7) Noi, dimpotrivă, avem în față un val, o clasă politică de hoți, de minciună, avem în față un tsunami de corupție, de hoție din banii noștri. Noi ne luptăm cu valul, noi nu suntem pe val. Noi suntem în fața valului, în fața tsunami-ului, pe care vrem să îl distrugem tot pentru tine, ca banii furați să se întoarcă la tine.
- (8) Vrea prosperitate prin modernizare, vrea un stat minimal și o țară mare. Ce înseamnă asta? Înseamnă că vrea un stat redus, cu o birocrație redusă, cu o parte bugetară redusă, cu un guvern redus, cu un Parlament redus, cu o intervenție cât mai mică în viața noastră, cu o intervenție cât mai mică în viața economică a țării. Și vrea o țară mare, o țară puternică – puternică economic, o țară puternică pe plan internațional, o țară puternică energetic, o țară relevantă. O țară care să conteze.
- (9) România are două mari taine. Cea mai mare taină este a revoluției sau a loviturii de stat din decembrie 89. Toți artizanii ei (aplauze)... toți artizanii ei s-au aflat

în primii 6 ani în toate structurile de conducere, de la generali trădători vânduți Moscovei la oameni care nu credeau niciodată într-o Românie capitalistă, ci voiau doar o Românie cu un capitalism cu față umană. [...] Când vom avea această taină, a revoluției, elucidată de justiție, atunci vom ști de ce ne-a mers rău, de ce-am stat în ambiguitate, ca stat membru NATO sau al Uniunii Europene sau de ce-am stat în ambiguitate până în 2004 cu privire la direcția noastră.

- (10) Cei care au făcut ca aceste realități ale României să tot fie clasate, amânate, sunt cei care au protejat sistemul, iar misiunea noastră este să smulgem definitiv România din mâinile sistemului. Și vreau să știți de la unul care a fost timp de 10 ani președintele României că nu-i ușor.
- (11) [...] ne spunea: Voi, dragi studenți, (era în vârstă) o să bateți mările și oceanele lumii. O să ridicați tricolorul la catarg la fiecare răsărit de soare, dar va trebui să știți ce înseamnă tricolorul, ce acoperă tricolorul și ne arăta harta României Mari. Am acest sentiment prin educația într-un institut militar unde am avut și profesori care au avut curaj să ne vorbească despre realitățile istoriei noastre într-o vreme când se vorbea doar pe la colțuri și într-o vreme când eram învățați că trebuie să stăm supuși față de Moscova.
- (12) În 2004, statul român a aprobat doar 4 (4!) cetățenii, cetățenilor din Rep Moldova, de câteva sute de ori mai puține decât a acordat arabilor.
- (13) De aceea am pus o postare, în care, cu experiența adunată în 10 ani, am definit sistemul și vreau să vă spun și dv această definiție, ca să nu plecăm cu ambiguități.
- (14) [...] vă rog să le amintiți și românilor că astăzi, când constată că sistemul de sănătate este aproape în colaps, în 2012, în ianuarie, un președinte le-a propus o nouă lege pentru organizarea sistemului de sănătate. Trebuie să ne batem pentru această lege, [...] acea lege găsea soluția pentru ca medicii să rămână în România.

- (15) Au fost mulți generali, au fost mulți generali trădători vînduți Moscovei, au fost mulți generali care au pus imediat mîna pe putere alături de Ion Iliescu, Brucan și ceilalți.
- (16) În primul rînd, oamenii politici nu sunt parte a sistemului. De ce? Pentru că ei nu sunt stabili pe funcții. Ei vin, pleacă, [...] Sistemul este format din aparat bugetar. Generali din serviciile de informații, generali din Ministerul Apărării, generali din Ministerul de Interne, profesori universitari, înalți funcționari care-s menținuți pe funcții în ministere, judecători – nu toți -, procurori – nu toți – dar ei sunt parte a sistemului. Sunt acea coloană vertebrală pe care o are orice stat.
- (17) Acum părem a fi într-o astfel de situație, în care sistemul domină politicul și lucrează pentru el și vă dau și exemple: 600 de doctori în Ministerul de Interne. Doamne! Dacă am fi avut 600 de ofițeri cu doctorat în Ministerul de Interne, am fi avut cel mai cult ministerdin lume.

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**CONSTRUCTION OF NATIONAL
IDENTITY IN POLITICAL
DISCOURSE: CASES OF
PRESIDENTIAL NEW YEAR TV
ADDRESSES AND APPEALS TO
THE FEDERAL ASSEMBLY**

Abstract

The study of national identities is congruent with the analytical approach to identity of the constructivist discourse. According to the constructivist paradigm, we interpret national identity in terms of its representation in language and speech, and its actualization in communication. The prominent aspect of the constructivist study of nations is discourse analysis as a condition and means for the “production” of national identity.

The paper discusses two politically important and popular genres of political discourse: the President’s New Year TV addresses and the Presidential Appeals to the Federal Assembly. These genres are typical of the political discourse as they determine the thematic and conceptual structure of political

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texts of other genres and attract the side audience.

To reveal the main discursive elements and means for the construction of national identity, we have compiled a corpus comprising the New Year addresses of Russian Presidents from 2000 to 2018 and the Appeals of the Russian President to the Federal Assembly of the Russian Federation from 2012 to 2018.

We used the program AntConc to process the corpus, find key words (lemmas), clusters (n-grams) and concordances including the main linguistic markers of the national identity.

The results show that the semantic construction of national belonging is processed in the corpus by means of the nominations people, nation (peoplehood), Russians, citizens of Russia. By thematizing these nominations, the communicator constructs them in predominately socio-economic, political and socio-psychological categories. Furthermore, in the texts, the concept of nation is constructed rather in subjective and agentive terms.

Keywords: national identity, construction, New Year address, Presidential Appeal, nominations, representations, corpus discourse analysis.

1. INTRODUCTION

Our everyday conviction in the reality of national identity appears when we believe in an ordinary, taken-for-granted and static nature of our belonging to nation. Moreover, we accept as true that our self-reference to nation determines our many core features, both social and psychicones. Individual stand to explain the reasons of their actions, relations and interactions from the perspective of nation. These features indicate predominately non-reflective character of the national identity. We treat it to on natural to put it under critical reflection.

Nevertheless, we can change national identities during our lives. For the last hundred years, Russian national identity has experienced fundamental transformations at least twice: firstly – after the Russian Revolution in 1917, and secondly – after the coup in August 1991. Even for the last decades, there have been profound identification changes that appear in linguistic terms: in 1980s, the government of the country used to address to its citizens as *Soviet people*, in 1990s as *Russian nationals*¹, while now as *Russian citizens* or *citizens of Russia*. Meanwhile, they have all the time remained *Russians* for the whole world.

The historical record is full with examples of ‘urgent’ formation of new national identities. For several decades, the communities of Irish become *Americans*; the conglomerates of administratively connected tribes become *Indonesians* and *Malaysians*; historically united but ethnically or even religiously independent communities of Serbs, Croats, Montenegrins, and Bosnians become *Yugoslavs*; people of certain Russian speaking regions of Ukraine become *Novorossians*. Some of these projects occur successful, and some are not. The success of national identification projects depends on both historical, political, cultural factors, and how cogent is the project for its addresses. Thus, for example, rhetorical reference to history as a nation-integrating factor can appear more efficient argument than the historical facts themselves. The discursive formation of national identity is one of the crucial aspects of national identification.

Before we address to the strategies of discursive practice of national identification, let us expose briefly the theoretical views on the issue of national identity. Depending on the research tradition, one can interpret the national identity as an objective phenomenon, independent from the human mind and given to humans a priori, or it can be regarded as an effect of collective and individual “mind-work”, a social and political construction, which specification depends on the certain social and political conditions.

1 There is a significant difference in Russian language between two nominations: *Russkije* (Russians) to indicate ethnical identity, and *Rossijane* (Russian nationals) to mark the political and national identity. It means that *Rossijane* as a heterogenic group includes *Russkije*, *Tatary* (Tartars), *Burjaty* (Buriats) and many other ethnic groups who build the population of the Russian Federation, while *Russkije* are a homogenic group. Further in the paper, we will use both nominations in English transliterated version: *Russkije* and *Rossijane* to make the difference clean in certain contexts.

2. NATIONAL IDENTITY: FROM ESSENTIALISM TO CONSTRUCTIVISM

During the 20th century, the theories of nation and national identities were developing in three directions: essentialism, instrumentalism and constructivism.

Essentialism is the historically first cohesive theory of nation. It interprets nations in objectivist categories treating them as “a natural entity” with historical “roots”. This approach refers to the works by Sergey Shirokogorov, Lev Gumilev, Yury Bromley, Pierre van den Berghe and many others (Бромлей 1973; Бромлей 1983; Широкогоров 1923; Berghe 1981). According to essentialism, nation, being an autonomous substance, does not depend on the individual or collective mind and it follows its immanent regularities. Essentialism did contribute to development of theories of nation since it first stated the fundamental ideas of the “reproducing” character of nations. Besides, this approach pays the special attention to the emotional aspect of belonging to a nation. From the essentialist point of view, the individual affective experience of nationality is the condition for consolidation of national and ethnic communities.

However, the approach have constantly been under a serious critique. The main critical points are about how essentialists ignore the “manageable” nature of national identity. Essentialism has a lack of abilities to explain the facts of emerging identities, as well as the facts of changes in national self-defining, and roles of media, political leaders and intellectuals in formation of national identities facets and patterns. Moreover, the critics of the essentialist approach indicate that such objective background of national identity as language, culture and territory are not unchangeable, and that the state borders do not necessarily coincide with linguistic borders of a nation, while there are often modern communities with authentic culture, language and territory that are far from the national status.

Instrumentalism emerged in 1970s to oppose essentialism in national identity studies. Instrumentalists regard the identity in terms of functions, which it has on both individual and collective levels (Kohn 1955; Brass 1991; Rothschild 1981). They define

nations as groups united with general interests, social and political goals and pragmatic attitudes. These groups exploit its national belonging as a resource for political struggles. This theoretical tradition simply eliminates the question of “nature” or “objective backgrounds” of national identity. Nationality is a result of national identification and it acts as an ideological resource for mass mobilization, as well as a social and emotional tool for making oneself feel secure and consolidated with other individuals. It means that national identity is not only a political resource but also a mean for emotional comfort. To achieve it, the society massively uses stereotyped images of national membership.

Weak points of the essentialist theory is non-distinction of notions “nation” and “class”, and too politicized interpretation of nationality, as well as a hyperbolized utilitarian approach to identity. By excluding the question of national ontology from discussions, instrumentalists come to ontologize the nation even more intensely than essentialists do, since they explain it as “already given” before individuals start using it as a tool in their practices.

These issues lead to the development of constructivism in the second part of the 20th century. On constructivist view, nation is not “natural entity” that determines “characters” or “mentalities” of individuals. It also does not appear as a tool for social and political relations. It is rather an ideal type (Max Weber), a goal, a set of individual representations of themselves. Obviously, such posing the question of nation leads to focus on rather the means for representation of nations in language and talk than nations themselves. What is actual for constructivist view are the issues of how national identities emerge in communication and what the ways of talking and thinking about it are (Bruner 2002; Checkel 1999; Wodak 2009; Kolsto 2018).

One of the key features of the constructivist study of nation is the critical analysis of discourse by which the identity is constructed. The special interest of critical discourse analysis is for the discursive struggle for meanings, interpretations and definitions (Wodak, Meyer 2001; Hester, Housley 2017), and at last, for the worldview, while the struggle is the collision of social group interests. The public talk about nation and nationality and the representations of national phenomena, from the critical discourse

analysis point, is a symbolic struggle for defining and re-defining of community principles, thus for principles of social order legitimation and redistribution of resources, etc. Actually, the constructivist approach is typical for discourse analysis that traditionally bases on sociological and linguistic theories (Брубейкер, Купер 2010; Barker, Galasinski 2001; Cillia de, Reisigl et al. 1999).

Benedict Anderson's conception of imagined communities is still up to now one of the most prominent theories of nation. He proved demonstratively the imagined character of nations. They exist exclusively in the minds of the individuals who refer themselves to national communities (Anderson 1991). According to Anderson, nation is a result of sociocultural construction, an imagined community based on the belief that its members "naturally" unite by the common culture and history. Nation results from collective discussions, representations and affections, and it becomes real to the degree that individuals are ready to believe and accept its reality.

National identity is also a *political category* since it assumes (self)reference to the stately determined communities. In the 2nd part of the previous century social sciences and humanities widely discussed and claimed this thesis (e.g. see the works by Michel Foucault (Фуко 1996, 2004), Manuel Castells (Castells 2009), Norman Fairclough (Fairclough 1995) and many more. The basic mechanism of individual reference to political phenomena is the discursive practice as a system of verbal and non-verbal meaning-making operations under the social, cultural and technological conditions.

3. NATIONAL IDENTITY AND POLITICAL DISCOURSE: CONCEPTUAL RELATIONS

Being essentially analytical, constructivist approach to national identity contributes to understanding it as a product of discursive and communicational practices. Identity, from the constructivist perspective, is not "given" but is "being done". It is important to emphasize that identity is not only the construction of someone's ideological or manipulative activity but rather it results from collective practices of social agents themselves. One can "be

Russian” not in all and every situations and times, but only in certain circumstances of collective action which is articulated, defined and thematized in national perspective. Thus, individuals construct identities in the cooperative activity (see, e.g.: Epstein 2011; Castells 2009). One of the essential elements of the discursive level of national identity is narrative, story as an “algorithm” of talking about one’s identity (ancestry and origins, biography, ergonyms, self-descriptions, descriptions and evaluations of *others*, etc.). In other words, *identity is an image of one’s own belonging to nation, which is constructed in the cooperative practice, i.e. in discursive practice*. In a sense, national identity is to a certain degree a discursive identity since self-defining in national perspective can only be expressed, fixed and defined by means of linguistic markers.

As Stuart Hall claimed, “a national culture is a *discourse* – a way of constructing meanings which impacts and organizes both our actions and our conception of ourselves... National cultures construct identities by producing meanings about ‘the nation’ with which we can *identify*; these are contained in the stories which are told about it, memories which connect its present with its past, and images which are constructed of it” (Hall 1996: 613).

Let us mark that such identification schemata are not constructed on a spontaneous narrations or stories about a nation or someone’s belonging to it. On the contrary, they base on organized discursive practices with their certain *discursive (system-forming) nodes*.

Firstly, these are *nominations* that fix the semiotic status of national identity: ergonyms; institutional nominations and titles; taxonomical subcategories which precise and typologize nominative categories (for example, the nomination *Americans* can include taxonomical subcategories *New-Yorker*, *Southerner*, *Californian*, or, in another discursive ‘regime’, subcategories *WASPs*, *Hispanics*, *Afro-Americans*, etc.).

Secondly, the origins, official chronology and key historical events are represented in *historical narratives*. The categories of *past*, *present* and *future* occur as necessary constructive epistemic elements of such narratives.

Thirdly, the categories of *us* and *them* (*in-group* and *out-group*) are central for political discursive practices and especially for identity construction practices. In texts and talks, individuals differentiate *them and us*, i.e. they differentiate discursively those who are members of their group and those who are not. In other words, they construct *national differences* in discursive practices (e.g. *malorossy – novorossy – russkije*). In addition, the category *we / us* is generally endued with positive descriptions and personified features, such as, for example, bravery, generosity, hospitality, kindness, etc.).

Fourthly, identities correlate or associate with *images (representations) of culture and territory*. Individuals construct discursively cultural and territorial images of the nation. These images include, as a rule, representations of language, culture, art, science, technologies, everyday life, habits, cuisine, sports, nature, cities and towns, geographical features, scope of territory, etc.

Fifthly, when discursively constructing national identities, individuals refer to social and political aspects of a national community. The specifics of political system of a country, social order of a state, social and political issues of a nation can be reflected in discursive patterns of national identity.

These discursive nodes are engaged in construction of national identity. They arise in its various forms: from national museums (Kaplan 1994) and institutionalized popular culture (Edensor 2002) to public political messages and comments in social media (Bennet 2012).

From the linguistic political view, there is a range of specific genres of the political discourse of which the main goal is to (re)construct the national identity. Such are, for example, *addresses of State leaders to nations, Independence Day addresses, Victory Day appeals, mobilization messages* in conflict and war conditions, etc. Not least important are *holiday televised addresses of state leaders to the nation, electoral political advertising and mediatized messages of politicians*.

Further, we refer to two politically important genres of the political discourse, such as *President's New Year Addresses to Citizens of the Russian Federation* and *Presidential Appeal to the*

Federal Assembly of the Russian Federation. These genres are, on one hand, typical for the genre variety of the political discourse, and, on the other hand, they are involving and intriguing in very massive terms.

One note we should make is that it would be rather simplistic if one consider that politicians believe their audience to fall blind under their (politicians') messages about national identity. This process is not "mechanical", it is rather non-discrete, non-linear, which result has more cumulative rather than reactive character. The national identity is constructed in the informational field where meanings are systematically "pulsating" in media. The role of such genres as New Year address, appeal, proclamation, political advertising or inauguration speech is rather ritual, since politicians fix meaning structures; they "make an inventory" of basic national concepts; they resume public discussions; at last, they articulate the principle discursive formulas which can be later used for construction of newer and newer texts about national identity.

In such a context, we are dealing with the corpus of political texts, but not with the most typical cases of usage as such.

4. NATIONAL IDENTITY IN PRESIDENT'S NEW YEAR TELEVISED ADDRESSES AND PRESIDENTIAL APPEALS TO THE FEDERAL ASSEMBLY

Before we discuss the results of the corpus discourse analysis of President's New Year televised addresses and Presidential Appeals to the Federal Assembly, let us refer to the general sociopolitical and cultural contexts of these both genres of political discourse. The sociopolitical framework, as we marked in our previous works (Pereverzev, Kozhemyakin 2009), refers to deep social and political changes in the country. The acute financial crisis and ahead-of-schedule resign of the President Boris Yeltsin dramatically resulted the first decade of the new Russia. The severe social and economic differentiation in the Russian society reflected in the widening gap between the rich and the poor, as the growth of oligarchy in all sectors of the national economics was evidently immense.

The national identity of the citizens of the newly-born Russia was under a big question in these conditions, alongside with the negative impact on it by the default of the new governmental policies, the vast immigration, the gruesome results of the first Chechen war and the war in Yugoslavia (Le 2002: 389-390). The first President of Russia Boris Yeltsin managed to transfer his power to the former KGB colonel Vladimir Putin.

In these years, the Government under President Putin managed to set things in a certain order (or, to take them under governmental control) in economics, military, mass media etc. Later, the task was to elaborate the ideological apparatus for the construction of the new Russian national identity. It encompassed ideas of the unity of the nation, the history of Russian Empire and the power of the former Soviet Union. The New Year's addresses of the Presidents to nation and the annual Addresses to the Federal Assembly during these years became a kind of summary of the ideological work done for constructing the national identity.

4.1. National identity in Presidential New Year Televised Addresses

Traditionally the New Year's address to the nation has been an integral part of the system of national rituals firstly in the USSR and later in Russia. As N. Kondratenko stated, this genre belongs institutionally to political discourse, and its rituality bases on principles of textual, temporal and event localization (Kondratenko 2007).

Historically the main public holiday of Russia was Christmas; however, it was changed by the New Year after the Russian Revolution in 1917. The present generation of Russians preserves this tradition and regards the New Year's Eve as a very special holiday. From the social point of view, the celebration of the New Year is preceded by the numerous social events that "prepare" people to the big celebration. Thus, the audience of the president's address is fully aware of the content and meaning of the message, which produces the special effect of sacred event. The political element of the context is formed by the ritualized of the New Year's address. The address may be given solely by the president, the content of

the address is highly institutionalized, its structure and its meaning must correspond to the previous addresses. (Kondratenko 2007). Culturally the context of the New Year's address corresponds to the contemporary traditions of Russian New Year celebration; as such it is integrated into the system of customs and beliefs practiced by Russians during the last days of December and first days of January each year. What seems rather important is existential context of the address, which is rendered in individuals' hopes and wishes for the next year and "justifying" their efforts and tries in the passing year.

It is rather special that is supposedly expected by every Russian standing with the glass of champagne in front of the TV. The tradition of the New Year's address to the nation has been lasting for decades since the times of the Soviet Union. Traditionally families and friends, celebrating the New Year's Eve together draw round the festival table about ten or twenty minutes before midnight. Celebration starts with ritual of "saying farewell" to the last year. The TV sets are switched on and the addressed is broadcasted through all the TV channels. It starts exactly five minutes before midnight – with the solemn music and showing of main symbols of statehood on the background of the speaking president. Many people are staying while listening to the President – the moment of symbolic unity between three elements of the state – the family, the President and the nation. Still as a cultural object, the New Year address is surrounded by the number of small rituals, such as "seeing off the last year", opening the bottle of champagne right when the bell is ringing twelve times, kissing, wishing and so on.

There must be effect of the President speaking to the whole nation, on behalf of the nation, personally and to every person.

To reveal the main discursive elements and means for construction of national identity, we made the corpus of all presidential New Year addresses to citizens of the Russian Federation from 2000 to 2018. We gathered all texts from the official site of the President of the Russian Federation. We used the program AntConc to process the corpus, to search for key words (lemmas), collocations and concordances with language markers of national identity.

Conceptual structure of the New Year address of the President comprises the consequence of these elements:

- Vocative address
- Congratulations
- Statements about the milestones of the state and/or the key events of the past year
- Reference to the family and emotional context of the holiday
- Reference to the state and national context of the holiday
- Greetings and congratulations

As the result of processing the televised addresses, we revealed the most frequent nouns including pronouns (see Tab.1).

Table 1. The most frequent nouns in the Presidential New Year TV addresses

№	Lemma	Frequency in the corpus
1	We (wordforms: we, us, our) / Мы (wordforms: мы, наш, нас, нам)	181
2	Year / Год (word forms: год, года, годом, году)	137
3	Russia / Россия (wordforms: Россия, России, Россией, Россию)	61
4	You (wordforms: you, your) / Вы (wordforms: вас, вы, вам)	48
5	I (word forms: I, me, my) / Я (word forms: я, мне, мной)	42
6	Friends / Друзья (word forms: друзья, друзей)	42
7	Country / Страна (wordforms: страна, стране, страной, страну)	20
8	People / Люди (wordforms: людей, людям, людьми, людях)	20
9	They (word forms: they, them, their) / Они (word forms: они, их, им)	17
10	Holiday / Праздник (wordforms: праздник, праздника, праздником)	17

The results demonstrate the specifics of the corpus of TV-addresses of the President: the contextual character of the communi-

tional situation (President's address + popular holiday) determines the frequent usage of words *country*, *Russia* and *holiday*.

Nation as 'we'

It is important that the lemma *we*, which is rather frequent in the Russian language, is the most frequent in the discourse of the New Year address, too. It proves the well-known hypothesis of the communicational pragmatics of this political discourse genre (see: Шейгал 2004, Кондратенко 2007). When addressing to people, the President performs the symbolic construction of the national community, and the integration of addressees into the institutional discursive sphere. This is reflected in the most frequent concordance with the lemma *we*: *together* (nine cases). It is remarkable that the sum of lemmas *I* and *you* does not exceed the value of frequency of the lemma *we*, thus here we see not differentiating but integrating function of the New Year address (see Tab.2).

Table 2. The most frequent pronouns in the Presidential New Year TV addresses

N	Lemma	Frequency in the corpus
1	We(us, our) / мы (нам, наш, нас)	181
2	you (your) / вы (вам, ваш)	48
3	I (me, my) / я (мне, меня, мой)	42
4	they (their, them) / они (им, их)	17

The lemma *they* is also present amongst the most frequent elements of the corpus. The concordances of the pronoun *they* (in decreasing order): *children*, *holidays*, *parents*, *plans*, *changes*, *joys and losses*, *citizens of the Crimea and Sebastopol* and several other. Obviously, the pronoun *they*, which is very often used in political discourse as an ideological opposition to the pronoun *we*, emerges in this genre as a positive identification marker (*they* are also *us*).

The most frequent clusters (n-grams) with the word *we* are *together*, *friends*, *year*, *new*, *ours*. The most frequent concordances

with the lemma *we* are *we together* (freq=9), *we will* (freq=5), *we remember* (freq=4), *we do* (freq=4), *we think* (freq=3). These clusters and concordances indicate the integrating, projective, reflective and actional character of President's statements.

The most frequent n-grams with the word *I* are *not* (freq=9), *want* (freq=8), *you* (freq=7), *Russia* (freq=5). The most frequent concordances with the lemma *I* are *I want* (freq=7), *I wish* (freq=5), *I always* (freq=2).

The most frequent n-grams with the word *you* are *happiness* (freq=4), *happy* (freq=4), *deserved* (freq=4), *I* (freq=3). The most frequent concordances with the lemma *you* are *you were* (freq=3), *you deserved* (freq=2).

Visible is the misbalance in temporal construction of the addresser and addressees, since the addresser models himself in the present while addressees are being modeled predominately in the past. Besides, modelling of the integrative sphere *I + you* (i.e. *we*) is processed in the present (*we remember*, *we do*, *we think*), that is in accordance with the speech positioning of the speaker.

The most frequent n-grams (size=2) in the corpus expressing the addressing are *dear friends* (freq=40), *citizens of Russia* (freq=11), *dear citizen* (freq=11). Such distribution of frequency points at the interpersonal, even intimate, but at the same time distanced manner of addressing to the audience.

The vary nominations of national identity are in the corpus as in Table 3.

Table 3. Nominations of national identity in the Presidential New Year TV addresses

N	Nomination	Frequency in the corpus
1	people / люди	20
2	citizens of Russia / граждане России	19
3	nation (peoplehood) / народ	10
4	Russian nationals / россияне	4
5	compatriots / соотечественники	1

It is obvious that implementation of national meanings to the nominations *people*, *compatriots* and *nation* is processed in communicational speech contexts of their usage, particularly in the situation of the Presidential address to people who interpret contextually these nominations as markers of their belonging to the Russian nation. Meanwhile, the nominations Russian nationals (Россияне) and citizens of Russia (граждане России) are extra-contextual. However, further, we will not emphasize this differentiation, meaning that the communicational context of the New Year TV address let audience perceive all these nominations as similarly indicating the nationality.

Let us observe three most frequent nominations: *people*, *citizens of Russia* and *nation (peoplehood)*.

Nation as people

Nominations of nation as *people* are represented in texts as follows in Table 4.

Table 4. Nominations of nation as people in the Presidential New Year TV addresses

N	Nomination	Frequency in the corpus
1	people / люди	7
2	the dearest and closest people (family connotations) / самые дорогие и близкие люди	7
3	people of our country, people in our country / люди нашей страны, люди в нашей стране	2
4	Elder people / люди старшего поколения	2
5	our people / наши люди	1
6	young people / молодые люди	1

The most frequent n-grams with the word *people* are of *elder generation, country, relatives, beloved, commonwealth*. The most frequent concordances with the lemma *people* are *the closest people, the dearest people, elder people, and improvement of people's lives*.

The concept *people* is released especially in the context of family and paternalist relations, since according to the speech practice of this type of political discourse *people* are treated as more

personalized individuals, mainly, parents, and also those who need helping and a special attention, and who act rather like an object than a subject of action.

The objective but positively marked character of the concept *people* reflects in the most frequent language constructions expressing not agentive but addressee features: *congratulate people, possibilities for people, improve people's lives, share emotions with people, make people live a bit better*, etc.

The objective meaning of this concept is represented also in the what it is thematized in New Year TV addresses. We distinguish several *thematic modules* of the usage of *people*:

- caring, helping and attention to close people: *we always try to be at our close and dear people's side; modern technologies let us share our emotions with dear people; today we are thinking of the closest people, our parents; the state must and will support and help elder people*;

- improvement of people's lives: *we managed to improve people's lives little by little; we have to do many things in economy to improve people's lives; what we should do to make people live a bit better; to fulfil the possibilities of everyone, to improve people's lives is the main goal*;

- hopes and chances of people: *we see as new chances are open for people; people in our country look into the future more confidently; these moments unite people (...) because everyone (...) hopes (...) for the best; how hopefully and trustfully people did vote at elections*.

We can resume that thematisation of the concept *people* results in mainly *social-economic* (improvement of lives) and *socio-psychological categorization* (caring, helping and attention, and hopes and chances): people are whose economic position has to make care about and who deserves the personalized, special attention and relation.

Nation as citizens

Nominations of nation as *citizens'* community in TV addresses are presented in Tab. 5.

Table 5. Nominations of nation as citizens in the Presidential New Year TV address

N	Nomination	Frequency in the corpus
1	citizens of Russia / граждане России	14
2	citizens of our country / граждане нашей страны	2
3	our citizens / наши граждане	2
4	citizens / граждане	1

The most frequent n-grams with the word *citizens* are *Russia, country, dear, sure, friends*. The most frequent concordances with the lemma *citizens* are *our citizens, all citizens, and citizens' life*.

The concept *citizens*, as distinct from the concept *people*, realizes in New Year TV addresses in the *state* and *social* contexts. Note worthy, this nomination is used as addressing (*dear citizens; namely to you, its citizens*), which is, on one hand, defined by the cultural speech conventions (it is common in Russia to use this addressing instead of *dear nation* or *dear people*). On the other hand, it has the meaning effect of applying the state and socio-economic features to an individual as an object of addressing. To a certain degree, the following *dear friends* softens the institutionalized manner of addressing as *dear citizens*, which is explained by the holiday, private family, and personally meaningful atmosphere of the communicational situation, and it contributes to a more informal and even intimate air of the contact with the President.

Thematization of nation as citizens includes the following topical modules:

- citizens' interests and their defence: *we will ... in the broadest sense defend the interests of our citizens;*

- labor activity of citizens: *many of our citizens, including those far from their homes, are maintaining the safety of Russia, are working at plants and making their services in hospitals, are conducting trains and plains;*

- citizens' life, welfare of citizens: *the state which is comfortable for citizens; I wish all the citizens of Russia mainly welfare; this year not all our citizens improved their lives;*

- demography: *it is pleasure that this year there have been more newly born citizens than the previous one;*

- ordeal: *our Motherland came through the dramatic ordeal ... due to you, its citizens.*

These topical modules show that the concept *citizens* is categorized in *socio-economic* (labor activity, life and welfare, demography) and (*geo*) *political terms* (defense of citizens' interests, ordeal, mentioning military servicemen first while naming categories of citizens. Thus, citizens are whose interests are linked and defined by the interests of the country. They are those who make up the whole entity with the state.

Nation as peoplehood

Nominations of the meaning *nation (peoplehood)* are as following in Tab.6.

Table 6. Nominations of the meaning nation (peoplehood) in the Presidential New Year TV address

N	Nomination	Frequency in the corpus
1	Russian nation / российский народ, народ России	4
2	our nation / наш народ	3
3	great nation / великий народ	1
4	united nation / единый народ	1
5	Multinational peoplehood / многонациональный народ	1

The most frequent n-grams with the word *nation (peoplehood, народ)*: *Russian, Russia, great, will be able, health*. The most frequent concordances with the lemma *nation (peoplehood, народ)*: *our nation, Russian nation*.

Thematization of nation:

- “way of nation” and its achievements: *the way which the Russian nation has chosen; we, the nation of Russia, will be able to move forward steadily; [Russian history] reflects the achievements of all the Russian nation;*

- pride of nation and authority of the country: *all this contributed to our common success. It added the authority to the country and the pride of the Russian nation;*

- positive features of the nation: *courage, diligence and intellectual potential of our great nation;*

- feeling of unity: *we felt ourselves the united nation.*

According to thematization strategies of the concept *nation*, its meaning structure is categorized *politically* (the authority of the country and nation, unity of nation) and *historically* (“way of nation” and its achievements). Let us remark that the New Year addresses, the concept *nation*, different from the concept *people*, is modelled rather in subjective, agentive than in objective aspects. The nation is active, united, non-personalized, it chooses its way, it has the pride and positive features.

On our view, on the scale “objectivity – subjectivity” we can place the concepts under consideration as follows: *people – citizens – nation*, where *people* are marked with rather objective features while *nation* is marked with subjective characteristics.

4.2. National identity in Presidential Appeal to The Federal Assembly of the Russian Federation

The Presidential Appeal to the Federal Assembly is an official speech of the country leader for the both palaces of The State Duma, which is determined by the chapter 84 of the Constitution of the Russian Federation. The Constitution specifies the main topical modules of the Appeal: “about the condition in the country, about general directions of the home and international state policy” (Конституция РФ).

First, Boris Eltsin addressed to the Federal Assembly in 1994, and then he made the Appeal every year until 1999. Later his successors in the status of the President continued and strengthened this tradition.

As the chapter “Dossier” of TASS says, “the content and the form of the appeal are entirely determined by the President and are not regulated by any legal acts”, except for the analysis of fulfilment of the social and economic development program that

is to be included to the Appeal according to the Federal Law “On state prognosis and programs of socio-economic development of the Russian Federation” (Информационное агентство ТАСС). Besides, the Appeal to the Federal Assembly the state leader formulates the main directions of the financial policy of the government (until October 2014 there was a special Budget appeal by the President).

The Appeals are not legal acts, they have the recommendatory nature, but since recently, they have also been functioning as legislative initiatives because they include presidential instructions for the government.

In follow-up of the Presidential speech, the State Duma and The Soviet of Federation make rulings for realization of the proclaimed goals and they base the legislative acts on the content of the Appeal.

TASS mention that before 2014, the Appeal was the result of consolidated work by Presidential Administration, government members and the cabinet of ministers, but after 2015 only by the Presidential Administration has been preparing the text.

The Presidential Appeal is one of the most important political events of the year, and this fact implies the comprehensive and detailed work on its content and speech strategies and tactics. As a rule, mass media messages in which authors make suggestions about its topics and aspects precede the Appeal.

Since this genre of political speech has become more traditional and less individual and monothematic, the public attitude toward it changes to be more formal. However, the Presidential Appeal attracts a special political interest which is reflected both in media coverages of it and in various politicological and linguistic analysis of this discursive practice.

The meaning of political discourse is revealed by defining interrelations between language structures and contexts of its usage. Teun van Dijk defines the context as mentally represented structure of social situation aspects in which a discourse emerges (van Dijk 2008). The context categories comprise the general definition of a situation; time and place of an event; actors; discursive genres; mental representations (goals, opinions, dispositions, etc.).

The main goal of the Appeal is to *inform* audience about how the situation is valued, about general directions of the home and foreign policy, i.e. it goes public to explain the important perspectives of the country development. Thus, the presidential speech contributes to formation of opinions and values in the society.

Expressing the national identity is one of these values that the Presidential Appeals to the Federal Assembly construct.

The corpus includes the texts of Appeals from 2012 to 2018, published on the official site of the President of the Russian Federation. To study the frequency of lemmas we used the program AntConc.

The list of the most frequent nouns including pronouns is shown in Tab.7.

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Table 7. The most frequent nouns in the Presidential Appeals to the Federal Assembly

№	Lemma	Frequency in the corpus
1	We (wordforms: us, our) / мы (wordforms: мы, нас, нам, нами)	778
2	Year / год (wordforms: года, году, годом, годах, лет)	334
3	Russia / Россия (wordforms: России)	291
4	They (wordforms: them, their) / они (word forms: они, их, им, ими, них)	216
5	Development / развитие (wordforms: развития, развитию, развитием, развитии)	211
6	Country / страна (wordforms: страны, стране, страну, страной)	166
7	Work / работа (wordforms: работы, работе, работу, работой)	144
8	People / люди (wordforms: людей, людям, людьми)	140
9	System / система (wordforms: системы, системе, систему, системой, систем, системами)	138
10	I / Я (wordforms: я, меня мне, мной)	124
11	Citizens / граждане (wordforms: граждан, гражданам, гражданами, гражданах)	105
12	Decision / решение (wordforms: решения, решений, решению, решением, решении)	99
13	Economy / экономика (wordforms: экономики, экономике, экономику, экономикой)	98
14	Region / регион (wordforms: регионы, регионов, регионом, регионами, регионе, регионах)	98
15	You / вы (wordforms: вас, вам, вами)	96
16	Colleagues / коллеги (wordforms: коллег, коллегами)	94
17	Government / правительство (wordforms: правительства, правительству, правительством)	90
18	Possibility / возможность (wordforms: возможности, возможностью, возможностями)	81
19	Growth / рост (wordforms: роста, росту, росте)	80
20	Business / бизнес (wordforms: бизнеса, бизнесу, бизнесом, бизнесе)	79

The analysis of the data shows the specifics of the corpus of Presidential Appeals as a political rhetoric genre. The frequent usage of words *year, Russia, development, country* reflect the contextual character of the communicational situation, since the state leader addresses to various power branches representatives, to various confession members, to mass media and citizens with the speech to propose the program of action for the next year or even a longer period.

Nation as 'we'

Lemma *we* is the most frequent in the discourse of the New Year address, and it is also very frequent in the genre of Appeal. The most frequent concordance with the lemma *we* are the verbs of various thematic groups including modal verbs in various tense-aspect forms. It let us claim that the Presidential Appeals, as well as New Year addresses, accomplish the integrative function, since the sum of lemmas *I* and *you* does not exceed the value of the frequency of the lemma *we* (see Tab.8).

Table 8. The most frequent pronouns in the Presidential Appeals to the Federal Assembly

№	Lemma	Frequency in the corpus
1	We (wordforms: us, our) / мы (word forms: мы, нас, нам, нами)	778
2	They (wordforms: them, their) / они (wordforms: они, их, им, ими, них)	216
3	I (wordforms: me, my) / я (wordforms: я, меня, мне, мной)	124
4	You (wordforms: your) / вы (wordforms: вас, вам, вами)	96

The most frequent n-grams with the word *we*: *should* (freq=53), *will* (freq=18), *already* (freq=14), *continue* (freq=11), *see* (freq=9), *will be able* (freq=10), *must* (freq=9), *ready* (freq=6), *have begun* (freq=6), *together* (freq=5). The most frequent concordances with the lemma *we*: *we* (freq=6), *our* (freq=4), *know* (freq=4), *should* (freq=4), *all* (freq=4), *told* (freq=3), *together*

(freq=3), *will* (freq=3), *possibilities* (freq=3). We can interpret this data as the reflection of integrative, projective, and – more seldom – actional character of the speech.

The most frequent n-grams with the word *I* are *ask for* (freq=20), *already* (freq=11), *now* (freq=7), *told* (freq=4), *said* (freq=4), *think* (freq=3), *know* (freq=3), *suppose* (freq=3), *want* (freq=3), *have* (freq=3), *wish* (freq=2), *would say* (freq=2). The most frequent concordances with the lemma *I* are *I want* (freq=7), *I wish* (freq=5), *I always* (freq=2).

The lemma *they* in the Presidential Appeals have various concordances such as *issues, problems, people, decisions, factors, objects*, etc. We could not reveal the frequency of its usage with any concretizing nouns. We suppose that in texts of this genre the pronoun *they* is not an ideological opposition to the pronoun *we* but it accomplishes the substitutive function and it is used mostly as a means for connection of statements.

Nominations that represent the national identity are as follows: *people* (140), *citizens* (105), *society* (59), *family* (27), *nation* (27), *children* (27), and *population* (24).

Nominations of the national identity itself are such as in Tab.9.

Table 9. Nominations of national identity in the Presidential Appeals to the Federal Assembly

N	Nomination	Frequency in the corpus
1	Citizens of Russia / граждане России	11
2	Compatriots / соотечественники	9
3	Nation, nations of Russia, Russian nation, nation of the Russian Federation / народ, народы России, российский народ, народ Российской Федерации	9
4	Population of Russia / население России	5

Of course, it is impossible not to mention the adjective *Russian* in terms of the Presidential Appeals. The speaker used this nomination several times in the speech in 2012: “*For the entire planet, regardless our ethnical identity, we have always been and we are the united nation. I remember one of my meetings with*

veterans. *There were different people of various nationalities: Tartars, Ukrainians, Georgians, and Russians, of course. One of the veterans, not Russian by the nationality, said, "For the entire world we are the same nation, we are Russians". So it was in time of the war, so it has always been*". Another time the President used the word *Russians* in the word combination for *Russian people* in the statement of Ivan Ilyin, cited by the President in the Appeal-2014.

Nation as people

The lemma *people* issued in various grammatical forms in the corpus both without definitive (freq = 89) and with definitive expressed by the possessive pronoun *our* (freq=3). It is also accompanied with notional words classified as follows: definitive indicating a social group affiliation; definitive with positive connotation; definitive with negative connotation.

Social features of the lemma *people*: *young* (freq=6), *old* (freq=3), *with health restraints* (freq=2), *physically challenged* (freq=2), *of elder generation* (freq=1), *of all ages* (freq=1); *work* (freq=1), *working* (freq=1), *with average income* (freq=1), *with above the average income* (freq=1), *with lower income* (freq=1).

These are definitive which specify the nomination *people* positively: *educated* (freq=3), *honest* (freq=2). The following specifiers appear in the concordance with the word *people* only once: *clever, prepared, healthy, talented, sincere, active, professional, meaningful, purposeful, industrious, with the steady moral and ethical basis*. When characterizing people who should gain the power in the society, the speaker used the specifying definitive *bright and independent*.

It is only twice that pejorative definitions for the nomination *people* appear in the texts. "*Actors of international scene*", who "*adopt the international norms to their opportunistic interests*", suppose "*all around*" to be "*under educated people*". Or: "*People who are lack of culture and respect for their own and others' traditions*" are provoking interethnic conflicts (Appeal-2013).

Let us remark that the usage of these specifiers and definitive reflects the social, socio-economic and socio-psychological categorization of the concept *people* in the Presidential Appeals to the Federal Assembly. It obviously corresponds to the strategies

of categorization of the same concept in the New Year addresses.

Nation as citizens

The lemma *citizens* functions frequently as the addressing to the audience, while its direct concordance in six Appeals is *dear citizens of Russia*. Besides, there are various other word forms in concordances: *our* (citizens) (freq=11), (our) *country* (freq=3), *Russian* (freq=2) (see Tab.10).

Table 10. Nominations of nation as citizens in the Presidential Appeals to the Federal Assembly

№	Nomination	Frequency in the corpus
1	Citizens of Russia / Граждане России	11
2	Our citizens / Наши граждане	11
3	Compatriots / Соотечественники	9
4	Citizens of our country / Граждане нашей страны	3
5	Russian citizens / Российские граждане	2

In most cases of word usage of the lemma *citizens*, the neutral nominations synonymous to the nomination *people* appear in various grammatical forms.

Various linguistic means specify the nomination *citizens* in the texts:

- 1) social specifiers: *own-account workers* (freq=3), *working* (freq=2), *the most socially vulnerable* (freq=1), *disadvantaged* (freq=1).
- 2) ameliorative definitive: *responsible citizens of Russia* (freq=1); *citizens who have reached significant results in creativity* (freq=1); *active, caring, socially involved citizens* (freq=1); *responsible law-abiding citizens* (freq=1).

In several cases, the President used the nomination *citizens* as opposed to *state, government and power*: “*Is it possible to develop adequately on the flimsy ground of weak state and externally driven government, limp, run out of citizens’ credit?*”; “*developers and banks, but not citizens*”; “*citizens pose the questions to the pow-*

er”; “argues of citizens with power”; “criteria ... of government’s efficiency that render service to citizens”.

It is interesting to note the examples of the usage of the word citizens as elements of gradual ranges in which strengthens the nomination of the speech object: *in the name of the country, city, region, town and every citizen; we: country, society, citizens*. On our opinion, the last case clearly demonstrates the way the communicator imagines the national identity: *we: country, society, citizens, we all are able to overcome difficulties*.

The concept citizens is constructed in *socio-economic* and *political* categories, which correlates with the categorization strategies in New Year TV addresses. However, the Appeals to the Federal Assembly represent this concept in a more detailed and qualifying way than in the discourse of TV congratulations.

Nation as peoplehood

The Presidential Appeals to the Federal Assembly represent the nominations of nation with the meaning *peoplehood* as following (see Tab.11).

Table 11. Nominations of nation with the meaning peoplehood in the Presidential Appeals to the Federal Assembly

№	Nomination	Frequency in the corpus
1	Our nation (peoplehood) / Наш народ	8
2	Russian nation, peoplehood of Russia, peoplehood of the Russian Federation / Российский народ, народ России, народ Российской Федерации	6
3	United (one) nation (peoplehood) / Единый (один) народ	6
4	Multinational peoplehood / многонациональный народ	1

The most frequent concordances with the lemma *nation (peoplehood)* are in the table above; n-grams with the word nation

(peoplehood) are *we are united, we are the one, our nation, proved its views convincingly, we are Russian, and Russia, has right, clearly demonstrated.*

The concordances *our, Russia, Russian* act like neutral specifiers. As for lexemes *united, one, multinational*, they are supposed both to fulfil the integrative function and to be the means for neutral nomination. To compare, in the Appeals there are nominations synonymous to *multinational peoplehood: multinational country* (freq=2, including once cited Alexander Solzhenytsin), *multinational state* (freq=1).

The same as in New Year addresses, the concept nation (peoplehood) occurs as the *political category* of a subject, an agent in the discourse of Appeals to the Federal Assembly.

5. CONCLUSION

The results of our study let us make the following conclusions:

1. Both the New Year address of the President and the Presidential Appeals to the Federal Assembly fall into the genres of the political discourse, and they accomplish the ritual and phatic (New Year address), and directive and informational functions (Appeal to the Federal Assembly), and also they fulfil modeling or constructive function. The object of discursive construction, the main and common for the both genres, is national identity as a system of individual and collective representations about belonging to the nation. Addresses and appeals to the nation and government are the highly important means for construction of national identity. Despite the genre and communicational differences between the TV address and the Appeal to the Federal Assembly, the tools of linguistic / discursive modeling of national identity are common for the both genres of the political discourse.
2. Lexically, the Presidential addresses and appeals construct the national identity predominately with the category *citizens of Russia* that is represented in nominations *we, people, citizens, nation (peoplehood)*. Resulting the

corpus discourse analysis, we defined the frequency of the usage and linguistic contexts of these nominations: concordances, collocations, clusters / n-grams. The data helped us to reveal the general strategies of thematization and specification of national identity. It let us estimate the main strategies of discursive categorization of the phenomenon under inquiry.

3. The nomination *we* is the most frequent both in New Year addresses and the Appeals to the Federal Assembly, and it reflects the integrative function of these political discourse genres. Herewith, the nomination *we* is mainly used in link with verbs of various thematic groups, including modal verbs. It indicates that the category *we* is constructed in subjective and agentive characteristics.
4. The nomination *people* is modeled in socio-economic and socio-psychological categories. The nomination *citizens* is the subject of socio-economic and political categorization. The nomination *nation (peoplehood)* refers to political and historical categories. Thus, the President constructs the national identity of Russians primary in *socio-economic and political categories*.
5. On the discursive and rhetorical levels, the means for linguistic modeling of national identity aim at personal and collective involving (*interpellation* in Althusser's terminology (Althusser 1996: 34) of addressees to the symbolic mental sphere of nation. Both the political contextualization of existential and cultural practices of the New Year celebration, and specifying and quality definitions of citizens in the Appeals to the Federal Assembly contribute to achieving this goal. The construction of national identity stem from the discursive integration of the power agent into both family / personal and social practices, which leads to the effect of construction the identity from "within" the social and cultural tissue of society.

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Juraj Marušiak*

CHANGE OF POLITICAL LANDSCAPE IN CENTRAL EUROPE SINCE 2010**

Abstract

This paper deals with the change of political landscape in Central Europe. Since the spectacular victory of Viktor Orbán and his party Fidesz in Hungary in 2010, conservative parties have become more popular. The conservative trends are present not only in Poland and Hungary, where the national conservative parties won the elections, but also in Slovakia and Czech Republic, with strong social democratic parties.

Keywords: Slovakia, Czech Republic, Poland, Hungary, conservatism.

1. INTRODUCTION

The Central and Eastern European states' integration into the European Union and NATO in 2004 was viewed as a "success story" of the post-communist transition in the region. On the other hand, from the perspective of societies in these countries, the achievement of the common goal led to the breakup of the consensus among the key political parties. The accomplishment of

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the integration processes was perceived as the symbolical end of the post-communist political and socio-economic transformation, raising an opportunity to balance the time following the collapse of communism in 1989.

After the EU-accession, new conflict issues emerged in the Central European societies. One of them is the role of the nation-state in the new context, since many real attributes of statehood were transferred to the level of EU as a supranational integration structure, including foreign policy coordination, customs tariffs and many aspects of control of economic relations with third countries, such as border control, monetary policies (for Eurozone members), etc. Such change produced a shift in loyalties, especially on the level of political elites and state administrations, as “European” politics became a new dimension of cooperation, unfolding in parallel with the domestic-level politics and foreign policy. On the other hand, the role of the symbolical and cultural dimension of statehood has increased, triggering the growth of nationalism region-wide.

One of the side-effects of the neo-liberal transformation and integration processes were massive labor migrations to the West, whose consequence, according to the International Monetary Fund data, was an outflow of about 20 million Easterners to the West since 1990 (Ilahi, Iliyina, Zakharova 2016). The democratic control of the economic and social policies decreased due to the de-stationization of the public services, pension reform and the commercialization of the health care system. In general, the post-communist transformation during the 1990s was accompanied by social consensus, driven by the wish to accede to EU-membership. However, after 2004, the issue of social cohesion re-emerged, as considerable segments of post-communist societies were left behind as “losers of transition”. Another challenge was criticism towards the rapid liberalization of everyday life compared to 1989. Corruption scandals and non-transparent privatizations contributed to disputing of the legitimacy of political elites which came to power since 1989. Sooner or later, after their EU-accession, all Central European countries witnessed the change of the government. On 2 May 2004, the Prime Minister of Poland Leszek Miller resigned, closely followed by his Czech counterpart Vladimír Špidla (end of June 2004). The Hungarian Prime Minister Péter Medgyessy was

replaced by Ferenc Gyurcsány in September 2004. All of them were to be replaced by their successors from the same political parties. However, the social democrats in Poland (Union of Democratic Left– Sojusz Lewicy Demokratycznej, SLD) lost the parliamentary elections in 2005 and the new national-conservative government dominated by the Law and Justice Party (Prawoi Sprawiedliwość, PiS) was formed. In the Czech Republic, the coalition led by the social democrats was replaced by the center-right government of Mirek Topolánek (Civic Democratic Party–Občanská demokratická strana, ODS) in 2006-2007. In the relatively stable Slovakia, the center-right government led by Mikuláš Dzurinda was replaced after the parliamentary elections in 2006, when a social democratic politician Robert Fico became Prime Minister, in coalition with some minor nationalist parties.

The disputing of the legitimacy of the pro-European liberal elites resulted in the electoral success of the large conservative parties in Hungary, Serbia and Poland, where they received more than 50 percent of the seats in national parliaments. These parties identified themselves as conservative. Fidesz – Hungarian Civic Alliance (Fidesz - Magyar Polgári Szövetség) is a member of European People's Party (EPP), associating conservative and Christian democratic parties. Law and Justice in Poland is a member-party of the *Alliance of European Conservatives and Reformists* (AECR), associating moderate conservative and Eurosceptic parties. In Slovakia, since 2006 (with a short break in 2010-2012) Direction – Social Democracy (Smer – sociálna demokracia, Smer-SD) member of the Socialist International and Party of European Socialists assumed a pre-dominant position. In the 2012 early elections, this party received more than 50 percent of parliament seats. They largely owe their success to the marginalization and fragmentation of the opposition and, as a result, there is no viable alternative for their replacement.

The territorial scope of our research will be focused on the four countries of the Visegrad Group (Slovakia, Czech Republic, Poland and Hungary), as these states established close cooperation since the beginning of 1990s and represent a sub-regional cooperation structure after the EU enlargement in 2004 as well. They also shared common structural characteristics of transition, i.e. neoliberal economic transformation, focus on building stable

democratic institutions and the rule of law. The aim of this article is to analyze the phenomenon of strong conservative parties in Central Europe and to identify, if there are any similarities between Fidesz and Law and Justice on one hand, and Direction-SD on the other. We will try to analyze in which aspects these three strong Central European parties transformed the politics in the region after 2010 and identify some similar trends present in the Czech Republic as well. The electoral victory of Fidesz in the April 2010 parliamentary elections in Hungary has been chosen as a milestone. The term the first government of Law and Justice in Poland (2005-2007) was too short, and was terminated by the collapse of the ruling coalition. Therefore, we can speak about the era of the governments challenging the liberal democratic development model in the region only since April 2010.

2. SITUATION BEFORE APRIL 2010

Hungary and Slovakia were heavily affected by the 2008 global financial crisis. The progress of economic recovery was quite slow, while Central European countries also faced an increasing unemployment rate. The economic crisis and consequently, also crisis of Eurozone, coupled with the profound debt crisis in Greece and other South European EU member-states, led to the demise of the previous political consensus based on the common support to European integration. However, it was not the EU membership that was primarily disputed by the public, but the legitimacy of the political elites that led the Central and East European countries into the EU. The phenomenon, defined by Jacques Rupnics “democracy fatigue”, became apparent in Central Europe already before the crisis (Rupnik 2007: 17-25). Ivan Krastev pointed to the wish of a part of liberal elites to weaken the democracy in order to avoid electoral victory of the parties representing non-liberal voters (Krastev 2008: 62-67). Another trend was the erosion of the system of traditional, program-based parties, which became replaced by the new, very often short-lived, political forces. Already before 2010, the tiredness of the Central European societies of the long period of social and economic reforms became apparent. This was the reason behind the success of the Union of Democratic Left (SLD) in Poland in 2001 under the slogan “We shall return the normality”.

Also, R. Fico built his political agenda on the sharp criticism of the social consequences of neoliberal reforms introduced by the two government of Mikuláš Dzurinda (1998-2002 and 2002 – 2006). During the 2002 campaign, he called for a “vote for order”. Thus, liberal reforms were contested both from the left and conservative positions. Since 2010, social criticism has also been accompanied by the demand for the preservation of national sovereignty and by an increasingly critical stance of the conservative Central European politicians toward the West. Such criticism increased after the outset of the refugee crisis in Europe, when governments of V4 states refused the project of mandatory migrant quotas for all EU-member states.

3. CASE STUDY: HUNGARY

Parliamentary elections in Hungary in April 2010 resulted in a spectacular victory of the coalition of Fidesz with the smaller Christian Democratic People’s Party (Keresztény demokrata Néppárt, KDNP). They received 52 percent of the votes and 263 out of 386 seats in the unicameral National Assembly, i. e. more than 68 percent (Sadecki 2014: 8-9). Fidesz was founded in 1988 as a liberal anti-communist party, however, its leader Viktor Orbán in 1994 switched the party’s orientation to a nationalist, morally conservative party and, subsequently, Fidesz withdrew from the Liberal International (Daily News Hungary 2013).

The new Hungarian government, controlled by Fidesz-KDNP block, adopted the so called “Program of National Cooperation”, containing a mix of national-conservative ideas, social conservatism, anticommunism and neo-liberal solutions. The spring of 2010 is defined as an inception of the System of National Cooperation, which means a “new social contract” based on the following five pillars: work, home, family, health, and order. The program announced the construction of a “new political and economic system created on the basis of democratic will”. However, it makes no mention of such liberal democracy pillars as freedom of the individual, human rights, rule of law and respect for diversity (The Programme of the National Cooperation 2010).

The new system aims to create a strong Hungary, with the restoration of the powerful state and social cohesion as the pro-

claimed key priorities of the new government. The Government announced tax-cuts below the average of the regional competitors (i.e. neighboring states), in support to domestic business, including small and medium-sized enterprises. Another priority is the strengthening of police. Fidesz accused the previous socialist governments of protecting criminals by mitigating the penal code.

Symbolic of the radical nature of changes was the 2011 adoption of the new constitution, or the so-called “Fundamental Law of Hungary”, with an emphasis on the national and Christian traditions. The new Constitution officially declared Hungary’s responsibility for its nationals living abroad, regardless of their citizenship. The conservative nature of the changes is underlined by the definition of marriage as a “union of a man and a woman”. The historical continuity with the Hungarian Kingdom existing before 1918 is accentuated by renaming the state to Hungary, instead of the Republic of Hungary, used since 1989 (Sadecki 2014: 40). Another trend, present in the “Fundamental Law” is the concentration of power. The Constitutional Court lost its right to adopt verdicts on the budget issues, taxes, custom tariffs etc. The right to appoint the president of the Constitutional Court was transferred from the Court itself to the Parliament, where the ruling party assumed the majority in the special parliamentary committee for the promulgation of candidates to judges (Halász 2011: 54). The state assumed power to supervise the educational institutions and hospitals instead of the regional governments (Sadecki 2014: 11).

Finally, the aim of Fidesz was to delegitimize the main political opponent, center-left Hungarian Socialist Party (Magyar Szocialista Párt, MSZP), which was stigmatized by constitutional amendment as a “criminal organization” (Venice Commission 2012). The trend toward the concentration of power is also shown in the following steps. The government strengthened the state control of media (Washington Post 2010) and in 2012 introduced the electoral reform. The total number of the Parliament seats was reduced from 386 to 199 and the previous two-round system for single-member constituencies was abolished and replaced by a plurality system assigning 106 seats, with a nationwide proportional system responsible for distributing a further 93 seats (Fumarola 2016). If in the previous electoral system, the unused votes from the single-member constituencies were allocated only to smaller

parties, according to the new rules they became allocated to the winning candidates as well (Tóka Gábor 2014). As a result, after the 2014 parliamentary election, the party alliance Fidesz-KDNP managed to preserve majority, in spite of the loss of 7,86 percent of the votes (The composition of the Parliament 2014). The electoral reform was conducted in the spirit of the “nation policy” as well, aimed at the 2,5-3 million Hungarian speakers living in the neighboring countries. Part of them have already received Hungarian citizenship. Although they have a permanent place of residence abroad, they received the right to vote on the party lists (Mudde 2014).

The neoliberal elements of the V. Orbán’s government policies are present mainly in the reduction of taxes. Corporate income tax was reduced to 10 percent (for income up to 2,5 million USD), while for higher-income tax-payers it remained at the level of 19 percent. Special taxation was imposed on some branches of services, as hypermarkets, telecommunication, natural monopolies, insurance companies and banks. In 2014, the Hungarian Government announced serious cuts in the state welfare system. Its plan was to do away with unemployment assistance by 2018 and to replace it by the mandatory public works for all unemployed people (Field 2014).

Despite its sharp criticism of the West European development model and of the system of liberal democracy, the political system of Hungary has not been changed to date. Even after the adoption of the new “Fundamental Law”, Hungary is still a parliamentary democracy. However, several steps were made to secure an influence of the ruling coalition Fidesz-KDNP in the long-term perspective.

4. CASE STUDY: POLAND

The reasons for the electoral success of Law and Justice party in Poland were similar as in Hungary. The contestation of the liberal democratic transformation from the conservative perspective was the result of the introduction of the “weak state” model, i.e. state supplying “lesser or less than adequate quantities of political goods and/or poorer-quality political goods” (Rotberg

2012: 383-389) from the perspective of social cohesion, stability of the institutions etc.

The ideas of a strong state, social cohesion and radical de-communization were embodied into the project of the new Constitution of Poland (constitution of the so called 4th Republic), presented by the Law and Justice Party (PiS) led by Jarosław Kaczyński. According to them, the constitution should clearly define the Christian traditions of the Polish statehood (by incorporation of the *Invocatio Dei* into the preamble), its anti-communist identity and special protection of family values¹. PiS was established in 2001 by the siblings Lech and Jarosław Kaczyński. They were former collaborators of Lech Wałęsa, younger generation of leaders of the “Solidarity” movement in the 1980’s. PiS has become one of the successor parties of the Solidarity Electoral Action (AWS). Both AWS and PiS were supported by the anti-communist trade union of “Solidarity”². The first electoral campaign of PiS was focused on the “law and order” issues, the second on the reconstruction of the state after the corruption scandals taking place during the government of SLD (2001-2005). PiS is a moderate Eurosceptic party, however, it doesn’t oppose Poland’s EU-membership.

PiS new conservatism gained influence for the first time after the 2005 parliamentary elections, when PiS established initially a minority, and subsequently coalition government together with the national catholic League of Polish Families (LPR) and social populist Self-Defense parties. Despite criticism to the post-communist government, the electoral campaign of PiS before 2005 was aimed predominantly against the conservative liberal Civic Platform (PO) promoting further liberal economic reforms. They promoted the vision of “solidary Poland” against the vision of “liberal Poland”, promoted by PO. However, PiS measures were not successful, the government was accused of the power abuse, and the coalition collapsed in 2007. The most important reforms introduced by the governments of Kazimierz Marcinkiewicz and J. Kaczyński were the establishment of the Central Anti-Corruption Bureau as a special governmental agency responsible for fighting corruption and the radical Lustration Act, which was, however, sharply criticized

1 Konstytucja Rzeczypospolitej Polskiej. Projekt Prawa i Sprawiedliwości. Warszawa : Prawo i Sprawiedliwość 2005. <http://old.pis.org.pl/dokumenty.php?s=partia&iddoc=7>

2 The official name of this trade-union is Independent Self-governing Labor Union “Solidarity”.

by the public and the majority of whose provisions were found unconstitutional by the Constitutional Court (Marek 2013:57-73). Another measure, introduced with the aim to improve the work of the state institutions, was the dissolution of the Military Intelligence Service, established before 1989. PiS also implemented the reduction of personal income taxes to 18 and 32 percent and aimed to raise state support to the families with children, as well as to introduce patriotic education in schools (Marek 2013:57-73). However, after the 2007 early elections, the liberal government of Donald Tusk (PO) was established.

The liberal governments were replaced by PiS only after the parliamentary elections in 2015. Similarly to Fidesz, PiS also gained an absolute majority of seats in the parliament (37,58 percent of the votes, 235 seats in the parliament³). The reasons of the repeated electoral success of PiS were social disparities and a high level of youth unemployment in Poland, but also discontent with the clientelist practices of PO. The program of the “moral and national renewal” (Bertoa 2015), presented by PiS, anticipated the introduction of the presidential system, strengthening of state control over courts, subsidies for the poorer families with children (500 PLN monthly) as well as for the second and subsequent children in all families.

The new government also strengthened state control over public media, announced the promotion of patriotic movies and attempted to make abortion law more restrictive. However, the last step was met by the protests of women. A very important priority of the government led by Beata Szydło was taking control over judicial power. The reform of the Constitutional Court raised sharp criticism of the so-called “Venice Commission” (European Commission for Democracy through Law, established by the Council of Europe); namely the way in which the new President of the Constitutional Court Julia Przyłębska was elected (in contravention of existing procedures), as well as for other reasons⁴. Another step

3 *Wyniki wyborów do Sejmu RP. Wybory do Sejmu i Senatu Rzeczypospolitej Polskiej 2015.* Warszawa : Państwowa Komisja Wyborcza. http://parlament2015.pkw.gov.pl/349_wyniki_sejm

4 According to the representatives of Venice Commission “the new President delegated her powers to another judge who was elected on a legal basis that had been found unconstitutional by the Tribunal; the Vice-President of the Tribunal was sent on a vacation he had not asked for; the election of three sitting judges is challenged seven years after the election.” Venice Commission (2017) *Poland. Statement by the President of the Venice Commission.*

towards the concentration of power in the hands of government was the establishment of the new military units “Territorial Defense Force”, consisting of 53 000 part-time soldiers, who report directly to the Minister of Defense and not to the President, who is, according to the Constitution of the Republic of Poland (1997) (Article 134, paragraph 1) the Supreme Commander of the Armed Forces of the country (Davies 2016). In the field of culture and education, Law and Justice announced the promotion of the patriotic movies. Patriotic rhetoric was present at the commemoration of the anniversary of the Volhynian massacre (1943)⁵, proclaimed in 2016 by Sejm (lower chamber of the Polish Parliament) as genocide (Sejm RP 2016).

PiS is promoting the “Europe of Fatherlands”. The party manifesto places very much attention to the relations with the Catholic Church, underlining its role as the single national institution in the past, and its role as the “holder and prophet of the moral doctrine, generally known in Poland”. Therefore, PiS recognized its specific role in the life of the Polish nation and state (Program Prawa i Sprawiedliwości 2014). The aim of PiS is the replacement of the existing constitution of Poland adopted in 1997 by a new one (Duda 2017).

The political priorities of Law and Justice are very similar to the priorities promoted by Fidesz. Both parties are interested in the strengthening of executive power, state control of the judicial system, but also in the strengthening of social cohesion of the Polish and Hungarian societies. At the same time, their views, mainly in terms of cultural and ethical values, are very often contradictory to the trends prevailing in the EU. In September 2016, the leaders of both parties- Viktor Orbán and Jarosław Kaczyński, vowed the launching of the so-called “cultural counter-revolution” in the EU as an alternative to the liberal model promoted by the EU. In the context of the United Kingdom’s decision to leave the EU, V. Orbán stated that there is no European identity. They advocate the preservation of the national identities in Europe⁶.

5 Massacres of ethnic Poles by Ukrainians dominating in the region during World War II.

6 Polska i Węgry ogłaszają kontrewolucję kulturalną! Debata Kaczyński-Orban w Krynicy. *Wpollyce.pl*, 9 September 2016. <http://wpollyce.pl/polityka/307451-polska-i-wegry-oglaszaja-kontrewolucje-kulturalna-debata-kaczynski-orban-w-krynicy>

5. CASE STUDY: SLOVAKIA

The Direction – Social Democracy has been the pre-dominant political party in Slovakia since 2006. This party created the ruling coalition in 2006 – 2010, together with the minor nationalist parties (Slovak National Party and Movement for Democratic Slovakia). After the early elections held in 2012, Direction – SD won 83 seats in the Parliament, i.e. 55 percent. In 2016 Direction – SD won the elections (22,28 percent of the votes and 32,6 percent of the parliament seats) and established a coalition with the Slovak National Party (Slovenská národná strana, SNS) and Bridge (in Slovak and Hungarian Most-Híd) party, representing the Hungarian minority. Direction was founded in 1999 as a non-ideological, pragmatic party. However, after 2002, it switched to social democracy. After the fusion with the minor center-left parties, Direction-SD joined the Socialist International and Party of European Socialists in 2004 (Marušiak 2005:165-178).

Despite the different ideological orientation, the political priorities of Direction-SD, Fidesz and Law and Justice were similar: “law and order” issues, strengthening the state by creating the State Doctrine etc. On the other hand, R. Fico opposed the privatization of the “strategic companies”, like the Slovak Gas Industry (SPP). At the same time, he used an anti-establishment and anti-minority rhetoric. Therefore, before 2002 this party was considered conservative, rather than social democratic (Forgács2002). Fico also raised the issue of reintroduction of the capital punishment (Marušiak 2006:19-55). When the party launched a coalition with the Slovak National Party, whose leadership in 2006 pursued radical right-wing nationalist politics, its membership in PES was suspended till 2009⁷.

Direction-SD established good relations with the Catholic Church, and its deputies in 2015 voted for the constitutional amendment defining marriage as a union between man and woman, together with the deputies from other conservative parties. The conservative shift of Smer-SD was strengthened before the parliamentary elections in 2016, when the party adopted an anti-immigrant

7 Smer sa stal plnoprávnym členom Strany európskych socialistov. *Sme*, 8 December 2009. <https://domov.sme.sk/c/5145169/smer-sa-stal-plnopravnym-clenom-strany-europskych-socialistov.html#axzz4j4iC6Zbt>

rhetoric in the context of the refugee crisis in Europe since 2015. Even the initial party electoral slogan, promoting the welfare policy (“We are working for the people”) was replaced by the nationalist conservative one (“We protect Slovakia”).

The relations between Direction-SD and PES are tense. Therefore, not only the party’s performance, but also the content of the party’s politics shows how much the party is like Fidesz and Law and Justice.

6. CASE STUDY: CZECH REPUBLIC

In the Czech Republic, the conservative shift is less remarkable compared to other Visegrad Group states. However, the center-right government of Petr Nečas (Civic Democratic Party) in 2010-2013 adopted massive cuts of the welfare system and the restitution of the property of the Catholic Church. Although the government of P. Nečas was in 2013 replaced by the coalition controlled by the social democrats, the president of the Czech Republic Miloš Zeman (former social democratic politician) retained close relations with the head of the Catholic Church in the Czech Republic, cardinal Dominik Duka. In 2016, M. Zeman for the first time participated in the celebration of St. Wenceslas Day (Day of the Czech Statehood, 28 September), although in the past he opposed the introduction of such a national holiday as it was too connected with the Catholic tradition, as well as with the heritage of the Nazi occupation of Czech lands during the WWII. The refugee crisis in Europe caused demonstrations against the alleged “islamization” of the Czech Republic and against the mandatory migrant quotas for EU member-states. The anti-immigrant sentiments contributed to the rise of the influence of the political movement Block against Islam (Blok proti islámu) and radical right parties Sunrise – National Coalition (Úsvit – Národní koalice), Freedom and Direct Democracy (Svoboda a přímá demokracie), as well as non-partisan initiatives, like “We don’t want Islam” in the Czech Republic. Another sign of the rising conservative shift in the Czech Republic is the decline of the role of human rights issues in the country’s foreign policy.

To date, there have been no conservative parties like Fidesz or Law and Justice in the Czech Republic. However, liberal democ-

racy is contested by the political party ANO (“YES”) led by the influential billionaire Andrej Babiš. He controls agro-food holding Agrofert and relevant nation-wide media. His party is defined as non-ideological, the “movement of practical doers” (‘We’re not politicians, we do work’). However, according to Babiš’s statements, he would run the state as a private business (Hanley2016). At the same time, his party is highly centralized and built on the principle of “business-firm parties” (Hloušek, Kopeček 2017: 92-115) Babiš is also discussing the introduction of the presidential system (Babiš 2017).

The lack of democratic rules within ANO and disrespect for the principles of liberal democracy, present in the Babiš’s statements, currently represent the main threat for the democratic development in Czech Republic. According to public opinion polls, ANO was the most popular party before the 2017 parliamentary elections. Authoritarian methods and A. Babiš’ way of thinking positioned ANO close to Fidesz and Law and Justice.

7. CONCLUSIONS

The political landscape of Central Europe, and of the Visegrad Group states in particular, has radically changed since 2010. The main trend is the increasing influence of conservatism in the region and the parallel decline of support for the liberal and social-democratic parties, and the liberal democratic values in general. In the political discourse, less focus is on human rights issues, and more attention is on issues of national sovereignty, social cohesion and stabilization of nation-states. The securitization of the political processes, the growing role of the police, prosecutors’ offices and special services is a dangerous trend in the region. Also, the stance of the regional political elites to the deepening of EU integration is more cautious than before 2004. The role of the statist parties controlled by the charismatic leaders, focused on strengthening of the state institutions’ role in domestic politics, is present in all states of the region.

Despite authoritarian tendencies, we cannot, until now, speak about the abolition of the liberal democratic regimes in Central Europe. The substance of the political regimes in the Visegrad Group countries has not been changed, they continue to be the par-

liamentary democracies. However, the main threat is the weakening of the institutions controlling power (constitutional courts) as well as the aim of some political parties (Law and Justice and ANO) to introduce the presidential system, what can lead to the substantial changes of the political systems in these countries.

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POPULISTIČKI STIL I LIDERSKA PATETIČNOST

Apstrakt

Populistička rečitost lidera govori o nemirnoj savesti komuniciranja. Politički populizam danas u Srbiji podrazumeva poseban politički diskurs kojim se želi prikazati da su stanovišta govornih subjekata i publike gotovo identični. I kada se određuje kao ideologija i kada je sredstvo političke mobilizacije, populizam se uvek oslanja na prepoznatljiva opšta mesta koja je moguće empirijski utvrditi. Ne može se biti uveren da je reč o populizmu ako se namere ne ostvare na diskurzivnom polju. Populizam je političko verbalno i neverbalno delovanje kojim se zadovoljava, a ne prekoračuje „horizont očekivanja“ masa, sa unapred spremnom namerom da se obećanja nikada ne ispune do kraja i da se pogođena očekivanja publike samo okvirno uzmu u obzir. U ovom radu ispitivane su stilske posebnosti i retorički topisi primenjeni u govoru Aleksandra Vučića u Kosovskoj Mitrovici septembra 2018.

Ključne reči: populizam, stil, politički diskurs, patetičnost, narativ

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1. UVOD

Politički populizam danas u Srbiji podrazumeva poseban politički diskurs kojim se želi prikazati da su stanovišta govornih subjekata dijametralno različita ako je reč o političkim protivnicima. Ali stanovišta su, nasuprot, gotovo identična sa očekivanjima publike. Od očekivanja bi, dakle, mogao da zavisi stil i retorički pristup populističkog političkog govornika. I kada se određuje kao „ideologija“ i kada je sredstvo „političke mobilizacije“ (Bešić 2017: 161), populizam se uvek oslanja na prepoznatljivi očekivani diskurs. Ne može se biti uveren da je reč o populizmu ako se namere, na kraju, ne ostvare u diskursu. Populizam je, pretpostavka je, političko verbalno i neverbalno delovanje kojim se zadovoljava, a ne prekoračuje „horizont očekivanja“ (Hans Robert Jaus) masa, sa unapred spremnom namerom da se obećanja nikada ne ispune do kraja i da se pogođena očekivanja publike samo okvirno uzmu u obzir.

Otuda je pri izučavanju populističkih stanovišta veoma teško odrediti zajednička svojstva jer se ona razlikuju u zavisnosti od konteksta, publike i ciljeva koji se žele ostvariti. Kritika se, na primer, može ostvarivati različitim stilskim i retoričkim sredstvima i ona nije uvek populističko oruđe. Na stranu to što se i primena stilsko-retoričkih sredstava znatno razlikuje. Metaforičnost ili analogičnost mogu biti veoma raznovrsne u svojoj primeni, što zavisi od invencije i darovitosti besednika. Najzad, čak ista metafora neće odzvanjati isto u svakom kontekstu i u primeni svakog govornika.

Uglovi gledanja u pristupu se, otuda, neprestano menjaju. Neretko se, čak, menja populističko stanovište istog govornika u trenucima kada se prave razlike među publikom i političkim grupama koje se bore za vlast. Populističkim stilom se želi postići naglašavanje jedinstvenosti među jednim grupama i raznolikosti među drugim. Pritom se veoma retko postavlja pitanje vrednosti populističkih stavova. Da li su vrednosti uvek iste sa stanovišta onog ko govori, obraća li se većini ili samo zamišljenoj većini? Sa gledišta onoga ko sluša i procenjuje kao deo nepristrasne publike, nije li populistički stil osuđen na površnost, promašaje i na uvek određeni, obično kratkotrajni, cilj. Stilske i retoričke vrednosti

obično zavise od okolnosti, istorijskih datosti, često i od „horizonta očekivanja“ pojedinaca ili odabranih pojedinaca.

Pojam populizam nastao je od latinskog izraza *populus* – *populi*, koji označava narod, tj. javno mnjenje. On izvesno nije ideološki pravac, već političko stanovište da se narodu treba obraćati tako da svi pojedinci razumeju o čemu je reč, tj. da se posebnim jezičkim sredstvima utiče na javno mnjenje. To se postiže metaforama jedinstva, kontrastima prema stranom i drugim pojednostavljenim shemama koje su u vezi sa svakodnevnim životom i osećanjima birača, a nemaju veze sa programskim ideologijama onih koji govore. Primeri savremenih pokušaja uticaja na kolektivnu svest građana Srbije posredstvom političkog diskursa svode se na buđenje starih strahova, od kojih su neki antropološki utemeljeni (paranoja prema drugome, strancima, nepoznatom), neki su iskonski strahovi predaka (osvajanja, kulturni imperijalizam, podjarmljenost), a neki su posledica neposredne stvarnosti i sukoba iz bliske prošlosti (rasizam malih razlika na Balkanu). Osim strahova, pobuđuju se nade (prosperitet, povećanja, prihvaćenost od međunarodne zajednice, izgradnja, budućnost). Posebnost populističkih izjava je hiperbolično laskanje.

Cilj ovog rada jeste da preispita, u skladu sa datim napomenama, oblike, oblikovanje i stilske funkcije populističkih toposa Aleksandra Vučića prilikom govora u Kosovskoj Mitrovici septembra 2018.

2. TOPOSI POPULISTIČKOG OBRAĆANJA

Brojni su toposi populističkog obraćanja Aleksandra Vučića. U njihovom središtu jeste relativizacija dosadašnjih ishoda i nesumnjiva „pseudoargumentacija“ (Atlagić 2018: 125). Na taj način se kritikuje „druga strana“, a uzdiže vlastita. Pokazuje se da se može govoriti protiv nekoga i jezikom onoga protiv koga se govori. Populistički retorički toposi su čak, možda, u izvesnom skladu sa ljudskom prirodom. „Rđav je, razume se, onaj zakon koji se suprotstavlja ljudskoj prirodi“ (Todorov 1994: 34). Utoliko je neophodno razlikovati Fikciju, koja je umetnička, od Pretvaranja, koje je izveštačeno.“ (Jankelevič 1989: 54). Pretpostavka je da je populističko pretvaranje izvor svekolike političke patetike.

1. Jedan od najčešćih populističkih toposa jeste sakriven u napadnom zahvaljivanju i izvinjavanju. „Hoću da se izvinim građanima Srbima iz Metohije koji nisu mogli da dođu na današnji skup jer su neki drugi ljudi sve puteve blokirali, palili gume, palili drva, šenlučili, pucali iz svog oružja i oruđa, valjda u nameri da još jednom uplaše Srbe koji žive samo na svojim ognjištima i koji ništa i nikome nisu oteli i uzeli. Hoću da se izvinim meštanima sela Banje i da im se zahvalim na tome što su me danas čekali, što su pripremali veličanstven doček i da im kažem...“ (Govor Aleksandra Vučića u Kosovskoj Mitrovici 9. septembra 2018, istakli D.S. i L.M.) U ovoj izjavi treba primetiti da izvinjenje nije autentično i neposredno; govornik se izvinjava u ime drugih ljudi koji su nešto uradili, što njega postavlja na višu hijerarhijsku lestvicu među svima koji su u govoru pomenuti, a ujedno ga oslobađa odgovornosti jer su ipak drugi za sve krivi.

U izlaganju Aleksandra Vučića postoji nastojanje da se populističke konotacije „izvinjenja“ i „zahvaljivanja“ uzdignu iznad nivoa obične učtivosti. Na taj način izvinjenje predsednika onima koji nisu mogli da dođu, umesto da se oni njemu izvine, postaje skriveno retoričko populističko jezgro kojim se, neoprezno, skreće pažnja na činjenicu organizacije njihovog dolaska od strane predsednika i njegovih saradnika. Na taj način se čin narodne spontanosti svodi na minimum i upućuje na mogući populizam koji ne podrazumeva spontanost, ali voli da sve izgleda kao da je spontano. Već na početku govor preti da preraste u populistički čin i svojevrsnu karikaturu spontanosti. Otuda možemo pretpostaviti da je populistički retorički čin, već u načelu, vešto ili manje vešto skrivana karikatura spontanosti. Već i anaforičnim „hoću“ pokazuje se neskrivena manipulativna namera. Umesto „izvinjavam se“ ili srodne formulacije, bira se izraz iz socijalističkog vokabulara kojom se govori o nameri, dok se stvarna akcija odlaže.

Populistički govornik sledi liniju manjeg otpora i postupa gotovo prostodušno da bi pridobio naklonost slušalaca. U njegovom retoričkom stavu i govoru tela (mahanje rukama i prividno utišavanje oduševljenja mase; mrzovoljno-umorno stiskanje očiju; nesigurno popravljavanje mikrofona, sakoa i naočara, češkanje čela; dužeg gledanja u tekst pisan „nekoliko nedelja“, naglašenije pauze, mestimično naslanjanje na govornicu...) vidi se uverenje da je u pravu i da će njegov govor naići na očekivani odjek. Od autentičnog

govornika bi se očekivala nadahnutost, možda i uzbuđenje, na početku, čak ispitivanje pulsa slušalaca i udarna misao ili osećanje kojima bi se naglasio početak kao važno strukturno povlašćeno mesto govora. Posle službenog i naglašeno tautološko-pleonastičkog ponovljenog oslovljavanja („Dragi prijatelji, dragi prijatelji, dame i gospodo, dragi Srbi sa Kosova i Metohije...”), govornik veruje da je istina na njegovoj strani i kao da nema motivaciju da je posebno dokazuje. Populista ne mora da dokazuje ono što tvrdi. Dovoljno je da učini da drugi veruju kako i on u to veruje. Dovoljno je da se lične tvrdnje predstave kao aksiomi i put za populističku komunikaciju je otvoren.

Otvoreno davanje prednosti jednoj strani nad drugom (nigde se ne pominju mogući Albanci koji su stanovnici Kosovske Mitrovice još uvek, sa ovog stanovišta, u sastavu Srbije) vidljiva je oštra podeljenost koja ne ide naruku onima koji tvrde da je reč o sastavnom delu Srbije. U govoru se ne naslućuje nikakva opreznost prema manihejskoj podeli. Reč je o čvrstom pridržavanju stava o „crnima“ i „belima“ koji je u tradiciji srodnih patetičnih populističkih govora. Promene u jeziku političara zasnivaju se na kontrastiranju sa preko potrebnim neprijateljem (npr. prethodnom vlašću, susednim narodom, stranim silama), čime je stvorena mitološka osnovu za razlikovanje pojmova „mi“ i „oni“ kao dobrog i lošeg. Govornik je spreman da zanemari sve ono što mu smeta i nameće rešenje koje će mu doneti neophodne očekivane političke poene čak i pod pretpostavkom da je reč o slučajnoj, a ne pripremljenoj publici.

2. Govornik, takođe, pominje činjenicu da je nešto želeo („ovo nije poslednji put da sam želeo, a sledeći put doći ću u Banje“). Topos želje da se nešto dogodi što se nije dogodilo, takođe, jeste često mesto populizma. Naravno, ono je u sprezu sa obećanjima („a sledeći put doći ću u Banje i beskrajno im hvala na veličanstvenom dočeku i na njihovoj ljubavi prema Srbiji.“) Hiperbola je pokazatelj praznoće smisla izgovorenog, osnova laskanja i superlativni oblik saopštavanja da spisak želja može biti ostvaren tek u zamišljenoj, dalekoj budućnosti.

Ponavljjanje elemenata socrealističkog miloševićevskog diskursa („beskrajno im hvala na veličanstvenom dočeku“) govori o nastojanju da se u populističkom govoru spoji ono što je posebno i lično („beskrajno im hvala“), sa onim što je opšte („ljubav prema

Srbiji“). Jezik razuma se meša sa jezikom osećanja, što je, takođe, stalno mesto patetične populistične retoričnosti.

3. Populističkim toposom „borbe“ (Nastavićemo da se borimo) izraslim, uglavnom, iz korpusa sorealističke retoričnosti postiže se kontinuitet sa minulim vremenima. Metafora „nastavka borbe“ računa sa predznanjima i predrasudama slušalaca o neophodnosti borbe. Pritom nije jasno šta se tačno označava ovom sintagmom u okolnostima kada su vojni i drugi borbeni potencijali van terena na koji se odnose. Malo šta je neumesnije od toga da se razoružanima i obespravljenima obećava „nastavak borbe“. Jer da se borilo, ne bi do toga ni došlo. Ako se na isti način nastavi sa borbom koja je do zatečenog stanja i dovela, onda je ishod vrlo izvestan. Iz rečenog postaje jasno da je posredi populistički kič („kič u političkoj kulturi“ – Bešić 2017: 175).

Populista retko kada odoleva iskušenju da ostane populist. Previše su ukusni plodovi populističke akcije. Otuda je u Vučićevom govoru veoma čest topos zahvaljivanja. Prema nekim istraživanjima populističkih narativa u nastupima ovog populističkog govornika ide i do 81,2% što je svojevrsni rekord (reč je o Predsedničkim izborima u Srbiji 2017; Bešić 2017: 168). Ovim se još jednom potvrđuje tvrdnja Timotija Snajdera da su „nacionalni populist političari večnog“ (Snajder 2018: 96).

4. Budućnost je jedna od tematskih okosnica političkog govora. Nije svaki govor o budućnosti populistički, ali je bledo aludirano na govore Zorana Đinđića sa jakim populističkim naglaskom:

„Hvala vam što ne odustajete i hvala vam što gledate u budućnost, budućnost našu srpsku i Srbije.“ (Iz govora A. Vučića)

Populista usvaja način na koji misli da publika misli. U tome leži opasnost da se mišljenje o nečijem mišljenju ne uklopi u očekivane kanone. U tom slučaju predviđeno je da u publici bude što više odabranih ljudi koji će nastupiti sa odobravanjem i sprečiti moguća negodovanja. Vučić često ne može da otkloni projektovanje svog mišljenja na druge. Otuda upotrebljeno ponavljanje u obliku anadiploze o „budućnosti“. Ponavljanje ima za svrhu da ojača polazni populističkih topos zahvalnosti posebnim toposima „neodustajanja“, „Srbije“ i izjednačavanje govornika i slušalaca upotrebom prvog lica množine („našu srpsku i Srbije“).

5. U Vučićevom govoru primetno je ubrzano gomilanje populističkih narativa, čak i svojevrsni klimaks. Osim motiva zahvalnosti i srpstva, javljaju se i motivi „čuvanja i branjenja“. Gotovo da nema celine u kojoj jedan populistički motiv ne priziva drugi. Oni se gomilaju, osnažuju i pojačano deluju sve do momenta posebne patetičnosti („Izmereno“ je čak 67,2% patetičnosti u Vučićevim predizbornim govorima; (Bešić 2017:70). „Hvala vam što čuvate i branite srpsko postojanje na Kosovu i Metohiji“, reći će Aleksandar Vučić.

Merenja patetičnosti su (ako i postoje čvrsta merila za ovu stilsku kategoriju koja ima elemente subjektivnosti; na polju stila smo često istovremeno i na terenu ličnih doživljaja i afekata koji su, zasad, teško merljivi), donekle, izlišna jer je jasno da populizam kao politički kič i ne može bez prožimajuće patetičnosti. Patetičnost, kao ni bilo koja stilaska kategorija ne zavisi toliko od učestalosti koliko od rasporeda u okviru tzv. strukturno povlašćenih mesta (najpre početka, središnjice i kraja).

Nisu ni svi populizmi isti. Ne mogu se izjednačiti ni sva populistička istupanja jednog političara, tako da se teško može govoriti o populisti uopšte bez prethodnog proučavanja konteksta.

6. Populista se predstavlja kao neko ko već odavno zna odgovore na mnoga pitanja. Otuda se govori sa primenom priloga „uvek“ („gotovo uvek“) što je znak, čak i uz relativizaciju „gotovo“, neodgovorne komunikacije kojom se ne uzima u obzir posebnost svakog trenutka. Tako se postepeno najavljuje topos samohvale i empatisanja sa ljudima kojima se obraća: „Gotovo uvek birao sam trenutke kada vama koji ovde živite nije bilo lako“.

Vučićev govor se kreće između neodređene konkretnosti i određene apstraktnosti. U tom klimaksnom lancu oslovljavanje sa „dragi prijatelji“ slušaocima se, brzom emotivizacijom odnosa, sužava polje zaokupljenosti na činjenice koje se iznose. Publika se ne poziva da razmišlja, već da oseća. I u tome se krije osnovna patetičnost teksta. Dakle, u prevazi motiva koji pozivaju na prisećanje i osećanja i njihovom odnosu sa ukupnim tekstom, a ne u broju mogućih patetičkih narativa.

7. Česta poređenja jesu takođe mesto sakrivanja populiste. Namerno izbegavanje superlativa smanjuje odgovornost prema

rečima. „Brže, jače, bolje“) politički slogan Srpske napredne stranke), uz asonancijsku potporu vokala „e“, ne kazuje od koga i od čega brže, bolje i jače, kao ni to zašto ne bi bilo, i kada bi moglo biti, najbrže, najbolje i najjače. Mada Aleksandar Vučić ne preza od neodmerenih superlativa („najviše puteva, najveće plate i penzije“), u ovom slučaju je jasno da nema mesta superlativima. Zbog toga što postoji sumnja u mogućnost neposredne kritike onoga što se iskaže i da bi se ublažilo moguće nepoverenje, nagomilanim poređenjima i započetim asinetom govornik se dodvorava publici laskajući joj. Laskanje je, ponovimo, stalno utočište populizma i pribežište patetike: „U svakom slučaju, bilo vam je mnogo teže nego nama u Beogradu, Nišu i Novom Sadu“.

Stalno unutrašnje pitanje populiste moralo bi da glasi: „Može li publika na osnovu očiglednih posledica da se zapita o stvarnim uzrocima i kako sprečiti da dođe do nepoželjnog odgovora.“ Otuda se priziva neposredna istorija, kojom se publika prebacuje iz mogućeg razmišljanja o rečenom u poželjno sećanje:

„I ne znam da li je bilo teže 98-me, 99-te, 2000-te, 2004-te, 2008-me ili danas.“

8. U tom kontekstu neophodno je uvođenje toposa skromnosti kojim se razdvajaju moći društva i moći pojedinca:

„Ali sam uvek svojom dužnošću smatrao da onoliko malo koliko mogu.“

Upozorenje na eventualne male mogućnosti („koliko mogu“) ne znači i stvarno priznanje o skromnim snagama i odbrana od pomisli da se moglo nešto više učiniti. Naprotiv, populistička misao uvek je okrenuta prema sebi sa ciljem da se ojača sopstveni položaj. Onome ko iskazuje skromnost, potrebna je još veća kasnija slava.

Uslovljen različitim populističkim opsesijama i mogućim horizontima očekivanja, govornik neguje svojevrstu populističku digresivnost i disonantnost. Otuda je i hermeneutički pristup ovim govorima nužno, bar delom, eklekticistički. On, po svoj prilici, „kao da ima nekih prednosti nad metodološkom egzaktnošću koja često deluje predodređujuće“ (Lompar 2009: 225).

9. Populističke metode imaju svoje konstante, ali i svoja posebna mesta. Populistička publika se mnogo manje razlikuje

jedna od druge nego što je reč o onima koji njome vladaju. Poznajući publiku, populista misli da poznaje i sebe i da potpuno vlada sobom. Na taj način stiče sve veće samopouzdanje. Populistička retoričnost može da bude veoma zavodljiva i za publiku i za onoga ko je osmišlja. Te recipijentske slabosti nije oslobođena nijedna strana. Populista misli da su njegove metode najbolje. On je očaran početnim uspehom. Ponovo se služi obećanjima o „borbi“ kao već uspelim narativom. Polako se izdvaja njegova pojedinačna uloga i upućuje blagi kontrast (ja – vi), koji nije lišen blage narcisoidnosti, junačenja i samohvale. Međutim, sada je taj spoj obogaćen novim, široko razumljivim kontrastom „i u dobru i u zlu“: „To me obavezuje da se borim za sve vas“, „I u dobru i u zlu uvek ćemo biti uz vas“. Na taj način uočavaju se tri populistička nivoa: 1. Obavezivanje; 2. Borba za sve vas; 3. I u dobru i u zlu, uvek ćemo biti uz vas.

10. Pomenuta tri nivoa povezana su opštom zamenicom „sve“ i vremenskim prilogom „uvek“. Ono što se u reklamnim sloganima prepoznaje kao gruba prevara, u populističkom govoru se prihvata kao prepoznata vrednost. Mogućnosti manipulativne zablude se uvećavaju. Činioci suptilne obmane, oličeni u pomenutim rečima, u ovim okolnostima postaju mesto posebne „mudrosti“. Publika ceni ono što joj je blisko i što može da razume u tom trenutku. Populistička rasprisanost postaje tako poseban jezik za opčinjenu publiku. Onaj ko bi iskazao nepoverenje, bio bi smatran za nekoga ko ne ume dobro da čuje.

11. „Pažljivi populista“ vodi računa o tome da ne skrene u manir i čisti relativizam. On je svestan toga da bi trebalo u svakom pasusu dodati nešto novo i drugačije. Otuda se koriste koriste narativi o „otvorenom razgovoru“, „istini“ i „teškoj poziciji“ koja se saopštava „oči u oči, licem u lice“.

12. Napadna iskrenost, umesto da je namenjena drugome, kao da je namenjena samome sebi. Bez bojazni da će neko postaviti pitanje zašto do sada nije bilo otvorenih razgovora „oči u oči licem u lice“, populista obogaćuje svoj populistički vokabular:

„Došao sam i da sa vama otvoreno razgovaram i kažem istinu o našoj teškoj poziciji i to na jedini način na koji se istina saopštava – oči u oči, licem u lice.“

13. Nema razloga da se sumnja u to kako će naredni populistički iskaz doneti novu retoričku nijansu i novi postupak. Sada dolazi red na dokazivanje autoritetom: „Veliki vladika Nikolaj Velimirović kaže: Ako treba da branim sebe, ima da ćutim, ako treba da branim istinu, ima da govorim.

Populistički okvir se sasvim obelodanjuje. Bira se autoritet koji je za većinu čuven iako se detaljnije ne razmatra suština onoga što je rečeno. Podrazumeva se da izrečeno važi i za govornog subjekta, koji ponovo sebe uzdiže pomerajući topos skromnosti prema svetačkim visinama. Najpre se otkriva autoritet, a potom se snaga odabranog autoriteta prebacuje na sebe. Na taj način se skriveni narcizam uvija u učenost i nepristrasnost prekrivenu značenjem, za te okolnosti, neospornog autoriteta.

14. Jedan autoritet, međutim, nije dovoljan. Paradigma prikriivanja autoritetom nastavlja se pominjanjem Borislava Pekića i Aleksandra Tijanića. Odabranim navodima potvrđuju se sopstveni stavovi. Vučićevo shvatanje o povezanosti tuđih autoriteta i vlastite autoritarnosti pomaže mu u daljem verovanju u učinkovitost sopstvenog populističkog metoda. On uviđa razliku između ovih primera, ali u njima nalazi i svojstva koja su mu potrebna. Tri snažna imena iz tri različite oblasti, takođe, ukazuju na potrebu populiste za samoreklamerstvom i skretanjem pažnje na vlastitu upućenost:.

„Zato što nemamo više oči na leđima, kako je rekao veliki borac i veliki sprski književnik Bora Pekić, i ljubimo zemlju svoje dece, a ne svojih predaka i čast nam se nalazi ne tamo odakle idemo, nego gde odlazimo i gde ćemo da stignemo.“

Navode se i reči Aleksandra Tijanića: „Pričamo kako živimo za K, ali na K neće niko da živi“.

Efektno upotrebljena Tijanićeva antimetabola je ujedno i skrivena samokritika za koju govornik misli da se neće prepoznati. Navedeni primeri odaju prevrtljivost. Govornik obuhvata kritikom sve, ali i samoga sebe, samo što misli da se to ne vidi.

Vučić savladava veštinu populističkog govora, ali on svojom inercijom i samog sebe uvlači u samoironičnu maticu.

15. Govornik očigledno navodima hoće da općini mase, ali se i samoodaje. Ta dva glasa odjekuju u ušima pažljivog slušaoca. Otuda se govornik postepeno vraća na teren sigurnije gradacije: „Ja mogu, moram i hoću“.

16. Nenametljiva populistička gradacija se oblikuje tokom celog govora. Tako se narativi o Rusiji i Putinu ostavljaju za kraj izlaganja, da bi se efektnije oblikovao klimaks. Na taj način populistički metod ostaje trajno zatvoren u sebe i deluje snagom skrivene nedorečenosti. Ipak, iz svakog pasusa naporedo jača još jedna gradativna matrica koja se sukobljava sa prvom. To je matrica narcisoidne samohvale:

„Radim to i hoću i po hiljadu puta ako treba. Znam razliku između salonskog i pravog patriotizma.“

17. Pri kraju se navodi i kolokvijalna hiperbola („i po hiljadu puta ako treba“) kojim se potvrđuje „znanje“ kao vid skrivenog samovrednovanja. I tu je ponovo sakrivena samootkrivajuća matrica populizma: Zašto bi se nešto radilo hiljadu puta ako je prvi put dobro urađeno. Ovde se računa na efekat kolokvijalne hiperbole, a zanemaruje skriveno paradoksalno značenje srodno onom u šaljivim izrekama:

„Tri puta sečem i opet kratko“ i „Žena mi nije dobro vezala pertle. Tripud sam ih vezivao do posla.“

18. Populista se nigde ne oseća tako dobro kao u svom govoru. Kao da ne računa da će se govor jednom završiti i dugo odjekivati u ušima pojedinih slušalaca.

Najzad, parolaška patetička retoričnost dolazi do izražaja u završnim rečima:

„Ostali ste ovde vi, najjači i najhrabriji“, „To ponavljam i danas na ovom veličanstvenom skupu“, „Hoćemo srpsku decu, škole za njih, udžbenike, obdaništa.“

Da se populizmom narušavaju temelji morala jasno je iz superlativa koji slede tek na kraju. Sopstveni skup se ocenjuje kao „veličanstveni“, škole, udžbenici i obdaništa se zahtevaju samokritički – ili od sebe, ako se računa da su Kosovo i Metohija još u Srbiji, ili od nepriznate Republike Kosovo, čime se potvrđuje da je ona impicitno priznata. I u jednom i u drugom slučaju „poru-

ka“ je dvosmislena. Tako se ne izlazi iz stare političke frazeologije i ne otvaraju vrata političke neopatetike.

3. ZAKLJUČAK

Populistički stil Aleksandra Vučića naginje posebno prepoznatljivoj patetičnosti oličenoj u nekolicini prepoznatljivih toposa. Svojevremeno kolebanje između ozbiljnosti i afektivnosti, kretanje stila iz krajnosti u krajnost, takođe su obeležje ove pojave. Razapet između objektivne situacije i subjektivnog pristupa, populista drži slušaoce na okupu, neprestano im obećavajući da će ispuniti njihov „horizont očekivanja“. Istovremeno, strah od otkrivanja slabosti populizma uslovljava upotrebu jakih stilskih sredstava nepodesnih za iskazivanje nijansi i pravog smisla. Retorički proizvodi populizma jesu, otuda, svojevrstne patetične šifre koje ostavljaju blede komunikativne tragove iza sebe, iako ponekad imaju jake persuazivne intencije. Populizam manje nagoni na razmišljanje i razgovor, više podstiče na osećanja i brze saglasnosti. Da bi dobio u vremenu, populista se (na primeru govora Aleksandra Vučića) patetikom služi gradeći prepoznatljive stilsko-retoričke celine kojima se ne postižu novi učinci. Otuda ovi govori nisu motivišući na duže staze u dovoljnoj meri jer se kreću, uglavnom, u shematizovanim retoričkim matricama. Gledano sa istorijske distance, populistički nastupi jesu proizvod blagog očajanja govornika koji nema šta da kaže ili ne može da kaže ono što hoće. Otuda su pritajena besmislenost i neinventivnost najčešće trajni ishodi populizma, naročito ako je patetičnost pretežni oblikovni deo.

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Dobrivoje Stanojević

Lidija Mirkov

**POPULISTIC STYLE AND
LEADERS' PATHETICS**

Abstract

The populist eloquence of leaders conveys the restless conscience of communicating. Political populism in today's Serbia implies a specific political discourse aiming to demonstrate that the viewpoints of the speaking subjects and the audience are virtually identical. Both when defined as an ideology and as a means of political mobilisation, populism always relies on recognisable clichés that are empirically identifiable. It is not possible to be convinced that something is populism unless it fulfils its intentions in the discursive field. Populism is political verbal and non-verbal action reaching, without traversing, the "horizon of expectations" of the masses, with the premeditated intention to never fully keep promises made and to take the identified expectations of the audience into account only tentatively. This paper examines the specific style features and rhetorical toposes used in Aleksandar Vučić's speech in Kosovska Mitrovica in September 2018.

Keywords: populism, style, political discourse, patheticness, narrative

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**A DISCOURSE ON THE
EUROPEAN PATH OF SERBIA
CRISIS OR CHALLENGE FOR
BALKAN STUDIES?***

Abstract

Since the beginning of the third millennium, the political myth about the country at the crossroads has been gradually replacing the discourse on the European path of Serbia. The European path was represented as a state of continuous movement, implying a slow-changing process inherent to the political and geographical nature of the country. Although the first discourse suggested cyclical / liminal, while the other one implied liminal / linear time, the semantics of both remain similar. Since political discourse is reflected in social sciences and humanities, Balkan studies were not an acceptance: they turn to the past / or present and future, resulting in the search of a new paradigm. The aim of this paper is to: 1. Point out the similarities and differences between these discourses; 2. Single out paradigms which enable interpretation of spatial / temporal processes; 3. Discuss political psychology as a neglected, albeit relevant interdisciplinary

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branch in the discourse analysis on “European path of Serbia”.

Keywords: discourse, Europe, Balkan myth, political psychology, academic discourse.

1. INTRODUCTION

At the beginning of the third millennium, Serbia nominally opted for the so-called “European path”. It involved respecting human rights, resolving conflict situations, establishing borders with neighbors, normalizing economic situation, increasing transparency at all social levels and in all public institutions. Changes encompassed by the term “transition” unfolded slowly, until the formulation “European path” became one of the discourses that dominate public speech. Thus, the “European path” became a verbal legitimization of the government’s actions which the population of Serbia negated. Like a tainted linguistic structure, it governs the public discourse, gaining a number of meanings that range from: “normalization”; “transforming chaos into order”; “establishing the structure at places of its absence”; the empowerment of human rights and democracy; even the acceptance of the “inevitable cultural change” in the process of globalization (Štrbac 2007: 6).

This discourse is mainly approached in a poststructuralist manner and knowledge which originates from linguistics. In the last few years, the discourse on the European path of Serbia took forms of repeated formulation interpreted in the manner of Roland Barthes (Barthes 2010: 123). Starting from the assumption that the language we use in the public discourse is neither new nor original, Barthes points out the impossibility of determining the chronological boundaries and the extent of discourse. So called one-time language is produced and expanded under the protection of power instances and by status is the language of repetition. In this context, all the official language institutions become machines for the dissemination of the same formulations. They repeat the same structure, the same meaning and the same words, turning discourse into a political stereotype and thus, transforming it into the main

figure of ideology (Barthes 2010: 124). However, this language also has a psychological meaning. The inability to abandon the state in which the subject is located is accompanied by the repetition of the same formulations, sentences, images, and reflects their compulsive use. As in psychology, the language compulsion has a function of blocking unwanted mental content. It is about content that is not accepted by the significant Other (Europe, Occident or any other geosymbolic entity that is synonymous with “progress”, “civilization”, “power”, “order”, “democracy” etc.). In order to block such content, defensive, compulsive behavior is developed and reflected in the ritual repetition of certain sentences. Despite the awareness of the manifest absurdity of these rituals, institutions use them as a defensive mechanism and as a means of controlling unwanted content and actions. In this case, these are the contents and actions stigmatized by the Occident which has a role of Super Ego. Unlike countries that became members of the EU and firmly tied these studies to the ethnographic field or human geography studies, such as Bulgaria, the post-Yugoslav countries faced the challenge while looking for an answer to the question: “What are Balkan studies?”; “What are their main topics”? The institutes and centers for Balkan studies are turning back to the past while favoring research from the perspective of history, history of art, archeology, and to a lesser extent, anthropology, linguistics, politics and rarely, sociology and psychology. Indeed, the question was already sensitive. The definition of the so called “balkanology” (Balkan studies) varies depending on the country. In the Kingdom of Yugoslavia, the first definition emerged between two world wars. According to the experts gathered around Balkan Institute (Balkanski institut), this new science was based on three sources: history, anthropology and comparative linguistics.¹ The results of the research should show the contribution of the Balkans to the “European civilization” (Milin 2000: 29-36). Actually, Balkan studies from their beginning until today tend to determine the relation between Europe and the Balkans which involves symbolic and cultural distance/closeness between these parts of the world. The successor of the Balkan Institute is considered to be the Institute for Balkan Studies of the Serbian Academy of Science and Arts established in 1969. Its main goal is multidisciplinary research of the Balkans (Tasić 2000: 7-13). However, since the 1930s, new

1 Balkanski institut (Balkan Institute) situated in Belgrade (1934-1841).

disciplines were born and modern syntheses have emerged. This is the reason why some centers and institutes for Balkan studies in other parts of the region give priority to sociology, philosophy and contemporary literature,² while European and American Universities, centers for research and institutes use knowledge that comes from psychology, philosophy and their interdisciplinary successors (Himstedt-Vait 2014). In this regard, academic research in the Balkans supports the cyclical image of the past while avoiding dealing with the current position of the region. Political psychology remains on the margin when it comes to the Balkans, Western Balkan politics and its cultural policy.

The psychoanalysis of the Balkans begins in parallel with the outbreak of the war in the territory of SFRY and it is oriented at the analysis of the imaginary space and time. The authors rely upon the research of Edward Said, Maria Todorova, while Said's students of postcolonial orientation like Homi Bhabha and Gayatri Chakravorthi Spivak reveal the significance of heteroperception and self-perception (Said 2009; Todorova 1999; Bakić – Hayden 2006; Bhabha 2002; Chakravorti Spivak 2003) (Bjelić 2008; Bjelić 2003; Žižek 2005). Slavoj Zizek, Julia Kristeva, Rastko Močnik and Dušan Bjelić stood out with new ideas. Basically, the questions posed by imagology and translatology as literary branches derived from philosophy, psychology and psychological understanding of identity, integrity and experience of Me / Us as a part of a unique group. The subjects of imagology are clichés, performances, representations of national character, ethnic prejudices and cultural stereotypes (Leersen 2009: 83-97). Key terms remain images, performances and Otherness (Todorov 1994: 247). Their understanding in these interdisciplinary branches is simplified and fragmented in relation to the perceptions of their mother sciences – philosophy and psychology.

2. DISCOURSE ON THE EUROPEAN PATH

The question about the temporality of discourse and the possibility of determining its origins is still a subject of controversy in sociology, philosophy and anthropology. Temporality is a process

2 Balkanološki istraživački centar, Republika Srpska. Some of them rely on the knowledge of only one discipline. For example, the Institute for Balkan studies in Sarajevo relies upon archaeological research. See: http://www.arhivsa.ba/wordpress/?page_id=1782

ontology underlying discourse analysis. Indeed, temporality is a key question for language use, or semiotics in general. Therefore, different strands of discourse analysis have repeatedly shown interest not only in time, but also in temporality. They investigate temporality as a matter of change, transformations, and ruptures, and as a matter of stability, continuity, and inertia (Hamann, Suckert 2018). Although it acts as a camouflaged version of the great narrative about the Balkan crossroad and the “European path of Serbia” it suggests a tendency toward linearity. Newspaper titles that express the manifest tendency to “get closer” to Europe testify in favor of the previous assumptions: “The next 96 hours is crucial for European path of Serbia” (Telegraf 2018); “European path of Serbia is the best option for young people” (Pink 2017); “New suggestions for European path of Serbia come from Brussels” (Sputnik 2018); “Austria strongly supports European path of Serbia” (Blic 2018); “European path of Serbia depends on the success of Merkel and Macron” (N1 2018); “Norway helps progress and European path of Serbia” (RTS 2018); “It would be wrong if European path would depend on Kosovo” (Srbija Danas 2018); “The rule of law could stop European path of Serbia” (Danas 2018); “No one questions European path of Serbia anymore” (RTV 2017); “Belgian prime minister is coming to encourage European path of Serbia” (RTV 2017); “Environmental protection is important for European path of Serbia” (Energetski portal 2017); “The President visited Moscow to strengthen European path of Serbia” (Informer 2017); “The European path must not and will not endanger the relationship with Russia” (Nedeljnik 2017); “Dialogue between civil society and Parliament is necessary for the European path of Serbia” (Eukonvent 2016); “2.7 million euros for the European path of Serbia” (Norway in Serbia 2018); “The opening of the Russian base would jeopardize the European path of Serbia” (Jugmedia 2016); “All the ups and downs of the European path of Serbia” (Antidot 2015); “The government is firmly defined for the European path of Serbia” (Blic 2018); “Czech strongly supports the European path of Serbia” (Euractiv 2017); “The Vatican supports the European path of Serbia” (Prva 2014).

Similar to the discourse on liminality (crossroads, country between East and West), the European path of Serbia becomes a discourse repeated without enthusiasm, obtaining the form of

something natural, self-evident, as if it is coming back each time for different, but logical and appropriate reasons (Barthes 2010: 127). As Foucault observes, every manifest discourse rests upon something which has been already said (Foucault, 1998: 30). But the discourse on the European path is not a mere formulation that emerged at the beginning of the third millennium and was directly initiated by the political process of democratization. This infinitely repeatable formulation motivated by desire for change explains anxiety and insecurity. Compulsive repetition of the aspiration for Europe testifies the inner sense of insecurity, liminality, displacement and marginality. Within the Balkan studies, this problem was most commonly dealt with by experts on travelogues and diplomatic reports. Their authors place the Balkans on the very edge of Europe, which is further reflected in the self-perception of the people living in this part of the world.

According to conventional understanding, the time is divisible to the present, past and future. Yet, languages and cultures use other divisions of time similar to: initial; final; individual and collective (Đerić 2005: 16). Linear time lasts without interruption and is characterized by sequence of events along the time axis on which days, weeks, months and years form a regular line. Cyclical time is repeatable, while liminal or frozen time uses distant historical events. Observing social behavior through three time axes, linear, cyclical and liminal, Joel Halpern offered an understanding of discourse on time in terms of premodern and mythical thinking in Serbia (Halpern, 1986). Discourse on the land between East and West belongs to the liminal time, also named frozen or dreamlike. Similar to dreamlike time, it implies the discourse on the “European path” as it reveals desire instead of an objective estimation between A (premodern, myth-like, liminal Serbia) and B (European future).

Statements, titles, newspaper articles, give the impression that Serbia has been trying to become part of Europe and to establish its European identity for a long time, although with an equal degree of uncertainty and fear of failure. A significant aspect of this problem is one about the symbolic and semantics of “path”. No one stays too long on the path except in the cases of failures and accidents (Zaninni 2002: 27).

3. POLITICAL PSYCHOLOGY AND THE STATUS OF THE BALKANS

Political psychology is the application of psychological research methods, theory and data to politics. Political scientists applying psychology to their research and psychologists applying their research in a political context, at least historically, tend to have distinctly different approaches. This article focuses primarily on the analysis of politics and political principles within psychology, although both approaches share the philosophical context of a scientific method and an interest in similar political issues (Stone, Johnson, Beall 2014: 77). Like other disciplines, psychology offers its own understanding of time / space by aligning it with the consensual reality and drawing ideas from philosophy. Paul Nesbit and Catarina Kinval point out that “psychology offers answers to the questions: “Why does the clock sometimes appear stopped?” Is it possible to perceive the world in slow motion during psychological crisis? Can action and effect be reversed?” Time perception is surprisingly prone to measurable distortions and illusions. The past few years have introduced remarkable progress in identifying and quantifying temporal illusions of duration, temporal order and simultaneity” (Nesbit, Kinval 2012: 45-59). Political psychology has adopted the concept of a discursive frame which enables understanding of the temporal and spatial aspects of discourse. Similar to other disciplines, psychology defines discourse as an organized body of knowledge that is generated from historically situated regulations and practices. Discourses construct the object of knowledge in such a way that only certain interpretations and modes of reasoning are possible (Nesbit-Larking, Kinvall 2012: 45-59)

Psychologists understand the relationship between psychology and politics as the study of political behavior. According to Leonie Huddy “the relationship between these two disciplines can be understood as the application of what is known about human psychology to the study of politics” (Huddy 2013). It is also about discerning how “human cognition and emotion mediate the impact of the environment on political action” (Huddy, Sears, Levy 2013).

Here we come to the issues that directly concern Balkans studies in Serbia in spatial/temporal terms. According to Žižek and Kristeva, the Balkan is a geographical patient and a set of cultures in inner split. Before the Balkans was regarded irrational, self-destructive subject, the authors approached this geography in terms of neurosis. At first, this geography was seen in the fusion of the Lacanian-Freudian and Marxist-Gramscian ideas, while emphasizing the impossibility of separating one's own identity from the image of the Other (Lazarević Radak 2014: 48). The perceptions of these two authors remain too radical even though they rely upon some of the basic Freudian premises. Unlike Žižek and Kristeva, Dusan Bjelić explained that the psychoanalysis of the Balkans implies a historical case of the normalization of geography and proves the radical transparency of tension between the discourses of universal "normality" and "mental illness" (Bjelić 2011: 7). This is the time of reexamination of the past and search for answers to the questions of war, economic and value crisis in post-Yugoslav societies. An adequate framework for analysis according to Bjelić, could be Foucault's understanding of psychiatric power (Lazarević Radak 2014: 49). Although remaining on the trace of anti-psychiatry, close to Foucault and even Cooper (Cooper 1980), Bjelić criticizes the hegemonic psychiatric position, while retaining the basic psychological postulates. He does not question or relativize the pathology of internal divisions, ethnic hatred and war as preconditions of paranoia and, in general, the psychological collapse of society. His analysis focuses on the feeling that comes from the position of Third person. Third Person Point of View was designed in the mirror of Occident (Petković 2010: 34). The use of the first person point of view depends on recognizing one's own as a complete and independent one. Only a healthy individual / healthy collective can speak for themselves. In pursuing such a situation in the collective, the consultation of political psychology becomes a challenge.

4. LIMINAL TIME: DEEP PSYCHOLOGY AND PERCEPTION OF TIME

Anthropological theories made possible to detect a link between psychological knowledge of the individual and his/her

perception of time and space as cyclical / liminal. The knowledge of political psychology can be transferred to the geosymbolic space of the Balkans. Both transitional times, cyclical / liminal; liminal / linear, mark the social phases followed by identity crisis and therefore also value crisis. This is especially conspicuous in the case of a Jungian analytical approach which accepts Van Genep's and Turner's knowledge, enabling liminal time to be understood as a potential, not deficit. At the collective level, transitional times are recognized as historical periods of society: an attempt to politically separate from the previous state; a state in which social roles are not yet divided; reintegration as a stage in which new roles are finally accepted, and societies gain a new identity. On the European path, Self (in the social context Us) is not yet formed, and it is impossible to speak from the position of the first person.

Jungians have often seen the individuation process of self-realization as taking place within a liminal space. Individuation begins with a withdrawal from normal modes of socialisation, epitomized by the breakdown of the Persona and expectations of Others (Jafe 1989: 71). Thus, Turner's concept of social liminality enables the transfer of the liminality concept from the individual to the social context. Individuation can also be seen as a movement through liminal space and time, from disorientation to integration (Jung 1996:81). What takes place in the dark phase of liminality is "a process of breaking down in order to "consolidate" one's meaning, purpose and sense of relatedness again." (Jakobi 150: 2000)

Liminality can be described as a state of "no longer/not yet". It is a space in our individual and social lives where the old self-narrative does not fit any longer, and the new narrative has not yet emerged. The transition process is similar to moving towards Europe (European path). It is a type of consciousness that implies frozen space and time. Critical issues in liminal societies are: "where do I come from?"; "who am I?"; "Where am I going?"; "what this life transition means - moving toward better or worse?"; "Society and individuals face the unknown". It implies to leave one's status, one's obscure identity worn throughout the decade for the acceptance of an unknown. It is this kind of status that produces new fluctuations and new uncertainties. But, more than during decade of the 1990's, when the political myth of the crossroads was cultivated, the new discourse allows the feeling

of stigma in the transitory state. Serbia is on the “European path” for almost two decades. Discourse about it is louder or quieter, depending on the foreign policy situation. The population of Serbia is no longer bound up with the firm internal notion of oneself, for an idea or feeling, but unwittingly wanders the paths and “roads” while striving to gain or construct the First Person point of view and stabilize on the symbolic map of Europe. The transition phase is characterized by a high degree of vulnerability accompanied by ideas and thoughts of inferiority. The interior spaces are reconfigured, and since the identity basis is not solid, it falls under different external influences especially in political terms. Questions such as: “Are we East or West?”; “Should we turn to Russia, EU, or both”? are more illusory. In the meantime, they are real dilemmas that enable the control of the population by political elites. Society is in the state of suspension. After the end of the wars that led to the dissolution of the SFRY, Serbia began to move towards the stage of progressive modernization and Europeanization, although preceded by the cultural, value and economic regression in the 1990s. A deep separation from the previous entity, which included other republics, today’s states, demanded a conscious recognition of the change and a decision to move in one direction. Historical myths slowed down the transition and conclusion. Instead of a stable, fixed state, ideologies, new expectations and fuzzy images of the future were emerging. If the result is the acceptance of these intangible conditions, the true image of Serbia is still one of a liminal society. The European path, the transition, and even Europe itself, have not yet been understood as a political and social reality in Serbia, but as ideal standards, or, among Eurosceptics, false promises of a better life. Although the reason for such image comes from its liminality, fluidity, undefined positions of both entities, Balkan societies continue to recognize European societies as their counterparts. Indeed, Europe remains a place to go, but not in terms of linearly understood movement, “political”, “social”, “economic”, “conceptual” progression, but as a geography of countries for which a visa or citizenship is required. In this regard, the population of Serbia is still far from being specifically involved in the social and economic map of Europe.

5. THE PSYCHOLOGY OF NO-LONGER-NOT-YET

Despite the inspirational understanding of in-depth analysts, it is necessary to note that state of frozenness implies emotions characteristic of depression and obsessive compulsive disorder (Sanja Lazarević Radak 2018: 47-60). It has already been said that the European path and movement formulas serve as self-help and a means of blocking unwanted thoughts and content. Adopting the philosophical concepts of Bergson, Husserl and Heidegger, psychologists have analyzed psychopathological disturbances in the experience of time, in particular in depression, obsessive-compulsive disorders and schizophrenia, thus establishing a tradition in the psychopathology of temporality on which philosophical authors in turn could draw. This tradition can be continued and extended in Balkan studies today.

According to Douglas Fuchs, “the pathology of temporality in the depressive thus, appeared to be an individual disturbance, an inhibition of vital becoming, and his lagging behind the socially shared experience of time was only a secondary feature” (Fuchs 2010). With progressive desynchronization, the “no-longer” and the “too late” gets new forms permeated with nostalgia: “We will never live in social security or a country like Socialist Federative Republic of Yugoslavia again”; “It is too late to change”; “It is too early for us”; “We will never be like Europeans”, “Europe is not for us/We are different from Europeans”(this is a form of evoking the Balkan/crossroads myth); “One should leave the country, but it is hard to adjust to another culture/society”; Common sentences and statements suggest lack of security, identity problems, and a lack of transparency.

These sentences become more and more dominant, and explicit, while time and space between Serbia and Europe is experienced as a painful burden. Like depressive patients, citizens of Serbia live in an “anachronistic”, slow-moving time of their own. External, intersubjective time continues, but it also “passes by depressive subject.” The disturbance of temporalization is also present: “depressives experience a stretching of time that means, subjects estimate given time intervals as longer than the actually measured, socially constituted time. Time degenerates into mere succession when our ability to fulfil time falters” (Fuchs, 2010).

This reified, spatialized time can also be subdivided in the way that, normally, only physically measurable time can be. Rhetoric and political discourse of the inhabitants of Serbia lack drive, interests and desires which are normally orientated to the future, inspite of public discourse which insists on “European path” as the only solution. For the people of Serbia, the future loses the character of openness, novelty, surprise, and becomes reified as inevitable fate or calamity, at least to a rigid continuation of the past or a recurrence of the same. According to Fuchs, “complete desynchronization from intersubjective time is marked by the transition into melancholic delusion. It can be understood as the explicit representation of the disturbed conative temporalization at the basic level: Past and future have now been frozen in the perfect tense of irreversible guilt and in the future perfect. At the same time, a return to a shared intersubjective time has become unimaginable” (Fuchs 2010). With the freezing of temporalization and the loss of contemporality the flexibility of perspective-taking is lost as well, since this is essentially based on an open future providing possible alternatives to one’s convictions. People of Serbia identify themselves with the current experience: “It has always been and will always be like this.” To expect or hope for anything different is an illusion. Even the explicit memory of recovery from an earlier state remains abstract and does nothing to change the hopelessness of the present situation. The same is true of the past: stability and integrity are represented as nothing but an illusion or political fraud (Fuchs 2010).

6. DISCOURSE AND TRAUMA

The theory I would opt for is focused on time perception during the trauma. It is also characteristic of time perception in PTSP disorder. Societies experience trauma the same way individuals do.

Trauma memories – like all memories – are malleable and prone to distortion. Indeed, there is growing evidence – from both field and lab-based studies to suggest that the memory distortion follows a particular pattern. “People tend to remember more trauma than they experienced, and those who do, tend to exhibit more of the re-experiencing symptoms associated with post-traumatic

stress disorder (PTSD)” (Erickson 1976: 22-26). Psychologists, psychiatrists and neurologists suggest that the likely mechanism underlying that distortion is a failure in people’s source monitoring. After a traumatic experience, intentional remembering and unintentional remembering (intrusive mental imagery) can introduce new details that, over time, assimilate into a person’s memory of the event. People’s memories for traumatic events are – like their memories for more mundane events – easily distorted. According to Todd McGovan „Memory distortion for traumatic events appears to follow a particular pattern, a phenomenon referred to as memory amplification which carries real consequences: symptoms associated with PTSD, such as intrusive thoughts and images“(McGovan 2003: 27-47).

Yugoslav and post-Yugoslav societies have gone through a profound identity, social and economic crisis. First, the war, then the sanctions imposed to Federal Republic of Serbia and finally, NATO aggression on Serbia, did not encourage productive reconciliation and the establishment of good relations with the neighbors. Serbia is still politically and economically in a liminal state, as it strives to exit the cyclical repeatability of crises and achieve a linear perception of its past, present and future. However, the situations through which it passes during the transition can still be understood and analyzed as traumatic. One trauma did not heal, although new one appeared.

Psychologically, trauma involves violence, shock, self-harm, loss of stability, the sudden loss of control over external and internal reality with consequences that reflect on the traumatized individual (society). This state forms the connection between experience and feeling of helplessness, allowing memory and forgetting to become more complex than in other situations (Erikson 1976: 22-26). Trauma is the result of a lifetime experience that does not emerge only from a moment, but can be the result of long-term social conditions (Leyderdorff, Dawson, Burchardt 1976: 22-26). According to trauma theorists, the history of the subject / society that experienced trauma is not linear, but multidimensional, temporarily reversible rather than chronologically linear and accompanied by numerous interpretations that replace one’s own insight.

Despite the fact that trauma studies are an inspirational area, several definitions today occupy the widest area in these studies. One of them comes from Lacan (McGovan 2003: 27-47). For him, trauma is a real, not yet assimilated experience that offers resistance to symbolism and language. It is an experience that has not become a speech and has not been historically traced in the boundary of the symbolic network (Laub 2012: 31-53). In traumatic memories, the past unexpectedly falls into everyday life, failing to situate within the framework of linear narration and consciousness. Thus, it remains unassociated in the narrative space of everyday memories and returns in the forms of nightmares, flashbacks, obsessive-compulsive behavior, threatening potential mystification, mythization and sacralization of traumatic memories (Meek 2010: 7). History begins to be perceived as cyclical, and experiences become repeatable. It is the sacralization of traumatic memories or the production of history in a secular-mythological sense that has become one of the key problems encountered by Yugoslav and post-Yugoslav societies, both during the war and the break-up of the SFRY, in the transition as well as post-transition periods. As a stumbling block towards reconciliation, they have prevented the productive implementation of trauma studies and the establishment of new relations among the republics that participated in the conflict (Lazarević Radak 2018: 19-125). In this regard, I am inclined to believe that the discourse on the “European path” is a kind of defensive mechanism of post-Yugoslav societies which are not yet EU members. If the agonizing, humiliating and self-degrading memories burst onto surface, another social collapse would occur. Considering the fact that recognition, reconciliation, restoration followed by constructive diplomatic relations among neighbors, and formerly the SFRY population, have not been established yet, defensive mechanisms threaten to turn the suppression into new trauma. Memories are neutralized by the mobilization of discourse on the European path, functioning as a space for the postponement of unwanted memories while refusing to recognize its own responsibility for war, economic, social crises and the inability to leave the state of crisis or transition. In this regard, institutions and public figures avoid confrontation with responsibility, while the discourse on European path serves as a justification whenever concrete and logic responses to social and political issues cannot be offered.

The fact that post-Yugoslav societies awaiting admission to the EU spent nearly twenty years in a state of suspension does not exclude the feeling of frozenness in the historical present of societies that have reached this goal. Therefore, fragile identities and fluctuations in relation to the position: liminal/linear and liminal/cyclic remain relative. But their reflection on the present and their problematization in the life of the individual and the collective is unusually tangible and real.

7. INSTEAD OF CONCLUSION: ACADEMIC CHALLENGES IN STUDYING DISCOURSE ON EUROPEAN PATH

The Balkan paradigm appeared at the time when the former Yugoslav republics became post-Yugoslav states, (Todorova 1999). Indeed, area studies are in crisis not only in Serbia and in the Western Balkans, but in the whole world. Area studies tend to be inter- or multidisciplinary – and the boundaries of their fields are usually historically contingent and, therefore, highly contestable under present conditions (Kaser 2013:215 -225). According to Karl Kaser, “area studies programs are sometimes considered as weak and scattered. They allegedly have no theories and lack their own intellectual mastery. A broadly based theory for area studies would require a kind of collaboration of area specialists that actually does not exist yet” (Kaser 2013: 215-225). The reason for this situation is the fact that we live global lives through global history. Global present cannot be subject of investigation. It can be imagined but cannot be written. “As an idea, global history has to be investigated through processes of globalization, economy, migration, or global protest movements” (Kaser 2013: 215-225). Actually, global world questions the ontology and even the importance of Balkan studies in the form we know them.

A glance at the recent history shows that only a few years after the fall of the Berlin Wall; while the Western Balkans were synonymous for ignorance of democracy, at the academic level at least, Balkan studies certainly dealt with it. When we look closely at the current situation in the academic community, it does not just appear that it is in a spatial / temporal stagnation due to political and economic problems. The actual and somewhat obsessive reversal

of the past suggests that science is skeptical towards the spatial and temporal process of abandoning liminal positions. In other aspects of culture, higher education and science, Serbia is facing a deep crisis. Confusion has affected all institutions in society, including the academia. They are characterized by a return to the traumatic events, referring to discourses on the wars and their consequences, while portraying Serbia as a regular victim (topics like World War I, the Balkan Wars, the subsequent redistribution of territories, the past relations between Serbia and Europe testify this). Topics function like flashbacks. They are followed by the inability to leave behind the reversal of the present and the future.

A look at today's research in Balkan centers and institutes for Balkan studies in Serbia reveals the favoring of cyclical time. Disciplines studied in the research centers for the Balkans are mainly history, art history, geography, archeology, ethnology, anthropology, sociology, philosophy, pedagogy, linguistics, history of literature.³ However, they are mostly aimed at studying the past. History remains dominant, suggesting at least two options: 1. The Balkans belong to the past; 2. Since it is an undefined, mostly symbolic part of the world, it can be the subject of study only by repeatedly favoring its cyclic nature. Bearing in mind that the academic community agrees that the Balkans is a symbolic geography and it is impossible to determine where its borders actually are, the question: "what are Balkan studies researching?" is as fluid as its boundaries.

At the time when the academic community in Serbia expects a new call for projects, Balkan researchers expect an answer to the question: "What are Balkan studies?" It will necessary to provide one of the answers to the question: "How far have we moved on our way to Europe?"

Political psychology is just one of the marginalized interdisciplinary branches in Serbia. This also applies to its understanding of space/place and temporality. A brief review of its potential in understanding the spatial / temporal identity of the Balkans and the perception of time is only a proposal that can be discussed further. However, long – term polemics bring danger of becoming frozen/liminal. We are confronted with the fact that the psychological side

³ For example: Annual of the Institute for Balkan Studies *Balkanica*, Institute for Balkan Studies, Serbian Academy of Science and Arts, Belgrade, 2004-2016.

of transition and the consequences it leaves, with all its meanings of liminality, may be of the utmost importance for the future of this part of the world. Social psychology gives indisputable and undeniable contributions to our understanding of the current situation. However, avoiding its involvement in quantitative and qualitative contributions to academic research impedes fruitful implementation, of not so young but in-depth subdiscipline - political psychology. The application of these studies to European and American societies has enabled a deeper understanding of many problems they have faced since the end of the Second World War. In response to researchers who still do not consider psychology as tangible and empirically defined by science, I recall all the contributions that the Frankfurt School gave after the Second World War.

The problem of the impossibility of temporal and spatial symbolization of the Balkans and the mobilization of discourses on the European path of Serbia requires considerable interdisciplinary research. Ignoring this problem and giving it to the political world in which academic discourse does not mix rhetorically leads to the deepening of uncertainty about the position and again provokes identity crises we witnessed in the late 1980s and early 1990s. To the extent that it was necessary to understand the political myth of the Balkan crossroads, today we are obliged to understand the discourse on the “European path of Serbia”.

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THE POWER OF “NORMATIVE POWER EUROPE” DISCOURSE***

Abstract

The article aims to analyze the concept of the EU as a normative power. In this regard, the article explores the concept of Normative Power Europe (NPE) introduced by Ian Manners. The intention is not to debate on whether the EU is a normative power acting in accordance with its norms, or whether it is an actor that acts strategically in pursuit of its interests, i.e., to debate on constructivist vs. realist/rationalist dispute in international relations. Instead, this paper is focused on the discursive representation of the EU as a normative power. It seeks to analyse the power of the discursive construction of the EU identity as a normative power with the ability to shape conceptions of “normal” in international relations and with the power to legitimise its actions in international politics. Through the example of the relationship between the EU and the Western Balkans, the paper concludes that the normative power identity discourse establishes a distinctive EU identity by turning parties into “others” and by

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representing the EU as a “force for good” in international relations.

Keywords: Normative Power Europe (NPE), European Union, Western Balkans, discursive representation, hegemony

1. INTRODUCTION

Since the introduction of the concept of Normative Power Europe by Ian Manners (2002), the EU studies have been shaped by the debate about the uniqueness of the EU in international relations. Manners’ influential article had a considerable impact on the study of European foreign policy. In the last decade, the concept of NPE has become one of the most widely used concepts in EU studies. It had become a fruitful avenue for research and contributed to moving forward the research agenda (Sjursen 2006). However, due to its conceptual vagueness, many scholars challenged the claim of the EU as a “normative power” and stressed the need for its further clarification (Sjursen 2006; Merlingen 2007; Diez 2005; Hyde-Price 2006; Diez, Pace 2011; Forsberg 2011; Keene 2012; Cebeci 2012, 2017). At the same time, the concept of NPE has led to the use of a variety of competing concepts introduced to describe the specific nature of the EU as an actor in international relations, such as soft power (Nye 2003), ethical power (Aggestam 2008), transformative power (Börzel, Risse 2009), quiet superpower (Moravcsik 2009), ideal power (Forsberg 2011). Nevertheless, the concept of NPE remains dominant in academic circles when it comes to the role of the EU in international relations (cf. De Zutter 2010).

However, the existing NPE literature does not pay enough attention to the question of discursive representations of the EU as a normative power. Most of the studies have been focused on the question whether the EU is a normative actor or not, ignoring the question of the power that lies in the representation of the EU as a normative power (cf. Diez 2004, 2005; Cebeci 2012, 2017; Merlingen 2007). In recent literature, there have been attempts to clarify the nature of the “power” through the debate on this concept, including the importance of the discursive or status context

for whether the EU can be regarded as a normative power (Larsen 2014: 896-7). In this regard, some authors argued that the precondition for the EU to be a specific, “normative power” is that the outside world attributes a distinct role to the European Union (Forsberg 2011; Keene 2012; Diez, Pace 2011; Persson 2017).

This article does not attempt to demonstrate whether the concept of NPE adequately describes the EU’s international behaviour, i.e., whether the EU is a “normative power” that acts in accordance with its norms, or whether it is an actor that acts strategically in pursuit of its interests. In other words, the aim of this article is not to analyse the constructivist/normative vs. realist/rationalist dispute in international relations about the role of the EU in world politics. In this article, the NPE is analysed as a practice of discursive representation rather than as an objective category (cf. Diez 2013). The discursive representation of the NPE is of double significance: on the one hand, it is a precondition for other actors to agree to the norms set forth by the EU, and on the other, it constructs a particular normative identity of the EU (Diez, Manners 2007). The article seeks to analyse the power that lies in the self-representation of the EU as a normative power prescribing what is ‘normal’ for others and legitimising EU’s acts in international relations. To this end, the concept of normative power Europe introduced by Ian Manners will be analysed first. Then, the focus of analysis will be on the relationship between the EU as a normative power and the Western Balkans, in order to demonstrate the power of NPE discourse on what is considered as appropriate behaviour by other actors. It is argued that the EU enlargement policy is the main tool of the EU normative identity discourse. Given that the European Commission manages the enlargement process on behalf of the EU, the article will be limited to official documents, speeches and statements that originate from the European Commission. It is concluded that the NPE discourse shapes a distinct EU identity by turning parties into “others”. It is through the practice of discursive representation that the EU’s “normative Self” is constructed in contrast to the “non-normative others”. Therefore, the EU represents a hegemonic power because it claims a monopoly on defining what its norms entail and thus creates the boundaries of ‘normality’ and ‘Europeanness’ (Haukkala 2008).

2. THE CONCEPT OF “NORMATIVE POWER EUROPE”

For decades, EU studies have been shaped by the question of the international role of the European Community/European Union. During the 1970's, François Duchêne elaborated the concept of “Civilian Power Europe” (CPE) (Duchêne 1972, 1973), by arguing that the European Community (EC) represents a “new stage in political *civilisation*”, an entity that “would have a chance to demonstrate the influence which can be wielded by a large political co-operative formed to exert essentially *civilian* forms of power” (Duchêne 1973:19). According to Duchêne, the civilian power of the EC represents a force for the international diffusion of civilian and democratic standards, as well as the promotion of values such as “equality, justice and tolerance” (Duchêne 1973: 20). Duchêne's attempt to conceptualise Europe's international role laid the ground for further debate about the role of the EC in international relations. In the 1980's, Hedley Bull considered the concept of “Civilian Power Europe” as a contradiction in terms and argued that “Europe is not an actor in international affairs, and does not seem likely to become one” (Bull 1982: 151). In line with his realist approach to Europe's world role similar to De Gaulle's concept of *L'Europe puissance*, Bull's main argument was that “civilian nature” of the EC in international affairs was the consequence of “state of the art”, i.e., its incapability to provide for its security out of its own resources and its dependency on the United States (Ibid: 151-2). Therefore, he advocated the “military power of Europe”, i.e., the necessity for the EC to take steps towards making itself more self-sufficient in the domain of security and defence (Ibid:152).

Influenced by this debate about the role of the EC/EU in international affairs, Ian Manners in 2002 developed the concept of the EU as a normative power, as a third way between these two concepts already established in the international relations theory. What does the concept of Normative Power Europe represent?

Manners' concept of the EU as a normative power relies on two core premises. First, it underlines the *normative difference* of the EU in international relations which is due to three basic features: EU's historical context, its hybrid form of polity and its political-legal constitution (Manners 2002: 240). Namely, the

historical context in which the EU was created committed the Europeans to preserve and strengthen peace and liberty. Also, over time, the EU became a “hybrid of supranational and international forms of governance which transcends the Westphalian norms” (Ibid). Finally, the EU constitution as a political entity occurred as an “elite driven, treaty based, legal order” (Ibid: 241). The combination of these features enabled the constitution of the EU as a normative type of actor. According to Manners, the most important factor shaping the international role of the EU is not what it does or what it says but *what it is* (Ibid: 252). In other words, the EU is “*predisposed*” to act like a normative power because it is different “to pre-existing political forms” (Ibid: 242). In this regard, “the EU has been, is and always will be a normative power in world politics” (Manners 2008: 45). Thus, the EU represents a hybrid, postmodern/post-Westphalian form of actor which has assured a sustainable peace among its Member States (Parker, Rosamond 2013: 230).¹

According to Manners, the EU gradually developed a normative framework based on the values it promotes in its foreign policy. He distinguishes five “core” norms within the *acquis communautaire* and *acquis politique* which constitute the EU’s *normative identity*: peace, liberty, democracy, rule of law and human rights. In addition to these core norms, he also distinguishes four “minor” norms, i.e. social solidarity, anti-discrimination, sustainable development and good governance. The normative difference of the EU to other polities is reflected in its “commitment to universal rights and principles” (Manners 2002: 241). Thus, Manners’ claims that the EU promotes a series of normative principles “that are generally acknowledged, within the United Nations system, to be universally applicable” (Manners 2008: 46). The difference of the EU as a power in the international system consists also in the EU’s pursuit of the spread of norms. Therefore, he distinguishes six mechanisms for norm diffusion in international relations: contagion, transference, informal diffusion, procedural diffusion, overt diffusion and cultural filter (Manners 2002: 244). The diffusion of these norms enables the EU to be a normative power.

¹ The EU’s normative uniqueness as a postmodern polity is not new in academic circles. John Ruggie wrote in 1993 about the EU as the first post-modern polity (Ruggie 1993). Other scholars also underlined the role of the EU as a postmodern polity (Van Ham 2001; Ortega 2003), thus advocating the normative uniqueness of the EU.

Second core premise of the concept of Normative Power Europe concerns the *nature* of the EU's normative power. Manners underlines the difference between the normative power of the EU and the traditional forms of power. Normative power Europe is about ideational power, about socialization and adoption of norms. Unlike civilian or military power, the normative form of power represents the ability to use normative justification rather than an ability to use material incentives or physical force (Manners 2011: 230), i.e., it is "power over opinion" (Manners 2002: 239). Manners does not *a priori* reject the reinforcing effect of military power, but considers that the EU as a normative power does not need military power in order to be a distinctive international actor. In a similar manner, when speaking of civilian power, Manners argues that civilian power is about the "ability to use civilian instruments", while the normative power is "the ability to shape conceptions of "normal" in international relations" (Manners 2002: 239). This ability to "define what passes for "normal" in world politics" is, according to Manners, "ultimately, the greatest power of all" (Ibid: 253). Manners argues that "simply *by existing as different* in a world of states and the relations between them, the European Union changes the normality of international relations. In this respect, the EU *is a* normative power: it changes the norms, standards and prescriptions of world politics away from the bounded expectations of state-centricity" (Manners 2008: 45). Thus, the ethics of the EU's normative power are located in the ability of the EU to normalize a more just, cosmopolitical world (Ibid: 47). In Manners' words, the NPE approach highlights "the cosmopolitan nature of EU normative power, in particular through a commitment to placing universal norms and principles at the centre of its relations with its member states and the world" (Manners 2006: 176). In other words, the EU is "doing good" in the international system (Sjursen 2006). The goals of the EU are linked to *universal goods* rather than being in the narrowly defined self-interest of the EU. Thus, he claims that these goods should be defined as something that is accepted as "normal".

The concept of NPE, mainly due to its vagueness, triggered different interpretations as well as critics (Orbie 2006; De Zutter 2010). Several authors argued that this concept is a contested term (Sjursen 2006; Nicolaïdis, Howse 2002; Diez 2005; Merlingen

2007; Hyde-Price 2006; Forsberg 2011). Some of the critics were concerned about the lack of conceptual clarity between the two key concepts of the term, i.e. “power” and “norm”. While the term “power” is usually associated with coercion, the term “norm” is linked with legitimacy (Sjursen 2006: 172), so it remains unclear how these two concepts can be interlinked. On the other hand, some authors considered that the boundary between civilian and normative power is not clearly demarcated in Manners’ work (Keene 2012; Orbie 2006). They stress that we cannot clearly see the difference between these two types of power, since “one could use civilian instruments to *shape* conceptions of what is ‘normal’” (Keene 2012: 941). Moreover, Manners itself argues that one of the most important means which enables the EU to diffuse its values is “carrot and stickism” of financial awards and economic sanctions (Manners 2002: 245). Some authors criticized Manners’ standpoint that the EU prescribes what is “normal” in international relations, comparing it with an empire. As Jan Zielonka points out, by spreading institutional structures and rules of legitimate behaviour, the NPE represents a “normative power ‘civilising’ the external environment” and therefore should be regarded as an empire (Zielonka 2013:35). In a manner similar to Zielonka, Raffaella del Sarto rejects the instrumental-normative dispute about the concept of NPE, considering it a “false dichotomy” and defines the EU as a “normative empire” aiming to “stabilize the periphery, to draw economic advantages from it, to export the imperial order and cultivate elites there” (Del Sarto 2016:216). The concept of NPE has also been criticized from a neo-realist perspective. For Adrian Hyde-Price, structural neo-realist theory represents a more suitable framework for explaining the emergence, development and nature of the EU foreign policy cooperation. According to him, the EU is not a normative power but is used by its Member States as a collective instrument for shaping its external milieu by a combination of hard and soft power (Hyde-Price 2006).

The concept of NPE encouraged many scholars to examine the correlation between interest-driven and normative-driven action of the EU as a normative power. However, not enough attention has been paid to the discursive representations of the EU as a normative power. How is the EU constructed as a normative power? Is the concept of NPE an objective category or represents the practice

of discursive representation of the EU as a normative power? And what about the power that lies in the representation of the EU as a normative power? Michael Merlingen outlines that the norms associated with a virtuous EU are “Janus faced”, and that the concept of NPE is “dangerous” (Merlingen 2007:449). The “hidden face” of the NPE lies in the “EU’s self-styled mission for humanity”, by which it “inscribes the very agency of those it seeks to empower in relations characterised by epistemic violence, the technologisation of politics and administrative arbitrariness” (Ibid: 436). What is then the “power mechanism” in the concept of normative power Europe? Manners himself stressed that the EU is a normative power because it has a normative identity (Manners 2002: 239). He also argued that it is the *EU’s normative difference* which enables the EU to define what is ‘normal’ (Manners 2002; Manners, Whitman 2003). However, the concept of NPE includes a relationship, i.e. is relational. If power represents “the ability to make others do what they would not otherwise do”, then the concept of normative power appears as “a contradiction in terms” (Sjursen 2006: 172). In a similar manner, Thomas Diez suggests that the concept of NPE is controversial and cannot be seen solely as a specific kind of actor in international relations that is different from other actors by its normative difference. It includes a relationship, i.e. “the power as A being able to make B do what he/she would otherwise not have done” (Diez 2005: 616). Thus, how do we know that the normative power that the EU is using is legitimate? How do we know that EU’s acting “in a normative way” is a “good thing”, something that is “normal”? And what is “normal” in international politics?

According to Diez, the NPE is an EU identity that generates a set of images, values and norms against an image of others in the “outside world” (Diez, Manners 2007: 174). It is through the discursive practice that the EU’s “normative Self” is constructed against “non-normative others”, and “EU-norms” against “non-EU norms”. Thus, the EU as a normative power is a construct which establishes a particular normative identity for the EU through turning parties into “others” and representing the EU as a positive force in world politics (Diez 2005). This invokes a moral superiority of the EU vis-à-vis a variety of others (Parker, Rosamond 2013: 235). In this regard, the self-construction of EU’s normative identity enables the EU to determine the nature of the relationship it has with others.

By presenting its norms as distinct, as of universal standing, the EU relationship with others implicates the asymmetry of power and enables the construction of an EU identity through differentiation which implies a hierarchy and subordination. In this regard, the EU as a normative power can be regarded as a hegemonic power because it seeks a monopoly on defining what its norms entail and thus creates the boundaries of 'normality' and 'Europeanness' (Haukalla 2017; Diez 2005).

One of the most powerful features of the discursive self-construction of the EU as NPE is its ability to shape the conceptions of 'normal' in international relations. However, the quest for defining what is 'normal' for others appears highly problematic (Cebeci 2017: 64). Is it about the ability of the EU to shape the conceptions of 'normal', or about "the ability to use ideas and values to get what you want or to make others do what you want" (Keene 2012: 942)? As some authors outline, defining 'normal' is "a disciplinary practice- an act of political power", i.e., the construction of EU identity having 'a sole monopoly on what can be called Europeanness" (Cebeci 2017). This points to the hegemonic power of the EU as the power to shape the values of others (Diez 2005: 616). The EU as a normative power can be seen as a "European governmentality", i.e., the sum of all discourses, procedures, processes and tools - governmental (especially security) apparatuses and knowledge - that are created and used to empower the EU and legitimise its acts" (Cebeci 2017: 70).

3. NPE DISCOURSE IN THE PROCESS OF ENLARGEMENT: THE EU AND THE WESTERN BALKANS

The EU enlargement policy is one of the most important policies of the EU as a normative power. The "core" norms identified by Manners have been elaborated in a series of declarations, treaties, policies and as an explicit set of membership conditions, thus creating the EU *acquis communautaire* and *acquis politique*. These norms were placed at the heart of the EU enlargement policy.

In the process of enlargement, the EU is represented as a value community where commitment to shared, "core" norms

steers the activities of the members and at the same time serves as a “role model” that encourages others (candidates) to adopt the same norms. Therefore, Article 2 TEU stipulates that the Union is founded on the values of respect for human dignity, freedom, democracy, equality, the rule of law and respect for human rights. Hence, as the former Commissioner Oli Rehn stated, “*the values define Europe*” (Rehn 2008: 8), i.e., the main determinant of enlargement is the embracement of “European values”. This was reiterated by the current president of the European Commission: “For me, Europe is more than just a single market. More than money, more than a currency, more than the euro. *It was always about values*” (Juncker 2017). The importance of “European values” is confirmed by Article 49 TEU which states that acceding countries must accept these values and promote them. As for candidate countries, through the process of monitoring, the EU applies strict conditionality, i.e., the complete fulfillment by the candidates of the criteria required before joining the EU. In the process of enlargement, the projection of the “core” norms (in Manners’ terms) is thus one-sided and enables the construction of the EU’s normative Self against the non-normative others, by imposing “EU-norms” against “non-EU norms”. As some authors highlight, the EU tends to treat its norms as absolutes that are imposed coercively as conditions upon negotiating partners (Diez, Pace 2007):

“The EU has successfully used its membership conditionality to export its economic and political models to post-communist Europe. History will show this is *to be the most successful example of long lasting regime change ever*” (Rehn 2008:8).

In this regard, the EU self-representation in enlargement has from the beginning been based on domination: the EU “provided models and the applicant states were supposed to copy or to imitate them (...) the key terms of the conditionality policy were safeguards, benchmarks, guidance and screening. The EU discourse was exceedingly inflexible and hierarchical, leaving little space for negotiation” (Zielonka 2013: 43). The “partners” engaged in the process of EU enlargement are obliged to be “transformed” according to “European values”. This process is “irreversible”, because it is an investment in peace and stability, as stated in the Enlargement package of the European Commission: “A credible enlargement perspective requires sustained efforts and *irreversible*

reforms. The EU Enlargement is an *investment in peace, security and stability in Europe*: a prospect of EU membership has a *powerful transformative effect* on the partners in the process, embedding positive democratic, political, economic and societal change” (European Commission 2018a). In a similar vein, Commissioner Johannes Hahn outlined: “Let’s be clear: a credible enlargement perspective is not a free lunch. It requires *a tough transformation* of our partners. They must now “walk the talk” and deliver. The criteria are clear and they will not change; they are not technical, but essentially about *European values!*” (Hahn 2018a). Enlargement is thus about transformation, about making accession candidates “European” with the principle of conditionality “which marks the core of the inherent asymmetry of enlargement with the bigger, more powerful side determining the conditions of entry for the other, weaker side” (Adebahr, Wunsch 2011: 23).

The EU enlargement policy is important for the EU normative power for two reasons: first, the compliance of applicant states with the norms promoted and spread by the EU is conditional upon a successful exercise of the NPE and second, it enables the construction of a particular identity of the EU (Diez, Manners 2007). The recognition by others enables the recognition of the discursive self-construction of the EU and legitimises its actions in international politics. Therefore, the discursive construction of EU identity has an inclusive aspect, i.e., the necessity to assimilate others. On the other hand, the EU self-construction as a normative power is also exclusive in nature, i.e., it is a self-constructed specific kind of actor in contrast to “non-normative” others. This exclusive identity comprises distinctiveness of the EU in comparison to others and thus implies the creation of “value” boundaries between EU-Self and Other. It is the Other that delineates and defines the EU-Self. Therefore, the necessary difference is constructed through a variety of boundary drawing practices:

“Enlargement needs to be understood as a process which supports reform and the fundamental changes needed to meet the obligations of EU membership. Such changes inevitably require time. This makes it all the more important to reaffirm unequivocally the European perspective of the enlargement countries. If the prospect of moving forward on the road to the EU is seen as real and credible, the risk of countries turning away from the

EU will be mitigated, as will the risk of disillusionment with the process or even failing in or backsliding on reforms” (European Commission 2015: 3).

The Mannersian concept of NPE conceives the EU’s normative actorness as a consequence of the uniqueness of its history and experience, which gives it a *missionary* responsibility and the ethical duty to be engaged in the development and prosperity of the people in its neighborhood. The NPE discourse thus produces a link between specificity, uniqueness and responsibility with significant implications (Meyer, Voigt 2006). The EU is represented as an actor best equipped for promoting the wellbeing not only of Europeans, but also of the whole world. Therefore, the ethics of the EU’s normative power are located in the ability of the EU to “normalize” a more just, cosmopolitical world. In the Commission discourse, the EU represents the “force for good”, illustrated by the words of Federica Mogherini: “So just imagine, for one moment, what if the European Union didn’t exist. For the rest of the world, it would be a *disaster*. Our world that is already quite chaotic - to put it bluntly - would be definitely *in a much worse situation*” (Mogherini 2017). So the EU has “eternal duty”, “perpetual responsibility” to act as a NPE (Juncker 2018)².

How was the NPE discourse constructed vis-à-vis the Western Balkans? How has the EU’s normative identity been constructed by turning the Western Balkans into Other? The Western Balkans occupy a specific place in the process of EU integration. During the civil war in Yugoslavia, and after the end of the conflicts, the Balkans was represented as a region that violated the “core” norms of the EU (Vukasović 2018). The EU’s normative power identity was constructed in opposition to the identity of the Balkans, i.e. through the dichotomy integration/fragmentation, unity/disunity, peace/war, Europeanisation/Balkanisation. The new context of post-Dayton era demanded a new representation of the former Yugoslavia in the new “reality”. The deconstruction of Yugoslavia was followed by its transformation into a regional formation. From 1996 onwards, by inclusion of the Balkans region in the Regional approach, the EU aimed to transform the Balkans to Western Balkans within the framework of regional cooperation and integration

² “Living up to Europe’s rallying cry – never again war – is our eternal duty, our perpetual responsibility” (Juncker 2018).

(Vukasović 2018). The negative image of the Balkans has been reconstructed in a “western” manner. We are thus witnesses of the harmonization of the EU discourse about the Balkans with the new political circumstances and processes. The introduction of the notion “Western Balkans” is the expression of the change in the EU’s approach to these countries. Thus, the notion of “Western Balkans” no longer is a synonym for conflict, but represents a new label created in the new context as a symbol of peace, cooperation and domination of “European values” (Svilar 2010: 512). These new characteristics of the region had a double effect. On the one hand, the EU approach towards this region had changed and, on the other hand, the normative identity of the EU has been strengthened. The new term “Western” offered a vision of the EU as a “healthy, comprehensive, prosperous and tolerant community” (Berzani 2008: 17) and at the same time symbolized the possibility for the region to be transformed according to “Western” norms and to enter the “European club”. Since the 2003 Thessaloniki summit, all Western Balkan states have an irrevocable accession perspective and are considered potential candidate states, with candidate status to be awarded once a certain number of conditions have been met. The Western Balkans becomes a region in “transition” with a “European perspective”. From then onwards, the only alternative for the Western Balkans is the acceptance of “European values”:

“Our common goal is clear: We want to see the Western Balkan countries to ultimately join the European Union (...) This is the *right way* to defend the long term prosperity of all the citizens in *our European family* and also to defend European stability” (Barroso 2014)

“Enlargement to the Western Balkans is about bringing peace, stability and prosperity” (Füle 2014)

“A credible accession perspective is the *key driver of transformation in the region* and thus enhances our collective integration, security, prosperity and social well-being” (European Commission 2018)

“The Western Balkan countries now have a *historic window of opportunity* to firmly and unequivocally bind their future to the European Union” (European Commission 2018).

“The EU is by far the *biggest beacon of hope* and the *most attractive model* for the people in the region” (Hahn 2018b).

Some observations can be made about the Commission’s normative discourse. First, there is no alternative for the Western Balkans but to comply with the norms of the EU because “this is the right way” and because the EU is the role model for the people of the region. Therefore, the path of the region towards EU is irreversible. Second, the Western Balkans have an opportunity to become part of the “European family”. Third, only by accepting the EU norms as the only valid, as “normal”, will the Western Balkans become a region of peace, stability and prosperity. In parallel with this new “reality”, the discourse of a “responsible EU” becomes dominant in the EU normative power discourse towards the Western Balkans. It is characterized by the EU’s *duty* to support the enlargement of this region and to *help* the candidates to “understand” EU norms. As stated by Federica Mogherini, “our joint commitment to *helping* all Western Balkans partners to take irreversible steps forward on their EU integration paths *stands as firm as ever*” (Mogherini 2018). This responsibility of the EU towards the Western Balkans is even more important because “it is a part of the world where *only us* really make a difference” (Mogherini 2017). This “duty” of the EU for the Western Balkans is represented as going beyond the self-interest of the EU and as the ability of the EU to normalize a more just, cosmopolitical world (cf. Manners 2008). In other words, the EU is “doing good” in the international system (cf. Sjursen 2006). It has a “*mission normalisatrice*” towards the Western Balkans, i.e. the duty to help the region to accept the “normal” norms of the EU, and to protect the region from other international actors with different norms. As the Commissioner Johannes Hahn outlined, “a hard look at the map will show you that a lack of engagement on our part would create *a vacuum that other powers would only be too happy to exploit*” (Hahn 2018b). In this regard, “it would be *unwise* and almost *negligent* to leave behind a vacuum that other international actors, *whose values do not agree with ours*, make use of” (Hahn 2018a). The similar statement is expressed by the president of the Commission who declared that “we must find unity when it comes to the Western Balkans and their future membership. Should we not, our immediate neighbourhood will be *shaped by others*”

(Juncker 2018). These statements point to the hegemonic power of the EU as the power to shape the values of others (Diez 2005: 616), as having monopoly on what it means and what it takes to be “European” and “Europeanness” (cf. Haukkala 2017).

However, the process of EU norms diffusion can only be implemented with the voluntary acceptance of these norms by outside states (O’Brennan 2006: 160). In other words, the normative power of the EU must be accepted by candidate countries. The identity of the Western Balkans as Other is based on the deep-rooted “Europe syndrome”, i.e., the unconscious acceptance of the image of self as inferior. The discursive construction of the Western Balkans as a non-normative Other, whose norms are inferior, backward, is taken for granted, i.e., is internalized in the process of self-identification. Therefore, in the process of enlargement, the discursive power of the EU to represent itself as a “progressive”, “role model” value community creates the standard of “normal” which is accepted by others. The recognition of the EU normative Self means superiority of the EU normative identity. The norms of the Western Balkans, as a region in “transition” and therefore as a non-normative Other, are competitive to those of NPE, and thus must be presented as inferior and replaced by EU norms. For some authors, “the Union seems to enjoy the authority of pronouncing what it means, and perhaps more importantly what it takes, to be “European” (Haukkala 2008: 1606).

4. CONCLUSION

The article focused on the normative power identity of the EU, drawing inspiration from the Normative Power Europe (NPE) concept. It argues that the EU as a normative power is a discursive self-construction which establishes a distinctive EU identity by constructing the EU “normative Self” against the “non-normative others” and the “EU-norms” against the “non-EU norms”. In other words, the NPE discourse establishes a particular EU identity through turning parties into “others”. The EU self-construction as a normative power is of double nature: it is exclusive, i.e., it comprises distinctiveness of the EU against others and thus implies the creation of boundaries between the EU-Self and the external Other, but it is also inclusive, i.e., is dependent on the recognition

by the Other which invokes superiority of the EU towards others. The paper focused on the EU enlargement policy as the main tool of the EU normative power. Through the analysis of the EU normative actorness towards the Western Balkans, the paper explored the power that lies in the representation of the EU as a normative power. By presenting its norms as distinct, as of universal standing, the EU relationship with the Western Balkans implicates the asymmetry of power and enables the construction of an EU identity through differentiation which implies a hierarchy and subordination. In this regard, the EU can be regarded as a hegemonic power because it seeks a monopoly on defining what its norms entail and thus creates the boundaries of 'normality' and 'Europeanness'.

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Yorgos Tahtsidis*

**A CRITICAL ANALYSIS OF
HOW THE LANGUAGE USED
IN NEWSPAPER ARTICLES CAN
LEAD TO FALSE PERCEPTION
OF FACTS, FAULTY PUBLIC
OPINION, AND FALSE
POLICIES**

**A CASE STUDY OF THE COVERAGE OF
THE REFERENDUM OF GREECE IN 2015**

Abstract

This paper focuses on how the language used in the Greek referendum of July 5, 2015 was used by the Greek and European press in a form that changed the meaning of the referendum. I critically analyze the language used in the discourse about the question of the referendum, as published in the Greek print media and compare the findings to articles on the same subject in the English- and German-speaking press of other European nations.

Furthermore, I uncover how the question of the referendum, which was whether the Greek public agreed with the terms of applied financial measures, was presented in a way that altered the meaning of the question and made a large portion of the general public believe that the question was about whether Greece wants to stay in the European Union (EU) and in the European Monetary Union (EMU).

Finally, I put my findings in a larger context, and express a hypothesis about the purpose and goals

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of this kind of publications, and their effect on the [un]trustworthiness of such publication and their influence on public opinion.

Keywords: referendum, Greece, language, public opinion, critical analysis, false policies.

1. INTRODUCTION

Two great thinkers have influenced the perspective with which I have studied the use of language in the media. First, and foremost George Orwell who, tells us that “if thought corrupts language, language can also corrupt thought”(Orwell 1946), and Oscar Wilde, who tells us in “*The Importance of Being Earnest*” that “the truth is rarely pure and never simple” (Belafron 2012).

The framework of this study has been set by years of experience as a foreign correspondent for the Hellenic News of America, as a radio-news show producer at City International in Thessaloniki Greece, as a political scientist with years of experience as a lobbyist at the American Hellenic Institute in Washington, DC, and as a linguist focusing on the analysis of media discourse. In this case study, one realizes what Orwell might have been referring to if one takes a critical look at newspaper reports and considers common practices in journalism – such as “twisting”, “spinning”, and “isolating” facts. More specifically, this paper focuses on how the linguistic aspects of the discourse around the question, posed to the Greek people in the referendum of July 05, 2015, influenced and confused public opinion on a linguistically clear matter. In doing so, one necessarily also has to take into consideration the political dynamics of this discourse.

In the media, this discourse was intense and reached far beyond the national borders of Greece. This is interesting, especially when considering that Greece’s financial, political, and legislative role in the European Union is not of great significance. Thus, one has to wonder: Why was this referendum so important? Why did everyone state that the referendum was about whether Greece wants to stay in the EU and the EMU, when it clearly was not? What was the European dimension of this referendum?

2. THE QUESTION OF THE REFERENDUM

Before we analyze the language of the question, we ought to have a look at the text as it appeared on the voting ballot of the referendum and at the translation thereof. A transliteration of the question, as well as a phonetic guide, can be found in the appendix of this paper. The language used in the question of the referendum regarding the continuation of the financial stability program, as proposed by the institutions, was the following:

1. ΠΡΕΠΕΙ ΝΑ ΓΙΝΕΙ ΑΠΟΔΕΚΤΟ ΤΟ ΣΧΕΔΙΟ ΔΕΝ ΕΓΚΡΙΝΕΤΑΙ/ΟΧΙ
2. ΣΥΜΦΩΝΙΑΣ, ΤΟ ΟΠΟΙΟ ΚΑΤΕΘΕΣΑΝ
3. ΗΕΥΡΩΠΑΪΚΗ ΕΠΙΤΡΟΠΗ, ΗΕΥΡΩΠΑΪΚΗ
4. ΚΕΝΤΡΙΚΗ ΤΡΑΠΕΖΑ ΚΑΙ ΤΟ ΔΙΕΘΝΕΣ
5. ΝΟΜΙΣΜΑΤΙΚΟ ΤΑΜΕΙΟ ΣΤΟ EUROGROUP ΕΓΚΡΙΝΕΤΑΙ/ΝΑΙ
6. ΤΗΣ 25.06.2015 ΚΑΙ ΑΠΟΤΕΛΕΙΤΑΙ ΑΠΟ ΔΥΟ
7. ΜΕΡΗ, ΤΑ ΟΠΟΙΑ ΣΥΓΚΡΟΤΟΥΝ ΤΗΝ
8. ΕΝΙΑΙΑ ΠΡΟΤΑΣΗ ΤΟΥΣ;
9. ΤΟ ΠΡΩΤΟ ΕΓΓΡΑΦΟ ΤΙΤΛΟΦΟΡΕΙΤΑΙ
10. «REFORMS FOR THE COMPLETION OF THE
11. CURRENT PROGRAM AND BEYOND»
12. («ΜΕΤΑΡΡΥΘΜΙΣΕΙΣ ΓΙΑ ΤΗΝ ΟΛΟΚΛΗΡΩΣΗ
13. ΤΟΥ ΤΡΕΧΟΝΤΟΣ ΠΡΟΓΡΑΜΜΑΤΟΣ ΚΑΙ
14. ΠΕΡΑΝ ΑΥΤΟΥ») ΚΑΙ ΤΟ ΔΕΥΤΕΡΟ
15. «PRELIMINARY DEBT SUSTAINABILITY
16. ANALYSIS» («ΠΡΟΚΑΤΑΡΚΤΙΚΗ ΑΝΑΛΥΣΗ
17. ΒΙΩΣΙΜΟΤΗΤΑΣ ΧΡΕΟΥΣ»)

The original lexical, grammatical, and syntactical form of the question will literally and metaphorically look “Greek” to any non-

Greek speaking readers. Thus, they will not be able to understand it. I will, consequently, use the official translation for the purposes of this paper. However, before reading and analyzing the official translation, I would like to present a translation of the question that aims at conveying the confusion caused by the relatively complex syntax of the referendum question. I will attempt to show the complexity and the confusion the wording of this question may have caused to native – non-English-speaking Greek speakers, by attempting to show how the wording the question in English would cause an equivalent confusion to native English speakers:

1. SHOULD THE DRAFT AGREEMENT, NOT APPROVED/ NO
2. WHICH WAS SUBMITTED BY
3. THE EUROPEAN COMMISSION, THE EUROPEAN
4. CENTRAL BANK, AND THE INTERNATIONAL
5. MONETARY FUND AT THE ΕΥΡΩΜΑΔΑ APPROVED/ YES
6. OF JUNE 25TH, 2015 AND CONSISTS OF
7. TWO PARTS, WHICH MAKE UP
8. THEIR JOINT PROPOSAL, BE ACCEPTED?
9. THE FIRST DOCUMENT IS ENTITLED
10. “ΜΕΤΑΠΡΟΜΙΣΕΙΣ ΓΙΑ ΤΗΝ ΟΛΟΚΛΗΡΩΣΗ
11. ΤΟΥ ΤΡΕΧΟΝΤΟΣ ΠΡΟΓΡΑΜΜΑΤΟΣ ΚΑΙ
12. ΠΕΡΑΝ ΑΥΤΟΥ” (REFORMS FOR THE COMPLETION OF THE
13. CURRENT PROGRAM AND BEYOND)AND THE
14. SECOND “ΠΡΟΚΑΤΑΡΚΤΙΚΗ ΑΝΑΛΥΣΗ
15. ΒΙΩΣΙΜΟΤΗΤΑΣ ΧΡΕΟΥΣ” (PRELIMINARY DEBT SUSTAINABILITY
16. ANALYSIS).

Besides the widely debated issue of the complexity of the sentence structure, another debated issue was the fact that the No option was placed above the Yes option. Some analysts interpreted this fact as a suggestion to vote no. Let us now have a look at the official translation of the text of the referendum of July 05, 2015 in order to understand what the people of Greece were asked to vote on.

The official translation of the text of the referendum

1. SHOULD THE DRAFT AGREEMENT, NOT APPROVED/NO
2. WHICH WAS SUBMITTED BY
3. THE EUROPEAN COMMISSION, THE EUROPEAN
4. CENTRAL BANK, AND THE INTERNATIONAL
5. MONETARY FUND AT THE EUROGROUP APPROVED/YES
6. OF JUNE 25TH, 2015 AND CONSISTS OF
7. TWO PARTS, WHICH MAKE UP
8. THEIR JOINT PROPOSAL, BE ACCEPTED?
9. THE FIRST DOCUMENT IS ENTITLED
10. “REFORMS FOR THE COMPLETION OF THE
11. CURRENT PROGRAM AND BEYOND” AND THE
12. SECOND “PRELIMINARY DEBT SUSTAINABILITY
13. ANALYSIS”.

When reading the text, one can see that in the first part of the referendum, the question asks whether the Greek people wanted to accept the draft agreement – as it had been submitted by the three institutions, which had become known as the “Troika”; that is the European Commission, the European Central Bank, and the International Monetary Fund. In the second part, there is a reference to two documents which compose the submitted agreement; that is the document entitled “Reforms for the Completion of the

Current Program and Beyond” and the document bearing the title “Preliminary Debt Sustainability Analysis”. What is important to note here is that the average voter was obliged to have read two documents that were part of the government’s negotiations and, thus, had rather complicated and specialized terms, which required specialized knowledge in order to be understood correctly. A more focused question, would have been stronger and clearer if the text of the referendum would have been worded in a way similar to this:

1. SHOULD THE DRAFT AGREEMENT, NOT APPROVED / NO
2. WHICH WAS SUBMITTED BY
3. THE EUROPEAN COMMISSION, THE EUROPEAN
4. CENTRAL BANK, AND THE INTERNATIONAL
5. MONETARY FUND AT THE EUROGROUP APPROVED/YES
6. OF JUNE 25TH, 2015 AND CONSISTS OF
7. TWO PARTS, WHICH MAKE UP
8. THEIR JOINT PROPOSAL, BE ACCEPTED?
9. THE FIRST DOCUMENT IS ENTITLED
10. “REFORMS FOR THE COMPLETION OF THE
11. CURRENT PROGRAM AND BEYOND” AND THE
12. SECOND “PRELIMINARY DEBT SUSTAINABILITY
13. ANALYSIS”.

Nevertheless, in this simplified form, it is unclear what the draft agreement is, and exactly which terms it contains. Thus, the question of what exactly it was the Greek citizens were asked to vote on remains, to this day, a subject of political controversy and a mystery for the average citizen.

While the complexity of the sentence structure is obvious and the location of the “No” box being located above and, thus, before the “Yes” box – which is indeed unusual – one has to focus

on the fact that the Greek people were asked whether they accept the draft agreement with a “Yes” vote, or reject the draft agreement with a “No” vote.

3. GREEK NEWSPAPER REPORT

Let us now have a look at some of the characteristic reports on the text of the referendum the people of Greece were asked to vote on 05 July 2015, as they were published before that date.

In the Greek press, on 27 June, 2015 the newspaper “Eleftheros Typos” published a title page article that stated: “Tsipras gambles the future of Greece. Referendum of Bankruptcy”.



When one reads the main article one can read that a “Startled, Europe directly questions whether Greece should remain within the common currency” (El. Typ 2015) although – in the referendum – there is not even an inference to the common currency; let alone whether Greece wants to stay in it. I disregard the claim of the article that “Europe directly questions whether Greece should


remain within the common currency” since there is no provision by EU treaties and laws for any procedure with which a member can be forced to leave. A member state can leave the European Monetary Union only by its own will and that matter was clearly not the subject of the referendum we analyze here.

On June 28, 2015, the newspaper “Prin” published an front-page article entitled “A National ‘NO’ to the EU and to submission”.



The relevant article, on the front page of this newspaper, emphasizes the fact that IMF Director of Communications, Mr. Gerry Rice, had stated that IMF had spoken of ‘payment default and not of bankruptcy’. Furthermore, he characterized any statements saying that Greece would have to declare bankruptcy in the case of payment default „an unfounded speculation“(Prin 2015).

On the same day, the newspaper “Efimerida ton Syntakton” (EfSyn 2015) had – on its front page – a caricature of a man holding a banner that had just one word: “Axioprepia”, which means dignity.



Under the caricature, one can read what the parties involved would vote according to the newspaper:

- The government of Greece would vote “No” to the humiliation of the Greek people with a new memorandum of understanding. It waits for new proposals from the three institutions.
- The three main opposition parties “New Democracy (ND) – POTAMI – PASOK” would vote “Yes” for an agreement with the creditors. They are portrayed to report the “Lobby of the Drachma” and they are shown to state that the referendum is a mistake.
- The institutions are shown to have a “Eurogroup” that threatens and blackmails. They speak of having been surprised and give a final notice until Tuesday.

Also on June 28, 2015, the newspaper “Eleftheros Typos” also devoted all of its front page to issue the referendum vote (El. Typ 2015) just a week before it was to be held. Spread over a third of the title page, the dominating report states that “Tsipras failed and he gambles the future of the country” as a lead in to the main title that spans across the front page and says “National Tragedy” with the subtitle stating: “He deceived the people, he leads Greece out of Europe.

The closing of the Banks and the outcome of the referendum are directly linked in the relevant article which states that *“If the result of the referendum is “No”, Greece will be put on a track to exit the euro zone with unforeseeable consequences for the economy and the nation.”* If that is not attempt to blackmail the voters to vote ‘YES’ rather than ‘NO’, then what is? (Kathim 2015)

Just four days before the referendum, that is on 01 July, 2015, one of the top newspapers in Greece, “To VIMA”, also connected the ‘YES’ vote to the common currency, the Euro. In its title page, the Words *“YES to Greece YES to the Euro”* were larger than the newspaper’s logo; clearly implying that a “NO” vote would mean NO to Greece and NO to the Euro.



What is particularly interesting here is that when one reads the entire article – instead of just reading the front page title – one realizes that the article simply refers to a proclamation of 85 well known actors, athletes, and other publically well known people who stated as a common trait of love for Greece and their anxiety about the future. (Vima 2015).

Only two days before the referendum, on 03 July, 2015, another major Greek newspaper “To Ethnos” had as its main title on the title page the message



The relevant article of this newspaper title page stated that there is a “Thrusting YES for the euro in Greece by 74% and derby in the referendum with a slight edge of YES, but with a clear upward trend, recording the poll.” (Ethnos 2015). Again, linking the vote of the people to the common currency without having any factual base to do so.

Finally, on the day of the referendum, on 05 July, 2016, the title page of the newspaper “Real News” had as its main title “Save the Nation.”



Naturally, one wonders how one can save the nation and the answer is that according to the relevant article one has to vote yes because it is “urgent and imperative to reach a new agreement with the EU partners.” (Real 2015).

Because the Greek referendum was portrayed to be of importance for the whole European Union and in order to have a point of comparison, I will now mention the main characteristics of newspapers written in German and English.

4. GERMAN NEWSPAPER REPORTS

In the German Press, the publications mainly focused on a claim that the German tax payers paid for the Greek debt and that Greece’s voters were about to decide about the future of the European Union.

The online edition of the very prestigious and globally read newspaper “Die Zeit” (the Time) announced that the Greek Prime Minister, Alexis Tsipras, plans on having the Greek people decide on their destiny in a Referendum vote about the proposals in the austerity program that the creditors want to impose on them.

SCHULDENKRISE

Tsipras will Griechen über Sparprogramm abstimmen lassen

Griechenlands Regierungschef wirft den Gläubigern vor, sein Land zu demütigen. Jetzt sollen die Griechen in einem Referendum selbst über die Vorschläge entscheiden.

von | 27. Juni 2015 - 00:58 Uhr

© Yves Herman/Reuters



Griechenlands Regierungschef Alexis Tsipras während der Verhandlungen in Brüssel

In this article, the Prime minister of Greece is quoted to say that “The partners have prompted us to accept even more austerity.” The newspaper adds that these measures would only result in further weakening of the Greek economy (Zeit 2015).

On 29 June, 2015, the newspaper “die Tageszeitung”, for example, the main title of the front page reads: “Democracy or Madness” while the subtitle poses the questions: “What should the Greeks vote actually still next Sunday? About a loan which will cease to exist by then? About the Euro, and its continued use in Athens, which becomes uncertain day by day?”



The interesting fact in this publication is that as the eye follows the title and reads the following question it falls on a group of people holding little pieces of papers, which have the word “OXI” written on it; thus connecting the word “madness” with the “NO” vote (TZ 2015).

The well-established and globally read magazine “Stern” had as its title page on 02 July, 2015, a torn flag of Europe with the title: “Final Game about Europe” with the subtitle saying “The week of the decision: Will the Greeks Tear us all into Chaos? What does the Euro Thriller mean for our Future?”¹

1 Stern, Nr. 28 - 2.7.2015 / “ENDSPIEL UM EUROPA“



Here, the referendum is presented as a vote of European dimensions. The world is being told that the referendum vote in Greece – in which the people of Greece are asked whether they want to accept a draft loan agreement – is a vote that will decide about the future of the European (Stern 2015).

On 03 July, 2015, the widely read German tabloid “Bild” chooses to publish a mock referendum on its front page:



In this mock referendum, the readers of Bild are informed that “On Sunday, Greeks will vote whether they will accept the

austerity measures for their country”. That is why Bild deemed it to be appropriate to ask its readers whether the German people should continue supporting Greece with tax billions. In doing so, however, the very concept is undermined instead of being strengthened... which might have a particular weight when considering the possibility of a political Union of the EU (Bild 2015).

Finally, the equally well established and widely read magazine “Der Spiegel” published on 04 July, 2015, a title page, which shows the Prime Minister of Germany, Ms. Angela Merkel, sitting on fallen columns of an ancient Greek temple. In their article titled “What exactly do the Greeks vote on?”



The correspondents of the magazine in Athens, Mr. Giorgos Christides und Mr. Hasnain Kazim, rightly reported that the vote was about the future stance of Greece toward the austerity measures imposed on it by the EU.” They also correctly predicted the dominance of the “No” vote. However, the fact that this article appears

in an issue with a title page that shows the German Prime Minister, Ms. Angela Merkel, on demolished columns of an ancient Greek Temple has very specific inferences... (Spiegel 2015).

In the online edition of the renowned newspaper “Die Welt” an article entitled “Tsipras confuses now his own People” was published on 02 July, 2015.

02.07.15 | Referendum

Tsipras verwirrt jetzt auch das eigene Volk

In wenigen Tagen muss ein ganzes Volk per Referendum über seine Zukunft abstimmen. Doch zu was sollen die Griechen eigentlich Ja oder Nein sagen? Schon die Wahlfrage versteht kein Mensch. Von Jan Dams, Martin

Große, Daniel Friedrich Sturm



Foto: AFP
Der griechische Ministerpräsident Alexis Tsipras blickt bei seiner Empfehlung an die Griechen, mit Nein zu stimmen. "Ein Nein bedeutet aber keinen Bruch mit Europa", sagte Tsipras am Mittwoch im griechischen Staatsfernsehen. Alles klar?

The lead in paragraph of this article is of particular interest since it does not follow the usual trend to talk about a not existing dilemma of the Greek people to choose between EU and not EU, or Euro and Drachma, and such. Instead the article speaks of a confusing referendum question and an uncertainty of the Greek people what they are really asked to answer. Furthermore, the article states that one needs to be a financial expert, in order to completely understand the question. This fact, in addition to the banks having closed down shortly before the Referendum vote, are the two reasons the article cites in order to predict a slight advance of the yes vote (Welt 2015).

5. ENGLISH NEWSPAPER REPORTS

In the newspapers published in English, it is curious that the English edition of the Greek newspaper “Kathimerini” published an article about the fact that Greece’s referendum would take place with the Banks closed on June 28, 2015; that is a day before the same article appeared in the Greek edition of the same newspaper.



KATHIMERINI

English Edition

Εκδόσεις 1979 - Νο 2877 - www.kathimerini.com

Α.Τ.Ι.Ε.Σ. Μ.Ο.Ν.Ο.Τ., 12ΝΕ 28, 2015

Not to be sold separately in Greece and Cyprus

Closed banks and capital controls until referendum

In wake of MPs approving plebiscite, coalition agrees to emergency measures after ECB decides not to lift limit on liquidity for lenders

Coalition is informed on Sunday that the ECB will not lift the limit on liquidity for lenders in or out of the eurozone, with its banks closed and capital controls in place after the European Central Bank decided not to lift the measure the emergency liquidity brought to banks in Greece.

The decision to keep as the emergency bank holiday was taken during a meeting of Greece's Economic and Financial Council, which included Finance Minister Yannis Varoufakis and Bank of Greece Governor Yannis Loukopoulos.

The official announcement had not been made at the time of going to press but sources said that ECB officials would be invited to sit across from the parliament and the banks would remain closed for at least the next six working days, including the day after the referendum on the referendum proposal by Greece. Voters in Greece will be able to withdraw cash up to the limit set by

request for a short extension of the program was an option and related to the response of the ECB, questioning the right of emergency measures to Greece. The plan was to support access to the national treasury.

"This decision led the HCN today to call for the only available to Greek banks and the Greek central bank to support a bank holiday and restrictions on bank withdrawals."

This decision led to a new proposal by an extension of Greece's bank holiday, which expires on June 30. It is based on the same committee and the heads of the European Central Bank, the European Commission, the IMF, the parliament and the European Council.

"I am awaiting their immediate response to a fundamentally constructive request," he said, adding that such a move could prevent the ECB to force a

not have enough support from its own party, for the ECB to create a situation that will allow negotiations with the participation of negotiations parties.

"The emergency will be similar to the bank holiday and the limit on liquidity for lenders will be similar to the bank holiday," he said. "It is not to be done by itself, but it should be supported by national coalition."

Development in the decision show the attention of the American government yesterday. US Treasury Secretary Jack Lew and his European Finance minister and the International Monetary Fund to continue working together to resolve the "unfamiliar situation," he added in Greece and its recovery within the eurozone.

Some reports by the media were not official but they included the finance ministers of Germany and France, and IMF Managing Director Christine Lagarde, according to a website that was published



Furthermore, the newspaper states that “Greece heads to a referendum on Sunday that could decide whether its future lies in or out of the Eurozone, with its banks closed and capital controls in place after the European Central Bank decided not to further increase the emergency liquidity it supplies to local lenders.” (Kathim2015).

The Guardian reported on the 28th June, 2015, in a title page article that “Jean Claude Juncker, the commission president, said: “It’s the moment of truth... I’d like to ask the Greek people to vote yes ... No would mean that Greece is saying no to Europe.”

Finally, just a day before the referendum; on Jul 4th 2015, in an article entitled “Europe’s future in Greece’s hands”, the Economist reported that “plans for a referendum that may hasten Greece’s ejection from the single currency, and the beggary of the people. Were the stakes not so high, all those emergency summits and last-minute demands would count as farce.” (FT 2015)



It is of particular interest to note that the article continued this unsubstantiated threat by asking the readers to “Look beyond Greece, and the threat of further conflict within the euro is all but inevitable. Although Greece’s departure would prove the euro is not irrevocable, nobody would know what rule-breaking would lead to expulsion.” (Economist 2015).

When reading all of these publications one quickly realizes that they are not factually reporting events and one has to wonder why that is the case. An answer could be that the papers have to sell sensation and – if necessary – create sensation if there is none to report factually.

6. CONCLUSION

The linguistically and politically interesting fact regarding the referendum vote the Greek people were to asked is that the actual and legally binding question of the referendum – that is *if the citizens of Greece wanted to accept the terms of the financial credit Greece was about to receive, as they were proposed by the three creditors* – was altered by the political and financial interests involved in such a way that this question had an unclear and ambiguous meaning by the time the actual referendum vote took place. Therefore, the results of this vote are doomed to have different interpretations although it is rather clear what the vote itself imposed on the political leadership. With the exception of a few newspaper reports, the image emerging from the published articles of newspapers and magazines is that if the people of Greece would have voted ‘NO’, Greece would have had to leave the EU and the Eurozone while if they would have voted ‘YES’, Greece could stay in the EU and the Eurozone and enjoy all the relevant benefits.

Taking into consideration that Greece is a relatively small in size EU member state with relatively insignificant financial contributions to the EU, one has to wonder about the large international attention given to the Greek referendum. The key indicators for understanding the unusual international attention given to this referendum might be found in the words: “**submitted by**” in line 2, and the words “**their**” and “**accepted**” in line 8, as well as in the text of the two documents the question refers to in lines 10-13 of the translation. The choice of these words indicates and highlights a discourse that can be found extensively – but not exclusively – in the British and German press, as well as in records of discussions in the European Parliament. This discourse suggests that a large part of the national legislations and/or fiscal policies of the EU member states are essentially formed by directives given by the European Commission. In many cases, these legislations are just direct translations of these directives, which are simply presented to, and approved by, the national governments of the EU member states.

From this perspective, the referendum I have examined in this paper – in which the Greek people were indirectly asked whether they accept the measures which would shape their future as

imposed on them by authorities they did not elect – seems to be indeed a deviation from the standard procedure in the European Union, in which policies seem to be imposed on people by authorities that are not directly elected by these people. A deviation, which – if adopted by a number of nations – undermines the role and the power of the European Commission to control and instruct democratically elected governments through directives without having been elected by the people, and without having to give an account to the people, who are subject to the imposed policies; a fact that is – of course – anything but democratic, social, or just.

From this perspective the referendum of Greece becomes a case study of international interest in which the people of an EU member state are essentially asked whether they accept to be governed by supranational institutions, which are not elected by the people and, thus, certainly do not represent the interest of the people, nor policies for the people. This issue is, of course, important not only for the Greek people but for all people of any sovereign nation on earth since it questions the role, authority, and accountability of nationally elected governments of states that are members of supranational unions.

I believe the international attention was on whether a government of an EU member state actually dared to question the authority of the Commission, since it seems that – within the EU mechanisms – it is common practice that national parliaments legalize policies drafted by the Commission; that is by people and institutions that have not been elected by the citizens of a nation and, thus, have no authorized power to shape a given nation's policies. This makes the decision of the government of Greece to ask the people whether they agree with the proposal, as stated in the mentioned documents – instead of simply push it through parliament – an “audacity”.

As seen in the Presidential Decree legalizing the referendum and the question thereof, however, there is no reference at all on exiting or staying in the EU or the Eurozone. In the vast majority of the media all over Europe, the question of the referendum was not presented as being about the proposed measures; it was presented as a question about staying in the European Union or not; a question about wanting the Euro or not; a question about obeying

to the orders (directives) of the European Commission or not but that has never been the question.

The perspective of the issue of the referendum held in Greece being one about democracy and national sovereignty, rather than one of economy and finance, has also been expressed by two leading Nobel-price winning economists, Paul Krugman and Joseph Stiglitz. Paul Krugman stated directly that *“voting “yes” on such a ballot would have the effect of undermining Greece’s popularly elected government”* and suggested that *“the troika clearly did a reverse Corleone — they made [Greek Prime Minister Alexis] Tsipras an offer he can’t accept, and presumably did this knowingly. So the ultimatum was, in effect, a move to replace the Greek government. And even if you don’t like Syriza, that has to be disturbing for anyone who believes in European ideals.”* (Kaufman 2015).

Joseph Stiglitz, on the other hand, tells us about the Greek “crisis” that *“it’s not about the money. It’s about using “deadlines” to force Greece to knuckle under, and to accept the unacceptable – not only austerity measures, but other regressive and punitive policies.”* (Stiglitz 2015).

Furthermore, Stiglitz offers us a political interpretation of the vote the Greek people cast on 5 July, 2015 saying that *“a no vote would at least open the possibility that Greece, with its strong democratic tradition, might grasp its destiny in its own hands. Greeks might gain the opportunity to shape a future that, though perhaps not as prosperous as the past, is far more hopeful than the unconscionable torture of the present”*. (Stiglitz 2015).

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Giuliano Bifulchi*

THE NORTH CAUCASUS IN THE RUSSIAN POLITICAL DISCOURSE

Abstract

Since the collapse of the Soviet Union, the Russian Federation has faced socioeconomic problems, religious radicalisation, local conflicts and the rise of terrorist groups in the North Caucasus. Although the region has often been defined as the most problematic of Russia where the Kremlin has spent billions of rubles with the purpose of restoring economic development and addressing the issues of militant groups and socioeconomic problems, the Russian government has always described the North Caucasus as part of its vital space and a fundamental region for its national security. Various Russian members of the government have several times underlined the importance of the region and the impossibility to separate it from the rest of the country. On the other hand, members of the opposition and some civic organisations have stressed both the instability of the North Caucasus as one of the weakest points of the Russian Federation and the possible failure of the Kremlin's regional strategy. Therefore, the feeling of Kavkazofobiya (fear of the Caucasus) has spread among the Russians and has been used to target the North Caucasians who lived

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in the country and to push the Kremlin to decrease its financial and military support to the region. This paper aims to describe the impact of the North Caucasus on the Russian political discourse, considering official statements released by the government and analysing the feelings towards the region expressed by the media and opposition parties. This research also highlights that the Russian political discourse has been characterised by opposite feelings: the Kremlin has positively presented the North Caucasus trying to convince the local populations that they are part of the Russian Federation, while some opposition parties have exploited the general feeling of fear regarding the North Caucasus and the North Caucasians diffused among the ethnic Russians conducting political and communication campaigns marked by hostility with the intent to oppose the Russian government.

Keywords: North Caucasus, Russia, Kavkazofobia, politics, discourse.

1. INTRODUCTION

The North Caucasus is a region in Eurasia between the Caspian Sea to the east and the Black Sea and the Sea of Azov to the west, the republics of Armenia, Azerbaijan, and Georgia to the south and Russia to the north. The region might also be considered as an ethnopolitical boundary and a geopolitical space which extends its area of influence to the South Caucasus and the Near and the Middle East thanks to the North Caucasian Diaspora (O'Loughlin *et al.* 2008; Emirov 2014: 170; Bifulchi 2018).

Due to the difficulty to define the boundaries of the North Caucasus in the south and the north, it is possible to affirm that the region comprises what is often called as *Yug Rossiy* (the South of Russia): the seven autonomous republics of Adygea, Chechnya, Dagestan, Ingushetia, Kabardino-Balkaria, Karachaevo-Cherkessia, and North Ossetia-Alania, the two *krais* of Stavropol and Kras-

nodar, and the Rostov *oblast*. Administratively speaking the region is divided in the *Severo-Kavkazskiy Federalniy Okrug* (North Caucasus Federal District, hereinafter NCFD) created in 2010 which consists of the republics of Chechnya, Dagestan, Ingushetia, Kabardino-Balkaria, Karachaevo-Cherkessia, and North Ossetia-Alania and Stavropol *kray*, and the *Yuzhniy Federalniy Okrug* (Southern Federal District, hereinafter SFD) composed by the Republic of Adygea, Krasnodar *kray* and Rostov *oblast* together with Crimea and Kalmykia, the *oblast* of Astrakhan and Volgograd, and the special status city of Sevastopol.

The North Caucasus was part of the Russian Empire and the Soviet Union; nowadays is a region of the Russian Federation which attracts economic and political interests of foreign countries and plays a strategic role as a transport and infrastructure corridor between Europe and Asia where different commercial ways intersect, first among all the New Silk Road¹. Also, the North Caucasus is a logistic cluster which links Russia with the Caspian Sea area, Central Asia, and the Middle East (Концепция развития транспортно-логистического кластера в Каспийском бассейне 2017).

Many consider the region as a barrier which has divided the Orthodox Christian and the Muslim world and protected the Middle East, Turkey, and Iran from Russian expansion. Today the North Caucasus continues to play this fundamental and decisive role of protection and division and for this reason its control remains one of the primary goals of the Russian Federation (Bennigsen Broxup 1992).

Additionally, as George Friedman noted, the North Caucasus is a *buffer zone* which protects the Russian Federation in the south from direct military aggression, and it is interconnected with the

1 In 2013 China started the Belt and Road Initiative, also known as the New Silk Road, an attempt to create a commercial and human interconnection between Europe and Asia. This strategy is composed by the land-based Silk Road Economic Belt and the Maritime Silk Road. At the beginning this initiative was called One Belt, One Road but in mid-2016 the Chinese decided to change its name in Belt and Road Initiative. Regarding Beijing's interests on the Caucasus and China-North Caucasus relations see: Andreeva, Yulia (2016, November 11) 'Кавказская семерка: как китайцы открывают для себя новый Шелковый путь в горах Кавказа', TASS. Retrieved from <http://tass.ru/spec/silkway>. For more information about the Chinese policy and strategy in the North Caucasus see: Babayan, David (2015) *Политика Китая в Центральной Азии, на Кавказе и в Северном Прикаспии в конце XX - начале XXI ВВ.* (Doctoral dissertation), pp.310-378. Retrieved from Institute of Oriental Studies RAN, ivran.ru/f/Dissertaciya_Babayana_D.K..pdf.

Black Sea where, after having crossed the Bosphorus, the Russian navy could have access to the global maritime trade. Also, in the North Caucasus are located some of the most relevant population, agricultural, and transportation clusters of Russia (Friedman 2016).

Due to its geostrategic centrality the Russian Federation needs to maintain its control over the North Caucasus, a region that has been labelled for decades since the collapse of the Soviet Union as the most depressed and unstable of Russia where corruption, unemployment, local militancy, violent attacks and the lack of socioeconomic development are among the main problems. The Kremlin's necessity to control the region affects the Russian political discourse, the central authority's propaganda and strategic communications which aim at convincing the North Caucasians to be part of the Russian Federation and the ethnic Russians to accept the North Caucasus as an integrated region of the country.

Therefore, the NCFD has become a significant topic in the Russian political discourse used at the same time by the central government to influence domestic policy and promote national strategies and by the opposition to attack the Russian political leadership and highlight the Kremlin's mistakes in managing the country.

2. METHODOLOGY AND PURPOSE RESEARCH

This research is a qualitative study that attempts to explain the Russian political discourse on the North Caucasus and how the region is used in Russian narrative by the government, political parties, and civic organisations and associations. The methodology used in this paper is based on a literature review about geopolitics, strategic communications, history, security, ethnography, and books, journal articles, and NGO reports concerning the role of the North Caucasus in the Russian political discourse taking also into consideration the phenomenon of *Kavkazofobiya* (fear of the Caucasus).

A useful starting point might be considered the research of Kolosov and Sebentsov (2014) who studied the Russian geopolitical discourse about North Caucasus and compared it with the opinions of inhabitants of the region itself for the periods October 2005-September 2006 and January-December 2010.

3. NORTH CAUCASUS IN RUSSIAN OFFICIAL NARRATIVE

Magomed-emi Shamsuev observed that in the contemporary world the media are a vital instrument to gain political power and economic success because they affect everyday life and have the ability to influence citizens' way of thinking. Due to their importance, the government needs to control the media and use them for its political and economic strategy and security (Shamsuev 2012). The Shamsuev's analysis reflects the Kremlin's strategic communications regarding the North Caucasus because wants to avoid the spread of ethnic conflicts and the affirmation of foreign powers and ideologies in the region counterbalancing them with the promotion of its domestic strategy and national values.

Indeed, if in the past Moscow described sometimes the North Caucasus as a problematic area, in the recent years, particularly after the creation of the NCFD in 2010 and the *Ministerstvo po Delam Severnogo Kavkaza* (Ministry of North Caucasian Affairs, hereinafter Minkavkaz) in 2014, the Kremlin focused its attention and political discourse on the regional development promoting the North Caucasus' role as logistic and touristic hub and its importance for the national economic future.

For instance, in 2009 Dmitri Medvedev stated that the North Caucasus was one of the leading domestic problems of the Russian Federation where the government fought against international terrorist groups and contrasted socioeconomic difficulties (Послание Федеральному Собранию Российской Федерации 2009). After less a decade during a meeting with the Government Commission for the development of the North Caucasus, the former Russian president and current prime minister changed his rhetoric and affirmed that the local development is one of the primary national interests and the region has a special status of a priority territory of the Russian Federation confirming the Kremlin's trend of supporting the NCFD and making it essential in the domestic policy (Заседание Правительственной комиссии по вопросам социально-экономического развития Северо-Кавказского федерального округа 2017).

Vladimir Putin described the North Caucasus as the fundamental backbone of Russia, “the stone on which Russia is hanging”, the support of the country and ‘the largest centre of a diverse but unified Russian spiritual culture ... the people of Russia and the peoples of the Caucasus have a common destiny’ (Заключительное слово на общественном форуме народов Кавказа и Юга России 2004).

In their research Kolosov and Sebentsov underlined the official positive narrative about the North Caucasus: they used three kinds of sources consisted of official statements, publications related to the region, and three Russian newspapers representing the positions of the left forces (*Sovetskaya Rossiya*), national patriotic opposition (*Zavtra*), and liberal position (*Novaya Gazeta*). According to Kolosov and Sebentsov’s results, the official optimistic position is slightly unpopular in the region itself while the oppositional discourse is of an alarmist character. In the Kremlin’s view, the Russian strategies have a positive impact because they contrasted terrorism and local militancy decreasing violent attacks in favour of stabilisation and economic development. Also, the Russian government describes terrorism in the North Caucasus as a phenomenon which does not find real support from the local population as the Western media and political opposition try to promote. Terrorism in the region, according to Moscow, is part of the international terrorist network which the Western countries have been fighting for years achieving more failures than successes and a consequence of the indiscriminate geopolitical strategies in the Middle East and North Africa perpetrated by foreign powers (Kolosov, Sebentsov 2014: 151).

Nowadays the Russian official narrative confirms what stated by Kolosov and Sebentsov because it underlines the success of the regional Kremlin’s strategy focusing the attention on the positive impact of the project *Kurorti Severnogo Kavkaza* (North Caucasus Resorts, hereinafter NCRP) on the Russian national economy, tourism and the regional stability. Although the 2014 Sochi Winter Olympic Games were organised in Krasnodar *krai*, a region which geographically speaking is part of the North Caucasus but administratively belongs to the SFD, the Russian government was able to link the success of this international event with the NCFD and its strategy of building touristic resorts to host international

visitors and attract foreign direct investments (FDIs) for the regional socioeconomic development (Реализацию инвестиционных проектов в СКФО рассмотрели в Минкавказе России 2018).

Moscow's goal to promote a positive image of the North Caucasus is confirmed by the recent meeting between the head of Minkavkaz Sergey Chebotaryov and the general director of the Russian information agency TASS Sergey Mikhailov. During the consultation, the two parts discussed the implementation of the subprogram 'Formation of the infrastructure of the state information policy in the NCFD' aimed at creating a positive image of the macro-region and increasing its investment and tourism attractiveness. The primary results of the subprogram implementation in three years was the rise up to 55 percent in the proportion of Russian citizens regularly receiving information on events in the NCFD. According to the Levada Center, the share of Russian citizens who estimate the situation in the North Caucasus as prosperous in 2017 increased 1.4 times compared to 2016 and 2.4 times respect 2013 (Сергей Чеботарёв провел встречу с главой информационного агентства России ТАСС Сергеем Михайловичем 2018).

To sum up, the official narrative positively presents the North Caucasus to the Russian public opinion and in the political discourse focusing its attention on the economic and strategic value of the region and the recent success that the Kremlin has achieved thanks to its strategy. The statistics together with official statements also confirm the positive trend giving an optimistic image of the region.

4. KAVKAZOFIYA AND THE "NORTH CAUCASUS PROBLEM"

The Russian Constitution affirms that "We, the multinational people of the Russian Federation, [are] united by a common fate on our land" and Vladimir Putin stated that the North Caucasus and its inhabitants are the backbone of the country. This favourable view spread by the government is not confirmed by the negative feelings related to the region such as the spread of *Kavkazofobiya* or the strong local distinction between *russkiy* and *russiyanie*.²

² The word *russkiy* is used to indicate the ethnic-Russians while *russiyanie* refers to non-ethnic Russians who have the Russian passport. For instance, a Chechen is considered a *russiyanie* because

The ethnic Russians have always seen the North Caucasus as a challenging area and during the centuries they have developed popular feelings against non-ethnic Russians, especially toward the North Caucasian people. The *Kavkazofobiya* is a strong negative sense of the Russian society which recently has been fuelled by the two Chechen wars and the local insurgency and resulted in the idea that the Kremlin must ‘*Khvatit kormit’ Kavkaz*’ (stop feeding the Caucasus) through massive investment projects (Foxall 2014: 5).

In his studies on ethnic relations in post-Soviet Russia especially in Stavropol *krai*, Andrew Foxall underlined the general feeling of *Kavkazofobiya* which affects the ethnic Russian and fuels racial tensions in the Russian Federation. The mass riots against the North Caucasians in Kondopoda (2006), Stavropol (2007), Moscow (2010 and 2013), and Pugachyov (2013), caused by a local dispute or fight between ethnic Russians and North Caucasians ended with victims and casualties, resulted in mass protests against ethnic minorities. As a consequence of this confrontation, the different North Caucasian ethnic groups do not consider themselves as part of the Russian society especially when the Government privileges the ethnic Russians and the Cossacks regarding governance and business (Foxall 2014: 142).

The Kremlin has often interpreted *Kavkazofobiya* and the slogan ‘*Khvatit kormit’ Kavkaz*’ as a political campaign against the current government and Putin’s leadership with the purpose of removing him from the power.

According to the leader of Russian nationalists Dmitry Demushkin, the slogan ‘*Khvatit kormit’ Kavkaz*’ and the negative feelings toward the North Caucasus are not part of the nationalistic movement but they belong to a very influential group of federal officials close to the Kremlin and promoted among the public opinion by the political scientist Stanislav Belkovsky who is considered by the media the mastermind and manager of several Russian nationalistic projects (Galyamina 2012; Yusupov 2015). The narrative regarding a group of federal officials supporting *Kavkazofobiya* finds evidence in some declarations released by politicians or activists linked in some way to the central authority

he has a Russian passport and he is a Russian citizen although his nationality is Chechen.

who accused the North Caucasians of being a problem for the ethnic Russians and the national security.

In 2011 the Deputy Speaker of the State Duma of the Russian Federation and leader of the Liberal Democratic Party of Russia (LDPR) Vladimir Zhirinovskiy during a TV programme said that “Caucasians do not know how and do not want to work, do not learn... they have captured everything.” and the Russians need protection from the “arrogant behaviour of the Caucasians”. This accusation caused the reaction of the North Caucasian members of the State Duma who considered Zhirinovskiy’s words “fabrications (which are) defaming the honour and dignity of the inhabitants of the North Caucasus.” (Muradov *et al.* 2011). In September 2011 Dmitri Rogozin³ confirmed the negative feeling of *Kavkazofobiya* stating that the Russian people in modern Russia are in the position of a ‘discriminated majority’, and at the same time they are in conflict with the natives of the republics of the North Caucasus. The dominant contrast is caused by the fact that the Russians represent the modernisation and the modern political culture in the broadest sense of the word, while the peripheral regions of the country, especially the North Caucasus, have demonstrated their adherence to archaic and social backwardness (Markedonov 2011).

The Russian central authority has always rejected the accusation of ‘feeding the Caucasus’ and has contrasted *Kavkazofobiya* with official statements and declarations released by different members of the government. For instance, Lev Kuznetsov, former minister of Minkavkaz (2014-2018) said that the slogan is gradually losing its relevance because the region is actively developing and in the future it will be able to create benefits for the entire nation and ‘feeds Russia’ (Министр поделам Северного Кавказа призвал изменить имидж региона 2016). The former deputy prime minister of the Russian Federation and Plenipotentiary Envoy of the President in the NCFD Alexander Khloponin accused of paranoia all those people who believe that the Kremlin is ‘feeding’ the North Caucasus. According to Khloponin, the reality is far distant from the allegations because the government decided to change its financing strategy for the North Caucasian republics with the

³ In 2011 Dmitri Rogozin was the Russian representative to NATO, later he became the Deputy Prime Minister of Russia in charge of defence industry and nowadays is the General Director of Roscosmos)

purpose to create a project development fund (Yusupov 2015). Vladimir Putin supported the Russian regional strategy and in his article for *Nezavisimaya Gazeta* newspaper stated that accepting the slogan ‘*Khvatit kormit’ Kavkaz*’ and the accusation toward the North Caucasus might be the first step for future allegations and discriminatory slogans against other regions such as Siberia, the Far East, the Urals, etc (Putin 2012).

The problem of the North Caucasus denounced by the media does not relate only to the negative feelings of *Kavkazofobiya* and the slogan ‘*Khvatit kormit’ Kavkaz*’, but it also has a huge impact on the Russian domestic politics. Due to the special friendship between Vladimir Putin and the head of Chechnya Ramzan Kadyrov the Chechens have often been labelled as the ‘Kremlin’s executioners’ of politicians, journalists, human rights activists and those people perceived as enemies by the central authority. For instance, as the Russian police stated, the assassination of the leader of the Russian opposition Boris Nemtsov in Moscow on February 27th, 2015 was orchestrated by Ruslan Mukhudinov, an officer of Chechnya’s Sever Battalion,⁴ and executed by Zaur Dadayev, the former deputy commander of Chechnya’s Sever Battalion. Western media, civic organisations and Russian opposition parties have accused Vladimir Putin of being indirectly involved in this homicide whose mastermind live in Chechnya and was identified with Ramzan Kadyrov (Satter 2017).

The Russian activist and politician Iliya Yashin has often accused Vladimir Putin of supporting the indiscriminate and violent actions of the Chechen leader. In 2016 he released a report where he stated that Ramzan Kadyrov is a severe threat for the national security because the Chechen leader owns a private army composed only by ethnic Chechens whose majority fought against Russia during the First and the Second Chechen Wars and received the amnesty. Yashin affirmed in his report that this private army might be the most combat-ready military group in Russia used by Kadyrov to control Chechnya and support the Russian Federation in its military operations abroad and probably secret operations inside the Russian territory (Bifolchi 2018: 264–265).

4 The Chechen Sever Battalion is under the direct control of Ramzan Kadyrov. According to the sources, it was formed in 2006 and include former militants and insurgents who have received training at anti-terrorist centres.

5. CONCLUSION

It is a fact that the Russian government must control the North Caucasus for domestic security and international interests, so the Kremlin decided to elaborate a political discourse which interests the region and its inhabitants promoting positive feelings and a successful strategy.

After the collapse of the Soviet Union the North Caucasus was one of the most dangerous regions in the Russian Federation characterised by ethnic conflicts and local militancy but since his first mandate Vladimir Putin has endorsed the area as a vital part of the country with the purpose of convincing the North Caucasian to abandon the idea of independence or autonomy from the Kremlin and the ethnic Russians to accept the North Caucasian populations as members of the national society.

The official narrative has focused the attention on the North Caucasus on two different aspects: promoting the region as ‘the backbone’ of the Russian Federation historically, culturally, economically and politically linked to the Russian society, and underlining the successful socioeconomic strategy elaborated by the Kremlin which is transforming the region in a touristic and logistic hub whose benefits will interest the entire nation.

On the other hand, the central authority has been forced to defend its work from the accusation by political opposition parties and civic organisations of preferring the North Caucasians to the ethnic Russians. Negative feelings such as *Kavkazofobiya* and the slogan ‘*Khvatit kormit’ Kavkaz*’ are part of the Russian political discourse, and they have affected the relations between Moscow and the North Caucasian populations who feel not accepted by the society and threatened by the ethnic Russians. Also, the special alliance between Vladimir Putin and Ramzan Kadyrov is often used by the opposition to attack the Kremlin highlighting the ‘North Caucasus problem’ and using negative feelings to influence the public opinion.

The Kremlin positive promotion of the North Caucasus in the political discourse depends on the success of the ‘The Strategy of Social-economic Development of the North Caucasus Federal District (NCFD) until 2025’ (hereinafter Strategy 2025) based

on touristic clusters, Foreign Direct Investments (FDI), and the improvement of socioeconomic conditions (Стратегия СКФО до 2025 года 2010). If the central authority failed in achieving the Strategy 2025's goals, opposition parties, local and international media and civic organisations would use the topic 'North Caucasus' in the political discourse to disparage the Russian leadership nourishing *Kavkazofobiya* and using the slogan '*Khvatit kormit' Kavkaz*' to influence the electorate.

In conclusion, it might be stated that the North Caucasus has a significant role in the Russian political discourse and it represents a challenge for the Kremlin which needs to balance the promotion of its successful strategy with the current socioeconomic condition of the region and the negative feelings among the ethnic Russians regarding the North Caucasians. Nowadays Moscow promotes the North Caucasus, especially the Chechen Republic, as one of its best achievement in managing a complex region, contrasting terrorism and reducing socioeconomic problems. This positive narrative depends on the Russian economy and the Russian ability to continue financing the Strategy 2025 although the recent oil and ruble crisis have demonstrated their ability to influence the regional economic development negatively. If the Russian Federation will face other financial problems and will be forced to reduce its participation in the North Caucasus' socioeconomic development, the region might become one of the most used topics in the Russian politics to attack the central authority and undermine the current leadership.

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DISKURS I NACIONALNI MITSKI NARATIV - O KOSOVSKOM MITU**

Apstrakt

Polazeći od savremenih shvatanja pojma diskursa, u ovom radu nastojali smo da ukažemo na to zbog čega je diskurzivni pristup pogodan za opserviranje mitskih narativa, ali i manipulacija njime, uz upućivanje na ono što u slučaju kosovskog kulturološkog mita „izmiče“ analizi diskursa. Primerima razlika između suprotnih pristupa u tumačenju nekih od bazičnih motiva kosovskog mita, kao što su kvalifikativ „nebeski“, „izdaja“ i „osveta“ pružili smo neku vrstu ilustracije toga kako izbor određenog diskursa podrazumeva određeni kontekst interpretacije, ideološku stajnu tačku i izbor pojмова unutar kojeg tumačenje figurira.

Ključne reči: diskurs, tekst, mitski narativ, manipulacija, kvalifikativ „nebeski“, kosovski mit, izdaja, osveta.

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1. UVODNA ODREĐENJA DISKURSA I MITSKOG NARATIVA

Budući da ovaj rad predstavlja pokušaj sagledavanja mitskog narativa o Kosovskoj bici u kategorijama diskurzivnih fenomena, odnosno unutar referentnog okvira socijalnog konstruktivizma, potrebno je najpre objasniti shvatanje diskursa, kao ključnog pojma-koncepta, a potom odrediti i značenje mitskog narativa.

Savremeni pojam diskursa¹ stoji u osnovi konstruktivističkog shvatanja prirode saznanja i ključne uloge jezika u procesu socijalne konstrukcije značenja. Polazi se od ideje da su jezičke kategorije posredstvom kojih mislimo o pojavama, tj. kodiramo društvenu stvarnost, zapravo produkt socijalnih i kulturnih uticaja, odnosno jezički, a samim tim i socijalni, kulturni i istorijski konstrukti. Svaka reprezentacija društvene stvarnosti stoga predstavlja samo jednu od mogućih interpretacija (konstrukata, diskursa, narativa).

Poststrukturalističko fokusiranje na konstruktivnu funkciju jezika vodilo je temeljnoj ideji o moći diskursa da konstruiše objekte, odnosno do njegovog izjednačavanja sa procesom stvaranja značenja². Važnu ulogu u tome imala su konceptualna polazišta Mišela Fukoa (Michel Foucault) koja su postala teorijski i metodološki okvir vodećih savremenih pristupa analize diskursa, iako svoja istraživanja nije nazivao imenom ove discipline.

Diskursi se više „ne razmatraju kao skup znakova (označiteljskih elemenata koji upućuju na sadržaje i predstave), već kao prakse koje sistematski oblikuju objekte o kojima govore“ (Foucault 1998: 54). Diskurs za Fukoa „nije prosto ono što borbe ili sisteme dominacije prevodi u jezik, nego je ono za šta se i čime bori. Diskurs je moć koju treba zadobiti.“ (Foucault 2007: 9) Ta moć je diskurzivnog karaktera, ona je upražnjen položaj u procesu označavanja stvarnosti, koji mogu prisvojiti društveni subjek-

1 Pojam diskursa izvorno potiče iz lingvistike gde se koristi kao tehnički termin za „uopštavanje koncepta jezičke konverzacije za sve modalitete i kontekste“ (Marks, 2011). Razvoj pojma diskursa vodio je njegovom uvođenju u analitički aparat ne samo sociolingvističkih disciplina, već i u socijalnosemiotička, sociološka, antropološka i psihološka proučavanja, filozofiju jezika, teoriju književnosti, retoriku, studije kulture i medija (Savić 1993), kao i u proučavanje političke upotrebe jezika, tj. istraživanje političkog diskursa (Wilson 2003).

2 Jedna od stožernih definicija koja je pokazala neverovatnu generativnu moć jeste ona M. Fukoa koja određuje diskurs kao „jezičku praksu“ koja „sistematski oblikuje objekat o kojem govori“ (Fuko 1998: 54).

ti i institucije. Reč je o ključnoj ulozi hegemonijskog diskursa, „isključenjima“ koja formatiraju diskurzivno područje, određuju raspodelu govornih subjekata u različitim tipovima diskursa i omogućavaju prisvajanja diskursa od strane izvesnih kategorija subjekata (Foucault 2007).

Određujući diskurs kao posebnim pravilima uređen skup iskaza koji sačinjava jednu diskurzivnu tvorevinu, a stalnost karakterisa iskazivanja kao nešto što čini njegovo jedinstvo, Fuko je identifikovao i pravila na osnovu kojih grupe iskaza ostvaruju jedinstvo, u vidu nauke, teorije ili teksta.

Pravila formiranja diskurzivne tvorevine su sledeća: pravila obrazovanja i pregrupisanja objekta; pravila oblikovanja iskaznih modaliteta; pravila organizacije pojmova u sisteme; pravila vezana za teorijske/tematske izbore i pravila uključivanja diskurzivnih subjekata (Foucault 1998 :81).³

Polazeći od bazičnih Fukoovih pojmova diskursa moći i znanja kao interpretativnog okvira, grupa autora ponudila je konceptualnu osnovu za razvoj kritičke analize diskursa (Poter, Parker, Van Dajk, Ferklof, Vodak). Parker je diskurs odredio „kao koherentan sistem značenja“ (Pavlović, Džinović, Milošević 2006: 374), što je impliciralo mogućnost mapiranja slike sveta koju diskurs posreduje. On je potencirao moć interpelacije diskursa, sadržanu u tome da nas diskursi uvek ideološki određuju smeštanjem u određene pozicije.

Jezik i lingvističke prakse pružaju sisteme izraza, narativnih formi, retoričkih sredstava i semantičkih struktura koji predstavljaju „građu“ za diskurzivno posredovanje određenog značenja i smisla. „Ovaj proces uvek podrazumeva izbor između brojnih, ‘konkurentskih’ diskursa, pa su značenja stoga često fragmentarna (a ne celovita), višeperspektivna (a ne homogena) i dinamična (a ne statična i nepromenljiva).“ (Pešić 2011: 480) Imajući ovo u vidu, postaju jasnija određenja diskursa kao „sistema iskaza koji konstruiše objekte“, kao „interpretacionog sistema“, odnosno „kontinuiranog procesa stvaranja značenja i njegovog javnog cirkulisanja“ (Fuko 1998, 2007; Halmi, Belušić i Ogresta 2004);

³ „U slučaju kada se unutar izvesnog broja iskaza može opisati jedan takav sistem rasipanja“ (rasporeda) unutar kojeg se „među objektima, tipovima iskazivanja, pojmovima, tematskim izborima može odrediti neka pravilnost (poredak, korelacije, položaj, funkcije, preobražaji), reći ćemo po konvenciji da se tu radi o nekoj diskurzivnoj tvorevini“ (Fuko 1998: 42)

kao „skupa značenja, metafora, predstava, slika, priča, iskaza koji (...) zajedno proizvode određenu verziju događaja“ (Ber 2001: 83).

U skladu sa tim, ispituje se kako diskursi jednog društva istovremeno reflektuju, konstituišu i reprodukuju određenu društvenu organizaciju, kulturne vrednosti, verovanja i norme; kako oni generišu socijalne procese, posebno unutar socijalnih konflikta (Grimshaw 2003).

Pod diskursom se najčešće podrazumevaju „celovite jezičke/komunikacione strukture, realizovane u pisanom ili govornom mediju, s fokusom na upotrebi jezika u datom komunikacionom i sociokulturnom kontekstu“ (Pešić 2011: 478). Iako elementarno, ovo određenje je instruktivno, jer sadrži sva tri distinktivna svojstva diskursa, a to je posebna jezička/značenjska struktura; jasna komunikativna upotreba, odnosno intencija date strukture i višestruka kontekstualna uslovljenost (sociokulturni, komunikacioni i tekstualni kontekst).

Cilj analize diskursa je, s jedne strane, razumevanje uloge diskursa, njegovih intencija, odnosno komunikacionih namera učesnika interakcije koji se njima služe, konkretnih socijalnih aktivnosti koje se realizuju posredstvom jezika. S druge strane, predmet proučavanja su i same jezičke/komunikacijske strukture: principi konstrukcije diskursa, kao jezička, retorička i semantička organizacija teksta. U realizaciji ovih ciljeva koriste se različite strategije kodiranja, koje u osnovi predstavlja „način organizacije sistema kategorija i traženja veza među njima, prema određenom paradigmatiskom modelu“ (Belušić 2000: 37, 39).

Kako ističe Ferklof, analiza diskursa treba da bude analiza „teksture“, odnosno forme i organizacije teksta, a ne samo „komentar“ sadržaja bez osvrta na formu. (Fairclough 1995: 4). Forma, struktura i organizacija diskursa mogu biti analizirane na svim nivoima jezika – fonološkom, leksičkom i gramatičkom, kao i na višim nivoima tekstualne organizacije koji se odnose na sistem razmene, strukturu argumentacije i žanrovske strukture. Bilo koji nivo organizacije teksta/diskursa može biti relevantan za kritičku i ideološku analizu (Fairclough 1995: 5-7). Ovako shvaćena analiza diskursa pomaže nam da razumemo ono što u tekstu postoji eksplicitno ili implicitno, ali i ono što je iz njega izostavljeno.

Određujući „tekstove“ kao „socijalne prostore“ u kojima se „istovremeno odigravaju dva fundamentalna društvena procesa: kognicija, reprezentovanje sveta i društvena interakcija“ (Fairclough 1995: 4), Ferklof je upotrebu jezika sagledavao šire, u kontekstu njene uslovljenosti društvenom praksom čiji je ova deo. Diskurs, tako, predstavlja upotrebu jezika shvaćenu kao deo društvene prakse. Njegova analiza bavi se upravo time kako on funkcioniše unutar sociokulturne prakse.

Diskurs je za Ferklofa „tip teksta visoko specifikovanih intencija“, odnosno „način označavanja određenog domena socijalne prakse i to iz određene perspektive.“ (Fairclough 1995: 14-17). Pojam diskurzivne prakse odnosi se na produkciju, upotrebu i distribuciju tekstova (Fairclough 1995:13). Tokom njihove „cirkulacije“ unutar postojećih poredaka diskursa, tekstovi se smenjuju i transformišu na sistematske načine.

Kontekst se smatra jednim od ključnih aspekata diskursa. Svaki diskurs egzistira u određenoj govornoj situaciji kao skupu okolnosti u kojima se ostvaruje akt iskazivanja. Te okolnosti, kao i fizičko i socijalno okruženje koje čini okvir akta iskazivanja, neretko se nazivaju kontekstom (Šimić, Jovanović 2009). Analiza diskursa bavi se upravo proučavanjem odnosa između jezika i konteksta u kome se on koristi (Pavlović, Džinović, Milošević 2006). Pojam konteksta obuhvata i komunikaciju i upotrebu jezika i društveni, ali i tekstualni okvir sagledavanja (Ibid).

Diskurs podrazumeva i određeni značenjski potencijal koji proističe iz interakcije teksta i konteksta. Tekst se u tom smislu shvata kao sistem iskaza neraskidivo povezan sa kontekstom i karakterom komunikativne situacije, sa širim sociokulturnim kontekstom, kao i sa učesnicima u diskursu i okvirima podrazumevanih znanja. Kontekst na jedan poseban način „predviđa“ tekst (određuje njegov referentni okvir), a tekst konstruiše taj kontekst tumačeći ga. Ovakav poredak odnosa moguć je zahvaljujući intertekstualnosti kao inherentnom svojstvu diskursa. „Diskursi se stvaraju na temelju postojećih jezičkih izvora, odnosno pisanih i usmenih ostvarenja jezika“ (Fairclough 2005: 2).

Svaki tekst delom je ponavljanje a delom kreacija. Tekstovi predstavljaju polje tenzije između centripetalnih i centrifugalnih pritisaka. Centripetalne sile u tekstu proishode iz potrebe za oslan-

janjem na dve klase konvencija: jezičke i one vezane za poredak diskursa, kao „istorijski posebno strukturiranu diskurzivnu praksu (praksu produkcije tekstova)“ (Fairclough 2005: 7).⁴

Centrifugalni pritisak dolazi od specifičnosti situacija tekstualne produkcije, budući da te situacije ne mogu beskrajno ponavljati prethodne, već su naprotiv beskrajno nove. Interpretacija teksta, stoga, predstavlja „dijalektički proces, rezultat pristupa promjenljivih interpretativnih resursa koje ljudi ‘unose’ u tekst i odlika samog tog teksta“ (Fairclough 2005: 9).

Za razumevanje složene međuzavisnosti teksta i konteksta, osim intertekstualnosti, važno je razumeti i specifičan karakter komunikativne situacije, kao relevantnog činioca produkcije i razumevanja diskursa. Komunikativnu situaciju, relevantnu kako za produkciju diskursa tako i za njegovo razumevanje, Van Dajk (Teun A. van Dijk) ne sagledava samo kao interakcijski, već i kao mentalni/kognitivni fenomen. Za problem kojim se ovde bavimo mentalni aspekt komunikativne situacije je primaran. Preciznije reč je o pojmu kontekstualnog (mentalnog) modela. (Dijk 2005)

Kontekstualni model omogućava nam sagledavanje posrednog uticaja socijalnog konteksta (društvene strukture, uloge učesnika u komunikaciji, vreme ili prostor) na diskurs i obrnuto. Kao posebna vrsta mentalnih modela vezanih za aktuelni događaj, oni su sačuvani u našoj memoriji i definišu naša lična iskustva.

Van Dajk kontekst upravo i određuje kao „mentalne reprezentacije učesnika u komunikaciji o relevantnim odlikama društvene situacije, unutar koje se odvija njihova interakcija, odnosno stvaraju i razumevaju tekstovi/razgovori“ (Dijk 2005: 75).

Može se reći da kontekstualni model, prema kojem učesnik u interakciji stvara pretpostavke o tome šta čitaoci/slušaoци znaju, mogu znati, šta su zaboravili ili još ne znaju, kontroliše strukturu diskursa, te stoga i njegovu produkciju i razumevanje. Ti različiti načini pretpostavljanja i tvdnji vezanih za znanja u vezi su i sa standardnim kategorijama prethodnih događaja, istorijske poza-

4 Poredak diskursa Ferkof određuje kao „socijalni poredak u njegovom diskurzivnom aspektu, ili kao istorijski ‘otisak’ sociokulturne prakse u diskursu“. (14) Svaki diskurzivni događaj nužno se pozicionira spram tog istorijskog nasleđa, selektivno ga reprodukujući i transformišući. Specifičnost određene sociokulturne prakse, čiji je deo dati diskurzivni događaj, očituje se pre svega u tome kako se ovaj oslanja na poredak diskursa i kako „radi“ unutar njega, a potom se ona i realizuje u odlikama tekstova. Veza tekst-sociokulturna praksa je posredovana diskurzivnom praksom.

dine, konetkstom i očekivanjima (Dijk 2005:87). Ove kognitivne strukture istovremeno su socijalne, kao što je to slučaj i sa znanjem, stavovima, ideologijama, normama i vrednostima.

Kao neprekidne i promenljive interpretacije i reprezentacije aktuelne govorne situacije, kontekstualni modeli su dinamični, jer dati diskurs menja znanja učesnika u interakciji o onome o čemu je reč, što je posledica onoga što je izrečeno/napisano.

Znanje predstavlja važnu kategoriju kontekstualnih modela. van Dajk ga definiše kao „lična uverenja koja su potvrđena kao socijalna, ona koja delimo s drugima i koja su diskurzivno podrazumevana od strane članova iste epistemičke zajednice“ (Dijk 2005: 75). Uslovi za upravljanje znanjima su u tom smislu dvostruko socijalni: kao uverenja koja su socijalno razmenjena i kao nešto čime operišu kontekstualni modeli, koji su reprezentacije komunikativnih situacija.

Znanje za van Dajka ima i specifičan status „kognitivnog uređaja“, pa ga on i naziva *K-device*. Ovaj „uređaj“ ključan je za kontrolisanje mnogih važnih aspekata diskursa, poput toga koje su informacije eksplicitno izražene a koje su pretpostavljene, šta se tvrdi. Kalkulišući s pretpostavljenim znanjem učesnika u interakciji (čitalaca ili slušalaca), u svakom njenom trenutku, on adaptira strukture teksta/razgovora prema dinamičnim promenama opsega tog znanja. (Dijk 2005).

Mnogi aspekti diskursa zavise od toga šta govornik/autor teksta pretpostavlja da slušaoci/čitaoci znaju ili ne znaju o onome o čemu je reč, pa u skladu s tim nešto iskazuje a drugo izostavlja. Govornik/autor teksta pravi izbor iz tog pretpostavljenog znanja učesnika, koristeći se fleksibilnim strategijama. On može prećutno ili eksplicitno da pretpostavlja, ili da podseti na ono zaboravljeno ili teško saznatljivo, a to može da radi i u skladu sa određenim namerama prećutkivanja, ili insistiranja na nečemu što nameće kao opšte znanje.

Za produkciju diskursa i njegovo razumevanje bitno je kako se „rukuje“ različitim vrstama znanja i različitim vrstama pretpostavki. Van Dajk ističe razliku između ličnih znanja, onih interpersonalne grupe, institucionalnih, nacionalnih i kulturnih znanja, od kojih „prva imaju tendenciju da budu reprezentovana

kao specifična znanja, koja su kao i mentalni modeli u epizodičnoj memoriji, a kasnije, opšte znanje u ‘socijalnoj’ memoriji. Ako Kuređaj u kontekstnom modelu treba da reguliše ove vrste znanja, moramo pretpostaviti da, zajedno sa ostatkom kontekstualnog modela, ono kontroliše verbalnu ekspresiju događajnih modela i generalnog znanja, kao i njihove formulacije u diskursu“ (Dijk 2005: 85).

Kritička analiza diskursa čini očiglednim načine na koje su socijalno razmenjena uverenja diskurzivno produkovana i kako su ona zloupotrebljena za održavanje i legitimaciju dominacije. Van Dajk ističe da je to potrebno i kada je reč o znanju; jer, ako znanje shvatimo „kao socijalno potvrđena uverenja koja dele pripadnici zajednice“ (Dijk 2005: 88), jasno je da su društvene grupe ili institucije koje imaju povlašćen pristup javnom diskursu, poput medija, ili različitih autoriteta, u odličnoj poziciji da utiču na formiranje ljudskih znanja/uverenja.

Budući da je značenje pojma mitskog narativa prilično široko, odnosno neretko se u svakodnevnom i publicističkom govoru koristiti neprecizno, potrebno je pojasniti kako ga ovde razumemo i zbog čega je diskurzivni pristup pogodan za njegovo opserviranje.

Pojam mita označava simboličku naraciju, dok narativ predstavlja simbolizovani prikaz neke radnje čiji su učesnici ljudi, i koja ima vremensku dimenziju, početak, sredinu i kraj. Priču drže zajedno prepoznatljivi obrasci događaja, takozvani zaplet. Središte konstrukcije zapleta je ljudsko predviđanje i pokušaj razrešenja problema (Sarbin 1986: 3).

Narativ je fabula (niz logički i hronološki povezanih događaja) koja je predstavljena na određeni način, budući da događaji mogu biti raspoređeni u različitim nizovima. Ove sekvencijalne karakteristike fokusiraju važne akcente priče. To nije samo pitanje sekvence, već i određene ideološke stajne tačke u priči, što se ostvaruje na razne načine. Određene osobine otelotvoruju se u određene likove, i/ili se događaji osmišljavaju njihovim smeštanjem u odnose koji uključuju određenu tačku gledišta, „fokalizaciju“ (Fairclough 1995: 84).

Ista fabula može se pojaviti u nizu različitih sižea i time posredovati različita značenja, odnosno dobiti drugačiji smisao.

Osim toga, ista priča, na primer fabula Kosovskog boja, može biti ispričana u više različitih narativnih tekstova u kojima pripovedač povezuje priču u okvirima određenog medija/žanra – istorijskom izveštaju, hronici, žitiju, pismu, epskoj pesmi, istorijskoj drami.

Mitski narativi vezani za istorijske događaje, imaju referentnu intenciju koja ih čini otvorenim za pitanja odnosa između priče i istorijskih događaja, odnosno pitanja istine, a odlikuje ih i objašnjavajuća, didaktička intencija, svojstvena svakom mitu.

Mitska naracija je „samoopravdavajuća aktivnost; to znači da ona već unapred uključuje eksterno opravdanje. Ona se ne dokazuje, već pokazuje/objavljuje i posredstvom te objave, samim svojim pojavljivanjem stiče legitimaciju u autoritet“ (Sladetek 1996: 54-55). Mit je, kao i diskurs, pozicioniran unutar određenog diskurzivnog poretka, sa utvrđenom konceptualnom shemom. Mit je uvek vezan za neki diskurs, jer su mu svojstveni fiksni jezički pravila i etabliranost značenja, što navodi na zaključak o diskurzivnom karakteru mita (Sladetek 1996).⁵

Za problem mitskog narativa, kao diskurzivnog događaja posebne vrste, važno je to kako se njegovi tvorci i (re)interpretatori oslanjaju na socijalno raspoložive resurse koji konstituišu poredak diskursa. Dve glavne centripetalne sile u svakom diskurzivnom događaju su jezik i poredak diskursa, kao što je već rečeno. Diskurzivni događaji su, s jedne strane, zavisni od njih i njima oblikovani ali ih, s druge strane kumulativno restrukturiraju. Povezujući tekst sa diskurzivnom praksom, intertekstualna analiza pokazuje gde je tekst pozicioniran u odnosu na socijalnu mrežu poredaka diskursa, kako on aktuelizuje i razvija dati potencijal unutar njih. Diskurzivna praksa upućuje na istoričnost diskurzivnog događaja, pokazujući istovremeno kontinuitet sa prošlošću (zavisnost od datog poretka diskursa) i njegovo učešće u stvaranju istorije (preoblikovanje i ponovno stvaranje poredaka diskursa) (Fairclough 1995: 15).

Granice između i unutar poredaka diskursa konstatno se pomeraju i menjaju ih, a time i oni postaju deo sociokulturne

5 Budući da se razlučivanje između pojmova diskurs i narativ završava se svojevrstnim stanjem konfuzije u kome diskurs poprima oblike narativa, a narativ se pojavljuje kao čista forma diskursa, najbolje je oba pojma posmatrati „kao tačke na kontinuumu koji se prostire od nadindividualnih matrica značenja, preko socijalnih i ličnih konstrukcija koje osoba bira da bi osmislila svoje iskustvo, do kognitivnih struktura smeštenih u ‘glave’ pojedinaca.“ (Pavlović, Džinović, Milošević 2006: 370).

promene (Fairclough 1995: 12-13). Perspektiva kritičke analize diskursa pokazuje da ono što se smatra pretpostavljenim znanjima jedne epistemičke zajednice/nacije može biti u najboljem slučaju nekompletna ili pristrasna verzija događaja (Dijk 2005: 95).

Ono što se smatra mitskim i ono što se prihvata kao činjenična istorija nije zauvek dato, već je rezultat kulturnih i političkih procesa u određenim uslovima. To postaje posebno značajno ako se ima u vidu da mitski i istorijski narativi definišu političke zajednice i doprinose njihovom upravljanju, da imaju funkciju legitimisanja političkih režima, država, ili nacija (Svein Stugu 2003: 4).

U Evropi je istorijski „materijal“ za izgradnju mitova o poreklu nacije uglavnom iz ranog srednjeg veka. Njihova transformacija u narative o nacionalnim herojima je, međutim, po pravilu moderna pojava i vezuje se za procese stvaranja nacionalnih država. Naročito tokom 19. veka, mnogi istoričari bili su intenzivno uključeni u stvaranje nacionalnog identiteta i procese izgradnje nacije (Svein Stugu 2003: 6-7).⁶

Istorijske činjenice za koje su mitovi vezani, kao i mitski sadržaji neretko se biraju i tumače na osnovu određenih instrumentalnih razmatranja. Tu je potrebno napraviti razliku između rano-moderne utilitarizacije mitskih naracija u procesima „zamišljanja nacije“ (Anderson 1998) i zloupotrebe izvornih mitskih sadržaja, simbola i vrednosti u cilju sticanja političke nadmoći pojedinaca i/ili grupe. Kada se stavlja u službu određene društvene grupe, mit gubi svoj univerzalni, viši smisao.

Korisnost izvornog mita korisnost je šireg, antropološkog, ili nešto užeg, nacionalnog karaktera. On predstavlja jedan od važnih aspekata „diskurzivnih strategija“ naracije nacionalne kulture (Wodak, de Cillia, Reisingl, Liebhart 2009: 23), koje povezuju predanja, nacionalne pejzaže, istorijske događaje, nacionalne simbole i rituale u celinu, reprezentujući tako kolektivno iskustvo zajednice.

6 Kako Entoni Smit ističe: „Istoričari zauzimaju istaknuto mesto među kreatorima nacionalizma (...) što ne iznenađuje, s obzirom na zajedničke elemente ranog evropskog nacionalizma i historiografiju romantične epohe. Zajedno sa filolozima, istoričari su na mnogo načina dali smisao i ‘povelju’ svojim aspirantskim nacijama” (Smith 1999: 29).

2. KOSOVSKI KULTUROLOŠKI MIT: VIŠE OD MITSKOG NARATIVA

Izvorni kosovski mit nastao je, kao što znamo, na osnovama stvarnog istorijskog događaja, kao svojevrсни odgovor naroda na veliku egzistencijalnu traumu koju je preživeo tokom Kosovske bitke a i nakon nje, gubitkom države i slobode. Kolektivna interpretacija ovog istorijskog događaja stvorila je nukleus budućeg kompleksa raznovrsnih segmenata kolektivnog pamćenja koji su se formirali oko Kosovske bitke. Raznovrsnost slojeva i višeslojnost izvora na kojima se zasniva viševekovna recepcija kosovskog mita, uveliko prevazilaze ono što se označava pojmom mitski narativ. Ovaj kompleksni fenomen potpunije se može sagledati ukoliko mu se pristupi kao kulturološkom mitu (Bošković 2014).

Specifična dinamika, „simultanih i konstantnih međudejstava“ (Bošković 2014: 27) između istorijskog, kontemplativnog, metafizičko-hrišćanskog, arhetipskog segmenta i segmenta kulturoloških predstava, koja se ostvaruje unutar duhovne celine kosovskog mita, čini njegovu sinkretičku strukturu otvorenom (Ibid). Raznorodni tekstovi kosovskog mita stvorili su, tokom vekova, jednu specifičnu „intertekstualnu konfiguraciju“ (Fairclough 2008: 15).

Istorijski segment kosovskog mita obuhvata jezgro istorijskih činjenica vezanih za Kosovsku bitku, oko kojeg je formirana mitska struktura. Istorijski fakti interpretirani su u crkvenim hronikama, fikcionalizovani u narodnim predanjima i transponovani u epske strukture, tehnikom usmenog posredovanja. Tokom ovih procesa kontemplativni segment nadovezivao se na istorijsku osnovu, uvodeći kolektivna narodna tumačenja srpskog poraza, a u skladu sa njima i određena odstupanja od istorijskih činjenica. Ključno je svakako bilo uvođenje motiva izdaje Lazarevog zeta i saveznika Vuka Brankovića, kao i njegovo rivalstvo sa drugim navodnim kneževim zetom Milošem Obilićem, koga je ovaj zbog zavisti oklevetao pred tastom kao „neveru“. Zbog toga se Miloš zakleo na svečanoj kneževnoj večeri da će ubiti Murata, što je, kako istorija i predanje beleže, i učinio.

Metafizičko-hrišćanski segment kosovskog mita zasnovan je na „tenziji između zemaljskog i nebeskog, čovečanskog i božansk-

og, prolaznog i večnog“ (Gavrilović 1989: 5) u koju su smešteni Kosovska bitka i izbor pred koji je stavljen knez Lazar.

Arhetipski segment kosovskog mita obuhvata mentalne i duhovne sheme kolektivnog nesvesnog, sadržane u dubljim jezičkim slojevima usmene epske tradicije Srba. Reč je o tragovima prehrišćanskog doživljaja sveta, koji odražavaju staroslovenske religijske predstave, kao prvobitne oblike kolektivnog percipiranja stvarnosti, otelotvorene u arhetipskim predstavama, slikama i simbolima, posredstvom kojih su modelovane kolektivne predstave o Kosovskoj bici. To su tragovi starih verovanja i ritualnog pesništva posvećenog precima u pesmama kosovskog ciklusa, kao što su posebno oblikovani prizori poginulih junaka kao i opisi bojnog polja, zbog kojih „se samo mesto bitke, Kosovo polje, doživljava kao mesto kolektivne grobnice, kao sveto mesto na kome počivaju kosti slavnih predaka“ (Bošković 2014: 159).

Segment kulturoloških predstava kosovskog mita proishodi iz kolektivnih predstava izrazite vrednosno-moralne snage. One odražavaju u najvećoj meri kolektivnu svest srpskog naroda. Reč je o duhovnim procesima koji određuju samu bit shvatanja kosovskog istorijskog događaja, a uslovljeni su mentalnim modelima koji se prenose putem tradicije, kao i specifičnošću samog sadržaja koji kolektiv formira, vrednuje i aktivno međugeneracijski prenosi. To su predstave „koje kolektiv izgrađuje o zajedničkom prostoru – fizičkom i duhovnom u kome živi, i koje potom reflektuje u kolektivnoj kulturnoj projekciji stvarnosti.“ (Bošković 2014: 362).

Tragovi duhovnih potreba transformišu konkretni prostor u „kulturni pejzaž“. Delovanjem kolektivnog viđenja stvarnosti, prostor biva oplemenjen odlikama društvenog identiteta. Posredstvom delovanja kolektivnih vrednosti zajednice, kulturni pejzaž se razvija u „prostorno-duhovnu celinu u kojoj se ispisuju kolektivna, realna i imaginarno-duhovna geografija i istorija“. Na taj način „mitska struktura kosovskog predanja postaje duhovni kolektivni toponim, centar kolektivne kulturne svesti.“ (Bošković 2014: 363-367).

Složena i dinamična duhovna celina kosovskog kulturološkog mita odražava različite stupnjeve srpske kolektivne svesti, kao i različite nivoe duhovnog pamćenja. Razvijajući se iz srednjovekovnog predanja o Kosovskom boju, zasnovanog na „nebeskom

toposu junačkog podviga“ (Knežević 2006: 151), kojim je srpski istorijski poraz uzdignut u duhovnu pobedu zadobijanja „nebeskog carstva“, on je budućem naraštaju zaveštao „etičko-golgota načela žrtvovanja života za zajednicu i potomstvo.“ (Žunić 1999: 29) Hrišćanska ideja o primarnosti očuvanja duše u odnosu na život, utelovljena u herojskom liku cara Lazara, dobila je u kosovskom mitu oblik jedinstvenog etičko-religioznog načela. Druga noseća ideja „kosovske etike“ o neporobljivosti duše srpskog naroda, uprkos činjenici porobljenosti njegovog tela, ideja je koja održava i podstiče „nacionalne vere“ svih podjarmljenih (Đurić 1988: 26). Ove dve temeljne ideje prožimaju kosovski mit u svim vremenima njegove recepcije, učestvujući i dalje u izgradnji srpskog nacionalnog identiteta i održavanju onog najvrednijeg što Srbi pamte o sebi.

3. KOSOVSKI MIT I POLITIČKE MANIPULACIJE

Jedna od osnovnih grešaka koju u pristupu kosovskom mitu prave svi njegovi kritičari sastoji u tome što polaze od ideje da se izvorni mit transformiše kada biva zloupotrebljen. Naprotiv, izvorni mit ostaje isti, ali se njegovi strukturni elementi izvlače iz prvobitnog konteksta i ugrađuju u kvazimitske strukture. Drugo je pitanje to zašto je kosovski mit tako pogodan za razne oblike manipulisanja.

Kosovski mitski narativ kompleksan je i u interakciji sa realnošću na jedinstven način. Složeni i promenljivi identitet kosovske teme razvija se kroz dinamički odnos između onoga što naučnici smatraju istorijski realnim i nerealnim, fikcijom i faktima, i nečega što egzistira u nacionalnoj svesti srpskog naroda kao neodvojivo, čak kao nediferencirano od ovog prvog u popularnom razumevanju (Bakić-Hajden 2006: 134).

Kao složena celina dinamičke i sinkretičke strukture, kosovski mitski narativ integriše značenja koja funkcionišu na različitim nivoima istovremeno, stvarajući tako homologije, saglasnosti između različitih aspekata priče, gde je sve međusobno isprepletano i međusobno zamenjivo.

Zahvaljujući otvorenoj strukturi kosovskog mitskog narativa, različita istorijska/socijalna i duhovna iskustva učestvuju u njegovoj društvenoj recepciji. To, međutim, kao jednu od posledica

ima podložnost mitskih reminiscencija različitim oblicima manipulacija. Objašnjenje za to leži u relativnoj lakoći sa kojom tema Kosova prelazi granice između književnih, religijskih i političkih diskursa (Bakić-Hajden 2006: 126-127).

Retorička snaga kosovske herojske epike i ideologije otvara put ka drugim diskursima, gde ona postaje politički pseudoargument i osnova mobilisućeg dejstva. Time biva olakšano „da se nove prilike sagledavaju preko poznatih predstava i asocijacija, oblikujući jedan idiom unutar različitih kulturnih ideologija i diskursa, kroz sjedinjavanje prošlosti i sadašnjosti, metaforičnog i bukvalnog“ (Bakić-Hayden 2006: 48).

Važnost Kosovke bitke kao etičke i religiozne paradigme ne samo u epskoj usmenoj tradiciji, već i u literaturi, umetnosti uopšte, kao i u svakodnevnoj diskurzivnoj praksi je nesporna. Ako tome dodamo i stalnu prisutnost kosovske teme, kako u istorijskoj perspektivi tako i gledano iz ugla aktuelnih političkih (ne)prilika, postaje jasno koliko je razvijena „receptivna dispozicija“ (Bakić-Hayden 2006: 136) među onima na koje se želi delovati upotrebom mitskih reminiscencija. Imaju to u vidu, postaje jasno koliko je u cilju političke propagande plasirati ideju o ponavljanju kosovskog istorijskog razbojišta.

Razloge upotrebljivosti mitskih elemenata u političke svrhe treba tražiti i u samom karakteru mitskih predstava. Budući da su ukorenjene u istorijskom i kulturnom pamćenju i na raspolaganju u vidu opštih znanja, mitske predstave odlikuje stabilnost i u svakodnevnom diskursu, bez obzira na promenljivost okolnosti u kojima se upotrebljavaju, jer su veoma prilagodljive aktuelnim prilikama. U svakodnevnom i javnim diskursima sadržaji kosovskog mita posreduju se putem formulaičnih iskaza, pa ga je zbog ove „redukovane diskurzivne predstavljivosti“ u tom kontekstu moguće posmatrati kao stereotip (Đerić 2002: 32).

Stereotipija o zajedničkom poimanju istorijske sudbine srpskog naroda i njenih pouka, neupitnih vrednosti i ciljeva u nacionalnom identifikovanju, egzistira u mitovima u vidu simboličkih kolektivnih akcenata. Upotrebom ovih ukorenjenih kolektivnih uverenja u cilju političke propagande, ona bivaju prezentovana kao „zaokret“, uz istovremeno upoređivanje sa idealnim mitskim, drevnim uzorima. Posebnu važnost u tom smislu dobija domen

„klišetirane, jezički svedene prenosivosti i primene mitskih naracija“ (Đerić 2002: 30).

Imena ili formule kojima se kosovski mitski narativ predstavlja u svakodnevnom/javnim diskurzivnim praksama pokazuju veću održivost u odnosu na značenja koja se za njih vezuju. Mitska imena-simboli i formule, kao nosioci određenih ubeđenja i „slika smisla“ ne objašnjavaju, već samo prenose i produkuju značenje. Slike koje se prenose mnogostruke su i višeznačne, te stoga lako smestive u različite kontekste.

Ovakva transpozicija značenja simbola iz izvornog mitskog konteksta u tekući kontekst, uz njihovo smpinjeno „distorziranje“ ostvaruje se zloupotrbom izvornih imaginarnih struktura svesti, arhetipova. „Mitska priča u savremenim političkim uslovima i uopšte javnoj upotrebi, nije priča iz usmenog predanja već primenljivi kliše ili jezički stereotip, ‘referenca’ i argumentacija u ideološkoj upotrebi“ (Đerić 2002: 32).

Raskorak između kompleksnosti značenja pojma-simbola u izvornom mitskom predlošku s jedne strane i njegove svedenosti u političkom diskursu, posredstvom predstavljanja izvedenim mitskih formulama s druge strane, upućuje na prostor pogodan za različita „pomeranja smisla“ datih mitskih predstava u željenom pravcu. „Stavljanjem u kontekst savremene situacije, formule izvedene iz mitskih naracija kodifikuju i usmeravaju samu stvarnost, postajući, za određene aktere, osnovnim argumentom političke mobilizacije.“ (Đerić 2002: 31)

U savremenoj recepciji kosovskog mita upadljiva je suprotnost između dva ekstremna pristupa. Dok prvi pristup podrazumeva nekritičko poistovećivanje mitskih i istorijskih činjenica, odnosno mitskog i savremenog konteksta, drugi osporava izvorni mit, na osnovu njegovog poistovećivanja sa kvazimitom, odnosno vrednovanja na osnovu savremenih uzusa. U ovom delu rada pokušaćemo da upravo ekstremnim primerima oprečnih tumačenja nekih od bazičnih pojmova kosovskog mita pokažemo „na delu“ izbor određenog diskursa.

Kvalifikativ „nebeski“ u kosovskom predanju, kao što je poznato, vezuje se za kneza Lazara, koji se, po uzoru na Isusa Hrista, sprema da „položi život za ideju koja jedino pomoću te žrtve

može da pobedi“ (Dvorniković 1990:538). Sintezom jevanđeoske misli o primarnosti očuvanja duše u odnosu na ovozemaljski život i osnovne ideje junačke epopeje, po kojoj smrt na bojnopolju osigurava ratniku boravak u nebeskom svetu i večnu slavu na ovozemaljskom, smisao kneževog izbora kao svesne žrtve, tumači se u moralno-religioznom ključu. Kneževo biranje herojske i mučeničke smrti u boju sa nadmoćnijom turskom vojskom dobija viši smisao iskupljenja za srpske grehe i opredeljenja za nebesko carstvo. Kao svaki izabrani mitski junak, knez Lazar predstavlja „harmonizujuću spregu suprotnosti“ (Miličić-Subić 2009), neba i zemlje, života i smrti (večni život u slavi nebeskog carstva), on je nebeski ratnik, mučenik.

Zagovornici novog mita o Srbima kao nebeskom narodu, nekritički prihvataju uopštavanje pojedinačnog svojstva svetosti mitsko-istorijskog lika na čitav narod, kao da se ta fundamentalna razlika na relaciji mit – stvarnost može neutralisati pukom jezičkom zamenom (svi smo mi knez Lazar). Nesporno je to da je tokom svog razvitka svaka nacija predstavljala sebe kao „izabrani narod“. Ali podržavanje ovakve ideje u savremenom kontekstu znači, u najboljem slučaju, negovanje narcizma nacije. U najgorem slučaju, ono što je u ravni dubokog simbolizma, a što retorički obrasci vezani za Kosovo čuvaju i prenose, u kontekstu manipulativnog bukvalizovanja simbolike inicijalne istorijske situacije, dobija moć da mobilise masu. U takvoj komunikativnoj situaciji, invokacija Kosovskog boja, posredstvom reprezentacije kosmičke bitke sa hrišćanskom mitsko-religioznom paradigmom, ima snagu mobilisanja ljudi na akciju, bez obzira na to da li je ona opravdana ili potrebna.

Tumačenja u ključu druge krajnosti oduzimaju etičkoj dilemi i izboru kneza Lazara veličinu i metafizički smisao, potencirajući predominaciju smrti u stvaranju metafore heroizma. Tako nastaju svima poznate kritizerske fraze o morbidnom veličanju smrti i poraza u kosovskom predanju, a atribut „nebeski“ podsmešljivo se poistovećuje sa mazohizmom i gubitništvom.

Izborom i zavetom kneza Lazara inicirana je „trijada svetosti, herojstva i izdajstva, oličena u caru Lazaru, Milošu Obiliću i Vuku Brankoviću“ (Đerić 2001: 251). Izdaja Vuka Brankovića, kao što je opštepoznato, nije istorijska činjenica, ali je kosovskom mitu

bila neophodna. Osim kao objašnjenje za poraz i nesreću koja je zadesila srpski narod, izdajstvo u kosovskom mitu predstavlja i „kolektivno osećanje nesloge kao izdaje suštinski zajedničkog interesa – očuvanje srpske države – simbolično uobličeno u epski lik izdajnika.“ (Bošković 2014: 260)

Istorijska činjenica o suparničkoj razjedinjenosti srpskih velikaša u odsudnom trenutku pred najezdu osvajača, dobila je svoj mitski analogon u obliku rivalstva Miloša i Vuka, uz koje su išla i dva različita aspekta izdaje. Miloševo „nabeđeno izdajstvo istovremeno je pokretač epskog kazivanja“, psihološki i moralni impuls za akciju oklevetanog junaka i objašnjenje toka istorijskih zbivanja vezanih za ubistvo Murata. (Bošković 2014: 257) Spoljašnje izdajstvo vezano je za epizodu o izdaji Vuka Brankovića na bojnopolju. Ono, za razliku od navodnog Miloševog izdajstva, nije bilo vezano samo za neveru Knezu, već je poprimilo javne, istorijske razmere, a njegove posledice imale su opšti karakter, odnoseći se na ceo narod, te su tako prerasle u simbol kolektivne propasti.

Izdaja je kosovskom mitu neophodna „jer pokreće i donosi pravo metafizičko rešenje u nerešivosti konkretnog, zemaljskog postojanja. Izdaja uzrokuje nesreću i stradanje koje otvaraju vrata večnog života“ (Bošković 2014: 288). Ona se javlja kao preduslov Kneževog izbora, i „u kontekstu hrišćanskog martirskog kulta uvodi Lazara u sfere hrišćanske duhovnosti“ (Ibid).

Tumačenja koja polaze od istorijskih podataka o sporenju Lazarevića i Vuka Brankovića oko prvenstva u upravljanju srpskim zemljama, kao i od činjenice da je crkveni vrh odlučno stajao uz Lazareviće, te da se, za razliku od kneginje Milice, Vuk Branković opirao prihvatanju vazalstva još pune tri godine, ulogu izdajnika koju je mit dodelio Vuku povezuju sa crkvenom propagandom. Budući da crkvene hronike predstalljaju važne i brojne pisane izvore o Kosovskoj bici, ovakvo tumačenje se neretko smatra nekom vrstom dekonstrukcije kosovskog mita, kao da je logiku mita uopšte moguće sameravati prema istorijskim činjenicama.

Spornija, a svakako i opasnija jesu ona tumačenja koja mitski scenario o izdaji koriste kao argumente iskustva višeg reda, primenljive u stvarnosti. Shematizovani mitski odnos pojedinac – izdaja – kolektiv, i zavetnu misao u vidu moralnog prekora koju kolektiv

izriče zbog izdaje njegovih interesa i upućuje budućim naraštajima, ovakva tumačenja preinačuju u pseudoargumentaciju, bilo da je reč o političkim borbama u kojima protivnik lako postaje izdajnik, ili o pozivu na javno, medijsko linčovanje svakog mišljenja koje je drugačije.

Motiv osvete jedan je od najspornijih pojmova kosovskog mita. U kontekstu kosovskog zaveštanja reč „osveta“ daleko je od uvreženog značenja poriva niže vrste rukovođenog pukom mržnjom, odmazde u vidu nasilja. Osveta je ovde shvaćena kao odgovor na ugrožavanje i odbrana od onoga ko dovodi u pitanje opstanak zajednice. Ona uspostavlja poredak između postupaka koji su za pripadnike zajenice prihvatljivi i onih koji to nisu (Tutnjević 2016: 118).

Osvetno-oslobodilačka ideja predstavlja vid pamćenja gubitka onoga što je oteto, kao i snaženje odluke da se oteto vrati. „U srpskoj istoriji taj trenutak pamćenja poslije kosovske bitke trajao je vijekovima i oblikovao se kao zavijet, nalog ili obaveza oslobođenja od viševekovnog turskog ropstva, koja podrazumijeva da ono što je borbom izgubljeno, ako se mora, borbom treba biti i vraćeno“ (Tutnjević 2016: 117). U svetlu ovih uvida, postaje jasno zašto je vidovdanski kult morao sadržati osvetnu misao i zašto ona u tom kontekstu ne može biti sporna.

Izmena konteksta upotrebe osvetno-oslobodilačke ideje menja i njeno izvorno značenja. Deformacije u recepciji kosovskog mita, odnosno njegovo nekritičko, politikantsko i praznoslovno evociranje, koje je za posledicu neretko imalo „konfuziju nacionalno-romantičarskih egzaltacija“, rezultirali su stanovištem „da je kosovsko zavještanje jedna pogubna i agresivna duhovna, kulturna i politička ideologija koja Srbe vodi u netrpeljivost i sukobe sa drugim narodima i kao takva im kroz istoriju donosi poraze i poniženja“ (Tutnjević 2016: 112).

4. ZAKLJUČAK

Razvoj pojma diskurs u interdisciplinarni koncept proučavanja društvenih i političkih fenomena značajno je doprineo potpunijem razumevanju kompleksnog karaktera njihove socijalne konstruisanosti i uslovljenosti jezičkim praksama, ali i shvatanju

toga kako diskurzivne prakse ne samo reflektuju već i generišu socijalne procese. Analizom diskursa ostvaruju se uvidi ne samo u jezičku i značenjsku strukturu date diskurzivne tvorevine, već i u sociokulturni i politički kontekst unutar kojeg nastaje i sa kojim uspostavlja složene odnose međusobnog uslovljavanja. U tom smislu, diskurzivni pristup nacionalnim mitskim narativima pokazuje višestruku funkcionalnost u proučavanju.

Kao svojevrsne intertekstualne konfiguracije, mitski narativi uvek su vezani za određeni poredak diskursa. Tako pozicionirani, oni upućuju na vlastitu uslovljenost datim poretom (jezik i pravila poretka) ali i na svoje učešće u njegovom kumulativnom preoblikovanju. Budući da predstavljaju rezultat kulturnih i političkih procesa u određenim uslovima, mitski narativi pružaju mogućnost istraživanja socijalno raspoloživih resursa koji učestvuju u njihovom konstituisanju, poput društvene/političke organizacije, kulturnih vrednosti, verovanja i normi.

Nacionalni mitski narativi imali su važnu ulogu u definisanju političkih zajednica, država i nacija, a i sada predstavljaju značajan faktor legitimisanja političkih režima. Zbog toga je u javnim diskurzivnim praksama instrumentalni pristup izboru njihovog sadržaja i tumačenja neizbežan, što predstavlja istraživački, ali i emancipatorni izazov za kritičku analizu diskursa.

Iako je kosovski mit nesporno diskurzivni fenomen, specifična dinamika simultanih međudejstava koja se ostvaruje između njegovih raznovrsnih segmenata, kao i višeslojnost izvora na kojima se zasniva njegova viševjekovna recepcija, učinili su ga duhovnom tvorevinom kompleksnijom u odnosu na mitski narativ. U interakciji sa realnošću na jedinstven način, složena i dinamična duhovna celina kosovskog kulturološkog mita odražava različite stupnjeve srpske kolektivne svesti, kao i različite nivoe duhovnog pamćenja. Raznolikost istorijskih, socijalnih i duhovnih iskustava koji učestvuju u njegovoj društvenoj recepciji, kao i njegova otvorena i dinamična struktura učinili su da kosovski mit bude i danas vitalni činilac nacionalnih identifikacija, što ga, međutim, istovremeno određuje i kao važan resurs političke propagande. Ako tome dodamo i činjenicu da su, usled lakoće sa kojom tema Kosova prelazi granice između književnih, religijskih i političkih diskursa, mitske reminiscencije podložne različitim oblicima manipulacija,

postaje jasno koliku važnost ima kritička analiza javnih diskursa koji njima barataju.

Pri analiziranju javnih diskursa koji invociraju kosovski mit, važno je istražiti pretpostavke koje potenciraju njihove socijalne funkcije, i postaviti pitanje koji se društveni/politički akteri njima služe i šta njima postižu. Time će biti olakšani uvidi u manipulativni smisao korišćenja mitskih naracija, što povećava šanse za predupređivanje efekata njihove zloupotrebe.

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Milena Pešić

**DISCOURSE AND NATIONAL MYTHICAL
NARRATIVE -
ABOUT KOSOVO MYTH**

Abstract

Starting from the modern concepts of discourse, in this paper we attempted to point out why the discursive approach is suitable for observing mythical narratives, but also their manipulations. We also attempted to show what in the case of Kosovo's cultural myth transcends the framework of discourse analysis. Examples of the differences between the opposite interpretations of some of the basic terms/concepts/motives of the Kosovo myth, such as the qualifier "heavenly", the terms "betrayal" and "revenge", provided some kind of illustration how the choice of a particular discourse implies a certain context of interpretation, an ideological point of view, and a choice of terms within which the interpretation works.

Keywords: discourse, text, mythical narrative, manipulation, Kosovo myth, qualifier, heavenly, betrayal, revenge

SHVATANJE NASILNOG EKSTREMIZMA I RADIKALIZACIJE U INSTITUCIONALNOM I AKADEMSKOM DISKURSU**

Apstrakt

Predmet istraživanja je shvatanje nasilnog ekstremizma i radikalizacije u institucionalnom i akademskom diskursu. Analizom sadržaja su ispitane različite definicije nasilnog ekstremizma i radikalizacije kako bi se utvrdile njihove najznačajnije karakteristike. Autor je u prvom delu rada objasnio amorfnost i varijabilnost fenomena ekstremizma, da bi u nastavku istraživanja ukazao na pozitivan i negativan kontekst fenomena radikalizacije. U drugom segmentu je pažnja posvećena elaboriranju definicija unutar institucionalnog diskursa, da bi treći deo rada fokus stavio na akademski diskurs. Utvrđeno je da suštinski problem nije sa vokabularom, već sa vrednosnim sistemom, koji predisponira raznolikost i neujednačenost definicija, kako u akademskom, tako i u institucionalnom kontekstu.

Ključne reči: diskurs, akademski diskurs, institucionalni diskurs, ekstremizam, nasilni ekstremizam, radikalizacija, nasilje, terorizam, ideologija.

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1. UVOD

Pojmovi kao što su nasilni ekstremizam i radikalizacija još uvek nisu čvrsto etablirani u akademskom i institucionalnom diskursu. Postoji više razloga zašto je to tako. Kao prvo, ovi fenomeni su relativno novi, te je i njihov diskurs još uvek amorfan. Drugi razlog je njihova varijabilnost i definiciona različitost u zavisnosti od vremenskog i prostornog konteksta pojavljivanja – ono što je za jedne nasilni ekstremizam, za druge će predstavljati „borbu za slobodu” i sl. Radikalizacija je pak, fenomen koji može biti shvaćen na ambivalentan način – u pozitivnom i negativnom kontekstu. Treći razlog je dualnost političkih standarda i morala u međunarodnim odnosima – jedna te ista pojava će različito biti okvalifikovana u zavisnosti od političkih interesa.¹

Dodatni problem u određenju nasilnog ekstremizma je i činjenica da se ova pojava prepliće sa srodnim fenomenima poput radikalizma, terorizma i sl. što još više zamagljuje njihovu distinkciju u naučnom i institucionalnom kontekstu.

Ista, gotovo slična sudbina, zadesila je i fenomen terorizma.² S obzirom da među državama unutar UN nije došlo do konsenzusa o jedinstvenoj definiciji terorizma, ovaj problem je prevaziđen donošenjem različitih rezolucija o terorizmu. Ujedinjene nacije su 2014. godine, po istom principu, donele Rezoluciju koja se tiče sprečavanja radikalizacije i mobilisanja pojedinaca za učestvovanje u terorističkim grupama na inostranim ratištima.

Da bi se razumela priroda nasilnog ekstremizma i procesa radikalizacije (koji neumitno korespondira sa ekstremizmom), potrebna je detaljna, objektivna i multikauzalna analiza, koja će odrediti oba fenomena, a potom ukazati na njihovu korelaciju. Na taj način će se bolje razumeti etiologija nasilnog ekstremizma i radikalizacije, što će svakako doprineti uspešnijoj borbi protiv ovih društveno-političkih pojava.

1 Dobar primer je rat na Kosovu i Metohiji u kome je OVK najpre definisana kao teroristička organizacija, da bi kasnije odlukom velikih sila (a protivpravno u odnosu na međunarodne standarde), nekadašnji teroristi OVK postali sastavni deo establišmenta tzv. države Kosovo.

2 U akademskoj zajednici terorizam je često poistovećivan sa gerilom i terorom, što je dodatno komplikovalo njegovo određenje, pa samim tim i borbu protiv njega. Osim toga, postoji sijaset definicija terorizma koje su ideološki obojene, što poništava njihovu naučnu validnost.

2. EKSTREMIZAM I POJMOVNO SRODNI FENOMENI

Da bismo razumeli prirodu fenomena ekstremizma, krenućemo od njegove etimologije (lat. *extremus* – krajnje, preterano). Već se iz etimološke osnove videti da ekstremizam podrazumeva „ponašanje ili delovanje na granici dozvoljenog, sa tendencijom da se ta granica pređe” (Đorić 2016: 22). Iako je kao pojava postojao odvajkada, ekstremizam je relativno kasno etabliran u akademskim i institucionalnim krugovima. Osim toga, ono što je za jedne predstavljalo ekstremizam, za druge je sasvim normalno i društveno prihvatljivo mišljenje ili ponašanje. Takođe treba imati u vidu, da neke pojave iz prošlosti koje su bile percipirane kao normalne, danas predstavljaju upotrebu ekstremnih sredstava i metoda.³ Time dolazimo do zaključka da je određenje ekstremizma uslovljeno mestom i vremenom pojavljivanja.

Ekstremizam je demonizovanog karaktera jer se o njemu uvek govori u negativnom kontekstu, te je kao takav i nepoželjan za društva savremene demokratije. Ne samo danas, već i u dalekoj prošlosti, ponašanje koje je bilo prenaglašeno i pretilo da uruši društvene norme i ravnotežu je bilo žestoko kritikovano i stigmatizovano, jer je narušavalo koncept opšteg dobra. Takav primer imamo još kod Aritotela, koji je smatrao da krajnosti (tj. ekstremi) nisu poželjne u polisu i da bi svaki građanin trebalo da teži umerenosti (*mesotes*). Zapravo, stari Grci su termin ekstremizam koristili za označavanje dve vrste negativnih političkih poredaka – anarhiju i tiraniju (Bakes 2010: 22). Sličnom logikom su se vodili i Latini, tvrdeći da su ekstremi puni mana (*Extrema sunt vitiosa*).⁴

Iako najuspešnije funkcioniše u uslovima društvenih kriza, neki teoretičari (Albert Breton) smatraju da na pojavu političkog ekstremizma dominantno utiču četiri elementa: asimetrija političke moći, dominacija političkih lidera, velike razlike i konflikt između suprotstavljenih društvenih grupe i obavezno saglašavanje sa odlukama trenutne vlasti (Breton 2002). Sa druge strane, Skruton (Roger Scruton) smatra da ekstremizam uvek sadrži:

3 Dobar primer za to je inkvizicija, koja je nekada imala legalitet i legitimitet (posebno kada je reč o obaveznim metodama mučenja opravdanim papskom bulom *Ad extripanda*), a za koju se danas smatra da je imala ekstremna sredstva i metode.

4 Više o tome u: Đorić, M, *Ekstremna levica: ideološki aspekti levičarskog ekstremizma*, Institut za političke studije, Beograd, 2016, str. 18.

1. Sklonost ka krajnjim idejama u politici, sa ciljem poništavanja opozicije.

2. Netolerantan odnos prema političkim protivnicima.

3. Upotrebu političkih sredstava kojima se ugrožavaju ljudska prava ostalih pripadnika društva (George, Wilcox 1996: 54).

Ekstremizam se najčešće poistovećuje sa terorizmom i radikalizmom.⁵ Iako je svaki terorizam u isto vreme i ekstremizam – to ne važi u obrnutom smislu reči. Ekstremizam ne mora uvek nužno preći u terorizam. Osim toga, terorizam je politički fenomen *par excellence*, dok ekstremizam ne mora uvek korespondirati sa politikom.⁶ Terorizam je nasilje koje je uvek usmereno protiv neke ili nečije vlasti, dok kod ekstremizma to ne mora biti slučaj. Obe ove pojave su demonizovanog, tj. negativnog karaktera ali je terorizam mnogo lakše prepoznati i izučavati, jer je eksplicitniji u svom pojavnom obliku.⁷ Samim tim je i delo terorizma lakše kriminalizovati, za razliku od ekstremizma.⁸ Važno je znati da nema terorizma bez ekstremizma i da se sve moderne strategije borbe protiv terorizma baziraju na prevenciji nasilnog ekstremizma i radikalizacije, što ukazuje da su ekstremizam i terorizam povezani pupčanom vrpcom.

Drugi fenomen sa kojim se ekstremizam poistovećuje kako u naučnim, tako i u institucionalnim krugovima je – radikalizam. Prirodu radikalizma ćemo najlakše prepoznati ukoliko krenemo od njegove etimologije (lat. *radix* – koren). Na taj način vidimo da radikalizam u biti može predstavljati (Đorić 2014: 43):

1. Vraćanje korenima – u smislu povratka „na staro”, što ukazuje na neku vrstu retrogradnosti i moguće rigidnosti.

5 Takođe se u mnogim teorijskim radovima ali i u institucionalnom kontekstu ekstremizam često poistovećuje is a fundamentalizmom, fanatizmom i populizmom. Više o tome u: Đorić M. *Ekstremna desnica: međunarodni aspekti desničarskog ekstremizma*, Udruženje Nauka i društvo Srbije, Beograd, 2014, str. 37-55.

6 Ekstremizam srećemo u sportu u vidu ekstremnog ponašanja navijača (huliganizam) ili pak ekstremnih sportova; u kulturi, religiji.

7 Da bi se neko krivično delo okvalifikovalo kao terorizam ono mora da ima politički motiv, političke posledice in a kraju – politički cilj. Više o tome u: Simeunović Dragan, *Terorizam*, 2009, Pravni fakultet, Beograd, 2009.

8 Na primer u Krivičnom zakonu Republike Srbije ne postoji delo ekstremizma, upravo zbog teškoće u njegovom određenju, pa samim tim i njegove kriminalizacije.

2. Obnavljanje „iz korena” – što može čak uključivati i neke inovativne ideje.

Suštinski, radikalizam za razliku od ekstremizma ne mora biti samo negativna pojava, već u zavisnosti od konteksta može čak imati i pozitivno značenje. Inače, izraz „radikalan” se prvi put pominje 1797. godine kod vigovaca, da bi se opisale radikalne reforme koje su se odnosile na izborni sistem (Chisholm, Garvin J. L. 1926). Neki savremeni teoretičari radikalizam doživljavaju i kao antipod pragmatizmu (Tansey, Jackson 2008: 81).

U širu upotrebu termin radikalizam ulazi sredinom 19. veka u zapadnoj Evropi (Engleska i Francuska), odnoseći se na korenite promene u kontekstu usvajanja biračkih prava. Ovaj termin je bio korišćen i od strane marksista u to u formi „revolucionarnog radikalizma”, koji se odnosio na promenu „eksploatatorskog kapitalističkog sistema”. Izraz „radikalizam” se sreće i u filozofiji i to kao „filozofski radikalizam”⁹, koji prati teorijski pravac Džejmsa Mila (James Mil) i Džeremi Bentama (Jeremy Bentham). Bez obzira što radikalizam (za razliku od ekstremizma) može egzistirati u pozitivnom kontekstu, to ne znači da je radikalizam lišen nasilja. Upravo zbog njegove bipolarnosti, prema radikalizmu postoji veća tolerancija u društvu, pa samim tim i u naučnom i institucionalnom diskursu.

3. NASILNI EKSTREMIZAM I RADIKALIZACIJA

Postoji nekoliko kriterijuma na osnovu kojih možemo izvršiti klasifikaciju ekstremizma (Đorić 2014: 55-64) prema ciljevima, akterima, vremenu nastanka i prema metodima i sredstvima delovanja. Uzimajući u obzir ciljeve ekstremističkih grupa izdvajamo ideološki motivisan ekstremizam (levičarski i desničarski), etnoseparatistički i religijski fundiran ekstremizam. Podela na osnovu aktera delovanja uključuje: individualni ekstremizam, ekstremizam organizacija, grupa, pokreta i partija i na kraju, institucionalni ekstremizam. Ekstremizam se može klasifikovati i prema vremenu nastanka, te u toj sistematizaciji razlikujemo tzv. „stari” i „novi” ekstremizam”.

9 Ovaj filozofski pravac polazi od premise da društvo može napredovati samo ukoliko se temelji na naučnom saznanju ljudske prirode.

Ukoliko kao glavni kriterijum klasifikacije koristimo metode i sredstva delovanja, onda se izdvajaju sledeće vrste ekstremizma: klasični, samoubilački, sajber ekstremizam i narko-ekstremizam. Kada je reč o metodima delovanja izdvojićemo jednu podvrstu u okviru ove klasifikacije (na osnovu stepena nasilja koje koristi) – u tom slučaju izdvajamo nasilni i nenasilni ekstremizam.

Nasilni ekstremizam je kovanica koja je novijeg datuma, a koja se tiče upotrebe nasilja zarad ostvarivanja određenih ideoloških, političkih ili religijskih ciljeva. Proces nastanka i oblikovanja ekstremiste se ne događa preko noći - on je kompleksan, multikauzalan i uključuje svojevrsno „pranje mozga” kojim se kod pojedinca (ili grupe) eliminiše postojeći sistem vrednosti, sa tendencijom usvajanja novih ideja i vrednosnog sistema. To je tzv. proces radikalizacije.

Iako postoji značajan broj studija o tome kako nastaje ekstremista, činjenica je da ni nauka, ni institucije bezbednosti do sada nisu uspele da daju jedinstven odgovor na ovo pitanje. Možda je to tako zbog činjenice što ne postoji univerzalan način radikalizacije. „Okidači” za nasilno ekstremističko ponašanje su različiti: frustracijska agresija, osećaj izolovanosti i nepravde, relativna deprivacija, stresni događaji u privatnom životu (smrt ili gubitak voljene osobe), postkonfliktni odnosi itd.

Da bismo razumeli fenomen nasilnog ekstremizma i proces radikalizacije, potrebno je objasniti nekoliko fundamentalnih pojmova koji se sreću u savremenom akademskom i institucionalnom diskursu. Jedan od takvih fenomena je CVE (Counter Violent Extremism), tj. „borba protiv nasilnog ekstremizma”. CVE je termin koji je nastao 2015. godine u institucionalnom kontekstu na predsedničkom samitu (U.S. Presidential summit) kada je promovisan od strane Amerike kroz niz konferencija i događaja.¹⁰ Sa druge strane UN su definisale sličan termin koji uključuje širi opseg mera i koji se naziva PVE (Prevention Violent Extremism), odnosno „prevencija nasilnog ekstremizma”. Kada je reč o OEBS-ovom vokabularu, često možemo sresti izraz VERLT (Violent Extremism and Radicalization that Lead to Terrorism), tj. „nasilni ekstremizam i radikalizacija koji vode ka terorizmu”. Po svemu

10 Peter Neumann, Countering Violent Extremism and Radicalisation that Lead to Terrorism: Ideas, Recommendations, and Good Practices from the OSCE Region, <https://www.osce.org/chairmanship/346841?download=true>, 201.02.2019.

sudeći, može se zaključiti da u institucionalnom smislu reči, postoji jasna razlika između sličnih (a opet različitih) fenomena kao što su (nasilni) ekstremizam, radikalizacija i terorizam.

Kada pravimo paralelu između borbe protiv terorizma i borbe protiv nasilnog ekstremizma, videćemo da se ova druga pojava prvenstveno bazira na prevenciji radikalizacije. Što se tiče borbe protiv terorizma, ona pre svega obuhvata osujećenje terorističkih napada i uništenje terorističkih organizacija, što uključuje prvenstveno hapšenje osumnjičenih, sprečavanje regrutacije i finansiranja terorizma, praćenje terorističke propagande... Sve ove kao i mnoge druge mere, podrazumevaju širok opseg obaveštajno bezbednosnih mera koje moraju uključiti i razmenu podataka¹¹ na regionalnom i međunarodnom nivou. Pored obaveštajnih službi, značajnu ulogu u borbi protiv terorizma imaju policija i vojska.

Za razliku od borbe protiv terorizma koja implicira mnogo konkretnije mere i nosioce tih mera, borba protiv nasilnog ekstremizma je dosta šira i složenija. Ona uključuje celokupno društvo, počevši najpre od porodice, škole, medija, države, religijskih i političkih lidera, okruženja itd. U sprečavanju nasilnog ekstremizma mora najpre da se radi na prevenciji radikalizacije, što bi podrazumevalo jačanje demokratskih kapaciteta, širenje tolerancije i poštovanje različitosti i razvijanje kritičke svesti, posebno mladih ljudi, jer su oni percipirani kao najugroženija kategorija.¹²

Prevencija nasilnog ekstremizma se odnosi na one koji se još uvek nisu radikalizovali, tj. na one koji još uvek nisu postali ekstremisti. Nasuprot tome, proces deradikalizacije je usmeren ka već postojećim i dokazanim ekstremistima (uglavnom se odnosi na nasilne ekstremiste i teroriste). Često se umesto deradikalizacije koristi kao sinonim termin „reintegracije”. Deradikalizacija podrazumeva niz sveobuhvatnih mera kao što su pronalaženje novog posla, promena ideološkog i/ili religijskog sadržaja, psihološka/psihijatrijska terapija i sl.

11 Razmena podataka bi bila veoma korisna, pogotovo kada je reč o sprečavanju terorističkih napada, ali je priroda obaveštajnih službi takva da nerado dele osetljive podatke sa drugim službama na internacionalnom nivou.

12 Pored mladih u kategoriju ugroženih spadaju i neobrazovani i siromašni, jer je njima lako manipulirati na ideološkom i materijalnom nivou.

4. NASILNI EKSTREMIZAM I RADIKALIZACIJA U INSTITUCIONALNOM DISKURSU

Smatra se da se u institucionalnom diskursu savremeno shvatanje ekstremizam prvi put sreće unutar Službe za zaštitu ustavnog poretka u Nemačkoj 70-ih godina 20. veka. Tada je ekstremizam bio percipiran kao negativan fenomen koji može predstavljati značajnu pretnju državi.

Interesovanje za nasilni ekstremizam u institucionalnom smislu reči počinje da raste od 2015. godine, kada je Obamina administracija zvanično objavila borbu protiv nasilnog ekstremizma (Perry 2019: 26).¹³ I OEBS u deklaraciji iz 2015. godine ukazuje na potrebu državne borbe protiv nasilnog ekstremizma (uključujući razne ekonomske, socijalne i političke faktore). OEBS je još 2012. godine u svojim dokumentima (Consolidated Framework in the Fight against Terrorism) isticao da borba protiv nasilnog ekstremizma nije više samo zadatak države i bezbednosno-obaveštajnog sektora, već mora uključiti i druge aktere poput mladih, žena, religijskih lidera, civilnog društva i medija.¹⁴

Kao rezultat ovog sastanka nastaje konceptualni okvir UNDP za prevenciju nasilnog ekstremizma koji se temelji na osam fundamentalnih pokretača radikalizacije¹⁵, koje je i OEBS usvojio (OEBS 2014: 29). Nasilni ekstremizam nije *differentia specifica* 21. veka, ali je činjenica da su proces globalizacije, razvoj tehnologije, novih generacija naoružanja i njihova laka dostupnost, ovaj fenomen učinili modernijim, drugačijim i bezbednosno izazovnijim. Poseban doprinos UN u okviru institucionalne borbe protiv nasilnog ekstremizma jeste donošenje rezolucije br. 2178 za borbu protiv nasilnog ekstremizma, koja se zasniva na sprečavanju radikalizacije i mobilisanju pojedinaca za učestvovanje u terorističkim grupama na inostranim ratištima. U svom Akcionom planu za sprečavanje nasilnog ekstremizma iz 2015. godine UN su ohrabrine sve zemlje

13 Ova borba je prvenstveno bila usmerena ka grupama sa džihadističkom ideologijom, poput ISIS-a, Al Šabab-a i sl.

14 <https://www.osce.org/pc/98008?download=true>, 23.02.2019.

15 To su sledeći pokretači: 1. uticaj globalne politike, 2. ekonomska isključenost, 3. politička isključenost, 4. nejednakost u sadejstvu sa kršenjem ljudskih prava, 5. nezadovoljstvo postojećim ekonomskosocijalnim sistemom, 6. neprihvatanje raznolikosti u društvu, 7. slabi kapaciteti države i nedostatak bezbednosti, 8. promena globalne kulture (sa posebnim osvrtom na intenziviranje nasilja u medijima).

članice da rade na sveobuhvatnom sprečavanju nasilnog ekstremizma kroz donošenje različitih strategija i akcionih planova.¹⁶

USAID se takođe temeljno bavi nasilnim ekstremizmom, uključujući ne samo prevenciju i borbu, već i njegovo definisanje: „Nasilni ekstremizam je zagovaranje, podržavanje, pripremanje ili na bilo koji drugi način davanje podrške (ili opravdanja) ideološki motivisanom nasilju u cilju ostvarivanja socijalnih, ekonomskih ili političkih ciljeva” (USAID 2011: 2-3).

Nasilni ekstremizam se može predstaviti kao „upotreba raznih sredstava kojima se izražavaju stavovi koji podstiču, opravdavaju ili glorifikuju nasilje terorista, u unapređenju određenih verovanja ili ponašanja koja pokušavaju da izazovu druge terorističke akte, kriminalne aktivnosti ili podstaknu mržnju, što može dovesti do nasilja u zajednici” (Kenneth Wither J. 2016: 40). Ova definicija je preuzeta od *UK's Crown Prosecution Service*.

Zakonska regulativa u Srbiji je u skladu sa međunarodnim trendovima prepoznala opasnost od nasilnog ekstremizma. Naša zemlja je 2017. godine usvojila Nacionalnu strategiju za sprečavanje i borbu protiv terorizma (za period 2017. do 2021. godine)¹⁷ u kojoj su nasilni ekstremizam i radikalizacija koja vodi u terorizam, definisani kao aktuelni bezbednosni fenomeni. Ova strategija zajedno sa Akcionim planom ističe četiri oblasti kojima će se baviti u budućnosti: 1) prevencija terorizma, nasilnog ekstremizma i radikalizacije koji vode u terorizam, 2) zaštita, uočavanje i otklanjanje pretnji od terorizma i slabosti u sistemu, 3) krivično gonjenje terorista, uz poštovanje ljudskih prava, vladavine prava i demokratije, i 4) odgovor sistema u slučaju terorističkog napada.

Državne strategije u borbi protiv nasilnog ekstremizma i radikalizacije su veoma značajne u bezbednosnom kontekstu, ali one se prvenstveno bave prevencijom i borbom protiv nasilnog ekstremizma i radikalizacije, stavljajući u drugi plan definiciono mapiranje ovih fenomena.

Interesantno je da su neke države eksplicitno razdvojile ekstremizam od radikalizma, kao što je to u slučaju Holandije iz 2004.

16 <https://www.un.org/counterterrorism/ctitf/en/plan-action-prevent-violent-extremism>, 27.02.2019.

17 Nacionalna strategija za sprečavanje i borbu protiv terorizma za period 2017. do 2021. http://www.srbija.gov.rs/vesti/dokumenti_sekcija.php?id=45678, 01.01.2019.

godine: „Radikalizam je aktivno traganje i/ili davanje podrške dalekosežnim promenama u društvu, koje mogu predstavljati opasnost po demokratski sistem u društvu, i sadržati nedemokratske metode (sredstva) koja mogu naneti štetu demokratskom pravnom poretku” (Perry 2019: 17).

Kada je reč o procesu radikalizacije, većina institucija je prihvatila činjenicu da ova pojava može imati pozitivno i negativno značenje. Jednu od najpreciznijih distinkcija između tzv. „pozitivne” i „negativne” radikalizacije napravio je OEBS. „Radikalizacija nije pretnja društvu ukoliko nije povezana sa nasiljem ili drugim nezakonitim radnjama” (OEBS 2014:17). Prema OEBS-ovom priručniku, radikalizacija čak može biti pozitivan podsticaj za dobre promene u društvu, poput npr. ukidanja ropstva ili proširenja ženskih prava. Radikalizacija koja vodi ka terorizmu je „dinamičan proces u kom pojedinac postepeno prihvata terorističko nasilje kao moguć, možda čak i legitiman, način delovanja. To na kraju može, ali ne mora, navesti tu osobu da zagovara, podržava ili učestvuje u terorizmu” (OEBS 2014:17). Može se zaključiti da je proces radikalizacije ambivalentnog karaktera i da označava korenite promene u jednom društvu. Te promene mogu biti konstruktivne i onda možemo govoriti o tzv. „pozitivnoj” ili „nenasilnoj” radikalizaciji. Međutim, ono što korespondira sa nasilnim ekstremizmom je tzv. „negativna” radikalizacija koju možemo nazvati i „nasilnom” radikalizacijom. Zbog toga kod OEBS-a srećemo najprecizniju odrednicu u institucionalnom diskursu a to je „radikalizacija koja može voditi ka nasilnom ekstremizmu i terorizmu”.

Jedna od prvih institucionalnih analiza radikalizacije je oformljena u njujorškoj policiji (Department Intelligence Division) još 2007. godine. Na osnovu 11 studija slučaja (koje su se pretežno bazirale na analizi džihadističke ideologije) napravljen je model radikalizacije koji se odvija u četiri faze (Ceylan, Kiefer 2013: 162).

1. Prva faza „preradikalizacije” je period u kome individua još uvek nije došla u kontakt sa „toksičnim” idejama ekstremista. Ovde ne postoji mogućnost identifikacije nekih faktora koji će predisponirati ekstremizam, jer je svaki proces radikalizacije individualnog karaktera i zavisi od osobe do osobe.

2. Druga faza „preidentifikacije” podrazumeva istraživanje ideologije kojoj se pojedinac priklanja, na šta može u velikoj

meri uticati neki stresan događaj (relativna deprivacija, gubitak ili smrt bližnjih, diskriminacija, osećaj nepravde...) kao svojevrsan „okidač za ekstremizam”.

3. U trećoj fazi „indoktrinacije” individua u potpunosti usvaja ideološka uverenja i sistem vrednosti ekstremističke grupe. Ovde je od ključnog značaja zblizavanje sa liderima grupe koji imaju veliki autoritet nad novopridošlim članovima.

4. Poslednja faza „džihadizacije” uključuje usvajanje svih operacionalnih aktivnosti i direktno učešće u okviru violentnih akata.

Uprkos veoma studioznom pristupu u objašnjenju procesa radikalizacije, ovaj model ima jedan nedostatak, a to je da se ne može primenjivati u opštem kontekstu, jer je usko usmeren ka isključivo „džihadističkom” ekstremizmu.

Činjenica je da institucije kako na nacionalnom, tako i na međunarodnom nivou tragaju za prihvatljivim definicijama nasilnog ekstremizma i radikalizacije. Imajući u vidu da su to relativno novi fenomeni koji se tek etabliraju unutar institucionalnog nivoa, čini se da će se za sada primat dati više radu na terenu (sa ciljem preveniranja nasilnih akata), a da će njihovo definiciono određenje biti predmet akademskih rasprava.

5. NASILNI EKSTREMIZAM I RADIKALIZACIJA U AKADEMSKOM DISKURSU

U ovom trenutku se samo na *google books*-u nalazi 1,430,000 knjiga i drugih tekstova koje u svom naslovu sadrže reč ekstremizam¹⁸. To svedoči o velikom interesovanju akademske zajednice za istraživanjem ovog fenomena.¹⁹ Upravo sve veća zainteresovanost za proučavanjem ekstremizma i njegovih pojavnih oblika utiče i na sve veću konfuziju u akademskom svetu. Poistovećivanje ekstremizma sa radikalizmom je jedna od „fatalnih” grešaka koje često srećemo u akademskom diskursu. Valeri Peri (Valery Perry) dobro primećuje sledeću distinkciju između radikalizma i eks-

18 <https://www.google.com/search?tbm=bks&q=extremism>, 04.03.2019.

19 Frekventnost reči „ekstremizam” se na ovom sajtu značajno povećala (uključujući i broj tekstova), u poređenju sa 2015. godinom kada je autorka ovoga teksta pretraživala zastupljenost reči „ekstremizam”, koji je u tom trenutku iznosio 593 000 pogodaka. Izvor: Marija Đorić, *Ekstremna levica: ideološki aspekti levičarskog ekstremizma*, Institut za političke studije, Beograd, 2016, str. 13.

tremizma: „Dok radikalizam ima tendenciju da bude povezan sa sistemom uverenja, ekstremizam implicira sistem uverenja, plus akciju” (Perry 2019: 17). Ona pokreće interesantnu debatu oko tzv. „reciprocitetne radikalizacije”. Ovaj termin se bazira na ideji da jedna vrsta ekstremizma uzrokuje drugu vrstu ekstremizma. Dobar primer za to je odnos između desničarskog i tzv. islamističkog ekstremizma, koji međusobno uzrokuju jedan drugog (Perry 2019: 20).

Dodatni problem u akademskom diskursu stvara termin „nasilnog ekstremizma” koji je malignog karaktera u odnosu na tzv. „nenasilni ekstremizam”. Veoma je tanka granica između nasilnog i nenasilnog ekstremizma. Upravo zbog toga Šmid naglašava da su obe vrste ekstremizma samo „dve strane istog novčića” (Schmidt 2014:15). Nasilni ekstremizam je fenomen koji predstavlja most između nenasilnog ekstremizma i terorizma. Nasilni ekstremizam je često i sinonim za terorizam, jer nema terorizma bez nasilnog ekstremizma.²⁰ Nenasilni ekstremizam možemo odrediti kao ostvarivanje nasilnih ciljeva nenasilnim metodama.²¹ Zapravo, nenasilni ekstremizam se više odnosi na određene stavove, vrednosti i uverenja koja su protivrečna savremenom demokratskom poretku, ali koja se ne sprovode u praksi. Dakle, nedostaje akcija, pa samim tim i eksplicitno iskazivanje nasilja. Upravo zbog toga je izučavanje (i mapiranje) ove vrste ekstremizma veoma problematično, jer dolazi u koliziju sa veoma osetljivom temom, a to su ljudska prava.²²

Većina akademskih definicija nasilnog ekstremizma u fokus uglavnom stavlja političko nasilje: „Nasilni ekstremizam je širok pojam koji podrazumeva bilo koje nasilje inspirisano određenim uverenjima, uključujući (ali ne nužno) i političke ideologije” (Lombardi 2015: 203). Mnogi određujući nasilni ekstremizam, ukazuju i na njegovu potencijalnu vezu sa terorizmom: „To je volja da se koristi ili podržava upotreba nasilja za ostvarivanje određenih verovanja, uključujući ona koja su političke, socijalne ili ideološke prirode. Nasilni ekstremizam može uključivati i akte terorizma” (Khader 2016: xxi).

20 To ne znači da će svaki nasilni ekstremizam preći u terorizam. Prema: Đorić Marija, *Ekstremna desnica: međunarodni aspekti desničarskog ekstremizma*, Udruženje nauka i društvo Srbije, Beograd, 2014, str. 38.

21 Npr. kada se koriste sve metode savremene demokratije za ostvarivanje nekih nasilnih ciljeva kao što je etnički „čista” država.

22 Ovo se posebno odnosi na slobodu govora i mišljenja.

Pojedini teoretičari elaboriraju ekstremizam kroz prizmu „homegrown” nasilnog ekstremizma (HVE – Homegrown Violent Extremism), tj. „domaćeg” nasilnog ekstremizma. Ovde se zapravo radi o nasilnim aktima ekstremista koji su izvedeni od strane državljana te zemlje na čijoj teritoriji se sprovodi nasilje.²³ Tako recimo, Erol Souters (Erroll Southers) smatra da domaći nasilni ekstremizam predstavlja „teroristički akt u kontekstu ideološki motivisanog nasilja ili zavere, koje izvršavaju državljani SAD ili oni pojedinci sa prebivalištem na teritoriji SAD” (Southers 2015:1). Ovaj autor izučava ekstremizam u formi „domaćeg” nasilja i to koncentrisanog isključivo na teritoriji Amerike, čime je navedena definicija i usko prostorno ograničena.

Što se tiče radikalizacije, ona je shvaćena kao proces u kome „individua ili grupa usvaja nasilne oblike akcije kojima se direktno povezuje sa ekstremističkom ideologijom u političkom, socijalnom ili religijskom kontekstu” (Khosrokhavar, Todd 2017:1). Za sada postoje dve teorijske škole mišljenja koje se bave fenomenom radikalizacije (Lombardi 2015: 84).

1. Prva polazi od činjenice da radikalizacija opravdava nasilje (poput terorizma) zarad ostvarivanja određenih ciljeva;

2. Druga smatra da radikalizacija može podrazumevati usvajanje određenog sistema vrednosti koji je daleko od prihvatljivog (tzv. „mejnstrim”), koja vodi radikalnim promenama, a samim tim koristi i nekonvencionalna politička sredstva.

Pojedini teoretičari proces radikalizacije dovode u vezu sa grupnim interesima: „Radikalizacija je intenziviranje ekstremističkih uverenja, osećanja i ponašanja sa ciljem opravdanja nasilja koje nastaje između određenih grupa, i zahteva žrtve u kontekstu odbrane grupnih interesa” (Mc Cauley, Moskalenko 2008: 146). Ovi teoretičari su nekoliko godina kasnije objavili knjigu u kojoj ponaosob elaboriraju individualnu i grupnu radikalizaciju.

Dodatni problem u određenju radikalizacije u akademskom diskursu nastaje u kontekstu njene klasifikacije. Lorenzo (Lorenzo) na primer, konstatuje razliku između „kongitivne radikalizacije” (koja se tiče ekstremističkih ideja) i „nasilne radikalizacije” (koja

23 “Homegrown” ekstremizam (a to se odnosi i na “homegrown” terorizam) podrazumeva ne samo državljanje, već i one pojedince koji (nemaju državljanstvo) ali zato imaju prebivalište u onoj zemlji na čijoj teritoriji sprovode akt nasilja.

se svodi na ekstremističke metode) (Vidino 2010). Još jedna u nizu grešaka prilikom određenja radikalizacije jeste što se ona percipira isključivo negativno i što se uglavnom dovodi u vezu sa „pristicama muslimanskog identiteta” (Southers 2015: 53). Važno je napomenuti da se radikalizacija koja vodi ka nasilnom ekstremizmu i terorizmu ne može vezati samo za jednu ideologiju, religiju, naciju ili rasu. Ovakvim simplifikovanim pristupom rizikujemo da jedan čitav narod, grupu ili pripadnike određene religije ili ideologije stigmatizujemo. Treba znati da niko nije „pelcovan” od nasilnog ekstremizma, pa samim tim i ni od procesa radikalizacije.

Smatramo da je danas najvalidnije koristiti dva kriterijuma, kada je reč o klasifikaciji radikalizacije.²⁴ Prvi kriterijum je **stepen nasilnosti**, na osnovu čega možemo izdvojiti **nasilnu** i **nenasilnu** radikalizaciju (čije karakteristike smo već prethodno objasnili u tekstu). Drugi trenutno aktuelan kriterijum može biti klasifikacija na osnovu **sredstava i metoda** koje se koriste u ovom procesu. U tom smislu reči razlikujemo (Đorić 2018: 54):

1. Direktnu (neposrednu) radikalizaciju
2. Indirektnu (posrednu, samostalnu ili samoinicijativnu) radikalizaciju. *Onlajn* radikalizacija predstavlja podvrstu indirektno radikalizacije.

Direktna radikalizacija iziskuje neposredan kontakt sa regruterima koji su članovi određene ekstremističke ili terorističke grupe. Obično su regruteri osobe iz naše neposredne okoline (prijatelji, rođaci, verski ili ideološki autoriteti i sl.). Za razliku od direktne, indirektna radikalizacija podrazumeva da individua koja se radikalizuje ne mora uopšte imati direktan kontakt ili susret sa predstavnicima određene ekstremističke/terorističke grupe ili organizacije. Kao primarano sredstvo radikalizacije se obično koriste savremena sredstva komunikacije (putem propagande), u okviru čega značajno mesto pripada internetu (pre svega društvenim mrežama).²⁵ Ovaj proces je ponekad veoma teško pratiti, jer osim zvaničnih sajtova i društvenih mreža koji su svima lako dostupni, ekstremisti koriste i tzv. enkriptovane aplikacije poput Telegrama.

24 U ovom slučaju elaboriramo radikalizaciju koja može voditi ka nasilnom ekstremizmu i terorizmu.

25 Dosadašnje iskustvo je pokazalo da ekstremisti najviše koriste Twitter.

6. ZAKLJUČAK

Izučavanje nasilnog ekstremizma i radikalizacije nije nimalo lak zadatak upravo zbog amorfnog i veoma kompleksnog akademskog i institucionalnog diskursa. Kako da se borimo protiv nečega ako ne znamo šta je to? A da bismo znali šta su nasilni ekstremizam i radikalizacija, morali bismo najpre da ih odredimo.

Uprkos velikom broju jezičkih indistinkcija, čini se da vokabular nije glavni problem kod definicionog određenja ovih fenomena, već vrednosni sistem. Radi se o tome da ljudskoj prirodi nije uvek imanentna objektivnost, posebno kada je reč o fenomenu ekstremizma, koji je inače obojen snažnim emocijama. Lišena objektivnosti, nauka je lišena istinitosti, i na taj način gubi smisao svoga postojanja. Zbog svega toga akademska zajednica ima izuzetno težak zadatak u profilisanju nasilnog ekstremizma i radikalizacije, posebno zbog činjenice da je nauka često proizvod aktuelnih ideologija, tj. politika.

I u institucionalnom kontekstu nailazimo na svojevrstne izazove, jer borba protiv nasilnog ekstremizma nije samo rad u praksi, već i teorijsko oblikovanje problema, mogućnost prepoznavanja ideologija, motiva i cilja delovanja, sa tendencijom predviđanja određenih događaja. Da bi se ceo ovaj „mozaik istraživanja” uspešno sklopio, mora da postoji koordinacija između akademske i institucionalne zajednice koje će biti međusobno percipirane ne kao rivali, već kao partneri. Samo zajedničkim radom i učenjem iz međusobnih primera možemo omogućiti jednostavniji, univerzalniji i opšteprihvaćen diskurs na temu nasilnog ekstremizma i radikalizacije, ali se čini da će to tada proteći još mnogo vremena.

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Marija Djorić

**UNDERSTANDING
VIOLENT EXTREMISM
AND RADICALIZATION
IN INSTITUTIONAL AND ACADEMIC
DISCOURSE**

Abstract

The aim of this research is the understanding of violent extremism and radicalization in institutional and academic discourse. The content analysis examined the most important definitions of violent extremism and radicalization, in order to determine their most significant characteristics. In the first part of the article, the author explained the amorphism and variability of the phenomenon of extremism, in order to point to the positive and negative context of the phenomenon of radicalization. In the second segment, attention is devoted to the elaboration of definitions within the institutional discourse, while the focus of the third part is on academic discourse. It was found that the essential problem is not the vocabulary, but the value system predisposing the variety and unevenness of definitions, both in academic and institutional contexts.

Keywords: discourse, academic discourse, institutional discourse, extremism, violent extremism, radicalization, violence, terrorism, ideology.

Zoran Ćirjaković*

**ZNAČAJ KULTURALNOSTI
DISKURSA ZA RAZUMEVANJE
GLOBALIZACIJE
„UNIVERZALNIH“
POLITIČKIH NORMI**

Apstrakt

Rad ističe važne negativne posledice redovno zanemarivane činjenice da je globalni politički diskurs, odnosno set normi i ideja koje ga konstituišu, zapadnocentričan, proizvod evropskog iskustva. Ono je, kao i sama Evropa, u sklopu postkolonijalne kritike, na koju se autor, uz novije antropološke uvide, snažno oslanja, predstavljeno kao ne samo partikularno već i „provincijalno“. Autor ukazuje da zato globalni politički diskurs, koji je proizvod „provincijalne“, evropske istorije, treba posmatrati kao univerzalan samo u smislu da je postao sveprisutan u sklopu procesa izraženo asimetrične globalizacije. Autor uvodi pojam kulturalnosti diskursa, ne gubeći iz vida njegovu materijalnost, kako bi ukazao na značaj i konstitutivnu prirodu uloge koju kulturalno prevođenje ima u aproprijaciji i ukorenjivanju globalizovanih političkih normi u svakom nezapadnom kontekstu, uključujući i procese društvene i političke tranzicije. Kulturalno prevođenje, kojim lokalni akteri daju smisao i značenje novousvojenim, globalizovanim diskursima i praksama, isporučuje vernakularne

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modalitete zapadnocentričnih normi. Tako i globalni politički diskurs postaje kulturalan – istovremeno isti i različit. Kulturalnost diskursa ističe potrebu da se, ne samo u regionalnim i studijama demokratizacije, naglasak pomeri sa definicija na tumačenja, što je brojnim autoritetima unutar discipline delovalo nedovoljno naučno. Autor daje pregled načina kako su političke nauke pokušavale da uzmu u obzir uticaj kulture i analizira zašto rezultati nisu zadovoljavajući, te je i dalje opravdano govoriti o nevoljama politikologije s kulturom, kako je sugerisano u okviru afrikanističkih istraživanja. U zaključku rada istaknuto je zašto su te nevolje posebno izražene u liminalnim regionima kao što je Balkan, redovno stigmatizovan u optimističkim tumačenjima globalizacije i predstavljan kao neevropska Evropska. Na Balkanu sklonost ignorisanju kulturalnosti modernog političkog diskursa i praksi osnažuje stare balkanističke i uspostavlja nove autobalkanističke stereotipe, koji dodatno patologizuju i diskredituju lokalne aktere i zatomljuju relevantnost njihovih iskustava. Autor sugerije da što su kulturalne razlike manje ili manje prepoznatljive, verovatnoća neprepoznavanja kulturalnosti diskursa i očekivane posledice kulturalne slabovidosti postaju veće, što uvažavanje kulturalnosti diskursa čini posebno važnim za analize političkog u Srbiji.

Ključne reči: kulturalnost diskursa, političke norme, globalizacija, zapadnocentričnost, provincijalizovanje Evrope, kulturalno prevođenje, vernakularni modaliteti.

1. UVOD

Na prvi pogled, globalizacijski procesi u političkoj sferi proizveli su ravan svet. Još u kolonijalnom periodu, sa Zapada je globalno rasprostiranje započela država-nacija, da bi vremenom postala politička norma za koju je danas malo ko spreman čak i da promišlja stvarnu alternativu, dakle onu koja se ne bi svodila na njeno puko, manje ili više globalno, rastezanje. Zatim su planetu, u

velikoj meri, kolonizovale izborna demokratija, organizacije civilnog društva i set pratećih zapadnocentričnih političkih institucija i praksi. Sa jednim brojem specifičnih izuzetaka, ove političke preskripcije i okviri, možemo ih posmatrati i kao norme,¹ postali su univerzalno prisutni. Nažalost, ovakvo, idejno i institucionalno poravnjavanje sveta u političkoj sferi bilo je i ostalo obeleženo tendencijom da se njihova sveprisutnost, globalni domet, olako i sasvim neprimereno izjadnači sa univerzalnom validnošću ili primerenošću, što je drugi, bitno različit smisao pojma univerzalno (Rorty 2007: 50). On je izuzetno važan u analizama politike u svakom kontekstu koji se razlikuje od zapadnog – rodnog mesta globalnih političkih normi i institucija, danas univerzalizovanih samo u prvom smislu, koji bi po sebi bio trivijalan da ne govorimo o svetu obeleženom ogromnom asimetrijom moći i bogatstva.

Pažljiviji pogled na globalnu normativnu i institucionalnu ravnicu u političkoj sferi otkriva brojna odstupanja i „ponore“, zbrku i nered, koji je najizraženiji na periferiji svetskog sistema, u postkolonijama (Mbembe 2001: 53), ali je uočljiv i na poluperiferijama kao što je Balkan (Jano 2008: 56). Ove neravnine i „nepravilnosti“ privukle su pažnju brojnih aktera, koji su pokušavali da ih tumače i, neretko, želeli da doprinesu njihovom otklanjanju – političara, diplomata i novinara koliko i politikologa. S jedne strane, sve je isto, ali, s druge, mnogo toga deluje različito, često sasvim neprepoznatljivo – i same nezapadne države i njihove institucije, demokratija i civilno društvo. Brojni autori su na različite načine iskazivali shvatanje da „to nije to“, da nije ono što „treba da bude“. Oni su na ne-Zapadu redovno videli senke, iluzije, fikcije, loše kopije, izigravanja, hronično slabe, krhke, neuspešne ili neispravne imitacije. Nažalost, za ovaj upadljivi i hronični, nekada možda i neotklonjivi nesklad između označitelja, ključnih zapadnocentričnih normi koje konstituišu globalno hegemoni politički diskurs, i označenog, njihove operacionalizacije u različitim nezapadnim kontekstima, krivica je po pravilu svaljivana na nezapadne

1 Govorim o političkim normama kako bi istakao da je reč o idejama koje imaju snagu normativne zapovesti. One normalizuju subjekte i njihovo usvajanje u savremenom svetskom sistemu postalo je, između ostalog, neodvojivo od potrebe da obezbede sebi legitimitet i budu prihvaćeni kao „ispravni“ i, makar deklarativno, uvaženi i ravnopravni članovi „međunarodne zajednice“. Globalizovane političke norme su zapadnocentrične i svoju moć i univerzalnu prisutnost u velikoj meri duguju shvatanju da su moderna zapadna društva „dobila ultimativnu formu, koja je i normativno i funkcionalno superiorna ostalim društvima“ (Rosich and Wagner 2016: 2), koje je, pak, neodvojivo od razmera zapadne ekonomske moći i vojne premoći.

subjekte. Pri tome, ona je redovno izražavana u rasističkim i kultur-rasističkim kategorijama, koje su, naročito u senci zavodljive, i, naravno, zapadnocične, iluzije o „kraju istorije“ (Fukuyama 1992), snažno sugerisale nezrelost, inferiornost ili „civilizacijsku“ zaostalost nezapadnih subjekata, sasvim na liniji devetnaestovekovnog orijentalističkog diskursa.

Oslanjajući se na uvide iz antropologije i subalternih studija, važne grane postkolonijalne kritike, pristupe koji nisu dobili značajnije mesto u komparativnoj politici i regionalnim studijama, u ovom radu ukazujem da globalizovani diskurs, kojim operišu kako političari, uključujući transnacionalne i lokalne aktere koji referiraju na političku sferu, tako i politikolozi, nije kulturalno neutralan. On se ne može adekvatno razumeti i tumačiti bez uzimanja u obzir različitih posledica činjenice da ovaj, danas hegemoni, univerzalno prisutni diskurs nije proizvod istinski zajedničkog, univerzalnog ljudskog iskustva i istorije već da se, pre početka njegove globalizacije, razvio na Zapadu, u jednom specifičnom, partikularnom kulturalnom kontekstu. Parafrazirajući shvatanje o materijalnosti diskursa, „materijalnom karakteru svake diskurzivne strukture“ (Laclau and Mouffe 1985: 108), ali, istovremeno, i nadovezujući se na njega –ističem *kulturalnost diskursa*, postojanje čvora, sklopa kulturalnog i diskurzivnog, kulturalni karakter globalnog političkog diskursa. Njega je potrebno uzeti u obzir kada razmišljamo o ishodima važnog segmenta globalizacijskih procesa u političkoj sferi – globalnog rasprostiranja zapadnih političkih institucija i normi, koje su, postepeno, prekrile celu, odnosno, kada je reč o nekim činocima, skoro celu planetu.² Naravno, i u ovom slučaju neko može sugerisati da bi bilo adekvatnije govoriti o diskurzivnosti kulturalnog, ali to ne menja poentu na koju želim da ukažem.

Globalni politički diskurs – set normi, shvatanja i ideja, koje danas oblikuju celokupnu političku sferu i kanališu politički život– ne može se na jednom specifičnom lokalitetu, odnosno u specifičnom kontekstu, konstituisati kao diskurs van specifičnog kulturalnog okvira u kome se vrši njegova aproprijacija i lokalizacija, odnosno, bolje je reći, vernakularizacija.³ Globalizovani

2 Izuzeci su retki, i danas, kada govorimo o političkim normama, nikada nisu sasvim izuzeci. Čak i Severna Koreja nije samo država-nacija već u svom zvaničnom imenu ističe da je demokratska republika.

3 Pojam vernakularno, koji je dobio važno mesto u postkolonijalnim studijama, a korišćen je i u antropologiji, pozajmljen je iz lingvistike, gde označava lokalne jezičke varijetete, „narečja“.

diskurs, tačnije sve njegove ključne reči (država, demokratija, civilno društvo, ljudska prava, političke stranke...), jeste svuda u svetu identičan, ali je njegov smisao, značenje ključnih reči kojima operišu akteri, bitno različit. U procesu aproprijacije i lokalizacije svi konstitutivni pojmovi ovog globalizovanog diskursa bivaju kulturalno prevedeni i dobijaju nova, vernakularna značenja. Zato, kada kažemo, na primer, država na Zapadu i na nekoj od različitih lokacija na ne-Zapadu – u Indiji, DR Kongu ili Srbiji, ne govorimo o istoj stvari. Mnogo toga biva izgubljeno, ali, istovremeno, i proizvedeno u procesu kulturalnog prevođenja, po pravilu neosveščene reinterpetacije, kako diskursa tako i prakse koju označava i konstituše. Njime lokalni akteri, sa svojim duboko ukorenjenim shvatanjima i specifičnim razumevanjem sopstva i mogućnosti delovanja, daju smisao državi i svim drugim ključnim rečima političkog diskursa. Zato, iako su označitelji isti, ono što u sklopu globalizacijskih procesa stigne na nezapadne lokacije nikada nije „to“, ono što je krenulo sa Zapada, i što bi, prema očekivanjima baziranim na kulturalno nedovoljno osetljivim pristupima, trebalo da bude. Želim da ukažem da srž problema, koji je mnoge autore navodio na više ili manje eksplicitne orijentalističke, pa i rasističke zaključke, nije u nezapadnim subjektima, i njihovim navodnim kulturalnim i civilizacijskim patologijama, već u teško prepoznatljivom, ali neizbežnom preobražavanju „putujućih“ temeljnih normi modernog političkog života. Iako kontekstualni faktori uslovljavaju ne samo šta ove norme postaju u procesu aproprijacije već i kako i koliko se mogu vremenom transformisati, razvijati i „popravlјati“, priroda njihove uloge i ogroman značaj su često bivali ignorisani, a neretko se može govoriti i o nedovoljnoj adekvatnosti ili neprimerenosti ovih normi u drugačijem kontekstu. Sve ovo je redovno ostajalo skriveno iza globalizovanog, univerzalno prisutnog, ali ne i univerzalno validnog, svima primerenog političkog diskursa.

Ako navedeno tumačenje kulturalnosti globalizovanog diskursa dopunimo shvatanjem o njegovoj materijalnosti, može se reći da ova specifična diskurzivna struktura, pored materijalnog karaktera, koji ističu Ernesto Laclau (Ernesto Laclau) i Šantal Muf

Vremenom je postao odrednica „istog ali različitog“, na primer kada u nekom kontekstu označitelj dobija novo značenje, odnosno kada isti označitelj opisuje bitno drugačije označeno. Vernakularizacija je proces simultane aproprijacije i kulturalnog prevođenja, kojim jedan pojam, norma, u novom kontekstu dobija drugačije značenje i smisao. Može se govoriti ne samo o vernakularizaciji pojmova i diskursa već i praksi koje označavaju.

(Chantal Mouffe), ima i kulturalni karakter. Drugim rečima, kada govorimo o globalnom političkom diskursu, skupu kategorija koje danas konstituišu „političku modernost“⁴ širom sveta, nije dovoljno poreći mogućnost postojanja „klasične dihotomije između objektivnog polja konstituisanog izvan bilo kakve diskurzivne intervencije i diskursa koji se sastoji od čistog izražavanja misli“ (Laclau and Mouffe 1985: 108) već je potrebno uvažiti da ne može postojati politički diskurs ili praksa čije je značenje i smisao moguće tumačiti bez uzimanja u obzir kulture, specifičnosti lokalnog konteksta u kome biva odomaćen i operacionalizovan. Naime, na svakoj specifičnoj lokaciji, globalni normativni okvir biva rekonstruisan i rekonstituisan, zadržavajući iste konture, označitelje, ali, istovremeno, menjajući sadržaj i smisao, označeno na koje referiraju. Značenje konstitutivnih ideja i normi biva iznova proizvedeno u procesu kulturalnog prevođenja. Pri tome, lokalizacijom globalnog, tačnije, i u ovom slučaju, zapadnog koje biva globalizovano, gubi se ne samo redovno očekivana ili podrazumevana veza između označenog (lokalnog) i označitelja (globalnog) već i veliki deo spektra pretpostavljenih mogućnosti za njegovu konsolidaciju, razvoj, transformaciju, tranziciju ili jačanje, koji redovno, mada neosnovano, biva utkan kako u naučna promišljanja političke sfere tako i u praktične politike. Naravno, sva navedena razmatranja su sasvim nevažna u originalnom, zapadnom kontekstu, gde su u političkoj sferi globalno i lokalno podudarni i gde se ne može govoriti o kulturalnom prevođenju. Taj zapadni izuzetak, koga treba imati u vidu i kada analiziramo navodnu zapadnu/američku izuzetnost, ilustruje značaj shvatanja, izloženog u okviru teorija globalizacije, da ne postoji neko „originalno globalno stanje“, ono koje negde prvo nije bilo lokalno. Naime, globalizaciju u svakom specifičnom slučaju možemo posmatrati kao spoj dva konsekvativna procesa. Prvi, globalno rasprostiranje lokalnog, najčešće zapadnog, u uslovima ogromne asimetrije moći koja karakteriše sve savremene interakcije. Zatim drugi, njegova lokalizacije na nekom drugom prostoru, po pravilu podređenom i nezapadnom (de Sousa Santos 2006: 396).

U sledećem delu rada dat je pregleda pristupa i perspektiva kojima su u političkim naukama uvažavani kulturalni činiooci, kao

4 Iako su sukcesivno globalizovane i „univerzalizovane“, moderne političke norme je uputno posmatrati kao celinu, političku modernost, skup koji je dobio „koherentne konceptualne temelje“ (Rosich and Wagner 2016: 2).

i neki od razloga zašto je sugerisan zaključak da one nisu uspevale da adekvatno odgovore na izazove kulturalnog i da se može govoriti o „nevoljama s kulturom“. U ovo delu rada istaknuti su i razlozi zašto u mejnstrimu discipline nije bilo dovoljno prostora za prepoznavanje prirode i veličine problema sa samo prividno univerzalnim političkim normama u nezapadnim, kao i za uvažavanje implikacija onda kada je njihova neprimerenost, neadekvatnost ili manjkavost bivala prepoznata. Zatim, u trećem delu rada, ukazano je na slabosti dominantne tranzicione paradigme i izložena konstitutivna, utemeljiteljska ulogu koju kulturalno prevođenje ima u globalizaciji političkih normi. Ovaj deo rada se bavi i pitanjima kako i zašto preoblikovane, rekonstituisane političke norme oblikuju vernakularne modalitete, koji su nekada ne samo bitno različiti već i nesamerljivi sa zapadnim originalima. U ovom delu je istaknuto i da globalni politički diskurs za nezapadne aktere smisao dobija kao kulturalni i, u senci asimetrije moći i normativnog nasilja, postaje isti ali različit. Konačno, u zaključku je izložena veličina i priroda prepreka koje sprečavaju uvažavanje kulturalnosti diskursa i razlozi zašto će ono biti posebno teško u Srbiji, kao liminalnoj državi jedne, već vekovima stigmatizovane i diskurzivno deevropizovane, druge i drugačije Evrope – koja jeste deo Evrope, ali njena društvena i politička istorija nije pratila njen dominantni, normativni zapadni tok.

2. NEVOLJE S KULTUROM U POLITIČKIM NAUKAMA

U okviru glavnog toka političkih nauka, koje su bile posebno sklone generalizacijama (Hyden 2006: 2), gde je najviše vrednovana potraga za univerzalno validnim teorijama i jasnim definicijama, glavni odgovor na izazove lokalnog predstavljala je hipeprodukcija, uglavnom implicitno, ali jasno vrednosno određujućih prideva, po pravilu sa snažnim negativnim konotacijama. Oni su relativizovali, a u nekim slučajevima i sasvim obesmišljavali, navodno univerzalne odrednice. Tako smo, između ostalog, dobili i oksimorone kao što su proceduralna demokratija i neuspešna država. Oni su trebali da razreše paradoks, koji je stvorilo neopravdano postovećivanje univerzalnog u dva bitno različita smisla, univerzalno prisutnog i univerzalno validnog – da mora da postoji i

ono čega nema.⁵ Sofisticiranije odgovore ponudila je kontekstualna politička analiza. Ona se razvila iz potrebe da budu prevaziđeni problemi sa kojima se suočavala komparativna politika, vezani u velikoj meri za kulturalne i druge razlike koje su komplikovale uporednu analizu, ali i za sve akutnije pitanje postojanja specifičnih kulturalnih pretpostavki koje bi morale da budu zadovoljene kako bi mogla da (pro)funkcioniše liberalna demokratija i drugi zapadno-centrični modeli. Ipak, kontekstualna politička analiza nije uspeła da u okviru političkih nauka ozbiljnije integriše neke od ključnih implikacija kulturalnog obrata, koji je knjigom *Tumačenje kultura* (1973) u društvenim naukama i humanistici pokrenuo Kliford Gerc (Clifford Geertz).

Kultura, po sebi izuzetno složen i teško uhvatljiv pojam, koji odražava važnost socijalizacije subjekata u specifičnom okruženju, predstavlja jednu od ključnih odrednica svakog (lokalnog) konteksta, ali Gercov prekretnički doprinos razumevanju njenog uticaja na subjekte učinio je da detektovanje i operacionalizacija uloge kulturalnih činilaca u istraživanjima postane još teža i mnogima deluje nenaučno u disciplini očaranoj potragom za univerzalnim odgovorima i preokupiranoj merljivim varijablama i kontrolom „spoljnih faktora“. Gercovo shvatanje da analiza kulture i njenih efekata „nije eksperimentalna nauka koja traga za zakonima već interpretativna, u potrazi za značenjem“ (1973: 5), predstavljalo je za mnoge politikologe poziv na nedopustiv iskorak iz prihvatljivog metodološkog okvira, pa i pad u hermenutiku, koja je, činilo se, sklona da kulturi pristupa kao da je reč o književnom tekstu otvorenom za spektar podjednako legitimnih interpretacija (Kuper 1999: 105-106). Ipak, pitanja kako je i zašto kultura važna dobila su značajno mesto i u kontekstualnoj političkoj analizi, koja je pokušala da „kontekst i njegove posledice podvrgne sistematskom opisivanju i objašnjavanju“ (Tilly and Goodin 2006:6). Štaviše, u okviru ovog pristupa, koji je ostao na rubovima mejnstrima političkih nauka, istaknuto je čak i da „kultura nije kontekstualna u odnosu na politiku; ona je esencijalna“ (Thompson, Verweij and Ellis 2006: 320) – što jeste na tragu Gercovog shvatanja da kulturu

5 Ovde je korisno razmišljati o normativnom nasilju, u smislu nasilja samih normi a ne nasilja koje je normativno, kao jednom od indirektnih, nevidljivih oblika nasilja koji predstavljaju važnu polugu globalizacijskih procesa. Pri tome, njegovo delovanje ne osećaju zapadni subjekti, koji političke norme doživljavaju kao svoje i izraz normalnosti, deo rutine i realnosti, koju zato ne vide kao nametnuti okvir i ne vezuju za nasilje (Ćirjaković 2015).

ne treba posmatrati kao spoljni činilac već kao temelj subjektivizacije, potku koja prožima sve aspekte života pripadnika jednog društva i daje smisao konceptima kojima su ovladali.

Verovatno najvažniji doprinos kontekstualne političke analize uvažavanju važnosti partikularnog nasuprot navodno univerzalnog vezan je za operacionalizaciju kategorije političke kulture.⁶ Ali, kultura je i tu, po pravilu, posmatrana jako usko i bila je redukovana na nekoliko glavnih dimenzija, ključne vrednosti, etnicitet i religiju, shvaćenih uglavnom kao eksterni faktori, kontekstualni u jako uskom smislu reči (Ersson and Lane 2008: 420). Zato, iako je omogućio da bolje razumemo načine kako lokalni akteri daju značenje svojim postupcima, pa i kako definišu i redefinišu samo shvatanje političkog (Lichterman and Cefai 2006: 408), fokus na ideju političke kulture nije otvorio pitanja razumevanja, smisla koji subjekti daju institucijama, normama i praksama. Drugim rečima, naglasak u razmatranjima političke kulture je bio na lokalnom pristupu politici, bilo u pojedinim državama bilo, mnogo češće, u različitim segmentima podeljenih, uglavnom zapadnih, multikulturalnih društava, specifičnostima bavljenja politikom i razumevanja političke sfere. U fokusu nije bilo političko po sebi, specifični činioци dinamične političke sfere, koja u mnogim kontekstima biva radikalno preoblikovana pod uticajem globalizacijskih procesa, dakle institucije i norme kojima lokalni akteri pristupaju, sa kojima moraju da se nose i kojima daju smisao. Studije političke kulture nisu posvećivale značajniju pažnju lokalnom značenju novousvojenih političkih ideja i praksi, koje može manje ili više odstupati od pretpostavljenog, „univerzalnog“, kako u praktičnoj tako i u dominantnoj, kulturalno nedovoljno osetljivoj, naučnoj sferi.⁷ Ograničenja i slabosti primetne u analizama političke kulture posledica su činjenice da autori uglavnom nisu uspevali da usvoje dovoljno sveobuhvatan odgovor na pitanje kako je i zašto kultura važna u politici.

6 Političku kulturu možemo definisati kao, „u odnosu na društvene strukture i socijalnu ili individualnu psihologiju“, relativno autonoman skup široko prihvaćenih „simbola i značenja ili načina delovanja“, koji oblikuju političke zahteve, stavove javnog mnjenja i način delovanja političkih subjekata, istovremeno „omogućavajući i ograničavajući šta ljudi mogu reći i učiniti“ (Lichterman and Cefai 2006: 392-393).

7 Samim tim, ozbiljnija pažnja nije mogla biti posvećena ni podjednako važnom i, čini se, još češće zanemarivanom pitanju mere u kojoj su moćni „međunarodni“ i zapadni subjekti uvažavali, pa i prepoznavali bitno različit smisao koji lokalni akteri daju globalnim političkim institucijama i normama.

U okviru regionalnih studija, prvenstveno u afrikanističkim istraživanjima, dakle u kontekstu koji je jako daleko, ako ne i najdalji od zapadnog,⁸ napravljeni su ozbiljniji odmaci od kontekstualne, prvenstveno kulturalne slabovidosti, koja, ako iz slike „celog sveta“ ne isključujemo podsaharska iskustva, postaje prepoznatljiva čak i u nekim od najšire prihvaćenih uvida.⁹ Uostalom, Podsaharska Afrika je odavno isticana kao nepogodna istina ne samo u političkim već i šire, u društvenim naukama, a „afričke realnosti su terale poštene naučnike da neizbežno rastežu čak i najuniverzalnije prihvaćene koncepte u svojim disciplinama“, pa i da govore o „afričkoj izuzetnosti“ (Hyden 2006: 3-4). Suočeni sa neobičnim lokalnim realnostima, svi afrikanisti, pa i politikolozi među njima, bili su skloni da značajnije odstupe od zapadnocentričnog, „univerzalnog“ kategorijalnog aparata. Ipak, treba istaći da su odlučujući doprinos razumevanju političke sfere često davali antropolozi, spremniji i metodološki bolje opremljeni da uvažavaju ulogu i značaj teško uhvatljivih kulturalnih silnica u oblikovanju lokalne političke sfere. Tako smo dobili i vrednosno neutralne pojmove kao što su „država rizom“ i „politika stomaka“ (Bayart 1993), kao i politikološke studije koje su dovodile u pitanje temeljna shvatanja, čak i ono o univerzalnosti same države, kao norme koja danas nema alternativu (Herbst 2000: 260), koja su retko kritički preispitivana u mejnstrimu političkih nauka. Tu se, između ostalih, ističu razmatranje konstruktivne, razvojne uloge „nereda kao političkog instrumenta“ (Chabal and Daloz 1999), kao i problematizovanje „razvoja“, prepoznavanje da se iza ovog naizgled benignog koncepta skriva moćna „antipolitička mašina“, koja može imati ne samo desubjektivizujuće već i, prividno paradoksalne, antirazvojne posledice u zemljama Trećeg sveta (Ferguson 1990). Naravno, i brojni afrikanisti su prepoznali fikcije, senke, karikature i loše kopije navodno univerzalnih originala – ali, po pravilu, nisu vezivale očite manjkavosti i neuspehe za delovanje i kapacitete podsaharskih aktera. Antropolozima fokusiranim na podsaharski region dugujemo shvatanje da se u temelju dominantnih

8 Po pravilu, u afrikanističkim istraživanjima „Afrika“ predstavlja skraćenicu za Podsaharsku Afriku. Ugledni autori ili na početku navedu fusnotu koja ovo ističe ili jednostavno podrazumevaju da će čitaoci razumeti da govore isključivo o afričkim državama južno od Sahare.

9 To ne sugeriše da su one po sebi pogrešne već da, na primer kada govorimo o veberosvkim shvatanjima države, mogu jednostavno biti irelevantne ili nedovoljno relevantne za razumevanje podsaharske države, kojoj je, kako je sugerisano, uputno prići kao „ni afričkoj ni državi“ (Englebert 1997).

pokušaja razumevanja političkog kriju ne samo zapadnocentrične teleologije, koje su dobijale različite naučne i ideološke predznake, već i tranziciona paradigma, njen zavodljivi, „moćni narativ koji je spatijalizovanu globalnu hijerhiju transformisao u temporalizovani istorijski niz“ (Ferguson 2006: 178), prepoznatljiv čak i u radovima naučnika koji su eksplicitno odbijali svaku tranzitološku dezinaciju. Ona se u analizama političke sfere i političkog razvoja prepoznaje u različitim, prividno nevinim, temporalno kodiranim odrednicama, kao što su „još nisu“, „izgradnja“, „nivo razvoja“ ili „konsolidacija“, koje su došle u fokus subalternista, aktivističkog teorijskog projekta razvijenog u Indiji, po aspiracijama i fokusu na deprivilegovane slojeve nalik marksizmu, mada negira temeljne zapadnocentrične pretpostavke marksizma.

Kritički pristupi, na prvom mestu poststrukturalizam, skrenuli su pažnju na važnost diskursa i potrebu da pažnja bude posvećena analizi diskursa, značenjima kodiranim i rekodiranim u jeziku, koji više nije posmatran kao puki prenosilac značenja. Ali, čak i u svojim snažno kritičkim verzijama, to je ostajao zapadnocentričan gest „diktiran evropskim terminima“ i obeležen zapadnim preokupacijama (Almond 2007: 4). U radovima poststrukturalista nije bilo mnogo mesta za kulturalno kodirana značenja, odnosno nestabilnost značenja koja je vezana za kontekstualne činioce na različitim prostorima. Njihov snažni otpor navodno univerzalnim kategorijama nije bio vezan za kulturalne silnice već za asimetriju moći, koja je omogućila Zapadu da bude „onaj koji može da definiše 'pravi' univerzalizam“, prvenstveno u vrednosnom smislu „univerzalno dobro“ (Hansen 2014: 178), uglavnom ostavljajući po strani važna pitanja univerzalne smislenosti i relevantnosti, koja ističu pristupi koji ne beže od optužbi za kulturalni relativizam. Ipak, fokus na vezu moći i stvaranja znanja, ulogu, na različite načine privilegovanih autoriteta, „znalaca“, u konstruisanju značenja izuzetno je značajan za razumevanje brojnih problema sa kojima se suočava, na različite načine podređen i desubjektivizovan, nezapadni svet, uključujući delove Evrope koji su dugo vremena bili van glavnog toka zapadne istorije. Snažni fokus poststrukturalista na reprezentacije, odbacivanje verovanja u fiskna značenja i univerzalne diskurse, kao i snažno isticanje važnosti interpretacija, imao je primetan uticaj u političkim naukama (Khan and Wenman 2017: 513–514). Poststrukturalizam je tako otvorio je put (re)interpretacijama na koje

je navodio kulturalni obrat u društvenim naukama, a posebno je značajno i to što je istakao važnost epistemologije, pitanja izbora „koje razumevanje treba usvojiti“ (Hansen 2014: 170).

Kritička analiza diskursa je važna jer je, koristeći interdisciplinarni pristup, uvažavala „konstitutivni potencijal diskursa“ i analizirala „kako diskurs igra ulogu kao aspekt društvene prakse bez redukovanja te prakse na diskurs“, odnosno njen diskurzivni aspekt, ali i ukazala da „analiza diskursa nikada ne može biti potpuna“ (Farrelly 2010: 98-99). Naglasak je uglavnom bio na razumevanju kako društva „organizuju i istovremeno bivaju organizovana korišćenjem jezika“, kao i, često neprepoznatim, konvencijama koje regulišu korišćenje jezika (Farrelly 2010: 99). U fokusu kritičke analize diskursa su uglavnom bili interesi i raspodela moći u društvu, prvenstveno pitanja čijim interesima služi određeni diskurs i čije interese delegitimiše ili negira, odnosno kako je „diskurs uključen u odnose moći“ (Janks 1997: 329). Metodologija kritičke analize diskursa, koja je diskurs snažno vezala za tri dimezije ukorenjene u istom kontekstu, nije pružala mnogo mogućnosti za analizu diskursa koji „putuje“, čija se produkcija i recepcija obavljaju u dva, često bitno različita, konteksta.

Sličan problem je prisutan i u pristupu konstruktivista, čije radove je karakterisala snažna „strukturna pristrasnost“ (Zimmermann 2016: 104). Ipak, oni su u sklopu analize difuzije i lokalizacije „međunarodnih normi“ posvetili značajnu pažnju ulozi „lokalnih okolnosti i ličnosti, sklonih da odražavaju lokalne norme i običaje sa kojima međunarodne norme moraju da prave kompromise“ (Finnemor 1996: 341). Iako je isticano da „ljudi mogu usvojiti slične organizacione oblike, ali da van toga, u njihovom ponašanju može postojati vrlo malo sličnosti“, kao i da izomorfizam koji proizvodi difuzija prividno univerzalnih normi „ne znači homogenost“, (lokalna) kultura je i dalje tretirana prvenstveno kao prepreka, „opozicija“, u ovom globalnom procesu (Finnemor 1996: 342). Društveni konstruktivisti su kulturu uglavnom tretirali kao „lokalne filtere“ i barijere i analizirali „normativnu prikladnost“, shvaćenu kao „konvergentnost međunarodnih sa domaćim normama“, dok su radikalniji pokušaji uključivanja kulture u konstruktivističku perspektivu bili redovno diskvalifikovani kao esencijalistički, jer su predstavljali „lokalnu političku kulturu i lokalne političke strukture kao nešto što istovremeno sprečava

promene i stvara otpor promenama“ (Zimmermann 2016: 100). Iako je razmatrana „aproprijacija, prevođenje i preoblikovanje transnacionalnih diskursa u vernakularne“, nedovoljna pažnja je posvećena lokalnim, zapadnim korenima „transnacionalnog“ i meri u kojoj su ključni lokalni posrednici i prevodioci, kao što su „nevladine organizacije“ i društveno angažovani pokreti, i sami bili kulturalno uslovljeni (Merry 2006: 3). Može se reći da prevođenje o kome govore konstruktivisti, s jedne strane, nije dovoljno kulturalno, dok je, s druge, njihov fokus u velikoj meri bio vezan za potrebu da budu zaobiđeni ili oslabljeni lokalni kulturalni činioci kako bi se ostvarilo globalno „širenje modernističkog shvatanja pojedinca i društva otelotvoreno na globalnom Severu“ (Merry 2006: 221).

Može se reći da političke nauke u celini, a komparativna politika posebno, ni dan danas „nisu u stanju da se na zadovoljavajući način nose sa kulturalnim činiocima“ i tu iskoriste uvide koje su ponudile druge društvene nauke (Chabal, Daloz 2006: 5). Čak je i nedavna „renesansa kulture“, tačnije renesansa uvažavanja uticaja kulturalnih činilaca „kao važnih, ali ne i jedinih“ u političkoj sferi, koju ističe Samjuel Hantington (Samuel Huntington), bila vođena shvatanjem da „kulturalne prepreke ekonomskom i političkom razvoju treba ukloniti ili promeniti“ (Huntington 2000: xiv –xv), a ne uvažavati kako bi bio omogućen brži napredak nezapadnih društava. Političke nauke su u velikoj meri ostale limitirane shvatanjem da treba da „postoji 'jedna' opšta teorija političkog razvoja“, sa svojom ideološki jasno obojenom teleologijom, i razlike su u velikoj meri bile vezane za neslaganja na kojim ideološkim pretpostavkama ta jedna jedina univerzalna teorija treba da bude zasnovana (Chabal, Daloz 2006: 8). Istaknuta su četiri glavna problema sa ovako uskim okvirom koji je usmeravao komparativna istraživanja politike. Prvi, njegova zapadnocentričnost, koja je navodila naučnike da „pretpostave linearni, ako ne singularni“ tok političkog razvoja; drugi, implicitan, ali jasan stav da će „slično razvijeni“ politički sistemi imati slične karakteristike“, što je uslovljavalo izbor relevantnih koncepata; zatim shvatanje da isti društveni i ekonomski uslovi proizvode iste ishode u političkoj sferi i, konačno, četvrti, verovanje da će svuda postojati kauzalnost kakva je postojala tokom razvoja modernih zapadnih društava (Chabal, Daloz 2006: 9). Ako u obzir uzmemo i ranije pomenutu prirodu „naučnih pre-

tenzija“ unutar discipline, postaje jasnije zašto političke nauke nisu uspele da adekvatno odgovore na izazov kulture, klizavog, teško uhvatljivog, „mekanog“ koncepta, subjektivnog i kontekstualno uslovljenog,“ pa zato ne dozvoljava „ispravnu konceptualizaciju i efektivno testiranje hipoteza“ (Chabal, Daloz 2006: 9). Patrik Čabal (Patric Chabal) i Žan-Paskal Daloz (Jean-Pascal Daloz) u knjizi *Nevolje s kulturom* zaključuju da je ovako velika nespремnost da se na zadovoljavajući način uzme u obzir relevantnost kulturalnih faktora „rezultirala u postojanju jako velike crne rupe u samom srcu komparativne teorije“ (2006: 10).

3. KA UVAŽAVANJU KULTURALNOSTI DISKURSA

Priroda i snaga otpora zadovoljavajućem stepenu uvažavanja kulturalnih uticaja u politici nameće potrebu da pažnja bude posvećena pitanju zašto je za bolje razumevanje politike u svakom nezapadnom kontekstu važna interpretacija značenja? Drugim rečima, zašto je, da bi uvidi iz političkih nauka bili više i doslednije naučni, potrebno fokusirati se na interpretacije i posegnuti za nečim što mnogim naučnim autoritetima deluje nenaučno? To, naravno, nije lako. Sami kritički uvidi iz subalternih studija, za kojima ću posegnuti u pokušaju da istaknem veličinu i prirodu transformacija političkog pod uticajem kulturalnih činilaca, snažno su osporavani. Insistiranje indijskih subalternista na kulturalnom subjektivitetu aktera – kao i tvrdnja da u društvenim naukama dominira perspektiva i istoricizam, koji neopravdano univerzalizuju zapadno shvatanje sopstva i razvoja društvenih odnosa, čime su subalternisti implicitno doveli u pitanje sve evrocentrične teorijske i konceptualne okvire koji ističu univerzalnu primenjivost – snažno je kritikovano kao istovremeno ideološko, jer „zamagljuje osnovna svojstva kapitalizma“, i orijentalističko, jer „esencijalizuje Istok“ i tako „vaskrsava najgore slučajeve orijentalističke mitologije“ (Chibber 2013: 286–289). Naj snažnije, marksističke diskvalifikacije subalternističke perspektive oslanjaju se na tumačenje po kome svako insistiranje na različitosti u odnosu na Zapad po sebi predstavlja reaffirmaciju shvatanja o inferiornosti ne-Zapada. Za subalterniste, pak, formulacije koje hijerarhijski postuliraju različitosti, koliko i insistiranje marksista na istosti, koje hijerhiju ne negira već je samo premešta u sopstvenu, teleološki definisanu

temporalnu sferu,¹⁰ imaju istu posledicu – potčinjavanje ne-Zapada zapadnocentričnim shvatanjima i historicizmu.

U okviru postkolonijalnih studija razvijena je dosledna kritika univerzalnog i može se reći da je „postkolonijalni naučni rad, skoro po definiciji, posvećen hvatanju u koštac sa univerzalnim“ (Chakrabarty 2000: 4). Njegov važan doprinos je i u tome što je istakao potrebu da bude razdvojeno ono što je postalo neizbežno, univerzalno prisutno u političkoj sferi, od onoga što pripada svima, što je istinski univerzalno, ne samo prostorno već i vremenski. Neki od ključnih konceptualnih i teorijskih temelja na kojima razvijam tezu o kulturalnosti globalizovanog političkog diskursa uvedeni su u knjizi Dipeša Čakrabartija (Dipesh Chakrabarty) *Provincijalizovanje Evrope* (2000), koja je, može se reći, uz studiju Gjatari Čakravorti Spivak (Gayatri Chakravorty Spivak) *Mogu li subalterni da govore?* (1985), najznačajnije delo celokupnog subalternističkog opusa u obe njegove grane, južnoazijskoj (indijskoj) i latinoameričkoj. Čakrabarti piše o „fenomenu političke modernosti... koji nigde u svetu nije moguće promišljati bez pozivanja na određene kategorije i koncepte, čije genealogije sežu duboko u intelektualne i čak teološke tradicije Evrope“,¹¹ koju on „provincijalizuje“ ističući da su njena istorija i intelektualna tradicija, kao i sve druge, ne samo partikularna već i duboko provincijalna (2000: 4). Koncepti koji konstituišu ovaj danas normativni fenomen, istovremeno ključne reči globalizovanog političkog diskursa, „kao što su državljanstvo, država, civilno društvo, javna sfera, ljudska prava, jednakost pred zakonom, pojedinac, razlika između javnog i privatnog, ideja subjekta, demokratija, narodni suverenitet, društvena pravda, naučna racionalnost i tako dalje, sve nose teret evropske misli i istorije“ (Chakrabarty 2000: 4). Činjenica da je ovo nasleđe zapadno, a ne univerzalno, da je proizvod zapadne istorije, jednog specifičnog društvenog i intelektualnog razvoja, po Čakrabartiju nameće potrebu da ne samo zapadna, normativna istorija, Istorija

10 Čakrabarti ističe Marksovu (Karl Marx) rečenicu „Ljudska anatomija sadrži ključ za anatomiju majmuna.“, kao i njegovo razumevanje istorije preko „univerzalne kategorije“ kapitala, i zaključuje da je Marks u svom delu postulira toliko evrocentrično da „kapital“ može biti zamenjen rečju Evropa a „buržoaska“ rečju evropska (2000: 30).

11 Čakrabarti podseća da je sama Evropa u stvari „Evropa“ – „figura imaginacije“, nestabilan i fluidan, „hiperrealan“ koncept, „čija je geografska referenca donekle neodrediva“, ali koji ima važno mesto u „strukturama dominacije i podređivanja“ (2000: 27). Ovo je važno imati u vidu kada u Srbiji, kao delu jednog liminalnog, diskurzivno redovno deevropizovanog prostora, razmišljamo o značenjima reči Evropa i evropeizacija, kao i njihovim politizacijama i depolitizacijama.

sa velikim I, već i sama Evropa bude prikazana kao lokalna, sasvim partikularna, kako bi mogli da razumemo „iskustvo sa političkom modernošću“ u nezapadnim društvima – gde je evropska misao „istovremeno neophodna i nedovoljna kao pomoć u promišljanju različitih životnih praksi koje konstituišu političko i istorijsko“ i u njenoj Indiji i u svim drugim nezapadnim društvima (2000: 4). Kako je i sam predvideo, u velikoj meri baš zbog ovih stavova, ubrzo je optužen za „nativizam, nacionalizam – ili, najgori od svih grehova, nostalgiju“ (Chakrabarty 2000: 28).

Čakrabartijev drugi važan doprinos je u tome što je istakao da ignorisanje mere u kojoj je istorija, koja nam je podarila „uni-verzalno“, partikularna i provincijalna čini da „još nisu“ u politički korektnim, temporalno izraženim globalnim hijerarhijama postane opravdanje da svi ostali budu smešteni u „čekaonicu istorije“ iz koje, u suštini, ne može biti izlaza – politička modernost koju navodno treba da dostignu im jednostavno nije dostupna (2000: 9). Zato ovo zapadnocentrično „još nisu“, obećanje (modernog) subjektiviteta, treba čitati kao „nikad“ – poricanje subjektiviteta, koje ranije postulirane, transparentno rasne, civilizacijske i prostorne hijerhije, samo prevodi u, podjednako desubjektivizujuću, deterministički ustrojenu temporalnu ravan, u kojoj Ostali ostaju večno nerazvijeni i zavisni od Zapada, u svakom relevantnom, pa i saznavnom i ontološkom smislu. Puna subjektivizacija pretpostavlja decentriranje shvatanja istorije i modernosti, odbacivanje zapadnocentričnih blizanaca, Istorije sa velikim I i Modernosti sa velikim M, u koje, iz dominantne, zapadnocentrične perspektive, ne-Zapad mora da se udene kako ne bi ispao iz obe. To podrazumeva prihvatanje shvatanja da svi na ne-Zapadu, Ostali odnosno Drugi u postkolonijalnom opusu, mogu biti moderni samo na svoje načine, koji su u postkolonijalnim i srodnim kritičkim teorijama nazivane višestrukim (Eisenstadt 2000), vernakularnim (Wardlow 2002: 163) ili alternativnim modernostima (Gaonkar 1999). Treba istaći da je prepoznavanje veličine različitosti i aspekata modernosti gde one dolaze do izražaja otežano ne toliko potrebom da se navodno jedina prava i ispravna, kulturalno neosetljiva, unitarna Modernost „pravilno“ izvodi i time potvrđuje u različitim sferama, od popularne kulture do politike, koliko, neretko farsičnom i komičnom, ali za posmatrača često neprepoznatljivom mimikrijom – „željom da reformisani, prepoznatljiviji Drugi, kao subjekt različitosti koja

je skoro ista, ali ne sasvim“ potvrdi svoj subjektivitet, mimikrijom koja „ističe ambivalenciju“, ali, da bi bila delotvorna, „mora stalno proivoditi svoja iskliznuća, svoje ekcese, svoju različitost“ (Bhabha 1984: 126). Na liminalnom prostoru kakav je Balkan, čija (post)kolonijalnost ostaje sporna, istovremeno očita i neistinita, farsičnost ovakve mimikrije redovno biva diskvalifikovana kao zaostalost, što prepoznavanje autohtonih aspekata i vernakularnog karaktera ovdašnje modernosti čini još težim nego u klasičnim postkolonijama.

Treći Čakrabartijev uvid, koji je posebno značajan za argumentaciju u ovom radu, i gde se on donekle nadovezuje na razmatranja uloge prevođenja i hibridizacije u delima Homi Babe (Homi Bhabha), jednog od tri ključna autora celokupnog postkolonijalnog kanona, jeste da problem nije samo u sugerisanoj neophodnosti „istorijske tranzicije“ ka navodno jedinstvenoj globalnoj destinaciji, toj originalnoj, zapadnoj, koja „zakasnelim“, nezapadnim poslovičnim „vozovima modernizacije“ nije dostupna. Čakrabarti ističe da je reč i o „problemu prevođenja“, kako lokalnih „oblika, praksi i razumevanja života na univerzalističke političko-teorijske kategorije koje imaju duboke evropske korene“, čemu je posvetio posebnu pažnju, tako i prevođenju u svakom novom, nezapadnom kontekstu svih novopridošlih, navodno univerzalnih kategorija i normi, za koje se verovalo da „transcendiraju fragment evropske istorije u kome su mogle da se pojave“ (2000: 17). On naglašava da nije dovoljan grub prevod „kako bi se ostvarilo razumevanje“ lokalnih normi, da se, na primer, prevođenje ne može svoditi na „rečnik pojmova“, autohtonih termina, kakav se često nalazi na kraju brojnih radova nastalih u okviru regionalnih studija, i da je neophodno „posvetiti kritičku i nepopustljivu pažnju samom procesu prevođenja“ (Chakrabarty 2000: 17). Iako kreće iz perspektive koja se bitno razlikuje od Gercove, Čakrabarti sugerše da se često moramo zadovoljiti interpretacijama, koje će neizbežno sadržati ambivalenciju i nejasnoće. Sve što prevođenje može da obezbedi jeste „prozračnost – ne transparentnost“, kao i da ta „prividna ’nesamerljivost’ ne predstavlja ni odsustvo veze između dominantnog i dominiranog oblika znanja niti ekvivalente koji uspešno posreduju između razlika, već baš onaj delimično nerazumljiv odnos koji nazivamo ’razlika’“ (Chakrabarty 2000: 19).

Kulturalno prevođenje se vrši i u drugom smeru, kome istoričar Čakrabarti nije posvetio značajniju pažnju – kao prevođenje zapadnih političkih normi, koje prati njihovu aproprijaciju i lokalizaciju u svakom nezapadnom kontekstu. Ovakvo kulturalno prevođenje je odnedavno došlo u žižu interesovanja pojedinih antropologa, koji su posmatrali kako ideje i prakse koje konstituišu političko bivaju internalizovane u različitim nezapadnim sredinama, odnosno u kakvom obliku one postaju ukorenjene u različitim delovima sveta (Michelutti 2007: 639). Tako, da bi razumela „indijsku demokratiju“, Lucija Mičeluti (Lucia Michelutti) koristi „prizmu vernakularizacije“, koja joj, između ostalog, omogućava da razume i kako to demokratija u Indiji nastavlja da funkcioniše bez prekida, decenijama, iako „konvencionalne teorije demokratizacije... smatraju Indiju teškim okruženjem za uspeh demokratije“ (Michelutti 2008: 3). Demokratija i druge moderne političke norme bivaju vernakularizovane „kad uđu u specifično istorijsko i društveno-kulturalno okruženje“, kao takve internalizovane i „postaju ukorenjene popularnoj svesti“. Ove vernakularne forme bivaju oblikovane pod uticajem lokalnih „idioma i društveno-kulturalnih praksi“, ali, istovremeno, one stvaraju nove društvene vrednosti i odnose koji dalje preoblikuju „političko“ (Michelutti 2008: 3). Dakle, uspostavlja se jedna dinamična interakcija globalnog (zapadnog) i lokalnog (nezapadnog) u političkoj sferi, specifični proces političkog razvoja koga ne može svesti pod redovno podrazumevani, zapadnocentrični i prepoznatljivo teleološki određen, smisao koji pojam „politički razvoj“ ima u glavnom toku političkih nauka i, posebno, komparativne politike. Može se reći da kulturalnim prevođenjem u novom, nezapadnom kontekstu bivaju preoblikovane zapadnocentrične norme, koje kao takve postaju ukorenjene u društvu i preoblikuju originalni kontekst. Ova nestabilnost konteksta, mera u kojoj stalno biva rekonstruisan i rekonstituisan pod uticajem različitih faktora, redovno je navođena kao jedan od argumenata protiv kulturalnog relativizma, ali smatram da baš ta činjenica istovremeno ističe ogroman, konstitutivan značaj kulturalnih činilaca u političkoj sferi, suštinsku kulturalnost političkog diskursa, i demonstrira veličinu nevolja s kulturom na koje su ukazali Čabal i Daloz (2006).

Kulturalnim prevođenjem zapadnocentrično univerzalno se širom sveta rastače na mnoštvo vernakularnih formi, a političkom

diskursu, kao i svim konstitutivnim normama, vraća se njegova (izgubljena) kulturalnost, u političkim naukama i dalje prečesto neprepoznata ili sasvim ignorisna. Drugim rečima, originalna kulturalnost zapadnocentričnost diskursa – zatamnjena moćnim spojem nekritičkog razumevanja univerzalnog i ignorisanjem činjenice da ne postoji autentično globalno, ono koje negde prvo nije bilo lokalno, i samim tim provincijalno – ponovo se ukazuje na nezapadnim prostorima gde on biva kulturalno preveden i kao takav odomaćen. Različitost, u velikoj meri kulturalna, mada ne treba gubiti iz vida druge kontekstalne silnice, jeste ono što čini da mnogo toga bude izgubljeno i proizvedeno u kulturalnom prevodu, kao i da ono što nastane nekome deluje kao, na primer, senka, fikcija ili loša kopija. Normativno nasilje, koje nalaže da mora „postojati“ čak i ono čega ne može da bude, s jedne strane, i činjenica da može „postojati“ samo ono što je akterima smisljeno i razumljivo, s druge, čini da to, navodno univerzalno pretočeno u vernakularno, istovremeno jeste ono što nije i nije ono što jeste. Dakle, diskurs jeste univerzalan, ali on se za lokalne subjekte opredmećuje, „postoji“, samo kao kulturalan.

4. ZAKLJUČAK

Prepoznavanje kulturalnosti diskursa jeste samo prvi korak ka, parafraziraću ovde Čakrabartija, deprovincijalizaciji političkih nauka, odmaka od neprimerene i, čini se, zaslepljujuće zapadnocentričnosti, koji ne može ići lako. Naime, kao i sama ideja Evrope – u smislu ne samo rodnog mesta modernosti već i ovaploćenja navodno univerzalnih vrednosti, ideja koja je „opredmećivana i slavljena u pojavnom svetu svakodnevnih odnosa moći“ – čija destabilizacija i provincijalizacija predstavlja pretpostavku deprovincijalizacije disciplina, pristupa i diskursa koje je „porodila“ kao navodno univerzalne i ispravno naučne, ni verovanje u univerzalnost, globalnu primenjivost i adekvatnost zapadnocentričnog političkog diskursa „neće nestati jednostavno zato što su neki od nas stekli kritičku svest o tome“ (Chakrabarty 2000: 28). Nevolje s kulturom nastaviće da kao senka prate uvide iz političkih nauka, posebno u liminalnim regionima kao što je Balkan – koji jeste u Evropi, ali je dugo vremena bio van glavnog toka moderne evropske istorije i pratio je drugačiji, u velikoj meri neevropski put društvenog, idejnog i

političkog razvoja. U Srbiji će zato svaki pokušaj provincijalizacije (zapadno)evropskog iskustva i istorije¹² nailaziti na jako snažne otpore i voditi u diskvalifikacije, a naša (kulturalna) različitost će mnogo lakše nego na „pravom“, mnogo daljem Istoku i Jugu biti uokviravana kao (kulturalna) patologija. Blizina balkanske poluperiferije zapadnom jezgru svetskog sistema čini da će ovde čak i puko prepoznavanje uloge kulturalnog prevođenja i kulturalnosti diskursa predstavljati jednu jako tešku, ako ne i, u suštini, nemoguću misiju. Bavljenje negativnim posledicama ovako snažne kulturalne slabovidosti značajno prevazilazi okvire ovog rada, ali treba istaći da je ona primetna u različitim sferama, ne samo u naučnoj i političkoj, i da je mnogo veća nego što sugerišu relativno neupadljive razlike između lokalnog i zapadnog konteksta.

Jugoistočna Evropa, odrednica koja odlično ilustruje meru u kojoj je Balkan ostao bauk, u jednom važnom smislu se razlikuje od ostatka, sve ređe pominjane, Istočne Evrope. Naša „ispravna“ postkomunistička tranzicija, čiji je kulturalno prevođenje važan i neizbežan, mada uglavnom neprepoznat saputnik, ima jednu dimenziju više. Ona je prvenstveno vezana za duboko nasleđe „vizantijskog komonvelta“ (Obolensky 1971) i „osmanskog ekumena“ (Buchanan 2007), kao nezapadnih i, u Saidovom (Edward Said) smislu, orijentalizovanih okvira (1978), u kojima se vekovima odvijao naš društveni razvoj. Zato postkomunistička tranzicija, koja je politička i društvena koliko i ekonomska, ovde ima jednu prepreku više – balkanizam i, sve prisutniji i neupitniji, autobalkanizam, specifičnu inkarnaciju autoorijentalističkog samorazumevanja, definisanog kao „jedan ‘mazohistički’ proces ‘uradi sam’ orijentalizma kojim dolazi do ‘prihvatanja i internalizacije’ rasističkih definicija koje su dali ‘orijentalizatori’“ (Parker 2008: 106). (Auto)balkanizam, kojim su snažno obeleženi i mnogi naučni uvidi u humanistici i društvenim naukama, dodatno teži ka uvažavanju uloge kulturalnog prevođenja i prepoznavanju vernakularnih modaliteta u političkoj sferi kao izraza različitosti a ne navodne patologije, društvene

12 Čakrabarti koristi reči evropski i zapadno kao sinonime (2000: 5), i, iako naglašava nestabilnost značenja, kao i velika većina postkolonijalnih autora slika jednu neizdiferenciranu, uniformnu sliku Evrope i njene istorije. U postkolonijalnom korpusu, Evropa najčešće jeste sinonim za Zapad, što je vezano i za činjenicu da je kolonijalizambio (zapadno)evropski, mada jedan broja autora kada kaže Evropa ima u vidu Zapadnu Evropu i prekomorske zemlje koje su uspešno kolonizovale dijaspore naroda sa Severa Evrope, koji je često posmatran kao najviše i najispravnije zapadni. Zato ovo shvatanje Zapada i Evrope, na primer, uključuje Novi Zeland i Australiju, ali ne Čile i Argentinu, u kojima su ključno mesto i ulogu imali doseljenici iz mediteranskih zemalja i njihovi potomci.

„bolesti“ koju treba lečiti nedemokratski ili različitim vrstama neokolonijalnih intervencija i mešanja. Dakle, Srbija se suočava sa jako sličnim izazovima političke globalizacije kao i postkolonijalni Treći svet, samo je ovde još teže čak i ukazivati na veličinu izazova i uvažavati njegovu važnu kulturalnu dimenziju.

Sa intenziviranjem globalizacijskih procesa, a naročito posle trijumfa Zapada u Hladnom ratu, praćenih, u međuvremenu odbačenim, verovanjem u kraj istorije i ideologije, stalno je rastao broj zapadnih, dakle tuđih političkih preskripcija i institucija, koje je trebalo prihvatiti i usvojiti u Trećem svetu kao ne samo univerzalnih već i, sve češće, navodnih panacea za brojne društvene i razvojne probleme. Vremenom je postajao sve upadljiviji ne samo sam nesklad između onoga što je stiglo i onoga što je u procesu kulturalnog prevođenja nastalo, već je došlo do određenog smanjivanja „asimetrične arogancije“ (Chakrabarty 2000: 28), snažno izražene sklonosti zapadnih, međunarodnih i mnogih (pozapadnjačenih) lokalnih političkih i naučnih autoriteta da ignorišu značaj konteksta, njegovih kulturalnih odrednica i drugih specifičnosti. Polako se počela javljati svest o negativnim posledicama nespremnosti da se ovaj nesklad prepozna ili, kada je prepoznat, da budu uvažene njegove brojne implikacije, od razvojnih do uloge u pojačavanju unutrašnjih tenzija i podela. Negativne posledice su primetne na svim periferijama i poluperiferijama, ali su najuočljivije u ekstremno siromašnim i postkonfliktnim društvima. Zato ovaj rad i uvodi shvatanje o kulturalnosti globalnog političkog diskursa oslanjajući na antropološki uvid razvijen u jednom od najsiromašnijih delova Indije (Mičeluti) i subalternističku analizu iskustva sa političkom modernošću u Indiji (Čakrabarti), zemlji koja je svo do 2018. godine imala najveći broj građana koji žive u „ekstremnom siromaštvu“, sa manje od 1,9 američkih dolara dnevno (Adebayo 2018).

Isticanje kulturalnosti diskursa pomaže da se prepoznaju ne samo navodno destruktivni, remetilački učinci konteksta, koje bi, kako mnogi veruju, trebalo smanjiti ili ukloniti, na čemu insistira Hantigton, već da se uvaži njegova temeljna i nezaobilazna, konstruktivna i konstitutivna uloga. Fokus na kulturalnost diskursa može da posluži i da se na još jedan uverljiv način ukaže na važnost konteksta u disciplini, koja je, uz mnogo otpora, konačno počela da ozbiljnije uvažava diskurs i kulturu, sa svim njihovim, često

teško uhvatljivim i merljivim, implikacijama i brojnim lukavstvima. Uzimanje u obzir uloge kulturalnog prevođenja, koje decentrira i pluralizuje globalni politički diskurs stvarajući pletoru vernakulnih modaliteta svih njegovih konstitutivnih odrednica, omogućava da – pošto i dalje nije moguće izbeći duboko ukorenjenu potrebu za kvalifikacijama globalizovanih, prividno univerzalnih političkih normi – koristimo pridev vernakularni, koji je već prihvaćen u antropologiji i postkolonijalnoj kritici. Bez bilo kakvog vrednosnog suda, on upućuje na, istovremeno, drugačiji smisao globalizovanih političkih normi u nezapadnim kontekstima u kojima se obavlja njihova aproprijacija i problematičnost pokušaja da bude uhvaćen njihov smisao, stalno podsećajući da se treba fokusirati na interpretacije a ne na definicije. Ističući različitosti, izbor ove neutralne, otvorene odrednice nas odvraća od nekonstruktivnog fokusa na samerljivost sa zapadnim originalom, koji u sebi uvek sadrži desubjektivizujuću moć i dalje hegemonu, tranzicione paradigme. Njena, uglavnom neprepoznata i nedovoljno uvažena, neprovincijalizovana zapadnocičničnost, stvara, po nezapadne aktere, jako skupu iluziju istinske, „pune“ univerzalnosti, na kojoj su utemeljena dominantna shvatanja pretpostavki globalnog i lokalnog političkog razvoja i pripadajuće im teleologije. I ovde, na samom kraju, treba istaći da insistiranje na kulturalnosti diskursa ne negira njegovu materijalnost. Ta dva aspekta su komplementarna i omogućavaju da bude uvažen kako globalni, koji, na primer, marksisiti vezuju za kapital i njegovu strukturišuću moć, tako i lokalni, kulturalni aspekt, na čijoj važnosti subalternisti zasnivaju svoju ideju o provincijalnosti Evrope i političkih preskripcija koje su se u njoj razvile. Konačno, istovremeno uvažavanje materijalnosti i kulturalnosti diskursa može da olakša odbacivanje sumnjičavosti, snažno prisutno političkim naukama, shvatanja da svaki fokus na diskurs po sebi nosi opasnost relativizma i nihilizma, nekonstruktivnog pada u diskurs i tekstualizam (Teti 2014: 195). Ona je kao senka pratila brojne pokušaje da se ukaže na preku potrebu da pažnja bude posvećena diskursu, značenjima i interpretaciji, ne samo u komparativnoj politici već i u političkim naukama u celini.

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Zoran Ćirjaković**IMPORTANCE OF CULTURALITY
OF DISCOURSE FOR UNDERSTANDING
GLOBALIZATION OF “UNIVERSAL”
POLITICAL NORMS**

Abstract

The paper highlights some important negative consequences of the commonly disregarded fact that the global political discourse, that is, a set of norms and ideas that constitute it, is western-centric, the product of the European history and experience. Within the scope of post-colonial critique that the author strongly draws on, along with some more recent anthropological research, it is presented, like Europe itself, as not only particular but also “provincial”. It is hence suggested that the global political discourse, as a product of the provincial, European history, should be seen as universal only in the context of its omnipresence within the distinctly asymmetrical globalization process. The author introduces the concept of culturality of discourse, without losing sight of its materiality, to highlight the importance and constitutive nature of the role that cultural transposition plays in the appropriation and incorporation of globalized political norms in every non-Western context. Cultural transposition, through which local actors make sense of and give meaning to the newly-adopted, globalized discourses and related practices, delivers vernacular modalities of Western-centric norms in all non-Western contexts. Thus, the global political discourse also becomes cultural – simultaneously the same and different. The culturality of discourse emphasizes the need to shift the academic focus from definitions to interpretations, not only in regional and democ-

ratization studies, but also in some other subfields of the discipline dominated by the authorities who tend to view focus on interpretations as not sufficiently scientific. The author offers an overview of attempts made in political science to take the impact of culture into account and analyzes why the results fall short of being satisfactory – that is, why it is still legitimate to talk about the troubles of political science with culture, as suggested in African research. In the conclusion, it is highlighted why these troubles are particularly marked in liminal regions such as the Balkans, regularly stigmatized in the optimistic interpretations of globalization and presented as a non-European Europe. In the Balkans, the tendency to disregard the culturality of the modern political discourse and related practices revives old Balkanist stereotypes and creates new auto-Balkanist ones, further pathologizing and discrediting local actors and obscuring the relevance of their experiences. The author suggests that, the smaller or less recognizable cultural differences are, the failure to recognize the culturality of discourse and the anticipated consequences of cultural myopia increase, making appreciation of the culturality of discourse particularly important in the analysis of the political in Serbia.

Keywords: culturality of discourse, globalization, political norms, Western-centrism, provincialization of Europe, cultural transposition, vernacular modalities.

SECESIONISTIČKI DISKURS KATALONIJE**

Apstrakt

Tokom poslednjih godina, duh secesionističke politike u Kataloniji se postepeno rasplamsavao da bi danas pitanje nezavisne Katalonije postalo gotovo stalni deo dnevne političke agende ne samo Španije već i Evropske Unije. Iako je španski Ustavni sud poništio zahtev Katalonije u regionalnom parlamentu za početak procesa otcepljenja od Španije, predvođeni Karlom Puđdemonom, zvaničnici Katalonije oglušili su se o odluku španske vlade i, upotrebivši javna sredstva, organizovali su ilegalni referendum o nezavisnosti 2017. godine. Tokom secesionističkog procesa, kao dominantna, izdvojila su se dva argumentaciona diskursa: nacionalistički diskurs „hegemonističke” Španije i secesionistički diskurs usmeren ka pravu na samoopredeljenje katalonskog naroda i sticanju nezavisnosti. Kako bi predstavili osobenosti javnog diskursa vezanog za secesionističko pitanje Katalonije, u radu je napravljen kritički osvrt na istorijsko-politički kontekst katalonskog pitanja, a zastupljeno je stanovište po kome je katalonsko „pravo na otcepljenje” prevashodno društveno-politički fenomen koji bi trebalo posmatrati kao deo populističkog diskursa svojstvenog određenom političkom projektu.

Ključne reči: Katalonija, Španija, diskurs, katalonizam, secesionizam, demokratija, populizam

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1. UVOD

U našem istraživanju koncept diskursa i izgradnje nacionalnog identiteta neraskidivo su povezani.¹ Većina autora u okviru analize diskursa pravi jasnu razliku između *pisanog* i *govornog* diskursa (Coulthard 1985: 3; Hoey 2001: 11). Ipak, zbog svoje komunikativne funkcije, pisani i govorni diskurs prepliću se kao iskazi čije se značenje ostvaruje u različitom komunikacionom i kulturnom kontekstu. Kako navodi Paolo Donati (Paolo Donati), koncept diskursa prevazilazi granice isključivo lingvističkog fenomena i, budući da deluje kao sredstvo pomoću koga „(...) goruće teme prerastaju u politička pitanja (...)” postaje konstruktivni element ideologije, jer se politička realnost interpretira kao deo javne sfere (Donati 1992: 139-141).

Da bi se na pravi način razumeo razvoj ideološko-političkog diskursa nacionalističke političke elite Katalonije, mora se sagledati evolutivni tok njegovih distinktivnih obeležja, od početka, tj. kraja XIX veka, do danas, tj. doba aktuelne borbe za nezavisnost. Generalno posmatrano, pitanje Katalonije je istorijsko pitanje jedne nacije bez države, koje istovremeno ima veliki značaj i za Španiju i za Evropu (Llobera 2003; Guibernau 2004). Projekat katalonskog otepljenja od Španije zasnovan je na spajanju etničkog i političkog identiteta u cilju izgradnje novog etničko-nacionalnog identiteta različitog od španskog ili kastiljanskog. Zapravo, klasični diskurs katalonskog secesionizma evoluirao je pretvarajući pravo na samoopredeljenje u radikalizovanu varijantu demokratskog prava na otepljenje, čime je nacionalistička crta katalonskog separatizma pala u senku pred kategorijama društvene heterogenosti, pluralnosti i različitosti (Guinjoan, Rodon y Sanjaume 2013).

U tom smislu, ovaj članak polazi od premise da je razvoj katalonskog secesionizma tesno uslovljen izgradnjom katalonskog nacionalnog identiteta koji se u početnoj fazi mogao definisati kao *nacionalismo de estómago ocorazón*, naspram modernog nacionalizma ili *nacionalismo de bolsillo ocartera*.² Najveći broj Španaca

1 Pojam *diskurs* izveden je iz latinskog glagola *discurrere*, što znači trčati tamo i ovamo, takodje od lat. *discursus*, u istom značenju. U tom smislu, diskurs je veoma širok i fluidan koncept unutar koga se ostvaruje jedan sistem mišljenja i argumentovanja “unutar autoriteta i legitimiteta pozicije moći.

2 Ovakvo određenje podrazumeva organski ili identitetski nacionalizam koji crpi svoju legitimnost iz jedinstva građana i same države, te otuda naziv *nacionalizam stomaka* ili *srca* kao obeležja

sebe identifikuje kao lojalne građane i centralnom i lokalnom nivou vlasti. Zapravo, u celoj Španiji više od dve trećine građana usvojilo je ideju o dvostrukom identitetu ili složenoj nacionalnosti, što podrazumeva poštovanje kako regionalnog tako i nacionalnog ili državnog identiteta (Moreno 2002: 400 - 401).

Drugim rečima, inicijalno, u okviru nacionalističkog pokreta Katalonije secesionistički diskurs bio je prevashodno razvijan od strane manjeg broja građana rođenih u katalonskom govornom području i okrenutih očuvanju katalonskog jezika i kulture i procesu otcepljenja od Španije određenih teritorija, poznatih kao *Països Catalans* ili Katalonske zemlje: na jugu Francuske ili *Cataluña Nord*, u Aragonu ili *Franja de Ponent*, Valensiji ili *País Valencià* i Balearskim Ostrvima, tj. *Las Islas Baleares* (Clua i Fainé 2014: 85). Danas, na političkoj sceni katalonskog nacionalizma dominira independistički diskurs promovisan od strane desničarske partije Demokratska konvergencija (*Convergència Democràtica de Catalunya* ili nekada, CiU), levičarske Katalonske republikanske levice (*Esquerra Republicana de Catalunya*, ERC) i Kandidature narodnog jedinstva (*Candidatura d'Unitat Popular*, CUP).³

Javni diskurs i društveni mediji uticali su na jačanje pokreta za potpunu nezavisnost od Španije, do čega osetno dolazi nakon španske dužničke krize 2008. godine, tj. u periodu između 2009–2011. Tokom ove, uslovno rečeno, početne faze secesionističkog diskursa okrenutog potpunom otcepljenju od matične države, mobilisani su istovremeno civilno društvo, javne institucije i političke partije, a u periodu od 2010–2015 održani su masovni protesti i demonstracije,⁴ kao i javne proslave katalonskog nacionalnog dana *Diada*.⁵ U periodu od 2011–2014 pokret za nezavisnost Katalonije

pripadnosti naciji, domovini, teritoriji i dr. nematerijalnim vrednostima, naspram modernog nacionalizma *džepa* ili *novčanika* koji po svojoj prirodi pre naginje liberalizmu, tj. postaje nacionalizam uslovljen materijalnim prosperitetom društva.

3 Sve ove stranke zastupaju stav po kome Katalonci moraju da odluče žele li da ostanu u Španiji kao višenacionalnoj i konfederalnoj ili da se osamostale. Stranke kao što su Katalonska socijalistička stranka (*Partido Socialista de Catalunya*, PSC) i *Inicijativa za Kataloniju – Zeleni* (*Inicijativa por Cataluña Verdes*, ICV) zalažu se za federalistički model, dok Demokratska unija Katalonije (*Unión Democràtica de Cataluña*, UDC) zagovara asimetrični federalizam. Sve ove partije traže da se zakonski dozvoli građanima da se referendumom izjasne po pitanju otcepljenja od Španije, ali uz federalnu opciju.

4 Masovne demonstracije održane su u Barseloni 2011. pod sloganom „Mi smo nacija, hoćemo sopstvenu državu” (*Som una nació. Volem Estat propi*), zatim 2012. pod sloganom „Katalonija, nova država Evrope” (*Catalunya, nou Estat d'Europa*) i sl.

5 Kako je 11. septembra 1714. godine pobedom Burbona u sukobima za presto Katalonija izgu-

prošao je kroz različite faze, da bi između 2015–2016 secesionistički diskurs doživeo punu zrelost i svojevrstan vrhunac potvrđen parlamentarnom većinom i odlučnom politikom usmerenom ka unilateralnom otepljenju od Španije.⁶ Nakon što je Katalonija proglasila nezavisnost u oktobru 2017., po nalogu španske vlasti uhapšen je bivši predsednik španske pokrajine Katalonije, Karl Puždemon. Ovaj događaj bio je povod protesta u centru Barselone u martu 2018. godine tokom koga je bilo kako povređenih tako i uhapšenih, ali su proindependističke stranke mahom pozivale na smirenost. Bez otvorene agresije, retoričkom manipulacijom političkog i nacionalističkog diskursa kojim se zapravo izvrće hijerarhijski model država-nacija, u ime demokratije prekršena su načela liberalne demokratije (Gascón 2018).

Zapravo, u postmodernističkom socio-političkom kontekstu došlo je do preplitanja nacionalističkog i populističkog diskursa, što je rezultiralo jačanjem secesionističke politike i tendencijom ka stvarnju lažnih država. Naime, analiza secesionističkog diskursa Katalonije i pomeranje njegovog težišta sa etno-lingvističke ravni na političku pokazuje da se, u skladu sa teorijom koju je plasirao Ernesto Laklau,⁷ independistički pokret Katalonije u populističkom duhu okrenuo diskursivnoj konstrukciji neprijatelja oličenog u ideji o ugnjetavačkoj matičnoj državi i tlačiteljskoj centralnoj vlasti. Kako je katalonsko pitanje atrikulisano na osnovu političke identifikacije, pod krilaticom moderne demokratije i novog katalonizma zanemaren je koncept legitimnosti u smeru jačanja etičkog subjektivizma. Plasirajući različite interpretacije određenih političkih problema, društvene mreže i ostala sredstva javnog informisanja nametnula su određeni način mišljenja i direktno obojila formiranje

bila autonomiju, danas se u znak sećanja na pad Barsleone pod vlast Burbona kao Nacionalni dan obeležava ovaj datum.

6 Koalicija secesionističkih partija pod nazivom Zajedno za DA ili (JxSí), predvođena Arturom Masom, 27. septembra 2015. osvojila je 63 od 135 mesta u katalonskom parlamentu, a istraživanje javnog mnjenja pokazalo je u izveštaju zvanom *Barómetro de opinión pública* da je u odnosu na 2009. skoro dupliran broj građana koji su za otepljenje Katalonije. U januaru 2016. proindependističke stranke JxSí i CUP (*Candidatura d'Unitat Popular*) formirale su nezavisnu vladu.

7 Argentinski intelektualac Ernesto Laklau autor je dela *Hegemonija i socijalistička strategija* u kome nedvosmisleno iznosi stav po kome politički identiteti ne zavise od ekonomskih i društvenih odnosa, već predstavljaju konstrukcije bitno zavisne od „diskursa“ i masovnih medija koji u demokratskim društvima imaju moć da naruše „tradicionalne identitete“ u ime „kulture demokratizacije“. Baveći se fenomenom populizma, u svom drugom delu *Populistički razlog*, Laklau navodi kako glavnu stratešku ulogu u formiranju političkog diskursa zapravo ima proizvodnja priče ili kreiranje diskursa koji otvara prostor „logici razlike“.

javnog diskursa. U tom smislu, iako se akteri procesa za otcepljenje Katalonije sve vreme pozivaju na demokratiju, u separatističkom procesu sam koncept demokratije gubi smisao budući da su poslanici katalonskog parlamenta zapravo prekršili Ustav i zakon.⁸

Katalonski secesionistički diskurs je višeslojan i moguće ga je analizirati sa kulturološko-političkog aspekta i ekonomskog. Sa kulturološkog aspekta, kao posebna etnička grupa na Pirinejskom poluostrvu koja ima svoj jezik, Katalonci insistiraju na očuvanju tradicije, a nezavisna država omogućila bi im upotrebu katalonskog jezika u pravosuđu. Kao deo Španije Katalonija nema pravo da donosi zakone, a u slučaju osamostaljenja, vlast bi bila u rukama posebne katalonske vlade – *Generaliteta*. Istovremeno, došlo bi i do širenja katalonskog jezika kao službenog jezika Evropske Unije, te bi zaštita istog bila na znatno višem nivou. Takođe, svest Katalonije da je u istorijskom smislu specifična zajednica, jer je za vreme Druge Republike (1936–1939) imala organe samouprave, doprinosi njenom insistiranju na pravu na legitimno političko preimućstvo nad drugim regionima. Takođe, španskom monarhizmu politički se suprotstavlja katalonski republikanizam koji naginje revoluciji i separatizmu. Sa druge strane, budući da direktno određuje stepen autonomije bilo kog regiona, pitanje finansiranja neizostavno predstavlja kamen spoticanja između Katalonije i Španije. Iako prema članu 156.stav1 Ustava Španije, regioni „imaju pravo na finansijsku autonomiju radi razvijanja i vršenja svojih nadležnosti, u skladu sa načelima koordinacije sa državnim finansijama i solidarnosti svih Španaca“ (Constitución Española 1978: 35), independisti su plasirali diskurs fiskalnog suvereniteta kao ključnog argumenta u rasplamsavanju separatističke borbe.⁹ Naime, nakon finansijske krize, javni diskurs u Kataloniji okrenuo se traženju krivca u Madridu. Kao jedan od najbogatijih regiona Španije, Katalonija je 2012. plaćala veći porez siromašnijim regionima nego što je dobijala novac od centralne vlade, što je nekadašnji predsednik Katalonije Artur Mas iskoristio kao argument za kampanju za nezavisnost. Tako je uz naglašavanje ekonomske neravnoteže između regiona i

8 Ukoliko region prekrši ustavom predviđene obaveze ili naruši opšti interes države, član 155 Ustava omogućava državi da u poslednjoj instanci interveniše u cilju ograničenja njegove autonomije. U slučaju da se predsednik regiona ogлуši o opomene vlade, Ustav dozvoljava vladi da uz saglasnost većine Senata usvoji mere obavezujuće prirode za region, odnosno mere u cilju zaštite opšteg interesa države (Constitución Española 1978: 34).

9 Ustavom je pitanje finansija u Španiji stavljeno pod kontrolu centralne vlasti u Madridu, ali uz primenu principa solidarnosti kako bi se umanjile razlike u ekonomskoj moći različitih regiona.

centra javni diskurs sve više delovao kao mobilisući faktor u borbi za otcepljenje, naročito na građane regiona sa osećajem dvostrukog identiteta koji, budući da imaju ambivalentan stav po pitanju etno-lingvističkog određenja, svakako su više zainteresovani za ekonomski nego kulturološki aspekt problema (Muñoz and Tormos 2015).

Ipak, kada je reč o independističkom diskursu, neohodno je imati na umu da se on rađa i razvija kao rezultat stalne promenljivosti političkih procesa, te u tom smislu i on sam jeste u procesu stalnog razvitka i promene, zbog čega se uvek mora analizirati u kontekstu aktuelnih dešavanja. Osim toga, u slučaju Katalonije i stavu građana po pitanju otcepljenja, ne sme se prenebregnuti heterogenost njihovih stavova i podeljenost po tom pitanju. Grubo posmatrano među građanima Španije možemo da napravimo podelu na osnovu jezika, identiteta i političkog aktivizma i tako izdvojimo govornike katalonskog, Katalonce i independiste naspram govornika kastiljanskog i zagovornika jedinstvene Španije. Ipak, stvarnost je mnogo slojevitija i vladajući secesionistički diskurs uslovljen je upravo raznolikim odnosima između navedenih kategorija. Današnju političku situaciju kako u Španiji tako i u Kataloniji svakako su odredili događaji iz XX veka kao što je Druga španska republika, Građanski rat i Frankova diktatura, demokratska tranzicija i period posle nje.

2. POLITIČKI KONTEKS I KONSOLIDACIJA SECESIONISTIČKOG DISKURSA

Kako simbolička i emocionalna interpretacija stvarnosti čine sastavni deo svakog nacionalnog imaginarijuma i političkog diskursa na osnovu koga se konstruiše određeni nacionalni identitet, u razvoju katalonskog nacionalizma i katalonističkog diskursa mitifikacija istorije i kultura sećanja značajno su doprinele razvoju istorijske i nacionalne svesti Katalonaca i učvršćivanju identitetske različitosti unutar Španije. U tom smislu, krajem XIX veka, katalonistički diskurs vratio se u srednjevekovnu istoriju veličajući krunu Aragona i institucije Principata Katalonije.¹⁰ U stvari, katalonski secesionistički diskurs doveo je u vezu proces propadanja Kata-

¹⁰ Katalonski antropolog Llobera (Llobera 1996) izneo je tezu po kojoj moderni nacionalizmi mogu da uspeju samo ako su etno-kulturološki ukorenjeni u srednjem veku.

lonije u periodu između XIV i XVIII veka¹¹ i dolazak na presto dinastije Trastamara.¹² Naime, u XII veku Katalonija se ujedinila sa Aragonom, da bi, pod vlašću Katoličkih kraljeva, Fernanda II od Aragona i Izabele I od Kastilje, postala deo ujedinjene Kraljevine Španije.

U periodu (1462–1472) duboki socijalni sukobi izazvali su građanski rat u Kataloniji. Ekonomsko nezadovoljstvo, kao i spor oko nasleđa trona, potresali su Principat Katalonije. Naime, nije postojala socijalna kohezija, što je rezultiralo tenzijama između plemstva koje je zajedno sa visokom buržoazijom upravljalo opštinama, gradski plebs bio je nezadovoljan zbog isključenja iz uprave opštinama, seljaštvo (na severu Katalonije) opterećeno feudalnim sistemom koje su činili *težaci*, koji su, uprkos tome što su gotovo imali status robova, bili svesni svoje radne snage.¹³ Upravo sa konfliktom između seljaka i vlastele, odvijao se konflikt između zanatlija i trgovaca i trgovačke buržoazije koja je u barselonskoj i okolnim opštinama nametnula monopol. Sukob je rešen uz pomoć Alfonsa V, ali nakon njegove smrti na vlast je došao Huan II od Aragona koji je imao konflikt sa svojim sinom Karlosom, što se prenelo u Kataloniju, jer je jedan deo stanovništva podržavao Huan II, dok je drugi bio na strani njegovog sina. Konačno, da bi ojačao svoju poziciju, Huan II je je ugovorio ženidbu svog drugog sina Fernanda sa princezom Izabelom od Kastilje (Domínguez Ortíz 2003: 71). Od tog trenutka počela je da jača hegemonistička politika Španije koja u XVII veku ipak doživljava krizu. Feudalne institucije, militantno i ortodoksno katoličanstvo i apsolutistički vladari bili su okrenuti centralizaciji državne uprave, ukidajući tradicionalna prava i autonomije staleških skupština (*Cortes*).

Ipak, sa dolaskom XVIII veka, doba prosvetljenosti donosi i u Španiju političku i socijalnu emancipaciju, koja dostiže kulminaciju 1898. godine.¹⁴ U međuvremenu, zahvaljujući razvoju metalurgije, industrije i trgovine, od 1830. godine počinje da jača katalonska

11 Prema tezi Pjera Vilara (Vilar 1974: 252–331) period katalonskog prosperiteta vezuje se za razdoblje 1250–1350, tj. doba od osvajanja Majorke i Valensije do izbivanja epidemije kuge.

12 Kraljevska loza kastiljanskog porekla koja je došla na presto Krune Kastilje (1369–1504) i Aragona (1412–1516), što je zapravo bio prolog budućeg ujedinjenja dva velika kraljevstva Iberijskog poluostrva, ali i razdora, jer je dolazak na presto dinastije Trastamara u Aragonu izazvao familijarno-političke sukobe.

13 Kuga koja je harala skoro dva veka znatno je smanjila broj radno sposobnog stanovništva.

14 Ova godina smatra se prekretnicom između stare Španije i režima nove, moderne Španije.

buržoazija i liberalna građanska klasa koja je tokom celog XIX veka nastojala da zauzme mesto u političkom životu koji je i dalje bio u rukama zemljoposjednika, vojske, crkve i monarha.¹⁵ Ipak, kulturno buđenje Katalonije započelo je delovanjem književnog pokreta *Renaixença* u periodu (1840–1870), čija je osnovna tema bila istorijska rekonstrukcija idealizovane prošlosti. Vremenom se ideja pokreta prenela i našla svoj izraz i u arhitekturi, vajarstvu, slikarstvu, pozorištu, filozofiji. Modernizacija i razvoj štampe omogućili su širenje katalonske kulture i nacionalizma izdavanjem popularnog feljtona liberalnog političara, istoričara i novinara Viktora Balagera (Víctor Balaguer) (Conversi 2000: 16). Bez obzira na napore španske liberalne države XIX veka da izgradi jedinstven nacionalni identitet koji podrazumeva kulturnu i jezičku koheziju i političku integraciju građana, Katalonci su negovali svest o posebnosti i različitost svog identiteta kako u pogledu istorije i jezika tako i u pogledu tradicije i mentaliteta.¹⁶ Upravo u periodu između 1843–1868 razvio se osećaj dvostrukog identiteta kod Katalonaca koji su se borili za katalanstvo, ali ne i secesiju. Kako su u svojim delima propagirali katalonsku posebnost i širili nacionalnu svest, može se reći da u preteče nacionalnog političkog programa Žoan Iljas i Vidal (Joan Illas i Vidal), Žoan Koartada (Joan Coartada) i Huan Manje i Flaker (Juan Mañé y Flaquer).¹⁷ Tokom Septembarske revolucije 1868. godine zbačena je kraljica Izabela II, a novi liberalni režim uveo je načelo narodnog suvereniteta i 1869. god. izglasan je novi ustav kojim je Španija postala ustavna monarhija sa dvodomnim parlamentom. Iako je španska monarhija bila jedan multinacionalni i usavotvorni entitet u kome je pod kraljevskom vlašću bilo ujedinjeno više političkih zajednica, Septembarska revolucija i narednih šest godina (*sexenio revolucionario*) nisu omogućile razvoj srednje klase jer je proglašena tzv. Prva republika. Pi i Margalj (Pi y Margall), koji je zastupao demokratske i socijalističke ideje i bio vođa Federalne republikanske stranke (*Partido*

15 U Barseloni su se radnici udruživali u *Comisión de Fabricas* još od 1827. i borili za poboljšanje nadnica i uslova rada, a prvi generalni štrajk izbio je 1855.

16 Otuda mišljenje nekih autora da je Španija bila „neuspešna u izgradnji unitarne nacije“ (Keating 2000: 31).

17 Kao najranija dela koja promovišu ideju katalonskog političkog nacionalizma izdvajaju se *Katalonija u Španiji (Cataluña en España)*, koju objavljuje 1855. Žoan Iljas i Vidal, zatim *Katalonija i Katalonci (Cataluña y los catalanes)* iz 1860. od Kortade, *Regionalizam (El Regionalismo)* iz 1887. gde Flaker u nekoliko članaka izlaže plan regionalne autonomije. Ipak, tek je 1886. Valenti Almiralj (Valentí Almirall) u delu *Katalonizam (El Catalanismo)* izneo prvi nacionalistički program budući da pevazilazi okvire regionalizma (Conversi 2000: 17)

Republicano Federal), oformio je levu republikansku vladu i bio izabran za predsednika Republike. Međutim, zbog izbijanja pobune levih republikanaca koji su zahtevali podelu Španije na kantone sa punom samoupravom i minimalizaciju prava centralne vlasti, Ustav iz 1873., ili *Constitución federal*, nikad nije stupio na snagu. Ustav iz 1845. već je umesto političkoj jednakosti, individualnim pravima građana i slobodi davao prednost jednoj kulturi, jednoj istoriji i zajedničkom identitetu svih Španaca, čime je promovisan diskurs *nacionalnog interesa*.¹⁸ Nakon pada federalističke Prve republike (1873–1874) i kontrarevolucije, okončavaju se karlistički ratovi (1872–1876) i uspostavlja monarhija i liberalni i centralistički režim kraljice Marije Kristine Burbonske (1885-1902) ili tzv. *Segunda Restauración*. Na taj način, u opoziciji novog režima udružuju se federalisti i bivši karlisti, a ubrzo im se pridružuje i mlada katalonska buržoazija, nezadovoljna centralističkim režimom Madrida. Upravo zahvaljujući finansijskoj potpori industrijske buržoazije kulturni i nacionalni pokret doživljavaju svoj procvat (Balcells 2013).

Ipak, razvoj katalonskog nacionalizma tekao je postepeno, svodeći se u početnoj fazi na zahtev za regionalnom autonomijom. Naime, uprkos povećanju kompetencija države, romantičarski liberalizam bio je prevashodno usmeren ka isticanju etno-lingvističke osobenosti Katalonije kao alternativnog španskog identiteta, ali suštinski nije bio antišpanski, već se borio za Kataloniju, ali i celu Španiju. Konflikti sa državom nastajali su prvenstveno kao odraz nedovoljne integracije katalonske nacionalne elite koja je ekonomski ojačala, ali je zbog društveno-političke marginalizacije postepeno razvijala *kompleks kolonije*, te je katalonski otpor vremenom ipak doveo do konsolidacije nacionalistički orijentisanog političkog pokreta, tj. pojave katalonizma (*catalanismo*) oko 1880. godine kada se razvila već antiteza centralizacije i započeo proces politizacije katalonizma. Zapravo, do jačanja katalonizma došlo je zahvaljujući udruženom delovanju pokreta kulturnog preporoda, naprednih federalista, antiburbonskih tradicionalista i novorođene industrijske buržoazije. U tom smislu, katalonizam se kao politički pokret suprotstavio klasičnom konceptu države-nacije, tj. španskom unitarizmu, i zahvaljujući društvenoj mobilizaciji i

18 U kulturološkom smislu, španski nacionalizam razvija se kao hegemonistička ideologija koja propagira kasteljanzaciju, unitarnost, konzervativizam i katolicizam i potire liberalno-demokratski diskurs političke nacije stvorene na osnovu volje naroda i poštovanju njihovih sloboda i raznolikosti.

propagandnom delovanju putem raznih organizacija, pamfleta i kulturnih događaja pridobio je pristalice iz različitih društvenih staleža (Riquer i Permanyer 1999: 50-52).

U januaru 1885. u Barseloni su se okupile brojne pristalice katalonizma, donevši odluku da se kralju Alfonsu XII pošalje Memorijalno pismo u odbranu moralnih i materijalnih interesa Katalonije, poznato kao *El Memorial de Greuges*.¹⁹ Predstavnici nove buržoazije (trgovci, industrijalci, umetnici, intelektualci) prvi put su se ujedinili u svojoj želji da zaštite katalonski građanski zakon,²⁰ čime je zapravo javno oživeo nacionalistički diskurs Katalonije. Takođe, veoma važna prekretnica u razvoju katalonskog nacionalizma jeste Drugi katalonistički kongres koji je održan 1883. godine. Naime, tada se prvi put zahteva da katalonski jezik ima službeni status, traži se primena ekonomskog protekcionizma i središnja vlada za Kataloniju. Nova katalonska buržoazija ima preduzetnički, kritički i politički duh, a okuplja se oko ličnosti kao što su Žoan Maragalj (Juan Maragall, 1860-1911), Prat de la Riba (Prat de la Riba, 1870-1971) i Fransisko Kambo (Francisco Cambó, 1876-1947) i političkih pokreta kao što je Regionalna unija (*Unió regionalista*), Regionalna liga (*Liga Regionalista*), Katalonistička unija (*Unió Catalanista*). Ovi pokreti daju glas katalonskoj građanskoj klasi koja želi da zaštiti svoje ekonomske interese, tražeći svoje učešće u političkoj vlasti države. Politički pokret *Unió Catalanista* okupljao je različite grupe udruženja i na skupštini u Manresi 1892. usvojen je politički program Osnove iz Manrese. Iako ovaj dokument nije bio direktno usmeren ka borbi za nezavisnost, u političkom smislu postavio je brojne zahteve. Zapravo, to je bio radikalni program koji je tražio političku autonomiju, javne položaje za Katalonce, status katalonskog kao jedinog službenog jezika, katalonske jedinice u vojsci, katalonsku policiju, obrazovanje, poresku službu i finansije, a dotakao se i pitanja spoljne politike.²¹

19 U sastavljanju pisma učestvovao je Valenti Almiral koji je 1879. osnovao i prvi novinski list *Diari Català* i organizovao Prvi katalonistički kongres 1880. na kom je osnovan politički pokret *Centre Català*.

20 Memorijalno pismo je nastalo da bi se predupredila mogućnost da se povodom sklapanja trgovinskog sporazuma sa Velikom Britanijom koja je mogla da otvori špansko tržište za englesku tekstilnu industriju na debati u Kortesu izostavi građansko pravo Katalonije.

21 Zbog obračanja grčkom kralju 1897. Madrid je preduzeo represivne mere 1901. protiv Katalonije.

Od 1898. pa do proglašenja Republike 1931. došlo je do definitivne transformacije *stare Španije*. Nekadašnja društveno-politička struktura počela je da se menja jer oligarhijska društvena klasa, administracija, kler i vojska nastoje da u svoje institucije integrišu novonastalu krupnu buržoaziju, ali na političkoj sceni počinju da vladaju predstavnici sitne buržoazije i srednjeg radničkog sloja. Razvoj teške industrije omogućio je stvaranje radničke klase (građevinara, železničara i sl.), a u periodu 1890–1897 proizvodnja uglja je udvostručena, a ojačale su i metalurgija, hemijska i tekstilna industrija itd. Pod uticajem novonastale intelektualne elite koja se bori za republiku i liberalno-demokratsku državu, pokreće se revolucionarna svest koja opovrgava dotadašnju društveno-političku stvarnost. Sa industrijskim i trgovačkim razvojem, Katalonija se okreće borbi za nacionalnu i regionalnu autonomiju i odbacuje centralizam Madrida, u potrazi za svojom domovinom.²²

U razvoju katalonizma, kao prelomna, ističe se 1906. godina. Naime, zbog objave antimilitarističke karikature u jednom časopisu vlasti su uhapsile urednika, što je izazvalo protest Katalonaca koji su izašli na ulice, a političke partije su oformile koaliciju *Solidaritat Catalana* koja je sledeće godine trijumfovala na lokalnim izborima.²³ Osim toga, od te godine aktivno se osnivaju instituti i druge obrazovne institucije koje šire katalonsku kulturu, a dolazi i do standardizacije katalonskog jezika.²⁴ Sa ciljem da se povrati mogućnost upravljanja sistemom starih katalonskih Kortesa, 1914. osnovan je prvi oblik katalonske administrativne uprave *Mancomunitat de Catalunya* koji je obuhvatio celu Kataloniju²⁵ i putem kojeg je osnovan književni pokret *noucentisme* sa akcentom na visokim estetskim kriterijumima. Na taj način, Katalonija definiše svoj nacionalni diskurs u potpunosti. Krajem Prvog svetskog rata, 1917. godine izbijaju nemiri. Fransesk Masija (Francesc Macià) 1922. godine osniva prvu katalonsku separatističku stranku *Estat Català*, ali u septembru 1923. general Primo de Rivera uvodi diktaturu. Uvedeno je jedinstveno obrazovanje za

22 Istovremeno sa procesom državne centralizacije i nacionalne unifikacije odvijao se proces društvene modernizacije, što je imalo imalo kontradiktiran efekat jer su periferne regije poput Katalonije postale ekonomski razvijenije od centralnih državnih regija (Barbarić, 2015: 133).

23 Kao odgovor na zakon o sudskoj nadležnosti, Katalonska solidarnost je bila sastavljena isključivo od katalonskih poslanika.

24 Prva gramatika katalonskog izlazi 1918. godine, a rečnik 1932.

25 Federacija diputacija na čelu sa Prat de la Ribom.

čitavu Španiju, zabranjena je katalonaska zastava i jezik i ukinut je Mancomunitat. Iako je Masija iz egzila u Francuskoj pokušao da organizuje oslobađanje Katalonije, uhapšen je. Tako je nastao jedan od prvih nacionalnih junaka katalonske nacije, poznat kao *l'Avi (el Abuelo - deda)*.²⁶ Nakon pada diktature, 14. aprila 1931., kao znak negodovanja katalonske levice protiv nove španske desničarske vlade koju su činile i profašističke partije, Masija je proklamovao Katalonsku republiku unutar Španske federalne republike. Na taj način, Katalonija uspeva da povрати kulturnu i proširi političku autonomiju kroz odobreni Statut autonomije. Osniva se Generalitat (autonomna katalonska vlada), čiji predsednik 1933. postaje Luis Kompanis (Lluís Companys). Ipak, ovaj pokušaj brzo biva ugušen vojnom intervencijom, a Kompanis 1935. uhapšen. Generalitet je suspendovan i skoro svi njegovi članovi su takode uhapšeni. Ubrzo potom izbija Španski građanski rat (1936–1939) u kome su pobedili desničari na čelu sa Fransiskom Frankom (Francisco Franco) koji je obnovio monarhiju i centralizovao zemlju.

3. OD FRANKIZMA DO TRANZICIJE I AUTONOMIJE

Iako je Ustav iz 1931. garantovao autonomiju Kataloniji kao španskom regionu, u poslednjih šest godina Druge španske republike došlo je dorazvoja velikih nemirai sukoba između različitih društvenih i političkih grupa. Zapravo, od 1936. Španija je ušla u duboku krizu u kojoj je vojska predvođena Frankom ustala protiv institucija Druge republike i svih regionalnih nacionalističkih pokreta. Uspostavljanjem Frankove diktature uveden je režim stroge državne centralizacije u cilju obnavljanja imperijalnog identiteta španske nacije (Barbarić 2015: 134–135). Nakon trogodišnjeg rata, tokom koga je Katalonija bila glavno žarište otpora republikanaca i intervencionista, u potpunosti je ugušena katalonska samouprava kao oblik separatističke težnje i nacionalnog razjedinjavanja. Totalitaristički diskurs Frankove autoritarne nacionalističke vladavine (1939–1975) u potpunosti je suzbio svako isticanje drugih nacionalnih kultura. Preduzete su radikalne mere u cilju ukidanja svih regionalnih identiteta i raznolikosti koje su predstavljale pretnju frankističkoj ideji o monolitnoj, centralističkoj državi i nametnuta

26 Doslovan prevod.

je lingvistička i kulturna uniformnost. Sve kulturne i političke institucije i organizacije ukinute su, a na snagu je stupila zabrana upotrebe bilo kog regionalnog jezika osim španskog.²⁷ Katalonija, obeležena zbog svojih separatističkih tendencija, doživela je izrazit udar na jezik i kulturu. Osim tendencije da se katalonski predstavi kao dijalekt španskog, na snazi su bile stroge kazne zbog upotrebe katalonskog jezika. Da bi se sproveo proces kasteljanizacije, radnici ili učitelji koji su koristili katalonski su otpušteni ili prebacivani u druge krajeve Španije, a privatnu prepisku je kontrolisala cenzorska služba, pa su i u privatnom životu ljudi pod pretnjom progona, novčanih kazni i zatvora prestajali da upotrebljavaju katalonski (Harrison 2009: 197). Međutim, ovakva politika represije imala je kontraefekat, pa su Katalonci još više čuvali svoju kulturu i jezik. Čim je pritisak diktature popustio počele su da se štampaju knjige na katalonskom, osnovana su razna kulturno-umetnička društva, a 1970. pokrenuta je i kampanja za uvođenje katalonskog u škole (Conxita 2008: 133). Na taj način, Katalonija kao državni entitet Španije okrenula se prevashodno nacionalističkom diskursu usmerenom ka očuvanju sopstvenog kulturnog identiteta.

Istovremeno, u periodu 1960–1970 dolazi do društveno-ekonomske modernizacije koja utire put sekularizaciji društva i destabilizaciji Frankovog autoritarnog režima. Nakon smrti Franca 1975. godine, uz podršku vojske i frankističkih institucija, kao Frankov naslednik imenovan je princ Juan Karlos I od Burbona (Juan de Borbón). Uprkos reformi političkog sistema i prelazu iz autoritarnog režima u demokratski, uticaj frankističkih režimskih elita ostavio je teško političko nasleđe u kome je proces tranzicije (*la Transición*) pre nastao kao dogovor sa opozicijom.²⁸ Proces španske tranzicije iz autoritativne države u parlamentarnu monarhiju dostigao je vrhunac usvajanjem Ustava 1978. godine. Ustavni izraz je ponudio srednje rešenje između koncepta o nedeljivoj španskoj nacionalnoj državi s jedne strane, i Španije kao zajednice različitih, istorijskih naroda i regija, s druge strane strane. Da bi se postigao sporazum između glavnih političkih stranaka uključenih u pregovarački proces, prihvaćen je otvoreni model ustavnih odredaba prema kojima Španija kao država, iako formalno ne federativna,

27 Zabranjena je upotreba svih simbola nacionalne osobenosti, a roditelji su deci takođe davali španska imena.

28 Fraza koja najbolje opisuje proces tranzicije u Španiji jeste upravo *reforma pactada* ili *ruptura pactada* - dogovorena reforma ili dogovoreni raskid.

podrazumeva izrazito decentralizovanu federaciju autonomnih zajednica (*Estado de las Autonomías* – država autonomija). Da bi autonomne zajednice postale legitimne, posle izbora na nacionalnom nivou, održani su i izbori na regionalnom nivou. Kataloniji je tako priznata istorijska nacionalnost, a na referendumu su Katalonci potvrdili svoj statut o autonomiji. Tako je Katalonija dobila svoju vladu (*Generalitat*) i parlament, a katalonski jezik kao *lengua propia* (vlastiti jezik) dobio je status službenog jezika uporedo sa španskim. U tom smislu, može se reći da je prelazak španske države u demokratski režim iziskivao prevazilaženje postojećih istorijskih i teritorijalnih različitosti i poštovanje regionalne autonomije.

Iako je na osnovu ovakvog modela postignuta opšta saglasnost španskih građana i izbegnut potencijalni građanski rat koji je mogao da nastane zbog nezadovoljstva regionalnih nacionalista, ostao je prostor za nejasnoće u pogledu formulisanja teritorijalne organizacije španske države. Tako je na primer, Član 2. Ustava formulisan tako da istovremeno nalaže poštovanje jedinstva i autonomije kao temeljnih načela španskog teritorijalnog modela. Ipak, samim ustavnim odredbama nije precizirano razgraničenje države na autonomne zajednice, već su samo uspostavljeni kriterijumi na osnovu kojih je određeno koje narodnosti i regije mogu da budu autonomne zajednice. Drugim rečima, Ustav je omogućio proces decentralizacije, ali je njegovu primenu prepustio političkim predstavnicima regiona. Kao posledica toga, danas je na delu ponovni proces restrukturiranja španske države, ali u smeru suprotnom od nekadašnjeg tradicionalno unitarističkog i teritorijalnog modela njenog formiranja. Danas, politički diskurs oblikuju različite predstave onoga što bi trebalo da čini španski nacionalni identitet, te sve više, kao posledica sukoba različitih političkih interesa i „vladajuće većine“ preovladavaju separatističke tendencije autonomnih regiona (Serra, Oñate 2007: 2-10).

4. KATALONSKO PITANJE DANAS

Može se reći da je pokušaj Barselone i Madrida tokom 2003. godine da se dogovore o povećanju autonomije Katalonije, kulturne i ekonomske, pokrenuo proces katalonskog odvajanja od Španije. Naime, te godine su partije koje su zastupale nezavisnost osvojile 88% mesta u regionalnom parlamentu, au svojoj izbornoj kampanji

budući španski premijer Hose Luis Rodrigues Sapatero (José Luis Rodríguez Zapatero) obećao je podršku ovim reformama. Međutim, 2005. godine katalonski parlament odobrio je regionalni statut o autonomiji koji je zahtevao veća ovlašćenja za regionalnu vladu u smislu određivanja oblasti u kojima regionalna vlada ima isključive nadležnosti, kao i formiranje novog tela koje bi direktno prikupljalo porez, zatim priznanje Katalonije kao nacije i primat katalonskog jezika nad španskim. Kao reakcija na ovakav reformisani regionalni statut 2006. godine usledila je tužba Marijana Rahoja (Mariano Rajoy) Ustavnom sudu Španije, da bi ubrzo Kongres i Senat odobrili „blažu verziju“ statuta o autonomiji koju su potom i Katalonci na referendumu ratifikovali.

U jačanju secesionističkog diskursa posebnu težinu imao je ekonomski faktor. Naime, politička elita Katalonije iznela je u javnost podatak po kome Katalonija plaća porez u visini od oko 8% regionalnog BDP-a. Istovremeno, finansijska kriza uticala je na povećanje stope nezaposlenosti u periodu 2009–2013, a odluka španskog Ustavnog suda na osnovu koje je 2010. doneta odluka da se promeni 14 članova statuta o autonomiji Katalonije i ospori tumačenje još 27, dodatno je otežala situaciju. Ipak, u političkom smislu najburniju reakciju izazvao je stav Španije po kome isticanje Katalonije kao nacije nema zakonsku validnost niti postoji mogućnost suprotstavljanja katalonskog jezika španskom.

Kao reakcija na ovakav stav, usledio je masovni protest na ulicama Barselone, praćen povcima: „Mi smo nacija, mi odlučujemo“. Tokom 2011–2012 pod vođstvom proindependističkih stranaka takođe su organizovani masovni protesti, a situacija se dodatno zaoštrava zahtevima Katalonije da poput Baskije sklopi sa državom finansijski aranžman u kome bi regionalna vlada sakupljala sav porez. Budući da dogovor nije postignut, jer je zahtev od strane Rahoja okarakterisan kao neustavni, katalonski predstavnici su 2014. tražili dogovor o referendumu, što je takođe odbijeno. Uprkos tome, Artur Mas je raspisao neobavezujući referendum o nezavisnosti Katalonije, što je opet rezultiralo suspenzijom od strane Ustavnog suda Španije.²⁹ Međutim, ovakva politika Madrida doprinela je zapravo jačanju secesionističkih tendencija i oglašivanju

²⁹ Ustav iz 1978. definiše Španiju kao nedeljivu državu, jer suverenitet pripada španskom narodu, stoga jedino centralna vlast ima pravo da organizuje referendum, a u slučaju organizovanja referenduma o otcepljenju Katalonije organizovanom od strane Katalonije morali bi da se izjasne svi građani u zemlji i organizuju referendumu na prostoru čitave Španije.

o zabrane Ustavnog suda. Tako su 2015. na regionalnim izborima apsolutnu većinu osvojile proindependističke stranke, nakon čega je i regionalna vlada u Barseloni najavila proces „razdvajanja” (*separación*) od Španije. Ignorišući protivljenje Ustavnog suda Španije, u julu 2016. separatističke stranke su organizovale održavanje glasanja za jednostrano otcpljenje. U katalonskom parlamentu stranke separatističkog bloka Zajedno za da i levica Kandidatura za narodno jedinstvo usvojile su kontroverzan plan da postizanje nezavisnosti sredinom 2017., a ubrzo je organizovan još jedan referendum na kome se više od 80% glasača izjasnilo za samostalnost.

Iako su centralne vlasti ovom referendumu takođe oduzele legitimnost, svodeći ga na nivo neobaveznog izjašnjavanja, katalonski parlament je usvojio i zakon o regulaciji procesa ka nezavisnosti, što je vlada Rahoja okarakterisala kao „smrt demokratiji”. Nakon još jedne neuspešne žalbe Ustavnom sudu centralne vlasti preduzele su radikalnije korake u borbi protiv independista. Kako bi se suzbile separatističke snage, sprovedena je potraga za dokazima o održavanju nelegalnog referenduma, te je policija intervenisala upadom u institucije regionalne vlasti u Kataloniji i uhapsila brojne katalonske zvaničnike. Ovakva situacija je dovela do produblivanja tenzija i hiljade izrevoltiranih građana Barselone u znak protesta i podrške katalonskoj vladi izašlo je na ulice. Prilikom zatvaranja biračkih mesta, došlo je do incidenata i obračuna između španske policije i demonстранata.³⁰

U međuvremenu, na osnovu dogovora separatističkih partija, početkom 2016. Artura Masa zamenio je Karl Puđdemon koji je već u aprilu 2016. otvorio pregovore o 46 pitanja: referendum plus 45 drugih tema, od socijalne politike, ekonomije do infrastrukture. Nakon pobeđe na referendumu 27. oktobra 2017. katalonski parlament je jednostrano proglasio nezavisnost Katalonije. Istog dana, španski senat je odobrio vladi iz Madrida da preuzme direktnu upravu nad Katalonijom, a kako bi izbegao hapšenje zbog podsticanja pobune protiv države, Karl Puđdemon je sa nekim od članova katalonske vlade pobeđao u inostranstvo. Iako se nakon ovih događaja situacija delimično smirila hapšenjem Puđdemon, katalonsko pitanje još uvek je otvoreno. Nakon pada Rahojeve

30 Povodom ustavnog prava na održavanje referenduma i Evropska unija je iznela stav o nelegitimnosti istog, smatrajući da je katalonsko pitanje unutrašnje pitanje države.

vlade, na mesto novog premijera postavljen je socijalista Pedro Sančes (Pedro Sánchez), dok je Puđdemonja je na vlasti u Kataloniji zamenio ultranacionalista Kim Tora (Quim Torra) koji je tokom 2018. pokrenuo novu kampanju za otepljenje Katalonije od Španije. Naime, Kim Tora insistira na obavezujućem i dogovorenom referendumu koji bi priznala Španija i međunarodna zajednica kao jedinom prihvatljivom rešenju za Kataloniju.

5. UMESTO ZAKLJUČKA

Secesionistički diskurs plasirao je u javnost dve vizije Katalonije: jednu, u kojoj su Katalonci nacija sa svojim specifičnim karakterom koja ima zajednički jezik i istorijsku prošlost; i drugu, u kojoj su Katalonci potlačeni narod, u liberalno demokratskom smislu na silu i veštački pripojen Španiji kao jedinstvenoj naciji. Iako za razliku od pokreta za nezavisnost pokret katalonizma suštinski nije bio usmeren ka secesionističkom diskursu, već pre kompromisnom koji zahteva od Španije da Katalonija kao regionalno superiorna ima poseban tretman, njegova ideologija podrazumevala je ipak diskurs različitosti. Na osnovu te različitosti koja je prvobitno bila isključivo lingvistička, katalonizam kao kulturološki pokret koji se u početku oslanjao na katalonski jezik, književno bogatstvo i političku slavu, vremenom je prerastao u ozbiljan regionalistički politički pokret okrenut potrebi za posebnim priznanjem od strane Španije. U tom smislu, iako se katalonizam razvio kao pokret podržan od strane većine Katalonaca koji su želeli da svi Katalonci prihvate građanski koncept autonomije i katalonstva u kome se Kataloncem smatra svako ko živi i radi u Kataloniji,³¹ katalonizam je otišao put secesionizma, insistirajući na pravu stvaranja države u državi, odnosno sukobu sa Španijom kao domovinom.

Jedan od glavnih elemenata katalonskog secesionističkog diskursa povezan je sa kulturološkom razlikom u odnosu na ostatak stanovništva Španije. Prema podacima istraživanja koje je 2013. sproveda vlada Katalonije, većina stanovništva koristi isključivo španski (45%). Ovaj podatak je pokazao kako katalonski jezik nije dovoljno zastupljen niti zaštićen kao deo katalonskog identiteta,

31 Začetak katalonizma povezan je sa književnim stvaralaštvom koje je promovisalo ideju katalonstva. Naime, sa ponovnim održavanjem takmičenja *Juegos Florales* 1859. godine, koje se organizovalo u Barseloni tokom XIV i XV veka, nagrađivane su tri najbolje pesme na temu „Vera, domovina, ljubav”, a katalonska književnost doživela je preporod.

već potisnut od strane državnih institucija koje ga ne priznaju na državnom nivou. Naime, zbog činjenice da se katalonski koristi samo u okvirima Katalonije, a u ostalim delovima zemlje ne, i nije zaštićen (Krnetić 2017: 47). Drugim rečima, u socijalnom smislu, španski je blago zastupljeniji u odnosu na katalonski, iako to nije slučaj u javnoj upravi i regionalnim institucijama. Što se tiče prezimena, potrošačkih navika, društvenih normi i pravila ponašanja, zahvaljujući migracionom talasu u periodu 1960–1970, u odnosu na Španiju u Kataloniji nije došlo do razvoja većih etničkih, lingvističkih ili bilo kojih drugih razlika. Sa druge strane, postoje specifičnosti koje su povezane sa klasnim razlikama i upotrebom jezika, pa su tako govornici španskog zastupljeniji među pripadnicima niže društvene klase, kao i među potomcima stanovnika koji su rođeni van Katalonije. Nasuprot tome, pripadnici srednje i više srednje klase i rođeni u Kataloniji govore katalonski (Miley 2006; Ovejero Lucas 2011; Santamaría 2008, 2011).

Drugi integralni element secesionističkog diskursa Katalonije odnosi se na ekonomiju i fiskalnu politiku centralne vlade. Katalonski secesionisti smatraju Madrid odgovornim za pljačku ekonomskih resursa Katalonije, te osuđuju nezakonitim špansko upravljanje prirodnim bogatstvom Katalonije. Naime, pozivajući se na kolektivna prava moderne demokratije proindependističke stranke promovisale su reformistički diskurs u kome je pravo na samoopredeljenje Katalonije politički legitimno kao strateški racionalno i efikasno. Katalonski secesionisti ili novi katalonisti su u stvari pravo na samoopredeljenje promovisali kao „nacionalno pravo” u klasičnom smislu. Budući da Katalonci čine manjinski narod koji u okviru države nema sopstvene institucionalne mehanizme kojima bi zaštitio osnovne elemente nacije, tj. svoju teritoriju, istoriju, tradiciju, kulturu, jezik i ekonomiju, građani Katalonije imaju apsolutno pravo na samoopredeljenje (Krnetić 2017: 52). U tom smislu, mnogi autori, poput samih promotera secesionističkog diskursa određuju katalonski nacionalizam kao građanski nacionalizam, mada je on u osnovi etno-lingvističke prirode i kao takav ima za posledicu projekat otcepljenja pokrenut političkim elitama, tj. „odozgo na dole” (Miley 2007: 31).

Zapravo, većina katalonskih nacionalista iako deli ideju o odbrani katalonskog jezika i kulture bila je sve do 2003. zadovoljna modelom autonomne zajednice u okviru Španije, budući je posto-

jala apsolutna autonomija u oblasti prosvete, zdravstva i policije. Stoga, može se reći da je postojala višedecenijska podrška centralističkim vlastima i da se tek nedavno težnja katalonskih nacionalista transformisala u aktivizam koji je radikalno počeo da menja političku agendu Katalonije. Iako katalonski nacionalni identitet postoji od odavnina, secesionistički diskurs razvio se kao produkt želje za izgradnjom alternativnog državnog identiteta, bez da je došlo do srazmerne promene kako u katalonskom tako i u španskom nacionalnom identitetu. Imajući u vidu prethodno navedeno, trebalo bi potražiti odgovor na pitanje kako i zašto je došlo do transformacije katalonizma koji nije bio u koliziji sa vizijom pluralističke Španije, odnosno koji je to društveno-politički kontekst omogućio politizaciju kulturno-etničkog identiteta Katalonije? Imajući u vidu da je razvoj katalonskog separatizma plod jednog dugog istorijskog procesa, trebalo bi postaviti pitanje da li je ekonomska kriza zaista bila jedan od glavnih katalizatora secesionističkog diskursa ili je to bio frankizam? Ako je centralistički Frankov režim bio prekretnica u evoluciji katalonskog nacionalizma ka separatizmu, zašto se u demokratskom uređenju nije razvio u istoj meri centralistički diskurs Madrida koji bi stavio španski nacionalizam u centralnu tačku svoje javne sfere?

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Sanja Stošić

**CATALONIA'S SECESSIONIST
DISCOURSE**

Abstract

Over the past few years, we have witnessed growing political and social efforts of a significant part of the Catalan community for the independence of Catalonia and today Catalonia's drive for independence has become almost a permanent part of the daily political agenda of not only Spain, but also the European Union. Although the Spanish Constitutional Court annulled Catalonia's request for the start of the secession process from Spain, the Catalan's officials led by Carles Puigdemont organized an illegal referendum on independence in 2017. During the independence process, two main argumentative discourse types have emerged – the hegemonic Spanish nationalist discourse and the secessionist discourse of self-determination of Catalonia. In order to present the peculiarities of the public discourse concerning the potential secession of Catalonia, the paper provides a critical review of the evolution of the political discourse of Catalan nationalism, stating that the right of the Catalan people to self-determination is primarily a socio-political phenomenon that should be understood as a part of the populist discourse inherent in the specific political project.

Keywords: Catalonia, Spain, discourse, catalanism, secesion, democracy, populism.

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