Slađana Mladenović
APPEAL BEFORE THE BOARDS OF APPEAL OF DECENTRALISED AGENCIES AS A FORM OF ADMINISTRATIVE REMEDY IN THE EUROPEAN UNION LAW
This paper discusses the mechanism of appeal before the Boards of Appeal (BoAs) of ten EU decentralised agencies with powers to take decisions intended to produce legal effect vis-à-vis third parties in the context of regulating the internal market. After a brief description of the function of administrative remedies in the EU law, the sources of law for this remedy and three aspects of the appeal procedure are discussed. The first aspect is related to the admissibility of the appeal and includes the following issues: 1) jurisdiction of the BoA, i.e. types of agency decisions that can be appealed; 2) active locus standi before the BoA; 3) time limits for lodging the appeal; and 4) suspensive effect of the appeal. The second aspect is related to the merits of the appeal, and in this regard the following issues are discussed: 1) interlocutory revision in some agencies; 2) mediation, i.e. the possibility of reaching an amicable settlement in the appeal proceedings in some agencies; and 3) examination of the appeal by the BoA and time limits for its final decision. The third aspect is related to the BoA’s decision. In this regard, the paper discusses two models of the BoA’s action when the appeal is accepted and also takes a brief overview of the possibility of contesting the BoA’s decision before the Court. The paper concludes by pointing out the main advantages and disadvantages of the appeals before the BoA.
Accountability of European Regulatory Agencies Between the Delegation of Powers and Public Accountability Models
The question of accountability of the European Regulatory Agencies (ERAs) has been the subject of the interinstitutional debate within the ‘institutional triangle’ of the European Union, but also the subject of the theoretical deliberations. In this paper the author is expounding two prominent standpoints in respect to the accountability of ERAs – the delegation of powers (principal-agent) and public accountability (actor-forum) models. The aim of the paper is to present the assessment of the EU agencies’ accountability through the lenses of these models, and to point out the troublesome accountability of the account holders. Finally, the author concludes that the two models are not mutually exclusive in assessing the EU agencies’ accountability, but that the actor-forum model provides a better framework for the implementation of the accountability mechanisms.
